ROSA LUXEMBURG STIFTUNG SOUTHEAST ASIA

The A to Z of Alternatives 2.0

From the Aesthetics of Resistance to the World Social Forum

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Translated from the 2012 German edition
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In cooperation with the
Rosa Luxemburg Foundation Germany, the daily newspaper taz.die/tageszeitung, the Scientific Advisory Board of Attac Germany, and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, Southeast-Asia.

VSA Publishers, Hamburg, Germany

This book was supported financially as part of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation project "Let's talk about alternatives...." See: http://alternativen.blog.rosalux.de/

www.vsa-verlag.de www.rosalux.de www.taz.de
www.attac.de

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Photos on the inside flap: Stefan Thimmel (front: World Social Forum, Dakar, February 2011; back: banner inside a football stadium in Mar del Plata, Argentina, at an alternative summit held parallel to the summit of American heads of state, start of November 2005)

Cover graphics: Logo of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation project, "Let's talk about alternatives...." [image-shift | visual communication & other misunderstandings, Berlin]

Printing and bookbinding: freiburger grafische betriebe ISBN 978-3-89965-500-1

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Foreword

"... so that the beginnings of the new world, always coarse and stony, may always be superior to the fall of a dying world and the swansongs emanating thereof" (Antonio Gramsci)

When the first edition of the A to Z of Alternatives was published in German in 2007, the standards set for the book were clearly articulated: we were concerned with making the plurality of alternatives to neoliberal, globalized, imperial capitalism as visible as broad daylight. It is only when possibilities are named that alternatives can become thinkable and discussable, that they can influence the altercations surrounding societal common sense, and that they can possibly even lead to demands for alternative action. The dominant conversation-stopper about the absence of alternatives – the infamous TINA principle, "There is No Alternative," was opposed through this book by Susan Georges' rallying cry "TATA!": "There are Thousands of Alternatives!"

By positioning itself against the *pensée unique,* the uniform, neoliberal thinking that Ignacio Ramon bemoaned as early as 1995, the A to Z attempted to do more than merely intervening in debates about politics and civil society. The project identified as itself being part of social movements, which issue practical challenges to the TINA principle through their struggles. Foremost, the A to Z was shaped by the breakthrough of what has been called the "movement of movements": the battles fought by the Statistics, the critique of neoliberal globalization proclaimed on the streets of Seattle, Prague, Hindenburg and Genoa, and the global movement against the Iraq War. These historical processes opened up resonating discourse spaces, in which questions about societal alternatives could be posed in terms rich in content. Concurrently, the movements themselves had created new forms of solidaristic contestant, particularly in social fora at global, regional and local level.

The substantial success of the first edition shows that our objective of positively describing societal alternatives using clear concepts, and going far beyond a big "No" to contemporary conditions, has fulfilled a need for many politically interested people. The A to Z of Alternatives has sold many copies, has been debated at numerous public events, and has made an equally important impact in many critical and political education contexts.

The project's enmeshment in social movements and in the critical, public sphere premises our conviction that a new edition of the book cannot simply reproduce the debate conducted five years ago. Therefore, a further aim of the A to Z of Alternatives 2.0 is to spotlight how social movements have changed in recent years – with a foregrounding of globalization-critical, socioecological, feminist and anti-racist social movements – to detail which new experiences have been gathered, and to examine which new challenges these movements must confront.

In this framework, two especially significant processes of upheaval must be mentioned, both joined to each other and of world historical dimensions, and both of which have permanently altered the global field of power relations and of discourses. Firstly, the sustained, multiple crises since 2008 make the challenge of articulating counter proposals to the ruling model of business more urgent than ever. This goes further than the abominable consequences for large parts of the world's population, both direct and indirect, inflicted by the world economic crisis. In the current phase of crisis management a toughening of the neoliberal class struggle from above – in the form of new waves of privatization, the ongoing dismantling of welfare state achievements, increased commodification of nature and of life, extending time spent in wage labor – combines with an erosion of civilian-democratic minimum standards. This ranges from the attempt to raise neoliberal austerity politics, in the form of balanced budget amendments, to the status of components of constitutions, to the deployment of "governments of [technocratic] experts" in Italy and Greece. All these issues must be taken account of in the examination of solidaristic and democratic alternatives to an increasingly authoritarian neoliberal capitalism.

Secondly, the global protests against authoritarian crisis management, against the destruction of nature and *for* real democratization do open up new spaces for debate about alternatives, and about how to put these into practice. The Indignados in Spain, the Occupy movements, the struggles against the European Troika in Greece, but also the rebellions in North Africa and the Near East all point to a new phase of global, social movements. Political actors have experimented with new strategies, forms of protest and models of participation in all of these fields. Reflecting on these experiences, but also on the contradictions and on the defeats, is just as integral to the search for alternatives. In these terms, 2011 was, as a year, literally unimaginable in advance.

This A to Z is therefore about assembling key terms in order to name the alternatives. The word alternative originally described a decision between two possibilities (French *alterne;* Latin *alternus* meaning on a rotating basis, or, by turn). In contrast to this, the term is used colloquially today to express a choice between several possibilities and, as such, points beyond an either-or type of decision. This book is concerned with this latter definition, and not with two, exclusive perspectives: on the one side, the hegemonic, imperial-neoliberal, capitalist, patriarchal, racist perspective, along with similar kinds of people and societal groups that marginalize others; and, on the other side, the emancipatory people. Yes, the book is about how to comment on and change existing relations of power and hegemony, yet the alternatives to these are nevertheless plural, must emerge in

practical forms, and are at times in tension with each other. Alternatives can be orientated around the existing state, can be critical of this state, or can also be anti-statist. Regarding their strategic objectives or their practice, alternatives either can be inherent in the system, or aimed at transforming the system. Ecological alternatives are frequently in tension with those based on an improved politics of wealth distribution, which is less concerned with the types and modes of economic production. Alternatives can be thought over and practically applied in smaller spaces – or in whole societies.

Some entries present alternatives in the sense of practical counter-models to existing structures. Others deal with strategic proposals, or forms of protest and movement of social forces. Others still trace back political traditions and illuminate historical experiences in the struggles for alternatives, which may be relevant today. All are *concepts* in the emphatic sense of the word, opening up alternative perspectives on societal interrelations, and different "worldviews."

The aim of making alternatives visible in the form of an A to Z, with short, introductory texts, inviting readers to engage with the subjects more closely, is not without problems. One of these problems is the danger, that this will be understood as us publishing an exhaustive compendium for use in the discussion about alternatives. The A to Z expressly does not have this goal. Surely many further concepts will occur to all of us – editors, authors and readers – which could have been included. If this is so, then the volume will already have fulfilled an important purpose, to drive forward thought about further, possible alternatives.

We hope that – alongside clarification processes in terms of content, and prompts to further discussion – that readers, and ultimately all of us, will allow ourselves to be inspired, by reading these cues, for our own, further engagement with these topics. Inspired to think things over critically, perhaps even to active engagement, so that we can see ourselves as part of comprehensive-historical and relevantly emancipatory developments, and be strengthened in this work. One of authoritarian neoliberalism's biggest intentional "successes" consists precisely of devaluing, denouncing and ridiculing alternative thought and action.

With this backdrop, we requested that the authors from the first edition review, and if necessary, revise their contributions. Some entries remained largely the same, many were updated, to do justice to the aforementioned developments of recent years, and some were completely rewritten in the light of recent experiences. In addition, we were able to gain numerous new authors, so that we could include forty-six new entries in the A to Z. This enabled us to close gaps that were brought to our attention in the discussions about the first edition of the A to Z.

Principally however, these new entries reflect the development in the debates about alternatives during the last five years. This reinforces the A to Z's particular quality of bringing together a wide spectrum of concepts and authors from diverse leftist, political and professional contexts. This plurality leads to individual contributions certainly do exist in a tense relationship with others, and could even be shown to be incompatible with each other in some points, is something we don't see as a deficit but rather as a strength of the project. This has also led to us including two entries for some individual concepts in the new edition. Where we considered that controversial evaluations and approaches to particular concepts – and, with that, to the perspectives for societal alternatives linked with these topics – diverged dramatically so that they could not be dealt with in a single entry, it was possible, by using tow entries, to make differences much more visible, and, for readers, therefore more discussable.

We also stressed that non-sexist formulations were used in all entries; the forms used to do this in the German-language edition was left in the hands of the authors. To create gender-neutral plurals, some authors capitalized the suffix of the nouns, while others used the gender gap underscore, as in the German word "Autor_innen." For us, the making visible of pluralistic approaches – the real content behind this apparently technical decision – was more important for us in this instance than to produce formal unity in the text. When purely masculine forms of words are used, this is explicitly to draw attention to male dominance.

Three A to Z contributors have died since 2007. We therefore decided to reprint their entries – on "Internationalism," "Keynesianism" and "Social Infrastructure" – in their original form in this second edition. This is, not least, a modest sign of our esteem for Josef Moe Hierlmeier, Jörg Huffschmid and Heinz Steinert, for their decades of engagement for comprehensive alternatives to the present, hegemonic conditions.

We are very happy that the A to Z of Alternatives 2.0 could again come into being through cooperation with *taz.die tageszeitung*, the Scientific Advisory Board of Attac Germany, and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. The latter supported this project financially and in terms of ideas, inside the framework of the umbrella project *"Let's talk about alternatives...."* We are very grateful for this.

We would also especially like to thank the more than 170 authors from 14 countries and 4 continents for confronting the challenge of introducing and explaining complex concepts in just a few paragraphs, without simplifying them inadmissibly. In addition, the three co-editors for the first edition owe thanks to Benjamin Opratko, not only for giving lots of content proposals for the strategic direction of the new edition, but also for

carrying the burden of project organization. We thank our publishers, VSA, and especially Gerd Siebecke, for their well-disposed, engaged and reliable cooperation. The results gathered in this book show that it was worth the effort. We hope and wish that the volume might contribute to intensive discussions, clarification processes, and practical alternatives.

Berlin, Cologne and Vienna. March 2012.

Ulrich Brand, Bettina Lösch, Benjamin Opratko and Stefan Thimmel

Aesthetics of Resistance

"...Locked into a single movement … they wrestled with each other … dreaming and lifeless with an insane vehemence." (Translated from the original German version of *The Aesthetics of Resistance;* German title 'Ästhetik des Widerstands I,' p. 8). *The Aesthetics of Resistance* is a reckoning with the proletarian movement, which is at premature and overdue at once. By striking early with his critical evaluation, Peter Weiss rescues in his novel what the year 1989 summarily condemned to historical uselessness. Yet, as a fictive biography, the book arrived too late, because an efficacious embodiment of the novel's position had never existed in any real historical process. The book is concerned with political aesthetics, as a counter-model to the aestheticization of politics under fascism. In an artistic weaving of historical references and dream elements, the novel says a lot that escaped a contemporary, theory-based perspective. Living and dying in anonymity, which has caused such widespread fear in the 20th and 21st centuries, is transformed into a productive principle in the figure of the anonymous narrator.

The work is arresting in the way it juxtaposes artifacts, and events in specific locations, and the locations of events. The reader is summoned to reinterpret what "the Original" and "the Authentic" actually mean. The dimensions of this work of art facilitate a dispute. This is because it carries the location of origins coded within in it, alongside the location of what is happening now, and along with the societal relations between people that these two different locations make possible. Examples of this are the images of the iron-rolling mills, or the high relief of the Pergamon Altar.

Whatever is inherent in these originals is developed as an excess, through an imaginary power that is simultaneously realistic, visionary and surreal. This culminates in the movement trapped in the artefacts being released, in order to give back dignity to the conquered depicted in these art works. Using a dialogical form, the timelessness of the moment fixated by works of work gets abolished; parallel to this, the permanent foundation structure of societal hegemony gets exposed. Readers are pulled into a virtuoso leaping through space and time, in which one thing becomes clear. A goal as large as ending the dominion of people over people, whether to be tackled immediately or first dressed up in rational clothing, demands a kind of thinking that must move in numerous spaces and epochs, from Angkor Wat to Berlin, from Pergamon to Guernica.

The epochs and spaces, tightly strung together, are connected by two threads: the decoding of societal hegemony, and the hidden and open techniques that accompany that decoding in order to fight fascism as one extraordinary overwhelming form of hegemony; and the defamation of the countermovement in all its forms. The similarities of living conditions under hegemonic relations facilitate a renewed recognition even over large distances of space and time, and a chance to unlock experiences, not just in the form of pure knowledge. Rather, the interpretative achievements of the book contain a muscular-motoric component, on which emotionality feeds. Subjectivity alters in the process or re-cognition, and gains access to the question: why has it not yet been possible to abolish the dominion of people over people?

Political-aesthetic resistance with all its manifold voices lives and suffers under the contradiction between overwhelming melancholy in terms of its victims, and strength for the deed. This must make it similar, in some respects, to what it is fighting against, so that it has any chance of standing against it – even if that comes at the cost of distorting itself. A successful movement for the abolition of the dominion of humans over humans requires an embracive art of exegesis and creation, to be practiced by those people who, until now, were excluded from both arts, and only turned up in artifacts as the conquered.

That which we call history cannot be the last word on the matter, as too much unfulfilled matter is piled up in it. Even if it seems, after 1989, that we are cut off from the springs from which taking sides ensued historically. We are left with a present that has been shrunk by a multiplication of spatial references, all of which demand critical interventions.

The central question remains: how can a developed, political-aesthetic individuality be interlinked with the necessities of a collective struggle, so that neither emotionality nor ability to act crack under the pressure of an over-powerful opponent, who's still willing to learn new tricks?

Siegfried Timpf

Further Reading

Günter Dunz-Wolff, Hannes Goebel and Jochen Stüsser, eds., *Lesergespräche. Erfahrungen mit Peter Weiss' Roman "Die Ästhetik des Widerstands"* (Hamburg, 1988).
Peter Weiss, *Ästhetik des Widerstands,* 3 volumes (Frankfurt, 1975, 1978 and 1981).
Peter Weiss, *Notizbücher 1971-1980,* 2 volumes (Frankfurt, 1981).

Against precarization

In most European countries, the conquest of finance capitalism has resulted in long-term unemployment, sweeping reforms of the employment market, and the spread of wage earner poverty. For over two decades now, a slow yet relentless shrinking process has remolded the core of "normal" full-time employment, and the trade union based fortifications of the post-war era along with it. A considerable number of the unemployed and other social-benefit recipients stand watching this spectacle. Between these actors, a gray zone widens, containing precarious wage relations like labor-hire, temporary contracts, under-employment, and fudged self-employment. The latter doesn't usually guarantee a living wage, nor do periods of self-employment normally last long – while still being characterized by a marked lack of security. Such wage earners comprise ten to fifty percent of the workforce, depending on which European country you look at. The percentage of female workers who have to live with such employment conditions is, however, normally much higher.

In this zone of weak trade union penetration, the members of workforces are harder to organize – this is due to the lower amount of average time they're present in companies, and increased relations of dependency on their employers when they're present. Yet more essentially, competitive situations between union-organized "insiders" and marginal-workforce "outsiders" generates an erosion in negotiating power concerning employment-markets and production processes. This is one of the trade unions' most important resources. Although trade unions in northern European countries have managed to extract concessions from the state and from associations of capital – including regulation of short-time working and more security for core workforces – "crisis-corporatism" of this kind actually deepens dividing-lines in the employment market. Precarization functions as a system of power and control, which also brings individuals in core workforces to heel.

In recent years, a debate about this issue has grown up in this context. Organizational concepts have been taken up and critically discussed, particularly concepts originating in the USA, which attempt to increase the trade unions' organizational power, through targeted organizing in poorly represented social groups, through campaigns, and redirecting movements – coupled with an innovative politics of alliances with social movements and NGOs. Although the concept of "working against precarization" has, to date, been mostly restricted to the German speaking world (in German: *Entprekarisierung*), it does provide a valuable point of interface with discussions about trade union and societal alternatives. This concept has been fed by the southern European "*San-precario"* and May Day movements, in which people precariously employed people went on the offensive, identifying themselves as the "precariat" in the public's consciousness – and thereby attempting to initiate a process of class formation "from below." However, experience quickly demonstrated that a group's collective subjectivization as "the precariat" faced tight restrictions, imposed by major social differences and hierarchies, themselves the result of objective underlying circumstances *and* subjective perceptions of what precarization means. While for young, well-educated academics the spread of flexible working condition can contain an emancipatory perspective, most sales-women interested in the regulation of employment are focused on the relatively traditional aim of an unlimited contract with a guaranteed minimum wage.

In this context, "working against precarization" means the attempt to link up resistant coping strategies against the impertinent demands precarization inflicts with organizational forms from the traditional workers' movement – and this against the backdrop of an extreme fragmentation of how people earn money. *Firstly,* this is about safeguarding normal working conditions against strategies of cutting social guarantees, and about safeguarding against companies being too closely tied into short-term entrepreneurial market risks. In this regard, conflicting parties inside companies need to work on alliances with social movements. *Secondly,* this is about expanding employment rights for all forms of earning, that are not protected by the welfare state *or* by trade union pay deals – this covers a legal ➞ minimum wage, regulations for workers without residency status, ➞ basic income, and more. This would grant the trade unions a new politicizing and shaping role in social conflicts. *Thirdly,* this is about concrete organizational measures, to tie precariously employed people into those labor force organizations, which favor real participation, rather than neoliberal activism, or paternalistic, proxy politics.

Alessundro Pelizzari

Further Reading

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Thomas Haipeter and Klaus Dörre, eds., *Gewerkschaftliche Modernisierung* (Wiesbaden, 2011).

Alessundro Pelizzari, *Dynamiken der Prekarisierung. Atypische Erwerbsverhältnisse und milieuspezifischer Unsicherheitsbewältigung* (Konstanz, 2009).

Anarchism

An opponent of all types of know-it-all, anarchism has never constructed doctrinal systems around itself. Forcing people to toe the line contradicts its political morals so fundamentally that it simply doesn't do this, not even a little bit. It therefore fits that dissidence and idiosyncrasy are the lifeblood of anarchism. Extremely different and contradictory elements coexist within its philosophical horizon, from the apotheosis of Max Stirner's radically egoistic theory of property, to Kropotkin's belief in mutual assistance in the world of animals and people. In terms of practice, the spectrum covers the highly qualified, skilled-worker anarchism practiced by Swiss clock-makers in the second half of the 19th century, *and* the pillage of churches by the rural Andalusian poor.

The protest against discipline from within articulated in such contrasts reflects the rigorousness with which anarchists actively make an enemy of the state, and all other forms of authority. Through personal behavior, anarchists have also demonstrated that they're quite able to do without being ruled. This contradicts the virulent prejudice – as old as antiquity – that an anarchistic absence of political leadership would immediately plunge human societies into bloody chaos. That's why anarchists shared a commitment to ➞ free association, through which, according to the emancipatory words of Marx and Engels, "the free development of each individual is the precondition for the free development of everyone." However, they did not agree with the authors of the Communist Manifesto about the path to such a society. "The reason I'm not a communist," wrote Bakunin, "is that communism concentrates and channels all power in society into the state, because communism has to lead to the centralization of property in the hands of the state. I, on the contrary, wish for the abolition of the state, the radical extinction of the principle of authority and of the guardianship of the state, which, under the pretext of the people's moral education and civilization, enslaves, oppresses, exploits and defiles that same people. I wish that both society – and collective and social property – be organized from below to above through the path of free association, and not from above to below with the help of any authority, whatever that may me. It's exactly in this sense that I am a collectivist, and no communist."

Historiography is full of attempts to use this type of utterance to write anarchism off as wishful romantic thinking, as nothing more than typical for the period of transition between agricultural and industrial society. The refinement and absurdity of capitalist control continues to be tangible, however. This contradicts the theory that anarchism as a motif should wither in proportion to the degree of general adaption to the norms of a society based on factories. The drive to expose capitalist control comes from an interest in unrestricted movement; after a series of encouraging, emancipatory processes, the anti-authoritarian impulse that informs this drive will certainly not be weaker than before.

Since the rise of the workers' movement, anarchism has had to put up with accusations from its ➞ Marxist competitors that it is incapable of making good on its own subjective, revolutionary demands, but ultimately plays into the hands of the ruling power through its lack of discipline. The mere will to perform revolutionary deeds is no substitute for the necessity of serious understanding about the conditions of political action. That said, some Marxists have admitted that accusations against anarchism have achieved little more than brushing over bureaucratic and authoritarian tendencies inside ➞ socialist organizations and states. However, the anarchistic alternative of rejecting the principal of delegation just as radically as rejecting politics in general did not meet with much sympathy among the aforementioned Marxists. The old anarchistic concept of the possibility of an immediate leap into the realm of freedom just seemed far too simple.

Although belief in both the idea of a sudden toppling of power relationships and in the emancipatory effect of anarchistic assassinations has disappeared, the possessors of wealth and power do not consider themselves any safer today. Quite the opposite: not even a dramatic expansion in the apparatus of repression and surveillance technologies are able to prevent the regular emergence in unexpected locations of temporary autonomous zones, in which alternatives to the state-capitalist looting of the planet are (almost) more practiced than discussed. In undermining the state-obsessed logic of political representation, cooperation forms including plenary meetings, networks and ➞ social fora, it can be argued that anarchistic motifs remain a virulent part of protest moments from Chiapas to Tahrir Square.

Malte Meyer

Further Reading

Daniel Guérin, *Anarchism. Begriff und Praxis* (Frankfurt, 1967).

Duane Rousselle and Süreyyya Evren, eds., *Post-Anarchism. A Reader* (London, 2011).

Victor Serge, *Erinnerungen eines Revolutionärs* (Hamburg, 1991). Anarchism

Anti-fascism

Anti-fascism describes a political attitude against fascist ideologies, groups and/or individuals. Initially, it is a definition based on what it is not.

The term stems from Italy, where, in the 1920s, people called themselves anti-fascists for the first time, in order to express their opposition to Mussolini and the Partito Nazionale Fascista. This took place alongside the formation of anti-fascist groups, who defended themselves against the violent assaults of the fascist Blackshirts. In Italy, as in Germany, anti-fascist alliances were primarily instigated by working class parties. In Germany, the Anti-Fascist Action was announced in the party newspaper of the German Communist Party in 1932. Its predecessor was the Rote Frontkämpferband (Alliance of Red Front Fighters), which was prohibited in 1929. The Anti-Fascist Action saw itself as party neutral, and open to all those willing to stand and face the SA's terror on the streets. The aim was to create a tactical alliance between all opponents of National Socialism. The Communists formed the backbone of resistance, just like after 1933. This is also the case for Spain, although the composition of the Republican and anti-fascist troops was more pluralistic there. Anti-fascist resistance groups also coalesced in other European countries, often reacting directly to the occupation of these countries by the Nazis; or they formed as resistance against local fascist movements. In Austria, the social-democratic Republikanische Schutzband (Republican Protective Alliance) fought primarily against the fascist Heimwehr (Home Guard). The battles here ended in February 1934 in a defeat for Social Democracy and a permanent ban on it. Many party functionaries fled, while those who remained where forced into the underground. All structures had been smashed, which could have made possible broad-based anti-fascist resistance.

After 1945, the broad-based anti-fascist identity in western countries – possessed above all by survivors of the concentration and extermination camps – was quickly replaced by an anti-communist and anti-totalitarian identity. This led to the term anti-fascism becoming much fought over, as it is until today. Proponents of the political right attempt to discredit the term. Totalitarianism theory, the "Historikerstreit" ("historian's quarrel"), and the theory of extremism – coupled with the Extremism Clause (the "Extremismusklausel," introduced by the German Federal Government in 2011, but rescinded in 2014) – have all unreflectedly equated "left-wing extremist" with "right-wing extremist," and see themselves as occupying the (un)political middle-ground. This way of thinking rejects anti-fascism as being "left-wing extremist." Contrary to this, anti-fascist groups in the whole of Europe today perceive themselves in the tradition of the Anti-Fascist Action, and gather information, disrupt neo-Nazi marches, and carry out outreach work. The foremost developments in these areas since the 1980s have been in autonomist milieus.

From today's perspective, it is no longer tenable to look at fascism in a one-dimensional manner. Fascism is fed by many sources, all of which should be fought equally. This makes broad collaborations in the field of anti-fascist work indispensable. This also means looking beyond your own back yard. It is necessary to inform ourselves about contemporary and historical anti-fascist movements outside of Europe (e.g. in Japan, South America or the USA), and to network with contemporary movements. Moreover, the struggle concerning the concerning itself, "anti-fascism," must also be pursued.

Questions about ➞ politics of alliances are a keenly debated topic in anti-fascist circles. The spectrum of opinions range widely. One position states that agreement must be reached on all detailed questions, which, for example, has long since hampered a sensible alliance in the protests against the Vienna Corporation Ball. (Renamed Vienna Academics Ball in 2013, this ball of German nationalist fraternities has become one of the most important networking meetings for European far-right extremists.) The other end of the scale are large, tactical alliances that draw much media attention, and include large associations and churches. The annual protests in Dresden against one of the biggest neo-Nazi marches in Europe demonstrate what this path could achieve. While this is going on, discussions need to be conducted amongst the left about which groups it is possible to cooperate with. To rephrase the question, how prudent is it to cooperate with groups that themselves defend and reproduce inequalities between people? Discussing this question is particularly relevant for feminism.

Natascha Strobl

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Appropriation

Every form of human existence is based on processes of appropriation. These include the creation of use value through work; using nature; and life-long learning and personal development. In capitalist societies however, these processes of appropriation are organized hegemonically, and take on a specific form, principally based on the appropriation labor power as a commodity, for the production of surplus value. Prerequisites for this were the enclosure of the ➞ commons, the producers having the means of production violently expropriated from them, and finally the manufactured products of the initial phase of capitalism. This process or expropriation continues today, for example through the privatization of public commodities, the patenting of seeds, or through forcing populations off land.

In the debate about political alternatives, the concept of appropriation will be used from a perspective critical of the state, in order to open up the space in order to discuss the autonomous satisfaction of needs in connection with alternative production forms. Through this, two questions arise: firstly, regarding the structuring of collective societies based on solidarity; and secondly, how to overcome hegemonic relations. Thinking in this vein, we can read the history of ➞ social movements as a history of appropriation struggles, focused on the most varied forms of hegemonic interrelations: class hegemony, racism, sexism, heteronormativity, and imperialistic north-south relations.

Political actions and practices have been developed under the heading of appropriation during the last few decades in Germany, which thematize access to commodities and services. These include squatting, the ''reclaim the streets'' movement, the ➞ right to the city, and things-for-free campaigns. The latter is a central object of current political debates about appropriation. These debates start with manifold individual practices concerning everyday appropriation, before moving on to address possibilities of generalizing about a moneyless society. In doing so, they raise the question of channeling these everyday practices into a collective, political practice.

Using the slogan ''everything for everyone and everything for free," numerous ''things-for-free'' activities took place in various urban centers, including using public transport, cinemas and museums without buying tickets; and even ''shopping'' by shop-lifting. These activities articulated criticism about the distribution of societal wealth and about how this is cemented by the state. In turn, things-for-free campaigns have also been criticized. The central objection is that they remain stuck at the levels of commodities and consumption, censorious of deficiencies inherent in the system, and nevertheless fundamentally failing to question capitalist social ownership.

As a perspective however, appropriation extends beyond more tightly defined socioeconomic practices of appropriation. Referencing a ''different'' future without waiting for that future to come about by itself, is a strategy that links up several differing types of demand. The improvement of an individual's own life-circumstances combines with the radical and practical questioning of hegemonic societal relations; and this in turn joins with the search for a collective, solidarity-based society, that could signify a life of autonomy and ➞ liberty for everyone. In this fashion, appropriation can issue into an anti-hegemonic project of societal transformation. Thoughts concerning self-determination and ➞ self-empowerment question the notion that the state should be the preferred terrain on which societal conflicts are played out. They also question the notion of the state as the addressee that receives demands for social and political rights. In so doing, appropriation is less an all-embracing concept with which to redress capitalist social ownership, and more an experimental approach with which to develop practices of resistance. An approach that can destabilize hegemonic patterns of thought in relation to the concept of ➞ common sense.

The strength of the perspective of appropriation is the overview it grants over very differing struggles, without placing these inside a hierarchy. It is possible to discuss struggles about sexual self-determination or the refusal of a uniform classification in one gender from the perspective of appropriation, and to use this same perspective to translate this discussion into practice. However, it is also just as possible to use the appropriation perspective to discuss – and to move these discussions into practice – struggles about land, public commodities or the distribution of wealth. Nevertheless, the question must be raised whether it is possible to use the lens of appropriation to permit and not to flatten the contradictions between various emancipatory dimensions and movements. This is not about achieving an ideal final state, in which societal conflicts have become a thing of the past. Rather, a moment of going on the offensive is contained within the appropriation strategy, that should throw open spaces in which to think about alternatives: in contrast to the usual defensive battles, targeted at safeguarding, and preventing specific undesirable outcomes. As an emancipatory perspective, appropriation attempts to provide opportunities for learning and experiencing the principal of self-determination in collective processes.

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Appropriation

Autonomy of migration

The concept of "autonomy of migration" remained hidden for a long period in an interview with the French political-economist Yann Moulier Boutang, from the start of the 1980s. He began by using the phrase "autonomy of migration'' to address the ''subjective factor'' that was withheld for years in many theoretical and political analyses about migration, and in public debates on the subject:

"Even if myriads of experts and civil servants in government organizations, and state and international institutions, devote themselves to the subject of emigration, they still have no idea about these...autonomy-of-migration [population] streams. They prefer the notion that all factors and phenomena that are linked to each other can be seen as caused by economic policy, and are therefore merely an object that should be dealt with using administrative regulation. Of course, this approach grotesquely over-estimates the objectivity of all politics, and especially economic policy, completely forgetting that emigration has its own internal dynamics. Although emigration can be met using repressive means, which ''demand'' the repatriation of immigrants, it is not possible to open and block [population] streams by programmatic methods and opinionizing."

In the intervening period since the early 1980s, it has become an axiom that migrants *do not* merely constitute a disposable mass that can be turned off and on at the will of economic policy. This axiom has permeated a broad, international and academic debate, and has even permeated into official political analysis of German and European migration management. In this context, the phrase ''autonomy of migration'' has taken on the function of altering perspectives *about* migration, by taking on the perspective *of migration itself.*

The concept was taken up by two groups in Germany, between the mid-to-late 1990s, for their work in the fields of anti-racism and migration politics. *Kein mensch ist illegal* and *Kanak Attak* were the names of their groups, and the term was much discussed and developed following their lead. It was an idea that resonated in the framework of international debates, in which many parallel approaches augmented each other while still preserving their intellectual independence. Work on the "right to flee"; historical approaches to slavery, wage labor and the lumpenproletariat; and numerous contributions from the fields of ➞ feminism, migration theory and ➞ postcolonialism, which in turn combined with artistic works and film productions. Because all these various discourses took up the concept, we can now discuss it as a single method.

It could be argued that the concept had become necessary, because it can sort out several absurdities that are believed about migration. While it is true that migration opens up a field of social and political conflicts, but instead of the resulting social antagonism being allowed to stand as a valid challenge, this burden is generally laid at the feet of the migrants. It's as if we're looking at an optical illusion, and our gaze is constantly being pulled back towards migrants in isolation, who oscillate between appearing in the role of the bad guys, and in the role of victims. This image, which holds sway over countless numbers of people and has proven historically very resistant, deprives the concept of the autonomy of migration of the theoretical ground beneath its feet.

Migration never occurs twice in the same manner, is motivated by numerous factors, and seldom proceeds in just one direction. It is not a project "owned" by a number of individuals, but rather a process, based on transnational networks (➞ transnational migration), and on a global movement. If we would call it a social or political movement, it would question our understanding of what actually is political. Taking on the perspective of migration means rethinking our concepts of the borders of national organization, whether in the form of a single state's migration politics, or in the form of national trade union work. It also means rethinking our notions of local and global, and of narrow disciplinary boundaries, but also the nonsensical idea that integration in a national society "without migration" functions perfectly.

The concept – whose core thought is shaped by autonomous Marxism – is not without controversy. Accusations along the lines that the approach prevents migrants being seen as victims of many processes – the international division of labor, exploitative interrelations, colonialism, postcolonialism, wars, gender relations, racism etc. – constitute the main lines of conflict. To which the riposte runs that the concept redirects people's gazes towards the conditions which shape migration movements, and not, in a biased fashion, towards taking sides with migrants. Instead, this is a perspective that accepts the challenges the struggles of migration pose, when migrants cross many borders in the search for a better life.

Manuela Bojadžijev

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Basic Income I

The idea of an unconditional, guaranteed basic income – also referred to as *Existenzgeld,* or “existence money”, in some German-language discourse – is clear and simple. Irrespective of all personal and social circumstances and relations, everyone should regularly receive a sum of money from the governmental authorities – in German-language discourse this role is played by the *Gemeinwesen*, or community, perceived in a formal sense – enabling them to live a dignified and participatory life free of economic worries. This income is intended exactly as formulated above, so that for example the answer to the question "will non-citizens of a particular state also receive it?" is "yes," or course. In essence, basic income has nothing to do with social security or fighting poverty – although it would be very effective in preventing poverty – but rather represents a polar opposite to these measures. Unemployment benefits, and all the various types of social security benefit – some aimed at state citizens, some at non-citizens of a particular state – are always connected with a whole array of stipulations and conditions, which often mean recipients are placed under rigid controls, both in terms of time, and in terms of freedom of movement. For example, recipients of the Hartz IV social benefit, or of unemployment benefit, in Germany, cannot go away from their place of residence without lengthy bureaucratic hassle, nor can they carry out particular (work) activities, that they themselves perceive as meaningful. In contrast, the basic income is distinguished by its absolute unconditionality.

As an alternative to these coercions, basic income wants to economically facilitate and safeguard the principle of "being active in a state of freedom." Everyone should be free to choose when, where, and to which extent they carryout which type of activity. This is regardless of whether this is wage labor or paid work for which money is actually received, an activity recognized by society, or whether this is one of the countless unpaid and normally less recognized activities – for example housework or care work – without which our everyday lives wouldn't function. Without this type of reproductive labor a spectrum of many important and enriching activities in culture, art, science, and even political and social involvement, would not be possible. In all societies, these activities account for many times more working hours than those in the official economic sector. In addition, such labor can either not be organized by the state at all, or – to be more precise – only parts of it can, so that it is free at the point of delivery. It is also not possible to transfer this type of labor into the wage and paid work sector in a comprehensive manner. No other single measure can unburden the individual so radically and thoroughly from the struggle to survive as basic income, and no other measure would so strongly facilitate a free choice of activities.

Although basic income draws support from leftists, Marxists, feminists, trade unionists, theologians, liberals, anthroposophists and anarchists, the basic income is in no way a genuine Marxist, feminist, liberal or anarchistic idea. Attempts to classify it are generally founded on polemical or denunciatory motivations. It must also be said, that the conceptualization of basic income is extremely closely connected with those societal and economic developments, to which traditional political currents have only been able to give insufficient answers. That interest in the policy began to rise dramatically at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, a period in which the previous, post-war order was turned on its head, is certainly not accidental. Experiences drawn from new, precarious forms of work, coupled with the transformation of the welfare state into a so-called “workfare-state," and coupled with other developments, all ultimately pointed in the same direction: having to work more than before for less money, with less social security, and under worse conditions.

Basic income wants to help realize real self-determination and autonomy, primarily in the territory of the economic and of the material. Whether and to what extent introducing basic income encourages autonomy in other areas, for example in gender relations, is a question of emancipation in the relevant area. The economic safeguard that basic income provides is certainly a condition conducive for ➞ emancipation, while not sufficient to achieve this by itself. Basic income also makes possible a first step towards overcoming capitalist relations. The core institutions of capitalism – wage labor and paid employment – cannot be overcome by basic income alone, but they can be massively relativized. For some, basic income is too radical. These critics champion a return to full employment, although, in contrast to the 1970s, this time with a massive integration of female workers. For others, the concept is not radical enough. This group of critics won't accept anything less than the immediate victory over money and property. However, I see the compatibility between the demands for basic income and existing hegemonic circumstances – while still putting a gentle question mark over these – as one of the biggest advantages of this idea. Basic income opens the doors to a post-capitalist world based in individual self-determination.

Karl Reitter

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Basic Income II

The idea of a general, unconditional basic income (UBI) has a long history. Van Parijs is justified in his summary: "The actual foundational idea goes back at least two centuries, although it's only recently that it has been seriously discussed." In both conservative-liberal and leftist political spectrums, UBI has been significantly revalued to become a one-size-fits-all remedy for rectifying fundamental erroneous developments and alienation phenomena in late capitalist society.

Why is this? Income as a controversial issue has been increasingly polarized in recent years. Even before the Big Crisis broke out in 2007-08, large parts of the population were convinced that social division was on the rise. Three-quarters of the population expect that social differences will grow, while two-thirds contend that an increasing number of people won't be able to keep up. They are right: millions of citizens are already dependent on the lowest level network of social transfer payments. Their livelihoods are tied into a bureaucratic and repressive system of controlling expectations. Formalized interest groups criticize provision as being insufficient, with deficits appearing at regular intervals in the media. The fact remains that a surplus exists in capitalist, industrialized countries, which does make a minimum of provision possible. We are constantly producing more commodities and services, using a consistently decreasing number of workers. This has led to those "surplus to requirements" being transformed into a mass of long-term unemployed. Instead of giving everyone access to the wealth that this surplus of commodities implies, a bottleneck at the entrance to participation has been constructed. The supporters of UBI want to fetch citizens out of the cul-de-sac of a repressive and humiliating administration of poverty. This means abolishing the coercion to work and creating possibilities of pursuing meaningful work activities, through safeguarding existential needs. But beyond this, basic income should become more than an instrument for merely providing for employees who employers have "rationalized" out of a job.

The counterargument against UBI runs thus: the concept is economically naive because it ignores the fact that this "people's income" must be created anew from somewhere, every year. Even if middle and high incomes were to be highly taxed to finance the measure, a major part of the annual national income (measured in either "net" or "adjusted" terms) would be redistributed inside society. The provision of work available would decline markedly, the work ethic would change, the sense of entitlement towards society would solidify, and, finally, it would encourage the shadow economy.

According to their own statements, the majority of champions of UBI do not want a transformation of a society based on the contradiction between wage labor and capital. From this follows that discrepancies in wealth distribution would remain. UBI would not alter anything in processes of value creation, or of utilization: this also applies to time-division, and to structures, in alienated wage labor. Social inequalities in those spheres of society that are subordinated to production – education, health, free time, culture and politics – would persist.

Can a mutual understanding be reached between proponents of UBI and those who defend a comprehensive transformation of wage labor, and a democratization of the economy? This would have to be based on a combination of a non-bureaucratic living income to guarantee livelihoods, and measures for battling against social inequality. Concurrent aims of this process would be improving the concrete situations of those affected, and an ongoing integration of marginalized elements of the population into the work towards a solution. Means testing is a massive assault on personal dignity, and impacts on the “self-image as citizens” of those affected. In addition, current levels of social transfer payments are below the minimum needed to ensure a social and cultural existence.

When the consequences have been thought through, basic income independent of need remains a radical version of existing statist, social politics – it is not about correcting the system. The financial crisis underlines the fact that we have to carry through an alteration in the ordering of production and working processes. UBI ignores the real, existing structures of value creation in the whole of society, including all structures of alienation and contradictions that are contained therein; the threatening tendencies of precarization and the reinforcement of authoritarian attitudes are pushed into the background. As an alternative, those people permanently forced out of reproduction processes have to be protected by a non-discriminatory guaranteed income. Simultaneously, they must be allowed to take part in moving work as an entity in society forward.

Joachim Bischoff

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Bifurcation – Partings of the Ways

Systems analysis demands a long-term perspective, in order to go beyond identifying realignments that inhere to systems, to comprehending the historicity of a coherent, systemic formation as a whole. Physicists and chemists, most notably Ilya Prigogine, have observed how manifold factors can cause systems to lose their coherence at a specific moment. They then enter into phases in which those components that had previously guaranteed their cohesion lose their power. Systemic imbalance can be eliminated by bifurcation, a branching out into various new, and newly constituted, conditions of balance. The new, structuring axes were already present in the previous system, but not central until now. This transformation in the organizational logic triggers a new composition of the inner elements of the system, and with that the elimination of the previous, central, connecting axis. There is no linear determinism; the complexity of the system prevents simple, organizational solutions. There are also no preset transitions, but only probable directions, which continue to realign themselves, an open and moveable totality, dependent on the interaction of elements.

When a system loses coherence, imbalance ensues on the one hand. Yet on the other, an opportune moment for new horizons presents itself. This is the period of bifurcation, of the parting of the ways.

Conceptions of how complex systems behave and act have also gained in standing in the social sciences. Immanuel Wallerstein is foremost among those who has formulated, in dialogue with such theses, new possibilities for the development of societal systems. Granting uncertainty a place in social theory allows us to discover new intellectual spaces, and to overcome deterministic approaches. No sequences of events are unavoidable, and there are no linear explanations. Moreover, diverse and overlapping time dimensions have to be considered: Fernand Braudel demonstrated that a long time span is necessary until a system develops into a whole, and that we need to differentiate between moments of genesis, periods of regular functioning, and crises.

When a system can no longer adjust its internal cohesion, and when it has lost the prerequisites for reorganizing itself, we can talk about a system crisis. At this point, the efforts to maintain order produce various offshoots and ramifications, until a permanent bifurcation occurs. Capitalism can be configured as a world-system, in all the complexity and open-endedness of its development, and not just regarding its mode of production. This perspective connects well to the decolonizing thought of authors like Guillermo Bonfil (Mexico) and René Zavaleta (Bolivia). These thinkers have always emphasized the diversity of those societies upon which universal axes of order were imposed, but which upheld specific forms of living together nonetheless. The idea of a unitary historical subject was knocked from its plinth when, after 500 years of colonialism and of world-system-education, ''new'' societal subjects became visible. These people, as bearers of non-capitalist coherence, rendered porous the defenses of a system, which cannot permanently renew the conditions that allow it to continue.

These rebellious subjects have not yet been able to saw through the roots that bind them to this system; but they have managed to stretch out other roots beyond those previously mentioned. The loss of balance and coherence that chaos theory discusses makes it impossible for the system to absorb these elements of decline, or to reorganize. That's whys they're pushed in the direction of other conceptions of societal order, and start out upon the path of epistemological realignments, or of bifurcation.

We are moving away from the classical idea of ➞ revolution that fitted with a medium-term conception of a conjectural epoch, towards a more complex process of bifurcation, which draws on the long-term perspective of civilizational change. Visions of new worlds emerge that draw on new patterns of elucidation and methodologies. New subjects become important appropriate to these diverse forms of co-living and of social organization.

Capitalism finds itself in a phase of irrevocable instability, and societies subordinated to it are wildly growing new branches. These resemble ➞ rhizomatic images searching for yet new ways to branch off, and for new free spaces for alternative forms of living together: by trusting in uncertainty, incompleteness and inconstancy.

Ana Esther Ceceña

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Care Revolution

Care revolution is a political concept that spotlights the fundamental significance of caring and nursing labor processes, and is also known as care work. It builds on the findings of ➞ feminist economics: the essential tasks of social reproduction barely make it onto the agenda of hegemonic discourse. Typically, care work remains women's work, unpaid in families or badly paid in social-care professions, and largely invisible. Many people, and above all women with custodial responsibilities for children and the needy, are forced into working within these parameters. Without support from society, and often, when done parallel to their own professional activity, on the edge of being utterly overstretched. The neoliberal form of the capitalist system that currently dominates constrains the time and resources available for this important work of caring and social reproduction, due to its boundless and precarious type of wage labor. Concurrently, the state reduces spending on education, health and care, and pushes these tasks back onto families. Contemporary political and economic developments are destroying the existential security and social support of human life. We're looking at a crisis of social reproduction,

The care revolution is a rallying cry for a thorough change of perspective. Realizing human interests in life should be the pivotal point of political activity, not maximizing profits. Taking care work as its starting point, the care revolution is about transforming all tasks into reality that are requisite for the satisfaction of human needs, and for individual and constructive reproduction. Despite the fact that these activities cannot be captured by use value, and reject the capitalist logic of utilization. In this vein, time for care work, time for political and civic engagement, and time to dream – while a social security net is maintained – become the goals of societal transformation (➞ the four-in-one perspective).

What does the care revolution mean in political terms? First, a radically ➞ shorter working time with no loss of pay nor personnel, achieving a minimum wage, and introducing a ➞ basic income that guarantees livelihoods, are all prerequisites. Secondly, care work in families that is currently being carried out by individuals on a voluntary basis needs to be linked into a substantially extended network of state or ➞ cooperative based services, which operate on a person-friendly basis. High quality childcare and educational provision, coupled with comprehensive health care and care for senior citizens, needs to be financed through taxation and provided to all independent of income levels. Parallel to this, the third important change is upping the social status granted to care work, and significantly higher remuneration for these services. This would mean all professional care workers at last attaining a living wage, particularly the many woman, who work in this area. It is also possible to improve and further legalize working conditions for migrant employees in the domestic, free-market and state sectors, who are performing personal support and care work. This would facilitate for a comprehensive redistribution of labor between the sexes, including care work in families.
The measures for a care revolution as detailed here cannot easily be put into practice, as these are costly and effect profit margins, even though they should be a matter of course for societies with highly developed economies. This is why we need a societal mobilization from below. The point of departure for practices of opposition and shaping a self-determined life are collective processes of self-reflection, which tap into everyday experience. This will illuminate that personal limitations on life-chances are no individual matter, but can instead by traced to structural and mutable conditions. Numerous overlaps with initiatives and networks that are tackling social and ecological transformation processes present themselves here (see ➞ socioecological transformation.) The common denominator could be the radical recognition that humane interests in individual and group biographies cannot be realized through profit-orientated accumulation of capital, but only through communal action and ➞ solidarity. In so doing, political activity related to the care revolution strengthens all anti-capitalist politics, and reveals new twists in the debates concerning ➞ socialist visions.

Gabriele Winker

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Care Revolution

Church From Below

The actual term “church from below,” at least in German-language discourse on the subject, is relatively recent. According to biblical evidence however, its roots stretch back to the 13th century BCE, to the formation of the people of Israel. During a period in which the Egyptian and Hittite empires and their satellites, the city-kingdoms in Canaan, families of Hebrew forced laborers – who had been emancipated from Egypt – joined forces with nomadic herders of small cattle, peasants liberated from socage, and Aramaic migrants, and inhabited the highlands of contemporary Palestine. In conscious opposition to the hierarchic political and economic systems dominating in that period, this alliance organized themselves in a largely egalitarian manner, and by utilizing family solidarity.

Memories of this society were upheld through opposing tendencies in the kingdom formed around the 10th century BCE, and through the introduction of a new economy, based on property, interest and money (from the 8th century BCE on), which split society into rich and arm. It was prophets and peasant movements, achieving legal reform, who carried forward the dissent. This form of society, in contrast with the societies surrounding it, was defended as far as possible against new, large empires – including the Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian and Hellenistic Roman Empire. Since the time in which the Book of Daniel was written, this alternative perspective was known as the "Empire of God." Jesus of Nazareth forces this narrative onto center stage, now described as "God's order free of rulers, and with a human face." Paul reinvents the concept as "*ekklēsia,"* as a new community, in which there are no hierarchies, neither between peoples, nor between master and slave, nor rule of men over women: "There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus." (Galatians 3:28). Seen from a biblical perspective, the Christian church can only *become* church when it is a church "from below," acting in ➞ solidarity with people who live their lives "below."

Since the period of the church conforming to the Roman Empire under the Emperors Constantine I and Theodosius I in the 4th century CE, this alternative perspective has been largely renounced. Although originally an impulse "from below," the majority of the Protestant churches increasingly brought themselves into line with the interests of the authoritarian classes. It was not until the 20th century that various attempts at rediscovering the biblical approach became visible, in order to overcome the "age of Constantine." The emerging ecumenical movement is a key to this. In Germany, the struggle against the church aligning itself with National Socialism led to beginnings of a "church from below." It was, above all, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who sharply criticized the establishment of churches in "places of privilege," and challenged people to participate in the compassion of God in this world, in emulation of Christ. Moreover, he challenged people to consider history "from below," and to contribute to its reformation.

This impulse was taken up by – among others – the various ➞ liberation theologies, principally in South America. In this context, the Second Vatican Council also played an important role in winning back biblical perspectives. These found concrete perspectives in the establishment of "basis communities," particularly in Brazil. But it has also been possible to progress in this field in Germany. Reforming the biannual *Kirchentag*, which now functions as an annual assembly and festival of the German Protestant Church, into a "Kirchentag from below," was just one of the victories notched up by the student movement between 1969 and 1973. As the Roman Catholic Church didn't allow events of this nature, a self-organized "day of Catholics from below" broke away from the main *Katholikentag* (Catholics’ Day). The "Church from Below" initiative was also given a formal foundation, as was the "Publik-Forum" magazine, and, on a European level, the organization "We Are Church." The World Council of Churches developed the concept of a "just, participatory, sustainable society" (JPSS) in the 1970s, followed by, in the 1980s, a "conciliatory process of mutual responsibility for justice, ➞ peace, and the integrity of creation" (JPIC). A further development were the "ecumenical networks" that united in 2006 to form the "German Ecumenical Network," or, to use the German acronym: ÖniD. At the center of the ÖniD's work is the ➞ solidaristic economy. In 1990, the group, "Cairo's Europe: journeying to a Europe built on justice" was formed at a European level out of diverse, ecumenical basis groups. In an alliance with "World Economy, Ecology & Development", Cairo's Europe formed the "Network for Democratic Control of the Financial Markets", which was later renamed *Attac Germany.* The ecumenical groups aim at leavening the church in its diverse social forms from below to above, and at encouraging people to join in with – and making people capable of – resistance and alternatives, in alliances with ➞ social movements. In so doing, a different world, as promised in the bible, is made possible and realizable.

Ulrich Duchrow

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Church From Below

Civil Disobedience

Would we not do better to name this practice "civil *obedience*"? Many citizens in Germany and elsewhere are convinced that laws passed and actions taken by particular governments – working through their various authorities and executive bodies – exist in fundamental contradiction to certain constitutional principles, and to human rights. These peoples' consciences demand that resistance be enacted in "obedience" to higher-level rights, which form the basis of the constitution. As "superordinated" rights, these form one element of positive law, albeit an element that has to be regularly be newly interpreted and analyzed. Building on these fundamental insights, civil disobedience to can be carried out against subordinate legislation. The "fathers" of the concept are seen as being Henry David Thoreau, Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, who, variously, fought against slavery in America, racial segregation, war politics, and the United Kingdom's imperialistic politics in India, and who practically founded disobedience on a theoretical level. Paradoxically, women who rejected particular laws are not seen as the mothers of civil disobedience. Rosa Parks, a person of color, remained seated in her bus-seat in the USA, to protest the racist regulations then valid, and triggered off the open battle against apartheid politics while doing so. In the former West Germany, women carefully orchestrated a campaign of self-denunciation – "We had abortions" – in order to force a change in the abortion law, paragraph 218. A peak in conflicts using civil disobedience was reached in the 1980s, with sit-ins to block the stationing of nuclear weapons in Germany. In practical terms, civil disobedience continues to play a major role in nuclear energy politics, peace politics, conflicts about asylum law (e.g. use of German church asylum law, which has parallels with the Sanctuary Movement), and, increasingly, in the battle concerning genetic engineering, which includes "liberating" fields, by destroying genetically modified plants grown on them, particularly in trial stages.

The justification behind civil disobedience is vehemently contested. Ralf Dreier is one among a number of legal writers in proposing a jurisprudential justification for civil disobedience: "Whosoever, due to political/moral reasons, fulfills the criteria for a criminal offense in the context of a prohibitive norm, and who acts nonviolently and publicly, and either with others or by themselves, acts in a justified way in reference to the Basic Law [for Germany], if, through their actions, they protest against larger injustice, and if their protest is proportional." However, every jurisprudential attempt at justification remains problematic and not merely because of questions as to how such criteria can be evaluated. Rather, civil disobedience draws its very essence from a violation of the law, a method aimed at reaching the public. This conscious breaking of the rules is intended to draw attention to the affliction weighing on the actors' own consciences, but also ultimately, and more importantly, to direct attention towards state action leading to a violation of a previously prevailing order. As such, a conditional readiness to face the consequences of criminal prosecution is a part of civil disobedience. This does not have to imply that the actors assent to potential punishments. Courts can also function as locations where public contestations of the legitimacy of protest can be conducted. Courts can judge a violation of norms to have been legitimate, if this has merely been illegal *prima facie*, and is subsequently judged legal after further consideration. In the conflicts in the 1980s, the primary legal question was whether sit-ins must be understood as "coercive violence." In a judgment from 1995, the German Constitutional Court clearly rejected this interpretation, leading to acquittals of most of the participants in the sit-ins, years after the event.

The jurisprudential justification of civil disobedience in Germany refers to the principle of "necessity as justification," as outlined in paragraph 34 of the German Criminal Code (or StGB, to use the German acronym). Some references are also made, in the same context, to the "right of resistance," as stated in article 20, paragraph 4, of the Basic Law for Germany. In the aftermath of the sit-ins to protest the Iraq War, which was itself in violation of international law, increased significance was attached to these arguments. The Basic Law prohibits preparations for a war of aggression and support for such a war as a consequence of this prohibition – or so ran the legal argumentation. It is generally accepted that the right of resistance is understood as encompassing the right of resistance against the abolition of legal order. This Basic Law article reveals an inherent contradiction, as it is aimed at legitimizing illegal actions. In practice however, the erosion of a societal order based on a state of law, or *Rechtsstaat*, proceeds gradually. Rights of liberty are sacrificed in the name of security, and wars that break international law are justified by using human rights rhetoric. A "small right of resistance" can be extrapolated from this context.

Be this as it may, the justification of civil disobedience usually takes a positive connection to the current societal order as its starting point. This approach is not about toppling those in power, but rather about a battle for legal positions, in order to assert civil rights and human rights that have been thoroughly understood by a variety of actors, inside the existing order. The protests against the G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany, in 2007, made clear the extent to which disobedience, against an expansionist banning of demonstrations, was met with broad approval, particularly among younger citizens. The offensive circumvention of police lines, and the use of sit-ins,

appear to have become methods that many consider legitimate, and effective in publicity terms. This is particularly so since the protests against the Castor transportations of nuclear waste began, and, more generally, against the use of nuclear power.

Elke Steven

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Civil Disobedience

Civil Society

This term allows us to think about politics in a broader fashion than the category of the state does, at least in a narrow sense of that latter word. What kind of society we live in is also determined outside of parliaments. Ranging from associations, societies and churches, to ➞ social movements, various forms of organized social relations can play a central role in societal transformation – but can also play just as big a role in cementing hegemonic relations. The concept of civil society can serve to direct people's attention to areas of collective action outside of state institutions.

An affirmative connection to civil society can be found in Germany primarily in the neoliberal call for more “civil engagement,” often made by the state itself. Whether Aunt Agnes is meant to single-handedly stop the neofascist mob, or whether a soup kitchen for those impoverished by lowest-level (so-called “Hartz IV”) social-security payments is praised as an example of the “self-healing powers of society,” the message is clear: where the state is failing, civil society should sort things out. This neoliberal turn is anchored in a conceptual tradition which goes back to antiquity, in which civil society is conceived of as a sphere independent of the state, in which citizens can live out their rights to self-determination and ➞ participation. This normative relation to civil society is by no means the sole prerogative of apologists for neoliberalism. The Zapatista, in their fight against neoliberal globalization, also call on Mexican and global civil society to support them in their struggle. This invokes a tradition that is linked to the establishment of new social movements in the 1960s, and especially with the struggles in South America and Eastern Europe in the 1980s: the creation of broad coalitions of opposition made up of political parties, trade unions and social movements, by using the label “civil society united”. While civil society thus understood as the epitome of democracy can serve as a savvy battle-cry – particularly in order to demand minimum standards of citizens’ ➞ social ownership – this conceptualization is in discord with the reality of developed civil societies. More significantly, overly idealized references to civil society threaten to disguise its function in stabilizing relations of authority and hegemony.

The Italian communist Antonio Gramsci prove himself a productive pioneer, in the critical and analytical way in which he tackled the concept. Gramsci's starting point was the question of why, in defiance of ➞ Marxist expectations, it had been possible to achieve a ➞ revolution in Russia, while in more mature capitalist societies revolutions had failed. Gramsci answers thus: "In the East, the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relationship between State and civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there was a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks." In this historical situation observed by Gramsci, civil society reveals itself as a bastion of authoritarian relations. It is possible to extract a central theoretical insight from this observation: the unfolding and development of civil society and civil society activities does not have the same significance as ➞ democratization and ➞ emancipation, but these former elements do change the conditions under which these latter objectives can be realized. In an "integral state" it is not enough to achieve state power, it is also necessary to allow your own side's political strategies and projects to become hegemonic, which means anchoring them culturally in what is taken to be private, everyday life – from sports associations to street names. The emphasis here is on the word "also," in two different terms. Firstly, hegemony has to be instituted in a material sense. Societal projects that have been contested in civil society have to be realized in the economic sphere. Secondly, Gramsci is correct in stressing the enmeshment of state and civil society, which he at one point reduces to this often quoted formula: "state = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony, armored with coercion." From this, we see that action in civil society is in no way free of state intrusions. In the context of the German Federal Republic for example, the "terrorism paragraph" of the Criminal Code (§129a) imposes an abrupt end on all struggles for hegemony. Scrapping this paragraph must become an aim for emancipatory struggles, which by raising this demand are directing themselves against "the state" in a narrower sense of the word term. However, the consensus for this legal change has to be organized on different territory: the territory of civil society.

Martina Blank

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Civil Society

Class Struggles

"The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles." With this expression from the *Communist Manifesto,* Marx and Engels laid the foundation stone for thinking about historical alternatives, which are either asserted through conflicts, transformed into reformist strategies, or suppressed.

In reality, economic crises are rarely times of smoldering "class struggles from below," and therefore rarely "revolutionary times." Instead, the subaltern classes are forced onto the defensive. This is because economic crises don't actually endanger the substance of the capitalist mode of production. Rather, these are an integral component of the system's reproduction. They function as a moment of regeneration of capital's political power, by successfully passing on to the subalterns the costs of managing the crises.

As regards "large crises" however, it is no longer possible to overcome the crisis through existing forms of economic regulation, as was the case for the crises of the 1930s and 1970s. The first, a crisis of assertion of the embryonic Fordist mass production, led to the drafting of a corridor for crisis-politics action, which enforced the regulation of effective demand. The USA's *New Deal* was capable of breaking the increasing militancy of class struggles, and channeling it away down new, reformist routes of the so-called Keynesian class compromise. The economic core of this was linking productivity advances with advances in wages, a model compatible with reproduction through mass production. In Europe, European fascism docked smashing the workers' movement to a form of "armaments Keynesianism." In the post-war order, all class struggles in developed capitalist countries were ultimately located inside Keynesian class compromise.

The reality of the 1970s crisis was utterly different. Resulting from a diminishing dynamic in Fordist production on the one hand, and workforces and trade unions strengthened by full employment on the other, organizations that had, since the end of the 1960s, won wage increases far above progress in productivity, capitalism entered a crisis of profitability. Although workers' movement institutions entered the crisis with a strong hand, a series of new crisis regulation measures were passed, which opened up new spheres of investment to capital, via the privatization of public goods, or the deregulation of the financial markets. The weakening of the trade unions also reinforced industrial profitability.

What both crises have in common is that at the points they broke out, 1929 and 1974/75 respectively, the forms of class struggles that the new economic regulations ultimately constituted were not yet ready for use. The 2007 crisis also commenced without the forms of struggles – that could have resulted in overcoming the crisis – having been fully developed. Antonio Gramsci described a similar situation in Europe in the 1930s, in which "the development of elements of a solution with the requisite speed is blocked; whoever rules cannot solve the crisis, but does have the power to block others solving it, i.e. merely the power, to single-handedly extend the crisis." A dramatically relevant statement. Restorative crisis-politics, as can be observed around us, which considers the crisis as overcome when the conditions before the crisis can be recreated, actually does nothing more than shifting the crisis, without solving it: into the financial markets via the so-called real economy and state budgets, via currency and European integration – and then back again.

Like all "large crises," the most recent crisis of capitalism was the result of a *specific* contradiction in the preceding phase of economic prosperity: a gigantic redistribution of power and wealth from below to above, on which speculative bubbles could continue to feed; and the development of massive, global, economic imbalances and dependence on exports, issues that only failed to cause scandals because of the interventionist effect of private and public debt. Genuinely overcoming crisis demands a restructuring of the whole model of production, based on global division of labor. A restructuring of this sort cannot be established technocratically, but only based on existing political forms. Innovative means of regulation cannot happen without class struggles as their precondition, conflicts which must move outside old, established practice. A new "class project from below," capable of uniting the resistance that has evolved in a scattered fashion during the crisis, is something that still lies before us. For the first time in over 150 years however, overcoming economic crisis seems inextricably linked into the "question about the system."

Bernd Röttger

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Climate Justice

The atmosphere is a global public good, belonging to all people. Accepting this starting point implies that all people can use it as a "depot" for climate-damaging emissions in equal measure. With only c. 13% of the world's population, the G8 states produce almost a princely 50% of global CO^2 emissions. The poorer the country, the less emissions it blasts out into the atmosphere. The imbalanced use of the atmosphere becomes even clearer when we look at per capita emissions. In the poorest countries like Tanzania only around 0.1 tons per capita/annum is emitted, while for Germany the figure is around ten tons, and for the USA around 20 tons of CO^2 per capita per year. When questions of global justice regarding climate protection are discussed, we must also pay attention to the qualitative meaning and not just the quantitative aspect of inequable emission levels. We can then focus on the "luxury emissions" of the richer population groups and the "survival emissions" of the poorer peoples, alongside various possibilities, of aligning these different emission types with the effects of climate change. In addition, we must also consider the possibilities for ➞ participation in climate change decision processes, as well as examining market economy instruments using justice-based criteria. From this perspective, how should a type of climate politics aimed at climate justice, and the distribution and process justice attached to that, be structured?

In international climate politics, the concept of "climate justice" was first understood to mean a "just" distribution of the burdens and costs of these politics – this was at least the understanding in the Framework Convention on Climate Change from 1994. Yet this agreement is blind to questions of justice that stretch beyond the simple differentiation between industrialized and developing countries. This manifests itself in the far too low, binding reduction targets for the industrialized countries.

This principle of justice between states has broadened over the years. Climate politics, so runs the argument used by prevailing opinion, can become just, when it aims at harmonizing per capita emissions at the lowest possible level. Industrialized countries have to substantially reduce emissions per head using a *green economy,* while the developing countries are allowed to increase moderately the same emissions with the help of sustainable growth. Although we can recognize the foundations of liberal principals of justice in this extended comprehension of the topic, it does not go far enough. This demand for the same, fair distribution of the burdens and benefits for each individual regarding atmosphere as a common good represents a pattern of thinking, which does not consider at all approaches based on non-pollution, or an approach based on tackling the climate crisis in a way that does not conform to the market. Instead, the premises of modernity, which have become hegemonic, are reinforced: societal development in both developing and industrialized countries must be accompanied by the efficient utilization of fossil fuels – including atmospheric pollution – with global competition for locations, and with global, economic growth.

This is the point at which social movements launch their critique, by drawing in their practices and struggles on an extended, more socially-critical concept of climate justice, which also takes in ecological and social distribution and process justice (see ➞ social justice), and also gender justice. Examples of this are the networks *Climate Justice Now!* and *Climate Justice Action*. This movement turns the equality of all humans irrespective of place of origin, gender, income or social status into the starting point for all climate politics.

For socially disadvantaged population groups, climate justice is tied up with the demand for societal participation. Seen in this way, climate politics is no longer an affair of states for the international economic exploitation of the depot for greenhouse gases. Rather, such politics must be aimed at – in a more encompassing, democratic sense – the realization of political, social and physical ➞ human rights. It would be "climate just" to end the era of fossil fuel energy, to establish decentralized and renewable energy systems, and to restructure, in emancipatory fashion, the politics of reduction and assimilation – parallel to the comprehensive triumph over global injustices.

Achim Brunnengräber and Kristina Dietz

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Cockaigne

The myth of Cockaigne (known in German by the etymologically contrasting term Schlaraffenland) is interconnected with the myth of its opposite: the "spirit of capitalism" and the protestant work ethic, as elaborated by Max Weber. As an intellectual and spiritual concept, Cockaigne blossomed in the transitional period between the late Middle Ages and the early modern era. The increasing dominance of commodity-money relations and the emergence of urban trade capital were overlaid with images of successful ➞ interrelations with nature: a society in which an economy of gift giving and of overspending could prevail.

"Spaces and times for wishing" have occupied people's fantasies since time immemorial; the expulsion from paradise brought the mortal coil of labor into the world; people from all eras have continued to hope for an end to this misery of labor, which, according to the bible, humans have brought upon themselves. Through ongoing disappointments, the fantasy image starts to change: Cockaigne is now no longer mentally located *temporally* in a distant future, but rather *spatially.* While the myth is always narrated in a tongue-in-cheek manner, the starting point remains the same: "A while back I came into / A land unknown and strange to me / And now I'll tell of wonders large / What God bids the people there to do / To live and be, in that life / Without labor and without pain!" (Interlineal translation from Herman Pleij's poem, via Rainer Kersten's German translation.)

The visitor from the world of “normalism”, who has made their way into the unknown, can certainly understand how this other world functions, even though it appears to be upside down. S/he will return with a greater wealth of experience of alternative ➞ forms of life, which they will narrate to their listeners amongst the common people. Some of these will become curious, and will be tempted to pursue ➞ rebellion. The discourse about Cockaigne refers back to parts of the bible that are widely known (including Isiah; cf. the work of Bloch and Doren on this), and uses this as flexible ammunition against the authorities. Why is this marginalized myth scandalous? Bloch wrote "all humans are equal there, namely, doing pretty well, and there is neither toil nor labor. Roast pigeons fly into your gob … all things and dreams are ready at hand as utilizable commodities. This is the pleasant life of the Cockaignians, who no longer allow the rich to tell them how very unenviable wealth actually is. Or how unhealthy long sleep is, how deadly idleness, and how very much we need destitution, so that the whole of life doesn't stand still." What happens in Cockaigne? Commodities are liberated from their commodity relations and are enjoyed as use values. They are available to everyone all the time on a moneyless basis. Pigs walk around with a knife in their backs, roasted poultry wing their way into mouths, and wine and beer flow as brooks; tables, benches, keys and houses, are all made out of omelets, meat pâtés and cakes. Prototypes for these images came from the eating orgies of the aristocrats and of the princes of the church, which had the subversive intention not of disciplining the top brass, but rather of making the sumptuous lifestyle available to everybody. Nature is positively alienated against this backdrop: "Whether fish or meat or fat capon / They cook themselves merrily, with their feathers still on" (Pleij, see ibid). Cockaignians have an ironical connection to gold and money: both simply lie around, and mean nothing. But in order to illustrate abuse in the other world (our normal world) of commodity fetishism, money in Cockaigne becomes the yardstick the greatest bodily feats are measured against. Whoever burps the louds, whoever drinks the most, or whoever's fecal production bears the greatest resemblance to Rabelais' Pantagruel (see here Bakhtin's concept of the "grotesque body") – gets paid the most money as wages for their labors. Whoever gets into debt will be paid back twice as much as what they owe, in short "whoever sleeps the longest [in that land] earns the most" (Pleij). All representations of Cockaigne discuss punishments for those who are addicted to labor: beatings, the pillory, and ultimately prison: for those madly determined to work. Unsurprisingly, the "mythology of labor" (Adorno) has taken and is still taking its revenge on this alternative realm. Cockaigne is discredited as being about consumerism, and critics omit to mention the "dialectical quality of the upside-down world" (Hegel), which crystallized into the basic structure for Cockaigne / Schlaraffenland around 1700, in the work of Caspar Gottschling. Deprived by its critics of its radical dialectic, Cockaigne contains nothing more than notoriously idle rogues, who not even Lafargue's ➞ right to be lazy can save. The critics' cunning strategy has been to strip the myth of power by presenting it as a saccharin, children's fairy tale. In contrast to this, Bloch's roadmap of utopias leads from Cockaigne – via Charles Fourier's demand that "two hours labor daily are enough!" – to a strategic evaluation of alternative movements. Whoever wants to realize a subsidiary aim – the category into which many critics of unconditional ➞ basic income put the efforts of UBI’s supporters – has to introduce a utopian surplus value into the field of discourse: a "pathos of the overall aim," as Bloch put it. Without this, no mobilization will work – mobilizations for aims included. Cockaigne can function as a seductive template for unconditional basic income. It already functions as a myth, opposing neoliberalism in its guise as a "utopia of boundless exploitation" (Bourdieu).

Manfred Lauermann

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Cockaigne

Commonism

In capitalism, the aim of production is profit. This is what companies want to make, while investors want a return on their money. This is founded upon private property, meaning that a person or a company gains comprehensive exploitation and utilization rights to a particular thing, including the right of excluding others from utilizing this thing. Most people only get the chance of fully participating in society if they can convince a company that their labor power can be applied profitably. However, this is difficult, as it involves competing with others who want the same. Yet the companies are forced into this competitive battle, if they want to sell their goods at a profit, because solvent customers are just as scarce as paid work. Profit, scarcity and competition are capitalism's requisite foundational elements.

A "strong state" is often extolled as the alternative to this. This, however, can do no more than alleviate symptoms, as states under capitalism only apply those game rules that enable market competition to develo "Commonism" is one of many terms used to discuss a radical alternative. This is not about mere critique, nor about purely theoretical debates, but rather about recognizing embryonic forms of entirely different modes of society and of production, and about understanding and strengthening these. Key elements of commonism are the ➞ commons themselves, common goods, and *peer production*, which is based on voluntary contributions and cooperation.

Debates about commonism emerged out of various political currents, and are only now starting to grow together gradually. One of their shared roots is the Oekonux Project, in which GNU/Linux, the free operating system, and free software in general, are viewed as a possible foundation for a different kind of economy. Companies also contribute to the development of free software for profit purposes, but this is not a commodity, and many participants are driven by other motivations. They develop free software because they're interested in co-shaping the work, and because the work gives them the chance to do things they enjoy, while others wish to contribute something back to society – without being obliged to do so. Peer production is not about profit, but about the participants' needs and wishes.

Peer production builds from what is already in the commons and, in turn, produces new commons itself. Put differently, this kind of production nurtures and improves the existing commons. These insights were first developed by Yochai Benkler, who also coined the phrase *commons-based peer production.* Alongside free software, this includes the free culture movement, with Wikipedia and OpenStreetMap as prominent examples, free radio networks, and community gardens. The things that emerge aren't private property belonging exclusively to particular individuals, but rather commons, which can be used, cared for and improved by anyone who's interested.

Commonism theory postulates that commons-based peer production could flourish outside of niches, and could help to reshape radically the whole of society. In practice, production of this type has gone beyond the stage of merely producing information. Increasingly, material products like furniture, clothes, electronics and machines are being communally designed in the internet, using object descriptions and building instructions that are also disseminated as commons *(open hardware).* Communities of peer producers construct means of production that are free to use, ranging from 3D-printers – and other types of digital fabricators – to CNC machines, to tractors. Parallel to this, self-organized spaces for needs-orientated production have sprung up in hundreds of towns and cities, often called fablabs or hackerspaces.

People increasingly taking production into their own hands does not mean that everyone will have to produce for themselves in the future. Rather than concentrating on one's own work, or subsisting in small groups, the focus is on communal activity and voluntary production for others and with others.

Nevertheless, production is only possible if the requisite resources are available. The decisive factor in capitalism establishing itself was "original accumulation" – which continues until today. This includes fencing off commons, both physically and immaterially, which are privatized or destroyed in this process. Today, the exact opposite form of struggle presents itself, the struggle to reproduce and recreate the commons, in order to establish a lasting, viable foundation for self-organized and autonomous communal peer production. Making both state and market superfluous into the bargain.

Christian Siefkes

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Commonism

Commons

DNA is what we all have in common. While it is complex as a whole, it still reveals a simple principle: it doesn't contain a single monopoly. The abundance of life emerges out of the free combinability of four building blocks. A similar assertion can be made for the *Commons,* for which no satisfying German translation has yet been found. The diversity of the appearance-forms and organizational-forms that the commons takes on results from the possibility to combine its various elements: *common pool resources,* user communities – from small groups to the world-community – and self-determined rules and norms.

Extremely contrasting shared resources can acquire the status of commons: ground and soil, seeds, raw materials, water, knowledge, are and culture, language, public spaces, a healthcare and/or education system, software – and much more besides. The process of resources becoming commons depends on political decisions and social processes in various localities. The term itself can be more deeply understood by thinking about the German word for community, *Gemeinschaft,* which is understood as a community that grants advantages to all members of a parish / community in turn. Commons can be nurtured, retained and further developed through collective action. This process is termed *commoning.* This is not primarily about production for the market, but rather about the immediate satisfaction or needs. Whether something is or will become commons depends on how it is used, and how successfully the commoning takes place.

There are no secret recipes for retaining or establishing principles. Yet, according to Elinor Ostrom, there are "design principles" for ensuring that commoning works and that commons have a long life. Clear rules about the boundaries of commons; the most direct communication possible for establishing trust in cooperation, and mechanisms for the same purpose; effective sanctions in case of violation of rules; and direct conflict resolution. Particularly important are a minimum degree of state recognition for problem resolutions "from below"; and self-organization. Commons are not a special form of goods, nor do they represent a special form of ownership (shared less). They should certainly not be seen as a "no man's land," in which anyone can simply help herself or himself, or behave as they see fit. Rather, the term connotes multifaceted arrangement to produce and retain resources that are used communally. This implies that commons do not *exist* in themselves, but need to be made. The fundamental factor is a specific kind of social interrelations, in connection to things that are necessary for their existence. Here, the insight that resources necessary for our lives and our cultural elaboration cannot be appropriated exclusively by particular individuals or companies. Instead, they necessitate fairer and more sustainable processes of appropriation. Ostrom concludes that the complexity of large (communal) resource systems demands a polycentric system of governance. An order, which doesn't consist of *one* authority decreeing order, but rather of a number of smaller units interlocked with each other, facilitating self-determination and self-organization.

Commons are as old as human society. The term originally comes from preindustrial England. People's fundamental rights were to be reinforced by utilization rights to the "commons." It was decreed that wood for building and heating, pasture for cattle and land to grow crops had to be available to everyone, even when land ownership remained private. (Multiple forms of ownership have roles to play in the commons that can be combined in multiple ways.) In turn, this kind of use guarantees care and retention of woods and pasture. Moreover, the right to commons includes the right to defend commons. This can mean the right to tear down fences and prevent *enclosures.*

Scientific research provided an important impulse for the current reanimation of the commons debate, especially interdisciplinary research networks that organize themselves through the International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC). Particularly since the start of the 1990s, a debate has drawn much attention, about the containment of the commons in the fields of knowledge, information and culture. In practice, the free software movement, and projects to create a knowledge-commons – including Creative Commons, Wikipedia, and open educational resources – have enlivened this debate.

Thinking consequently about categories of the commons means stopping thinking in dichotomies. Commons exist beyond the individual versus the collective, but also "beyond market and state" (Ostrom). This is the decisive, transformative power of the commons, capable of developing into the alternative to the capitalist market economy. Commons also offer an alternative to the coercion towards growth that is built into capitalism, which politicians have no means of opposing, and which considerably erodes the communal resources available to us.

Silke Helfrich

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Commons

Common Sense

As a theoretical concept, this term entered critical theory through the work of Antonio Gramsci. His conceived the notion as a consciousness that was fragmentary, contradictory, orientated towards dealings with others, composed of various parts, and one that drew from various sources. ''Elements of stone-age man, and principles of the most modern and advanced science,'' may be attributed to it. Typical for ''common sense'' is compartmental thinking, making it incoherent. Common sense is not simply coincidental, but rather a wholly functional means with which to move through a contradictory world, and to manage various challenges. By using this concept, Gramsci is able to navigate past the disastrous apprehension of a ''false consciousness," that it was previously thought could only be altered through re-education (at best); others thought such a form of consciousness should even be eliminated. Instead of looking for ''false'' or ''correct'' / ''true'' contents, the focus now rests with what results from this form of consciousness. These results are understood as moments of social ownership.

This is the juncture at which emancipatory education and politics come into play. These processes cannot be about moralistic teaching of the people ''from above," but rather about assisting them in ''taking stock'' of the contents of their common sense. As this does contain elements which, if reflected upon in context, could become critical. We emphasize that common sense is more than just mere thoughts. Instead, common sense is primarily a practical way of relating to oneself and to others, and of comprehending the world. If ➞ emancipatory education wants to make use of the concept of common sense, then such an education cannot ignore everyday practices. On the contrary, such education needs to start with everyday behavior, and go on from there to ask questions about how we can interpret this, and which contradictions and perspectives are implicit in it.

This approach should not be confused with the extraneous ''subject orientation'' of mainstream education. Alternatively, it takes both its theoretical stringency and its political-practical relevance from analyzing societal contradictions. The defining features of common sense in an individual human should be understood in the context of hegemonic rule. That individual is not simply subject to hegemony, but rather carries it inside herself or himself. Forms of education and politics building from common sense make possible a resolution – albeit at first only occasional, and step-for-step – of the initially unreflective enmeshment of the individual in hegemonic relations. Alternatives start to become thinkable and do-able, whereby biographical idiosyncrasies should be respected. Alternatives and resistance cannot be developed by making life uniform, but rather as expressions of an individualized structuring of the social and cultural spheres. It is the totalizing force of capital relations that reduces individuality to occurrences in the world of commodities; critical pedagogy and politics would make a genuine plurality of forms of experience available for the first time. And, it should be stressed, this would be *during* the process of emancipation, and not postponed until the secular afterlife of the ➞ revolution. For Gramsci, the goal of critically reflecting on common sense is to acquire more intellectual coherence, a process that fits with his overall aim of constructing a philosophy of practice. The latter can, in turn, only become real culture when the re-engineering of common sense has begun.

Nonetheless, we should not disguise the fact that reflecting on common sense and gaining critical coherence can only reach beyond the intellectual dimension to a limited extent: life lived inside the contradictions of bourgeois society continues, even though we are more conscious about it. But this society is now seen from the perspective of individuals who want to triumph over it. While reforming individual consciousness does touch upon the hegemonic edifice, this will only start to shake when the masses start to question their connections to the edifice. Emancipatory educational work that does not resonate in a social or cultural movement is just as much a waste of time as leftist politics that thinks it can ignore the worries, ideas, dreams and prejudices of everyday life. Political organizations have the task of providing spaces for the collective reworking of common sense. This demands, simultaneously, that the same organizations overcome their limitations: being political alone is not enough.

On this note, all projects concerning alternatives, reflection and experiments should be supported as moments of re-engineering. Of course not all projects will actually lead to ''revolutionary practice'' (Marx), but will provide experiences. Critical politics then needs to analyze to what extent these experiences can be generalized, if necessary increasing what it offers in terms of organizations.

Uwe Hirschfeld

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Communism

Three platitudes continue to do the rounds about communism (from the Latin *communis,* shared): it was, alongside fascism, the twentieth century's second "totalitarian system"; its time has passed; and its impact was solely due to a secularized "messianic promise of salvation." The first platitude is as true as it is false in equal measures, social struggles will prove the second to be an error, while the third carries an element of truth within it, which still has to be evolved. The first and third platitudes are often recited together, and combine a vulgar atheism with an ultimate approval for prevailing conditions.

It is correct to say that communism, in expecting complete upheaval (Latin: *revolutio*) joins, in a messianic manner, our history with the beginning of a completely different history. That's why it comes as no surprise to discover that it has Judeo-Christian roots, and first emerged, via the French ➞ revolution, as *utopian* communism. However, it is also correct to point out that communism took on a radical change of direction through Karl Marx' thought. Marx also conceived of communism is messianic – but not primarily as a utopia, as we can read in *The German Ideology* (1846): "Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement that abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence."

So communism is the movement of upheaval itself, in the here and now, which is why the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848) calls it "the movement progressing in front of our eyes." The correlative of this is that the "communist's theoretical sentences" are not invented by "world-improvers," but are, instead "general expressions of actual relations of class-struggle as it currently exists," i.e. of the "real movement," sublating communism out of existing conditions. In so doing, communism unites the complete turnaround of all relations to be arrived at practically through social struggles with the theoretical ambition to grant these struggles "general" – i.e. correct, truthful and authentic expression. The messianic promise hidden in this linkage concerns the proletariat – meaning the mass of those denied private ownership of the means of production – triumphing over prevailing conditions of production, in carrying through the communistic movement, and entering into an "association" to replace "the old, bourgeois society of classes and class antagonisms." In this form of "association," "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" – in that order, and not the other way around!

The requisites to uphold this promise are brought forth out of the Global "Becoming" of class-society itself, and consist of the fact that the mass, excluded from private ownership of means of production, will become a global majority. In order for the masses to enter the fray as a majority in the worldwide struggles against class-society, the *Manifesto* demands that they shed their "national character." It also demands that they detach themselves from the bonds of their family, ethnic, religious and class origins, from the "societal status" accorded to "differences in gender and in age," and from other bourgeois ideologies, in order to join together for "united action" in this radical state of *property-lessness*.

When you apply the *Manifesto's* theoretical premises to the present, it can be said that the condition of possibility of communism, the Global Becoming of the masses – excluded from private ownership of the means of production, and released from all binds – actually does represent the consistent tendency of the globalized class-society. Yet their paths are blocked more powerfully by opposing tendencies than many communists have hitherto realized. It is in this imbalance – although, certainly, not only here – that the monstrous terror, practiced by communists in the name of communism, has its roots. Since this terror first broke out, it must always be born in mind. Nevertheless, the practical and theoretical task of communism remains, precisely because of the terror, *in principle* the same as that drafted in the *Manifesto.* It must determine and strengthen those tendencies inside social struggles – which can strengthen, but which can also override each other – in which communism, i.e. "the independent movement of the tremendous plurality, in the interests of the tremendous plurality" – i.e. the communistic masses – becomes radically free of bonds. In order to open itself up for the messianic promise of its own possibility: in order to become messianic.

Thomas Seibert

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Comprehensive Schools

The German-language "*eine Schule for alle"* ("one school for everyone") campaign can best be communicated by referring to UK comprehensive schools. It is aimed, politically, at the abolition of a tiered school system, and educationally, at the realization of a ➞ emancipatory and democratic school form. The fact that educational success depends on socioeconomic background, a reality reinforced by a hierarchical division into three types of schools in the German system – *Hauptschule, Realschule* and *Gymnasium* – should be challenged by the egalitarian counterweight of "one school for everyone." The school structure proposed in recent years is based on ten years of unsegregated schooling in a state-financed and state-run form of school. This is targeted at overcoming the academic segregation of students, which applies during the period from school year 5 to school year 10 (known as *Sekundartufe I*, in German). It also aims at doing away with the need to create extra schools for students with disabilities. Instead of the practices of not allowing students to proceed to the next grade or year, and of "de-schooling" students down to a lower-level school, both based on students' academic performance, one-school-for-everyone is based on progressive educational concepts. Heterogeneous classes are perceived as a learning incentive, and an opportunity of establishing relations of students learning from and tutoring each other. The old, authoritarian type of school should make way for a democratic school culture, which is why a far-reaching process of shared decision-making between students, parents and educationalists is an integral part of this concept. All children possessing a general ability to learn and to acquire education is taken as a fact on which to ground the whole project, as opposed to the concept of students possessing natural gifts, which today is seen as an ideological justification for the segregation into different types of school.

Historically speaking, the battle for "one school for everyone" descends from the political tradition of the German-language part of the workers' movement, and its demands, in the field of education politics, for a "unitary school" (*Einheitsschule*). It is also, however, a product of the progressive education movement, or *Reformpädagogik*, which pressed for participative learning environments. In West Germany prior to reunification (1949-1990), the demand to create one school for everyone continued to fail due to the bitter resistance put up by the bourgeois camp, who defended, and still continue to defend the gymnasium as the guarantor of the privilege of their humanistic education. While it was possible to introduce an alternative type of school in the shape of a comprehensive school, or *Gesamtschule*, in several federal states in the 1970s, these had no chance of properly establishing themselves as a regular school form, as they were considered to be a mere extension of the hierarchical school system. When the former East German federal states were integrated into reunified Germany, the GDR's unitary school model was wound u

Recently, the demand for one school for everyone has been taken up again by diverging interest groups in society. One motivation for this has been Germany's poor results, from 2001 on, in the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), understood as international ratings for school education, and commissioned by the OECD. Another catalyst has been increasing demands for an internationally competitive educational system, voiced as part of the ongoing transformation towards a post-Fordist knowledge-based society. The German system was sharply criticized in the international educationalists' report. Not only did it fail to offset students being disadvantaged by social and cultural differences in the starting points for their educational journeys. Moreover, the current structure of the German school system actually reinforces societal inequalities to a high degree. In the face of this long-term discrimination against many children, particularly against those coming from black and minority ethnic backgrounds, or from so-called socially weak families, the very early selection of students into hierarchic school types – as spotlighted by the OECD comparative study – has been put increasingly under pressure. Austria is the only other European country that separates the vast majority of its school students so early – also, like Germany, when they're ten or eleven years old. Representatives from business associations do not have a problem with the existing school structure in terms of democracy, but rather in terms of locational politics. They criticize that the tiered system is only suited to a now outdated industrial society, based on a clear separation between intellectual and manual labor, while contemporary working processes are increasingly directed by knowledge-based activities, for which intellectually qualified workers are a must. "One school for everyone," intended to have socially compensating effects, also promises to act as a correlative to the growing demand for modern "knowledge-society" workers.

As an institution of society, school fulfills the function of a pedagogical generalization of requirements that are stipulated by the fields of qualification and education. Under current capitalist relations, these are directed at actors in an economy, shaped around the commodity, wanting to utilize the "products" of primary and secondary level education. Simultaneously, every school system has to be perceived as a contested interrelation of forces, in which immediate economic interventions are thwarted by the struggle for ➞ emancipatory educational contents and practices. The politics of "a school for everyone" also exist between these poles:

democratic-humanistic targets *and* the neoliberal insistence on "school as location" as a postulate for competition are both mainsprings of the contemporary school system debate. A starting point that unquestionably demands critically reflective action, including subversive action, should demand an egalitarian and pedagogically progressive structure for German schools, without falling into the trap of actually going backwards, while appearing to move forwards.

Andreas Merkens

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Comprehensive Schools

Cooperation

Cooperation is the name we give to the human activity that forms the bedrock of all areas of society, and which places humans in (re)-productive interrelations with each other – relations that are brokered in countless ways. Its immediate aspect is to describe the fundamental level of the actual, material life-processes that appropriate nature, processes in which humans work together, communicate, and take on – either directly or indirectly – the work and experiences of other human beings. According to Klaus Türk, cooperation should not be conceived as an exchange process of isolated individuals, who are focused on maximizing benefit. Instead, Türk sees cooperation as a preexisting sociality, which reaches beyond the productive work of each individual, a timeless instance, and as such a condition for the possibility of individuality. Examples of cooperative behavior can be found, for example, in households, when bringing up children, in capitalist enterprises, when thinking, writing, and even by war-like conflicts.

Cooperation continues to be mediated through societal formations that have varied throughout history; as such, it is not free from issues of power. "The sporadic application of co-operation on a large scale in ancient times, in the Middle Ages, and in modern colonies, reposes on relations of dominion and servitude, principally on slavery. The capitalist form, on the contrary, presupposes from first to last, the free wage-laborer, who sells his labor-power to capital." (Karl Marx) In the first instance, Marx uses the term cooperation to define productive forces, and to define production of relative surplus value in the immediate production process. Although, by concentrating on this, other areas of society tend to be neglected, Marx does highlight a decisive problem. In capitalist production, it is capital itself that *appears*, alongside the division between labor and machinery, as a productive force, and not cooperation. This is because the unity of workers cooperating with each other is located in capital in the combined entity of the "whole worker," or *Gesamtarbeiter*, to use the German term. Capital reduces individual parts of labor power to carrying out sub-functions that are useless outside the factory regime. Workers' ability to act productively in this location is a result of capital and not of an "ability of the species" developed independently.

Analyzing "coerced" cooperation in capitalist enterprises and other hierarchic organizations is not solely about recognizing the concealment of productive forces, but also about appreciating the value of these forces in the framework of workers' resilience. If they're not able to violate the rules and norms of formal organizations, and to act independently in an informal and cooperative manner, then it is barely possible for workers to produce a viable result from their work. If they refuse to make use of this insubordinate form of cooperation, by using "work-to-rule" as a form of resistance for example, the irrationality and despotism of capitalist production are fully exposed. These autonomous and cooperative "experiments" therefore have two functions at once: they're the foundation for fulfilling planes laid down by capital, *and* they're the basis for labor struggles that germinate, time after time. ➞ Wildcat strikes and factory occupations should not be primarily regarded as spontaneous or anarchistic disturbances by workers however, but rather as planned, egalitarian coordinations of cooperating actors. Actions such as these are also the moment at which ➞ grassroots-democratic decision processes come to the fore. Cornelius Castoriadis goes as far as to say that, above the structure of capitalist-bureaucratic organizations, a specific form of self-determined cooperation asserts itself, the nucleus of an alternative kind of cooperation, or, to use Marx' words, a transit station of revolutionary union through association (➞ free association).

Building on the work of Christoph Spehr, who differentiates between "forced" and "free" cooperation, the question must be asked as to how much "free" or self-determined cooperation has always been present in the areas of forced cooperation? Which political possibilities are there for enabling the seed of "free" cooperation present in "forced" cooperation to develop further? Experience shows that attempts to realize "free" cooperation more fully – historically, for example, in the movement of ➞ soviet councils, but also in Zapatista activity, or in factory occupations around the globe – frequently started from concrete labor struggles: and had an enormous impact on society, precisely because of that.

Peter Scheiffele

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Cooperatives

Cooperatives are self-governing companies and enterprises, held in shared ownership between all their members. In their day-to-day looking, they look to the norms and goals of ➞ solidaristic economics. Yet these companies also continue their attempt to compete inside markets against other, non-cooperative companies. In some countries, cooperatives form an impressive part of the 'civic sector,' while they dominate whole branches and regions in particular regions – the agricultural cooperatives in Emilia-Romagna (northeast Italy) for example, or the Mondragón cooperative complex in the Basque region in Spain.

Cooperatives were invented by the workers' movement and grew as an organized and economic form of self-help and self-defense, against various forms of exploitation and repression. Small consumer cooperatives were founded in the 1820s, unsupported by aims for thorough economic reform. Producer cooperatives followed – often by staff taking over bankrupt companies – and, later, these were joined by cooperatives for credit, housing and insurance. A further stage, cooperatives amalgamated; in turn, these amalgamations built up shared enterprises for all members – schools, shopping cooperatives, transport cooperatives, planning and engineering offices, and research and development offices. New cooperatives aimed at providing self-help regularly emerge in times of crisis. In a similar manner, small-scale self-employed individuals – for example, farmers or tradesmen – can form cooperatives, in order to be able to resist the economic power asserted by large trading capital, the banks, or industry.

All cooperatives are based on the principle of owners and workers identifying with each other, or, in the cases of consumer cooperatives, on owners identifying with customers. In principle, every cooperative member has the same share in the enterprise, and is therein simultaneously co-owner and co-worker. This is what the elementary principle of self-administration is based on – the management is made up of all cooperative member, each of them equally involved in the important decisions the enterprise has to face. In practice, this means that managers and directors are determined by the cooperative members, and can be voted in *and* voted out. In principle, each member has an equally large share in the cooperative, and the same voting and decision-making rights – concerning all decisions. Cooperatives also remain in the shared ownership of all the members – it's possible for anyone to resign from the cooperative, but no one can buy or sell shares in the cooperative. Cooperatives are – or should be – open to new members. It must be noted that cooperatives, which decide to hire wage laborers instead of enabling them to join as new members, go through a complete transformation in character.

In 1896, Franz Oppenheimer constructed the so-called law of cooperative transformation – also known as 'Oppenheimer's Law'. This postulated that the long-term perspective for cooperatives was either to go bankrupt, or to transform themselves into normal, capitalist enterprises. The cooperative movement countered this by arguing that strategies for survival and growth certainly could be successful, if cooperatives ally with each other, and expand the solidaristic economy sector by founding new enterprises. So are cooperatives capable of living under capitalism? The empirical evidence that answers 'yes' is overwhelming, as central claims of neoclassical economics in this regard are erroneous: inside cooperatives, profits are not normally distributed – as they're to shareholders in a normal company – but are invested in the members' own enterprise. In addition, wages drawn for work are on average lower, and differences in wages and salaries are normally smaller than in comparable capitalist, private companies. There is definitely no decrease in workforce productivity, quality, or innovative ability, work satisfaction is much higher, and fluctuation in staff members is much lower. Large cooperatives, who are in a position of being able to cooperate with many other cooperatives, appear to be extraordinarily resistant, even in times of large-scale crisis.

In ➞ socialist and ➞ anarchistic traditions, cooperatives are perceived as schools for economic self-administration, and as nuclei for a solidaristic, democratically organized economy. As an element in a long-term transformation strategy, cooperatives play a part in many movements that critique capitalism. However, in order to serve as role models, as living examples of another way of working and running the economy, they need more. They need forms of everyday self-administration and collective, democratically organized self-determination in enterprises, in the work place, while shopping, when saving or investing money in an institution. These practices of self-determination 'point beyond themselves' – if we may use this Marxian phrase.

Michael R. Krätke

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Counter-hegemony

As a concept, counter-hegemony can be understood as contributing to ➞ emancipatory movements developing strategic perspectives. In this sense, hegemony isn't seen exclusively in terms of its coercing and compelling elements, but rather as a way in which the ruled over are bound into developments in society – in a sometimes more, sometimes less consensual manner. This is the dominance that Antonio Gramsci described as hegemony. As an interchange of political, economic and socio-cultural interrelations, hegemony emerges in the form of strategies and projects of the dominating powers in society, who, in turn, must agree alliances with each other, and maintain balance. In addition, hegemony is created through selective compromises with the hegemonies and their organizations, in connection with various front lines of conflict – this doesn't stop massive marginalization processes taking place. Under certain circumstances, compromises and distributions of power are fine-tuned to last a long time. The state, using both its local and its international mechanisms, is an important territory on which this hegemonic safeguarding is played out. Despite this, there is no privileged point from which emancipatory action can approach these issues – approaching exclusively from the side of the state for example, won't work here.

Using the term counter-hegemony should allow us to take more strongly into account strategic elements among pluralistic, emancipatory actors – including emancipatory movements and associations, leftist parties, left-wing currents inside trade unions, and critical academics and journalists. In so doing, the focus is not only on the "big" decisions, concerning new employment market laws or wars, nor just on highly visible ➞ mobilizations for protests, but also on the manifold, daily – and often invisible – constellations of power.

This is where we should identify some contemporary points of leverage, in both critical analysis and in emancipatory movements. Firstly, this implies a counter-hegemonic perspective, and carefully for strategies of authority. Making power and hegemony visible is often the first point of leverage from which to change these instances. Secondly, critique of globalization, as currently dominant, often tends towards a problematical "above and below" model, which identifies politicians, bureaucrats and managers as the agents driving neoliberal-imperial hegemony forward. It is often overlooked that the conditions that are criticized – and which we are discussing changing – are at least passively accepted by many people. Thirdly, diagnoses reached through applying theory to current developments and historical experiences are important for developing practical alternatives. Knowledge about societal relations does not just accrue theoretically, but also in the midst of concrete conflicts, and coupled to specific experiences. It is however just as important, to be able to integrate these experiences into wider reaching analysis. Time and again, actors changing society have to reaffirm for themselves the (in)-stability of ruling structures, constellations of power and processes – in a subjective *and* a discursive sense – in order to develop their own strategies. Fourthly, counter-hegemonic perspectives and practices consider emancipatory and not very institutionalized ➞ social movements and alliances to be the central objects of their focus. However, these perspectives also take in institutional structures and practices, for example in companies, public administrations, schools and universities, which need, in part, to be reformed, "from the inside out." Such change is not simply the outcome of social movements, but also, for example, the outcome of dissent inside institutions, or answers that have been sought to particular problems.

Emphasizing more intensely the strategic dimensions of conflicts could prevent emancipatory movements primarily orientating themselves around ruling powers' agendas: the next G8 summit in one's home country for example, or a law that has been blocked. These concrete occasions are important, or course, but from a counter-hegemonic perspective, they should be supplemented by the protestors' own agendas – that have been discussed and reflected upon. Counter-hegemonic perspectives and practices urgently need to be internationalized. This means not only strengthening international alliances and campaigns. The imperialistic way of life is based for many people in the societies of the Global North – both hegemonizing and hegemonized people – on a materially and culturally advantageous involvement in the international division of labor. This fact is hardly addressed at present, neither by leftist parties, nor by trade unions, nor by the major part of the social movements. How this can be pushed to the top of agendas – through educational and organizational processes; through trenchant demands and international alliances; through hard conflicts and fundamental institutional changes – remains to be seen.

Ulrich Brand

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Counter-public Spheres

What role did the internet and social media (including Twitter and Facebook) play in the ➞ series of revolutions that began in December 2010 in the Near and Middle East? How decisive was the hacktivist group Anonymous' contribution to the start of the ➞ Occupy movement? Will governments and corporations ultimately triumph in their efforts to control the internet – using methods including the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, which the European Parliament decided to reject in 2012, or the massive attacks seen in recent years against WikiLeaks, and other sharing platforms? In a novel way, the public sphere has become the realm of heightened altercations. Information warfare remains a popular phrase, and one that demonstrates that disseminating suppressed information is the easier part of the counter-public sphere. Communicating perspectives that contradict hegemonic viewpoints is the difficult part.

The public sphere is one function that power has available. Whoever can control or influence which information is swapped, which depictions of 'reality' are accessible, and which questions are posed, can control and influence the actions of groups or individuals. That's why the public sphere is always a contested space, an axiom true for every group, institution or society. The counter-public sphere in contrast emerges as a spontaneous practice from 'conversations held in whispers'. However, it can also constitute a highly organized form of counter-power, which produces and utilizes its own media, or by setting targets in order to affect, undermine and transform the hegemonic public-sphere.

The 1960s and 70s were a series of highs about 'counter' as an idea. People intervened to shape the counter-public, counter-information, counter-power, and so on. An array of 'people's own' media came into being. The new ➞ social movements, second wave ➞ feminism, many groups and currents in the New Left, and countless cultural groups and initiatives were grounded in these technological upheavals. The production of people's own printed publications and radio programs continues to get simpler and cheaper. Since the 1990s, new technologies, in conjunction with the internet, created enormous global communication possibilities, which in turn sublated the old dichotomy of broadcaster and recipient, in favor of more interactive, networked structures. Indymedia became one of the global counter-public's primary and central projects.

However, the hegemonic media's structural lead is not just made up of money, power and control. It also consists of the ability, acquired over years, of tapping into diverse, everyday experience, and of being able to offer 'appropriate' ways of acting, even though in practice these often simply mean the wish to be passive. It is difficult for the counter-public to attack dominant public opinion about the financial crisis. Since the 1980s, representatives from hegemonic politics are happy to admit that the world is in a bad way – so that they can present themselves as the most powerful problem solver in the next breath.

With hindsight, the conception that the extra-parliamentary opposition (in German: APO) had about the counter-public can be seen to be strongly influenced by the bourgeois concept of a single, true and representative public, as requisite for sensible decision-making. Rather, as we now know, a plurality of publics exist, with 'public' itself always being a social production. The counter-public also has to face up to the power structures, marginalization and blind spots, which it itself creates. In the internet as in other media networks 'attention economics' becomes a factor of power, alongside structures of property. Both of these factors are however based on resources and abilities. Race, class and gender all structure the possibilities for appropriating new media, and using them in one's own interest. The counter-public has to face up to external evaluation concerning whether it manages to break with this mirroring – at times even accentuation – of pre-existing inequalities.

The standards that the counter-public sphere sets itself are manifold: to be different; to give other people and groups a platform; to seek communication with other people and groups; to be controlled in a non-commercial and democratic fashion; and to critically influence and transform the dominant, mainstream public. This counter-public is not just about media and niches, but is also about using democratic language and non-elitist forms of organization, and about popular social and cultural spaces. Despite all this, the counter-public's task remains the same as that described by Günter Eich: ''be sund in the cogs of the world, not oil!''

Christoph Spehr

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Critical Emergency and Development Aid

This term describes a concept, which sees helping as part of political action aimed at a sustainable victory over want and over political immaturity. With an approach based on causes, critical emergency and development aid distances itself from other aid concepts, which are mostly concerned with mitigating people's dire situation with a flood of material goods, without considering the long-term impact of these intrusions into the respective societal contexts. Whether intended of not, this kind of "quick aid" makes a significant contribution to reinforcing those same global-societal interrelations that systematically produce want and dependency.

The fundament for critical aid is a steady analysis of both the relations that exist between those in need of aid and those prepared to give it, and of the political, social and cultural conditions, in which aid is granted. It is well known that one of aid's idiosyncrasies is its two-facedness. One the one hand, aid for the destitute is a humane destitute, deciding, as it can, over life and death; on the other hand, aid contributes to the retention of those conditions that produce want in the first place. If aid takes care of "repairing" mistakes in the system, then it also helps to overcome deficits in political legitimacy. Critical emergency aid responds to such ambivalence by attempting to defend, criticize and transform existing aid provision, all at the same time. For example, however necessary it is to stop further erosion in levels of minimum social benefits, it is also just as necessary, to reject the authoritarian nature of social benefit as such, and to insist on its metamorphosis into an adequately calibrated ➞ basic income.

There is much consensus about the moral-ethical foundations of aid in itself. Critical aid is also based on individuals' readiness to help, while working towards the creation of agreements in societies that would guarantee a legal right to financial support in times of want. This type of aid concept has many roots, including the "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" from 1966. The signatory states committed themselves to the realization of various rights, including the right to social security, and to a life without hunger. This means there is a legal claim to efforts to overcome destitution in currently valid international law, albeit a claim that is guaranteed by states less and less. One consequence of neoliberal globalization strategies and the crisis of nation-state politics that has accompanied it, is that the civil rights based safeguarding of ➞ human rights is under pressure everywhere – not just in the global South. This is, as Hannah Arendt put it, "the right to have rights." In a system of globalized relations, the realization of ➞ social rights can only be successful when these are stretched out to cover the whole globe. "Stretching" in this case means creating and bringing into force of a cluster of international agreements, which action social redistribution, and liberate people from destitution and dependency.

In this vein, a system of financial redistribution, regulated by international law, to fight against the global health catastrophe, is a thinkable model, and one through which the wealthy countries would pay for the health needs of the poorer states. A system of this kind would take up the principle of a shared division of risk – the core of the concept of ➞ solidaristic health insurances – and internationalize the principle. under this scenario, support in times of emergency would no longer depend either on those in need of aid "behaving as they should," nor on selfish considerations on behalf of aid-givers, nor on the arbitrariness of media agendas. Critical aid clutches implacably to the idea of a different, better world. It confronts the neoliberal tendency to depoliticize the political, which has even managed to reduce the granting of aid to a technocratic and pragmatic laying on of hands. Conceptualizing an unpolitical, purely political aid simply serves to make the paradox of aid bigger still. The more uncritical aid is, the larger the danger that it will be manipulated for purposes that are not aimed at overcoming aid and dependency.

"The separation between the humanitarian and the political that we are experiencing today is the most extreme phase of the distancing of human rights from citizens' rights. The humanitarian organizations, which are increasingly graduating into becoming supranational institutions, can ultimately only grasp human life in the abstract figure of life stripped to the bare, physical bones, and thus maintain, despite themselves, a secret solidarity with the very powers they ought to be fighting." (Giorgio Agamben) By contrast, critical emergency and development aid intervenes on the side of people suffering from want, positioning itself against that structural violence responsibility for the indigence of these individuals.

Thomas Gebauer

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Critical Pedagogy

All socialist experiments in the 20th century faced a similar problem: ➞ social ownership of the means of production at the level of the state, but also in small units like ➞ cooperatives almost always led, in the medium to long-term, to a sharp drop in productivity. Bourgeois business science contended this was caused by the lack of individual incentives.

Although the political bias of this argument is obvious, it is undeniable that most collective production forms in the 20th century didn't accrue more than a meagre dynamic. Against this backdrop, an international debate broke out in the 1960s about what was labeled "the incentive problem." Bonus payments for individuals and for workforces were introduced as performance incentives, a step criticized by both Maoists and the Cuban Minister for Industry of the time, Che Guevara. Instead, Guevara proposed a new form of educational politics that could uncover the "new socialist human" as a productive force. In this manner, the Guevarian period in Cuba was shaped by a moral appeal to take on collective responsibility and a valorization of personal sacrifice. In China and Cambodia however, permanent political mobilization metamorphosed into dictatorships based on education.

In this context, critical pedagogy, which developed in South America, has a decisive contribution to make to societal projects in the future. Alternative social interrelations are something that have to be learned, but what could a learning process to achieve this look like, without it boiling down to authoritarian education? The Brazilian Paulo Freire (1921-1997), who was instrumental in coining the term critical pedagogy, used literacy programs in Brazil and Chile to develop his concept. Starting from the question of why particular learning methods are not capable of penetrating learner apathy, Freire concludes that learning cannot be conceived as merely a neutral process of knowledge transfer. Learning can only be successful if it engages with an individual's specific experiences, and gives them the capability to work through these. Thus, learning is a ➞ self-empowerment process, during which the learners' social situation actively changes. In opposition to state-socialist orientated educational forms, which attempted to "awaken" the oppressed masses through a form of edification, Freire rejected political agitation in educational environments. He based this on his insight that agitation recreates relationships of alienation between teachers and students: between those leading and those being led.

The literacy programs developed following Freire's intervention used the specific knowledge that oppressed individuals have as their foundation, and theorized about the collectivity of learning processes – a collectivity that also included those doing the teaching. As all participants contribute knowledge, and collective processes always produce unexpected results, it was suggested that the literacy trainers would also learn continually. In this regard, critical pedagogy contains a notable parallel to Foucalt's ''suppressed forms of knowledge.'' Critical pedagogy also propagates the emancipatory power of suppressed knowledge, and pleads for discursive power systems to be broken open.

It is fascinating how liberation theology draws its impetus to shake classical academic power from leftist Christian practice (➞ liberation theology). Grassroots currents in Christianity (➞ church from below) debated the question of how pastors could join in the life of parishes, making their knowledge useful for ➞ emancipation, without inhabiting positions of power. Concepts like submissiveness and humility, which play a major role in Freire's attitude, emerged in this context. The critical educator – comparable to a political activist, but not to a Leninist cadre – must continually expose their own role to scrutiny.

However, critical pedagogy doesn't really pose the question of whether educational methodology is in itself a concept subordinate to bio-political power. Seen historically, the problem of how to bring up children only became acute when new forms of production and government began to necessitate disciplined state-citizens and workers. Nevertheless, the practical value of critical pedagogy projects is unaffected by this reservation. The diverse approaches that ''Educaciòn Popular'' is comprised of – anchored in the grassroots and inspired by Freire – are certainly one of the reasons why ➞ social movements have been able to regroup again and again in South America over the last 35 years, despite brutal oppression. This array of educational approaches has transferred self-confidence to the oppressed, and has demonstrated what can be done with communal perspectives for action.

Raul Zelik

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Critical Politics of Memory

Critical politics of memory is based on the axiom that the historical analysis of society can contribute to overpowering exploitation, oppression and authority in the present. This is about history as a location of subjects who strove for self-determination and ➞ emancipation; as a form of action, it aspires to supporting this same objective in the present, through research and public intervention.

The actors in critical politics of memory interventions are every bit as diverse as the fields and practices in which they engage. They shed light on hidden facets of history, and on marginalized perspectives, through, for example, self-organized work on memorials, interviews with witnesses of lived history, demonstrations, interventions in the public sphere – for example through "wildcat" renaming of streets, in accordance with political agendas. Further, they engage in their own historical research, public relations work, or in the struggle to elucidate past human rights abuses. Initiatives are dedicated to, for example: working through the legacies of National Socialism or of colonialism; or remembering the history / histories of the resistance, of the workers' movement, or of feminism.

On a very basic level, critical politics of memory can serve the purpose of challenging the hegemonic representation of the past, and of thus criticizing its manipulation for the present.

In contrast, hegemonic politics of memory puts the past to work in serving the needs of the present, and contributes to the legitimation of contemporary power relations. This delivers the "ideological kit" for collective identities, that of the nation, for example: through building myths and maintaining traditions, the present is marketed as an inevitable consequence of the past, and in being that, as "natural." This kind of politics of memory has no choice but to work with historical myths, in which contradictions and struggles *within* society are turned into tabus, heroic stories are constructed, and historical alternatives are defamed as "disturbing elements." This kind of history is related from one specific perspective, shaped by being white, male, bourgeois and western, and all other perspectives are marginalized. With this backdrop, the politics of memory may be seen as important terrain on which bourgeois hegemony is manufactured. Critical politics of memory – as carried out by ➞ critical science and academia, and by historiography "from below" – should be seen as part of the struggle for ➞ counter-hegemony. Critical academic history reveals the empty spaces in hegemonic historiography, while floodlighting possible directions for emancipatory efforts. Critical politics of memory can then disseminate these findings into the public sphere, and into other parts of society.

Critical politics of memory and historiography invoke numerous traditions of a critical encounter with history, which date back to the 19th century, and differentiate themselves further in the second half of the 20th century. In this regard, it's particularly important to name English historiography "from below" (Edward P. Thompson), the social history of West Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, the "ditch-where-you-are-standing" movement of the (mostly German) history workshops, local history and company histories of the 1980s, alongside numerous feminist, autonomous and post-colonial influences. Particularly relevant, methodologically, for critical historiography is the attention paid to everyday history, oral history as an approach, and establishing witnesses of lived history as a source, primarily to illuminate historically marginalized perspectives.

Critical politics of history sees history as a process shaped by societal subjects, and as lit up by "non-realized possibilities" (Herbert Marcuse). This means that history can be used as a props store, as experiences to draw on in the struggle for liberation. Using such methods, critical politics of memory can make its identities and traditions available to emancipatory movements. It functions in doing so as a means for self-empowerment and for strengthening collective positions, from which action can proceed. Yet this approach carries with it the danger of lapsing into a homogenizing and self-serving interpretation of the past. That's why a continually self-critical positioning is a requisite for critical politics of memory. This positioning should reflect upon the societal location of the individuals doing the memory politics and their potential blind spots – in relation, for example, to gender, class or race.

Loukanikos Author Collective

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Critical Politics of Memory

Critical Science and Academia

Let's just assume that critical theory – along with so many otherthings – began with Marx. Located in this frame, this theory is also represents the continuation of bourgeois knowledge about state and society. This is also a theory that forms the next chapter in the philosophy of the enlightenment, even though that philosophy is then turned upside down. Since the age of Kant, Hegel and Marx, critique means the self-reflective analysis of the premises for appearance, or for, to use the more philosophically potent German word, *Erscheinung.* The appearances under discussion are shaped by authority and dominion, or, to give it its German name, *Herrschaft.* Analyzing authority in all its forms is the central point of critical science and academia. As is valid for all intellectual production, people do science under the conditions of the culture industry: this is the form in which authority – itself in commodity and administration forms – over the production, application and dissemination of societal knowledge is practiced. Critical science proves itself such, by reflecting upon this form of culture-industry authority. Even critique as resistance against this authority is composed in a societal way, meaning that it also cannot step outside these contexts of authority. Instead, it reflexively becomes part of the object of analysis in all areas of content.

The material premise for such a position of resistance was, historically speaking, the bourgeois autonomy of thinkers. Later, intellectual resistance was carried out by the workers' movement, the proletarian women's movement, and by bourgeois renegades, who can be located socially in bohemia. Patronage, journalism, other paid writing and (their fathers') entrepreneurial activity gave bourgeois dissidents and the sons and daughters of the aforementioned financial independence. The enlightenment in Germany was an enlightenment of professors, and in various later eras, including the 1970s, the university made critical science and academia possible.

In our "knowledge-based society" today, attempts are made to colonize those areas of life, in which it was formerly possible to organize resistance, critique and reflectivity. "Knowledge-based society" means that the production of knowledge ought to be consciously targeted, according to the imperatives of saleability. This causes critical science to lose a part of its material basis. For thinkers of Horkheimer and Adorno's era, it was no longer possible to have an unproblematic connection to the workers' movement, and this connection has become even more problematical today. On the one hand, the collapse of the workers' movement released a plurality of ➞ social movements, no longer subordinated to the political orthodoxy and thought of the older movement. New culture-industrial possibilities for coordination and ➞ cooperation have arisen, which also include publishing and discourse, and these can be utilized for resistive thought. Critiques of the "knowledge economy" will also have to turn their sights to the rationalization of intellectuality. Just as, through Fordism, the knowledge components of manual work were rationalized away, and relocated into machines and work organization, a similar process is now taking place in intellectual work. The personal computer is the medium of this change. Critique, applied positively in this context, is about spelling out details for individual fields of action. It is about asking, in the field of social politics for example, which forms of organization are thinkable, sensible and meaningful, in relation to the contemporary mode of production. Such pursuits can be grouped together under the tag of "intellectuals' politics."

Critical science and academia can expose contradictions in society, and make explicit which unkept promises are inherent in any given situation. Critical science will not and cannot deliver blueprints, neither for *realpolitik*, nor for the politics of movements near to it, but it can offer up its findings and ideas for further thought, precisely because it does not have any specific interests it wishes to push through itself. Comprehended as intellectuals' politics, critical science can take up "general" interests. The ecological movement's "opposing experts," the defectors from the natural sciences of the anti-nuclear power movement, and those involved in the debate about housework in the women's movement are just a few examples of these "general" interests.

The universities are obviously not the sole locations of critical science, a fact that the recent Bologna Process reforms will do nothing to change. These reforms may continue to make life harder for those "critical academics," who want to be able to live from their work. Yet as a reflection of the conditions under which we manage our lives, as an analysis of experiences that we gather in diverse social positions, and as a contribution to the progress of society, there is no other way of organizing critical science. Because critical science means the self-reflective observation of society, no more and no less – and this is something that can also happen outside of universities.

Christine Resch

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Critical Science and Academia

Critical Whiteness

Being white is one of the most non-transparent and influential features of social differentiation and causes structural privilege in society. This is because being white is not perceived as a difference: being white is normal, everyday and invisible. It articulates its existence through absence.

White people associate racism mostly only with the marginalization of black people. In this conception, racism has nothing to do with one's own position. The extent to which discrimination of so-called "others" results in people's own *white* privilege, and the extent to which racism also signifies *white* hegemony, are issues that have not been addressed enough, even in critiques of racism, and in anti-racist education work. The discussion mostly remains centered on the "others."

It's exactly at this point that the U.S.-American Nobel Prize Winner Toni Morrison. She is concerned with redirecting the critical gaze from the "racist object" to the "racist subject," from the "described and imagined" to the "describers and imaginers."

White and *black* in this context does not primarily mean skin-color, but rather a political category and a social construct. The terms are not utilized in an essentialist sense, but rather as a strategy to map out and criticize hegemonic interrelations. They serve to make visible certain positions that people occupy, which result from both historical and contemporary power relations.

Black signifies a politically resistant category, founded on people of color's experience of oppression. The term connotes the potential for resistance that finds expression in the self-confident epithet Black People. *White* signifies a politically dominant category, in the sense of the experiences of power, which people construed as *white* have – people who, concurrently, are mostly not aware of their structural privilege.

The term critical whiteness emerged from the relatively young discipline of critical whiteness studies (CWS), which in turn grew out of the critique of Afro-American feminists about the dominance of *white* feminist positions. In Germany, critical whiteness studies were taken up both at an academic level and by the arts business from the 1990s. That happened and is continuing to happen due to the efforts of younger academics who explore Black-German, feminist and migrant perspectives in the search for ways of transplanting this discourse into the German speaking world. CWS is involved with researching the historical and social constructions of whiteness, and with the real effects that these construction processes have.

Just as post-colonial studies continues to do, critical whiteness studies poses the question of representation. The numbers of *white* people employed in academia and in political education is well above the average in percentage terms. In the anti-racist movement, it is more often *white* people who have access to the resources needed to engage politically. Similarly, employment positions that deal explicitly with racism are often occupied by *white* people. Moreover, a kind of color-blindness can be observed in emancipatory discourse, with white individuals negating the perception and significance of black and *white* – albeit with good intentions. The equality of all people is the standard that is being followed.

CWS aims for a change of perspectives, in the sense of a critical self-reflection on *white* positioning with regard to particular issues, *white* norms and *white* hegemony in the context of hegemonic historiography, but also in the history of social movements. This also means making Black Positions and Black Knowledge visible. A critique of racism, and anti-racist education and practice, which sets the standard of wanting to change dominant societal relations, cannot be thought through properly if Black Knowledge is absent. An exclusively *white* intellectual debate about racism will simply (re-)produce *white* hegemony.

Unlike in Anglo-American critical whiteness studies, the questions thrown up by Black Perspectives and Black Knowledge still need to be explored in Germany. In order to fight a tendency towards "white-on-white talking to themselves" in critical, societal research, and in order to combat anti-racist work being done by proxy, Black Articulation Spaces must first be fought for.

Maryam Mohseni

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Critique of anti-Semitism

The definition of anti-Semitism is a contested political field, and stretches, on the one hand, from denying the existence of anti-Semitic semantics all together, to, on the other hand, making accusations of anti-Semitism for which no tenable evidence exists. In general, anti-Semitism is conceptualized as a substitute for religion, an ideology, a bunch of prejudices, and as a cultural, interpretative power, with which an all-encompassing picture of a personified modern world can be constructed. A picture of "the Jew or the Jewess" is drafted to function as the counter-image to the positive self-image of a "we-group," which sees itself as a nation, a people, or a cultural unity. In this process, "the Jew or the Jewess" is defined as rootless, international, and abstract. In contrast to racism, anti-Semitism doesn't merely imagine an inferior grou Instead, it attributes to "the Jews" characteristics including omnipotence, above-average intelligence, and to much influence in politics, culture, science, the economy and the media. Semantics of this type are socioculturally rooted, and cannot be reduced to individual consciousness. They have nothing to do with "Jews or Jewesses," but are revealing about anti-Semites.

Today, the existence of anti-Semitic positions amongst the ranks of the left is largely undisputed. General suspicions that *all* members of certain groups, e.g. critics of globalization, hold such positions, are however inaccurate. One of the forms in which leftist anti-Semitism has taken itself since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War is a specific form of criticism of Israel, and discussions on the significance of leftist anti-Zionism have continued since then. Presented in a polarized form, we can see two opposing positions: one that links itself to Jewish Europeans and anti-Zionist Israelis, and in so doing perceives itself as immunized against the accusation of anti-Semitism; and the other, which defines anti-Zionism as a disguised form of anti-Semitism. Secondly, anti-Semitic stereotypes articulate themselves in a specific form of anti-Americanism, e.g. the image of a "Jewish lobby" that has infiltrated the political system, controls the financial markets (expressed through the code of "East Coast" and "Wall Street"), and / or includes the suggestion of complete manipulation through mass culture and control of the media. Finally, such semantics are applied in an anti-modern form of defense, which usually draws on traditional anti-Semitic images.

In modern anti-Semitism, "abstract" capital is "biologized" into the form of "international Jewry" (Moishe Postone). All the attributes of power that anti-Semitism attaches to "the Jew or the Jewess" are also attributed to the dimension of value of capitalist economy. The "mysterious power" of capital to produce interest is personalized, by locating the extraordinary exploitative capitalists amongst the "Jews." Modes of operation that structure capitalism are projected onto a tangible group of humans, who can therefore be held responsible for the economy's fatal consequences. It is not possible to explain an accusation of anti-Semitism in terms of such fetishistic forms of thinking. However, anti-capitalism that does not move beyond this fetish is compatible with anti-Semitic semantics, for example in the differentiation between "good productive capital" and "bad finance capital." This kind of compatibility with anti-Semitic semantics is also how we would define the term structural anti-Semitism.

Although parts of the left have been decoding and objectifying meanings of this kind since the 1990s, and have thus been able to sensitize themselves about personified signifiers and mutable codes, there is still no leftist consensus on this issue. This is illustrated by the public conflict regarding a secondary form of anti-Semitism attributed to several parliamentarians in the LEFT party in Germany, which has been continued since 2008.

Attention has also been drawn to the problems caused by omnipotent explanatory structures in leftist movements outside of Germany. These include, for example, a criticism of the economy that conceive the crisis-beset nature of our economic system as being exclusively located in globalized financial markets, and not fundamentally in capitalism itself. Despite these efforts at self-criticism, a female activist at a leftist rally as part of the ➞ Occupy Wall Street movement in October 2011, made the comment that "Zionist Jews" are responsible for steering banking infrastructure, and they should therefore be driven out of the country.

Regarding the critique of anti-Semitism in leftist ➞ political education however, there are an increasing number of initiatives that focus on differentiated analytical steps, which, when used, do not permit political and economic developments to be simplified. It is ultimately not enough for progressive political theory and practice to explore the boundaries of what may be said. It must also work comprehensively against the logic of blurring differences.

Mona Urban

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Critique of anti-Semitism

Critique of Bioethics

Large milieus in society today accept biotechnological medical procedures. Young parents allow the cord blood from their newborn babies to be stored, so that it could theoretically be used to breed person-specific substitute organs sometime in the distant future. Diabetes and Parkinson patients set their hopes on stem-cell therapies, which could renew cells that produce insulin or dopamine, or which could replace damaged neurons. The acceptance of biotechnical diagnostic procedures is even higher, as used in prenatal testing, or when looking for the gene(s) that cause breast-cancer.

Things weren't always like this. Until well into the 1980s for example, intensive medicine was seen by many as inhumane, with the result that medically controlled, clinical birthing practice was forced onto the back foot by ''natural'' or ''gentle'' birthing. The boom in biomedical technologies began at the end of the 1980s concurrent with developments in health politics, which were distinguished by an internationalization of medical research, the economization of the health sector, and the privatization of responsibility. Bioethics spread from its starting point in the western world, and grew to match the boom in biomedicine. Bioethics is intended to weigh up the uses and disadvantages of biomedical procedures while considering the interests of all societal actors, as far as possible. Because it obeys, in the broadest possible sense, democratic principles, even socially critical free spirits tend to attribute a corrective function to it, in the matter of regulating biotechnologies.

Yet the relationship of bioethics to biomedicine is certainly not a fundamentally critical one. Rather, both share the same scientific and societal background. Neither practice asks questions about the social development of illnesses and needs, nor is there room to discuss alternative ways to interpret the body (→ dis/ability). Instead, particular illnesses are assumed part of the status quo, in order to build from there to develop appropriate medical-technical therapies, which can be produced cheaply by industry, and marketed profitably worldwide. It may seem obvious for those who refuse this network of biomedicine, bioethics and bioindustry in terms of our personal, physical wellbeing, to open themselves up to the possibilities of alternative medicine. It's not without reason that Chinese medicine, Ayurveda, natural health practice, homeopathy and other alternatives have been booming for years now. They certainly are capable of offering something in cases where western medicine is at its wits end. For people suffering from pain without any "identifiable organic cause," they're helpful because they do not deconstruct and decontextualize human existence. However, alternative therapies cannot do anything to alter societal causes for illness and pain. On the contrary, established under the label of "wellness programs," they contribute to feeding the individualization of social problems, whether consciously or not. In the context of the restructuring of health care systems, this individualization is certainly leading to an increase in private responsibility.

What are we left with then, when we've revealed that the question "biomedicine or alternative medicine" is a false dichotomy? What might a socially critical altercation with medicine look like, which neither furthers the advance of the privatization, nor restricts an individual's right to medical choices? Distinct from the "bioethics or social-criticism" choice, a two-step scheme presents itself: a strategy of denaturalization and analyzing power.

The former calls attention to the constructed nature of apparently naturally occurring conceptions of illness and of need. This is not about denying anyone the sensitivities they may have, or even about downgrading these to the status of "wrong," but rather about making these sensitivities comprehensible to those affected. Limitations and marginalization(s) that are connected with particular, inherited interpretations of the body and of illness should be made tangible, thereby relativizing personal feelings of guilt, that are thrust upon individuals by the privatization of responsibility. This reveals to us, in the second step, a new way of looking at interrelations in the health system. Now the same question can be posed to the technological and alternative healing arts alike: who develops, and with which motivations, which therapies? Who profits for them, who can afford them, and who do they really benefit? The → politicizing practice of questioning what appear to be self-evident axioms, in order to sound out the power relations that back them, opens up new spaces for action and possibilities for thought, for both individuals and for society.

Alexandra Manzei

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Critique of Capitalism

There are neither winners of losers in capitalist globalization – or so we are told. A ripe moment for a critique of capitalism? Nonsense! Humanity has generally done well out of the system, and the "wealth of nations" is higher than it has ever been previously: growth rates have averaged 2% and more annually for over twenty years, unparalleled in human history. The simultaneous growth in inequality of income, wealth and live chances between the winners and the losers is merely the endurable pain that comes as a side effect of these gains.

We could continue in this vein for a long time, reducing the debate to an argument about a more or less fair distribution of the wealth produced. Yet almost everything has its limits. That's why there are also boundaries imposed on utilization, the transformation of natural resources into value, especially because capitalist societies can only produce a small amount of the resources they need to keep accumulation processes moving themselves. In the case of immaterial resources like the qualification of the workforce, or some technological developments, it is possible to (re)-produce these resources, which cannot be said for raw materials of a mineral or agricultural nature, and certainly not for fossil fuels – today, primarily natural oil and gas. Without these, the accumulation of capital would break down. If we were far removed from the limits of natural resources – as people were at the beginning of the fossil fuel age, more than 150 years ago – then we wouldn't bother about the finitude of these resources. Yet from out contemporary perspective, close to peak oil, every analysis of capitalism must account for societal ➞ interrelations with nature. If it has not done already done so, this is the moment, at the latest, when the double nature of economic activity, which Karl Marx described as a "jumping point," becomes significant for a critique of capitalism: the material-natural dimension of the resources that have been converted into value remains significant even during and through the process of capitalist accumulation.

Endogenous contradictions in accumulation are also detectable as limits to development. We see that the losers' losses and the winners' gains in capitalist globalization cannot be simply balanced out against each other. The winners include those possessing monetary assets, rich capitalists, and consumers with high purchasing power. The losers include many of those who are dependent on their work to make a half-decent income. This doesn't just highlight problems of distribution and justice. In addition, their purchasing power is regularly insufficient to buy up the products of the forces of production, which are continually getting bigger.

The periodic crisis of the capitalist mode of production becomes obvious: capital accumulation gets stuck, because of the lack of high purchasing power demand – meaning that growth gets stuck in turn. Capital gets destroyed, and many jobs and the life chances of many people are lost with it. Incomes sink, including the income of states. The crisis also encompasses financial markets. These are impossible to restrict, and when attempts are made to do so, the continually extending liberalization of financial markets facilitates ever more risky and gung-ho financial innovations. Armed with these, "financial investors" can secure high returns for themselves even during crisis periods, at the cost of whole layers of population and of countries, who are pushed into poverty. Here, accumulation is no longer a consequence of (relative) surplus value, but rather of sheer expropriation.

If the system functioned without crises and without a fuss, there would be no occasion for critique, and also no reason to think about alternatives to capitalism. We can see therefore that it is crises in the formation of society that provoke intellectual and practical critique. And on what must this critique primarily set its sights? On ensuring that capitalism measure itself against its own results, and on refusing to accept any other criteria for doing this aside from the capitalist of rates of return, profitability, accumulation and growth rates. Firstly, the process of accumulation brings about periodic crises out of its own contradictory dynamics. Keynesian, anti-cyclical interventionist politics is unable to prevent or restrict this, and neoliberal trust in the "fundamental stability of the private sector" is even less capable of making an impact here. Secondly, capitalism has a tendency to overuse the resources of accumulation, human labor power foremost among them. The modern ➞ social state was fought for in order to protect this power, but is now being abolished in the "neoliberal counterrevolution," in order to increase boundless exploitation. Even the conditions in which the reproduction of material nature takes place are being systematically abused. Resources are being exploited to the point of extinction, while ecosystems and the global climate system are being worn away to the point of collapse.

Elmar Altvater

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Critique of Globalization

Critique of globalization and the globalization-critical movement that has embodied this critique, began as a result of a new phase of capitalist development at the start of the 1990s, and had their initial peak at the turn of the millennium. Their incipient and central slogans have remained efficacious over the years: "globalization is not a matter of fate" and "a different world is possible" reject a logic of supposed practical constraints and underline the fact that alternatives to the current economic and societal order exist and are practicable. "The world is not a commodity" attacks the increasing valorization of numerous areas of our lives through privatization, liberalization and deregulation. There are several points at which the critique can gain traction. The deep gulfs within society; a multiplying destruction of the environment; the loss of democratic spaces for shaping conditions; and the growing influence of transnational concerns and supranational economic-policy organizations, including the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO. Globalization critique encompasses positions concerning the transformation of systems, but also presents concrete demands, like the regulation of "unchained capitalism" and the financial markets, in order to fend off neoliberal restructuring. (See ➞ financial market regulation.) Alongside anti-capitalist groups, the globalization-critical movement, but also diverse spectra who neither articulate a clear position about capitalism, nor focus explicitly on a reform strategy. The phrase "opponent of globalization" is primarily used for defamation, and is rarely used to self-identify. Whilst rightist criticism of globalization emphasizes the significance of national identity, a positive understanding of the globalization of ➞ social rights and of ➞ protest movements is part of the self-image of emancipatory critiques of globalization.

Globalization critique has provided many connecting factors from which alternatives might be developed. The gathering together of diverse political traditions and spectra – the workers' movement, new ➞ social movements, and North-South solidarity work – by using terms like "global" ➞ solidarity," ➞ "global social rights," and ➞ "ecological justice" has been innovative. The consequence of this approach is that the development of alternatives is more informed by processes of searching, and practical altercations then it is by concrete conceptions of a "different world." Moreover, organizational alternatives have emerged: networks that, to a large extent, are ➞ grassroots-democratic and orientated around ➞ alliances, are a mark of the globalization-critical movement. Alongside numerous autonomous, local groups, it encompasses wide and diverse networking fora including Attac, Vía Campesina and People's Global Action, internet platforms like "gipfelsoli," NGOs such as Focus on the Global South, and the ➞ Occupy protests. Typical organizational forms are ➞ social fora or summit protests, at which content-based alternatives and new forms of protests are worked out through sharing experiences, educational work, and action training.

One example for practical globalization critique is the global water movement. This is typical for a number of reasons. Firstly, it pushes the impacts and causes of the privatization and commercialization of water supply in the North and South up the international agenda. Secondly, it brings manifold groups together at national and international levels, including environmental and development-politics associations, trade unions, indigenous peoples, etc. Thirdly, alongside defensive battles against concrete privatization initiatives, or against the politics of particular institutions – including the World Bank and the World Water Forum – it also encompasses ➞ appropriation struggles for a democratic water supply orientated around need. With initial successes in the Cochabamba Water War, the water movement has gained a symbolically weighty reference point. A strength of globalization critique is its proximity to practice, and the way it links in to concrete political struggles. The broad roof under which the diverse contents of globalization-critique cluster facilitates alliances that traverse the borders or previous alliances, and also means that any barriers to participating in its many political activities are kept low. On the other hand, there is a lack of deeper debate and reflection – including tackling issues theoretically – in parts of the globalization-critical movement do. This means that many participants only have a vague and intuitive understanding of the role of the market and the state, of authority and hegemony: and of the strategic options that they themselves have open to them.

Since 2008, the ongoing financial and economic crisis has confirmed many warnings made by the globalization-critical movement, so that some of their concrete demands, including financial transactions tax, no enjoy broad support. The actors in the ➞ Occupy movement have attempted, since 2011, to push critique of international financial capitalism back into the center of societal conflicts. This has led to a new upswing in the critique of globalization.

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Critique of Globalization

Critique of Growth

Critiques of growth are certainly not a new phenomenon, but are as old as economics itself. For the writers of the classic texts of economics, it was clear that economic growth must eventually hit natural limits. What classical economists did not fully consider, and were unable to consider fully, was the extent of technological progress. Not only did this facilitate undreamt of increases in productivity and production, this also became, with the emergence of industrial society, a motor of apparently limitless growth in itself.

In his critique of capitalist growth, Marx already drew attention to how the urge towards growth is caused by the coercion individuals experience to pile up ever more capital, earning themselves as high returns as possible into the bargain. However, the production process needed to reap these returns can only function by "undermining the springs of all wealth: the earth and the workers."

From then on, critique of growth debates have continued to circle around ethical questions at best, for example on whether growth is a reasonable prerequisite for people to be able to live a good life. In 1848, John Stuart Mill criticized that a small number of individuals are "richer than anyone needs to be," and already referred to the necessity of everyone having "sufficient physical and spiritual leisure." A little less than a hundred years later, this critique of growth was taken up again, this time by John Maynard Keynes. Looking at developed national economies that slowly but surely satisfied essential needs, Keynes envisaged that the sense and the necessity of further growth would disappear. In approaching the matter thus, he asserted "*the economic problem* may be solved, or at least within the sight of solution, within a hundred years" (emphasis in original). At that point, growth would no longer contribute to wealth. This branch of the critique of growth lives on until today, and has been pursued since the mid-1970s within the framework of "happiness economics."

The critique of growth received its biggest boost in the 1970s, from the debate that began about the ecological limits of growth. Using the "World3" system dynamics model, Donella and Dennis Meadows used computer simulation in 1972 to calculate that the world economy would break down before the year 2100, principally because of disappearing resources, if economic and population growth were allowed to continue unhindered. By the end of the 1970s, "new" ecological boundaries were pushed into the foreground of the debate. The increase in pollutants recorded in the environment would increasingly over-challenge the capacity of local and global ecosystems to regenerate, resulting in the danger of ecological catastrophe even *before* non-regenerable raw materials have been exhausted. The emergence of newly industrialized countries alongside continuing growth in older, industrialized economies means that the demand for resources is increasing massively. Dramatic social and ecological consequences of these processes are proliferating, as are their implications for the politics of distribution.

The ➞ feminist movement principally criticizes the social and ecological blindness of the capitalist fixation on growth, and the systemic causes of this fixation: this kind of economy only functions at and through markets. Only what occurs at this location is visible, productive and valuable. Work exclusively means paid work. Unpaid care work is thrust into the hands of women, and is cut off from the rest of the economy (➞ care revolution).

Contemporary critique of growth combines elements of the debates about "old" limits (the availability of resources), "new" limits (the problematic of materials that cannot be fully utilized in production processes), ethical limits (the question of the essential meaning of growth), and feminist critique (the problematic of unpaid care work). Unaltered growth in the industrialized countries accelerates the global exploitation of non-renewable resources. Parallel to this, the natural conditions of human life are destroyed. Because the resulting higher quantity of goods cannot doesn't even increase people's well-being in the wealthier countries, and because the same system doesn't even enable a large part of humanity, particularly in the global South, to provide for their basic needs, the critique of ongoing growth must constitute a major element of leftist social criticism, especially in advanced, industrialized countries. Instead of focusing on growth in general, economic and societal *goals* have to be defined through democratic process. Whether the qualitative *development* resulting from this would be compatible with further gross domestic product growth remains to be seen.

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Critique of Growth

Critique of Political Economy

Marx used this expression to describe his intention of analyzing the capitalist mode of production in order to uncloak that mode's functions, and to criticize simultaneously that part of economic science, which justified this mode of production. Claims about the form of a socialist or communistic society shouldn't be postulated merely based on abstract principles. Instead, a critique of the current system coupled with proof of already existing potential should deliver the outlines for a post-capitalist society.

Marx contemplated a "critique of national-economy and of politics" already as a young man, in the phase in which he was considerably influenced by Feuerbach's philosophy. In the *Paris Manuscripts* (1844), he developed a "theory of alienation": under capitalism, humans are alienated from their own, humane being. However, in *Theses on Feuerbach* and *The German Ideology* (both from 1845), Marx criticizes this very idea and others like it. These 1845 works are about replacing abstract philosophical constructions by the empirical examination of societal relations. To achieve this, Marx relied at first on bourgeois political economy, and only developed a real "critique of political economy" later, which became the content of his main work, *Capital* (1867). This is where he shines a light on capital's inherently destructive and implicated-in-crisis tendencies: capitalist development can only take place at the cost of humanity and of nature. The destructive character of capitalism is not a result of capitalists' "greed," but rather a consequence of factual constraints that prevail in capitalism. This is why Marx was not interested in a critique of capitalists, but in a critique of capitalism. In contrast to pre-capitalist forms of society, it is not *personal* relations of hegemony and dependence that dominate under capitalism, but rather the hegemony and dependencies attached to *things.* Market prices, profit and interest rates, and stock-market prices force people into specific courses of action, assuming, that is, that they want to survive economically. The process of relations in society being turned into things, which has been described as *Versachlichung* in German, was labeled "fetishism" by Marx. Humans stand, live and fall under the hegemony of things that they themselves have created.

In everyday, capitalist consciousness, as in economic theory, this condition appears to be "natural" and fundamentally immutable. The fact that capitalist relations are a specific, historic, and therefore alterable form of human social ownership, becomes more or less unknown. By critiquing economic categories, Marx destroys this illusion of naturalness, so that a fundamental alternative for society can now be thought about – and not just vaguely wished for. In his early phase, and on the footing of an insufficient critique of economy, Marx configured this alternative primarily in abolishing private property – as he does in the *Communist Manifesto*, from 1848. When he, however, starts from the critique of political economy that he developed after that, it becomes clear that changing ownership relations does not, in isolation, constitute an alternative to capitalism. That's why Marx, in his later work, emphasizes the need for a break with the functional logic of commodity, money and capital. The societal framework, which has, in the market economy, taken on a life of its own, must be brought back under the control of those who actually do the production. This is the reason why the "association of free people" that Marx discusses in *Capital* – (see MEW, vol. 23, 1962, p.92) – does not just work exclusively with communal means of production; instead, members of this association utilize their workers primarily as labor power for the whole of society. It is neither the factual mechanisms of markets nor a central planning authority but rather people themselves who – after they become able to resist capitalism's unreasonable demands – must reach agreement with each other, as to how they will coordinate their various labor powers, and must also reach an understanding regarding the aims and methods of production. This coordination of the whole of society is more than merely the answer to the destructive and crisis-ridden cycle of the capitalist mode of production. The productive forces developed under capitalism, especially the connections between science and production, warrant every more strongly a coordination of this type.

This is how a mode of production can be made possible, which has different aims and follows a new logic for society. The anonymous authority of factual constraints will be replaced by conscious altercations about the methods and aims of production, and their societal coordination. Instead of chasing wildly after ever-higher profits, with the unending destruction of humans and nature in the process, an orientation around the needs and wishes of people can take the stage. A focus on people who can now decide, as consumers *and* as producers, what it is they wish to strive for.

Michael Heinrich

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Crossover

Crossover – a term from music theory used to mean an interweaving, or grafting, one to the other, of various musical genres – was first transferred onto political practice to mean a strategy of alliances. It was the upshot of the processes of searching for alternatives in the crisis commencing in neoliberalism in Federal Germany in the middle of the 1990s. Left-wing currents inside the SPD, PDS and Green political parties organized discussion processes and congresses through their own respective magazines, to develop an alternative project, an "ecological and solidaristic New Deal," and to prepare for a left-wing government, which many other European states had already realized. Thus crossover as theory and practice was initiated by leftists inside parties, but saw itself as a ➞ radical-reformist approach, which had to transcend party boundaries. And which also had to anchor itself inside the social – as opposed to party-political – left.

This alliance was smashed apart because of disputes about the politics of the first Red-Green federal government, 1998-2005, particularly regarding its participation in the Kosovo War, and its "Agenda 2010" politics [social security cuts and reforms]. Since this coalition government were voted out, there have been a series of attempts to restart the process, in part negotiated by "Der Freitag" newspaper. Yet this new start has proven difficult in the face of neoliberal politics "pursued by two out of the three parties involved" (Ralf Krämer in "der Freitag" on 05.09.2009). The first of the new alliances established itself timidly, like the “Oslo Group” that formed in 2009 for example, and consisted of parliamentarians from all three parties.

Finally, it was the foundation of the non-profit "Institute for Solidaristic Modernity" (ISM) at the start of 2010 that brought with it an institutionalization of the idea of Crossover. This was a reaction to the failed attempt at a government of the left in the federal state of Hesse, Germany, and the recognition of the necessity of broadly establishing in society an "anti-hegemonic project" in opposition to neoliberalism. That's why ISM no longer principally understands itself as a project preparing for a left government – even though this is still definitely seen as a possibility for transforming power relations – but rather as a place for an alternative production of knowledge.

The participants in the practice of Crossover today are members of various organizations: from politics, trade unions, academia, civil society, social movements, and NGOs. They bring with them perspectives from each of their respective organizations on the one hand, but also bring with them a readiness to reflect critically on their respective approaches. While making conscious the differences between the respective actors, and while working through these differences communally, new political concepts will ideally be created. These don't just represent a minimum of consensus between the various actors, but should also bring new, innovative and emancipatory potential up to the service. This requires a chaired debate between partners who possess equal rights, and a regularly renewed agreement about aims. For this purpose, the ISM has for example developed a tailor-made, participatory communication method, the "ISM code." This practice can be time consuming, but does contain the chance to create ➞ anti-hegemonic concepts and practices. The new idea, concept or practice will then be communicated back into the individual organizations of origin. In this manner, this can be a transcendent practice.

To conclude, Crossover can be understood as the attempt to bring together parliamentary and extra-parliamentary movements and parties, and radical / less radical positions – to work on synthesizing various demands. The process should not however be understood as a harmonious project, but rather its opposite. The inextricable presence of institutional politics alongside extra-institutional and anti-institutional politics coupled with contrasting experiences and differences contains long-term potential for conflict. This is why the methods for fleshing out what positions are communally held, and what are the differences, are so central. Crossover as a way of coming up with a new leftist concept for society is therefore a social learning process dealing with collective experiences of conflict. Crossover knows about the failure of previous, multifaceted alliances. It nevertheless views continued new attempts to unite and stabilize disparate traditions and movements as indispensable.

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Culture of Everyday Life

Starting from the theory that patriarchal capitalism reproduces itself not only through economic exploitation but also through repressive norms, the new Left has continued to demand the ➞ politicization of everyday life. This involves critical questioning and new living experiments focused on interrelations of how people live, on families, and on interrelations concerning the body. This final category also includes sexuality. Attempts aimed at raising awareness about the problems of everyday life – and at contesting the concept of the "bourgeois family" – began last century already, and should be seen as a part of the history of working-class culture. Movements such as the "Friends of Children movement," the first (socialist) women's movement, and experiments in socialist education are just some examples of these historical precedents.

The classic workers' movement is shaped by thinking about a principal contradiction between capital and work, but also by thought about parallel contradictions, for example those contained in colonialism, sexism, or the urban-rural opposition. The principal contradiction has to be resolved before the parallel contradictions can be, and the former is needed to foster and facilitate resolutions to the latter. This means that the parallel contradictions can only be resolved after the ➞ revolution, the principal contradiction. The majority of individuals in the organized workers' movement and in organized working-class culture have supported this simplifying perspective throughout their history. Alongside and in opposition to this, artistic and sexual avant-gardes have always existed. The social revolt of 1967-68 has not yet reached its end. This revolt places the struggle of the "old Left" against exploitation shoulder-to-shoulder with the struggle of the "new Left" against alienation. It criticizes both the uniform living practices of the 1950s and 1960s, and the hierarchies that participants wove into them: above all, this revolt grants a place in politics to an individual's own psychological and social experience. Uniform life practices were, *in part,* a result of the compromise between classes, and of social democracy's struggle for societal security. That is why the new Left positioned themselves against the old, which led to severe consequences and a mutual lack of understanding between the groups, until the present day.

What had seemed closed-to-debate in private life, including roles based on sex and gender, has been increasingly deconstructed. "The personal is political" became the slogan of the new movements, principally of ➞ feminism. The Germany-based *Weiberrat* (Council of Women) saw the question in these terms: "It's imperative to change private life in qualitative terms, and to understand this change as a revolutionary act." An extension to the traditional male concept of politics as held by the classic workers' movement, this new approach aimed at highlighting the political dimension and mutability of daily life and of what appeared to be private relationship structures. This set in motion communal forms of living, attempts at more politically conscious consumption and at different ways of determining the parameters of bringing up children, and ➞ cooperatives as a form of material reproduction based on solidarity. Most of these attempts have become commercialized as time has passed, but there has been a revival of new collective forms, including for example finance co-ops, and urban communes.

It cannot be denied, of course, that the "new spirit of capitalism" (Boltanski/Chiapello) has appropriated several leftist demands, and transformed them for its own purposes. Alternatives have fostered new patterns of consumption. The demand for first person politics has paradoxically lead to public life being privatized and made more intimate. With regard to ➞ social movements, the moralization of political problems and individual (incorrect) behavior is problematic, as is the call for us to limit ourselves, or to do without. The moralization of everyday life is a consequence of its politicization – and comes at the cost of hypocrisy, and of daily life becoming overburdened. The concept of ➞ free spaces is a matter of increasingly critical debate amongst autonomous leftists, and in the alternative economy movement. Although free spaces are seen as an important precondition for emancipatory action (i.e. for emancipation), in being locations and spaces involving only low-levels of coercion, they can also quickly become cut off from the rest of society.

The paucity of ➞ protest against "the crisis" can in part be linked to the non-existence of a radical hinterland that has already managed to become part of everyday life. The necessity of "alternatives" is impossible to overlook and yet, simultaneously, Hartz IV [the lowest level of German social benefit payment] and "the crisis" result in utopias being lost, and even more submissiveness.

The importance of our "daily life," and the use we make of it, lies in the fact that no one can escape from it. Everyone has a daily life – it's omnipresent. A subversive and emancipatory culture of everyday life, in which ➞ revolution and pleasure are not in opposition to each other, increases our joy in living, and motivates us towards new acts of resistance. This transformed culture should be the simplest of things – and is harder to achieve today than ever. How can we apply political perspectives in our daily life? How can we revolutionize –

or even just change – our daily life? There are no secret recipes: answers can only be found in a collective and an individual way, by people working actively and independently.

Bernd Hüttner

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Deceleration

The trend towards acceleration that has impacted everyone's actions in the context of globalization is also accompanied by opposing movements. These look upon "the discovery of slowness" as an alternative to the commandment of speed, with slow food being the best-known example. Despite this, deceleration has not yet established itself in the programs of the proponents of politics, as an alternative in societal politics. It has not even been possible to convince a majority to support speed limits on German highways, an easy step to implement, even though the positive effects of improved road safety and lowered CO2-omissions are proven. Acceleration became possible through the invention of new transport and production technologies in the throes of the industrial revolution, and would be unthinkable without the use of fossil fuels to fire mechanical power. The industrial revolution brought forth technologies that were many times quicker than human or animal bodies, facilitated enormous increases in productivity, and enabled sensational processes of economic growth.

The limits of the agrarian "age of metabolic speed" and dependence on the "speed of living things" (Rolf Peter Sieferle), which have determined the largest part of human history, were overcome with a revolutionary transformation in the energy-basis of society from an agrarian, solar energy system, to a fossil-fuel energy system. The new information and communication technologies make possible what is, in many respects, a new quality in the compression of space and time. The possibility of communicating in real time provides the technical precondition for a deep-running societal transition, in relation, for example, to the enormous significance for international financial markets, corporations structured around networks, or new forms of warfare. Acceleration, which should also be understood here as a concept in the economy of time, has several knock-on effects, all in concord with the slogan "time is money." The speed of innovation – and work/production processes – are accelerated and concentrated to an extreme extent, by the plugging of an ever-increasing number of "time pores" to stop "time leakage." Using an ever-new number of methods to structure work – ranging from Taylorism, to "flexibilization," to no fixed working hours – the drive towards more time economy and efficiency slogs on. In the context of the subjectivization of labor, these new methods increasingly shape individualized demands we make on ourselves, in terms of self-management and of the microeconomics of our feelings; we can conceive this as a collectivization of work.

Keeping up in this race of time, and meeting the claims the motto of "faster still" demands a speed from us that brings people to their limits. In terms of ecology, the crisis of acceleration has made itself evident in societal ➞ interrelations with nature, with the use of resources having reached a speed and an extent infinitely in excess of periods needed for these resources to form again, or even to absorb impacts. People's health and regenerative capacities suffer when work-processes are over-concentrated, as do the safety and quality of work. Indeed, quality of life is endangered when stress and a dictatorship of short-term-ism insist that "flexible people" (Richard Sennett) do without long-term life-plans and social ties. Social rhythms of care work, bringing up children and looking after people become, in the process of their own economization, in conflict with the dictatorship of speed. The risks of acceleration have long since prompted time-management discourse to pay lip service to the idea of deceleration. Concurrently, this discourse argues that fixing speeds for physiological and psychological rhythms should be done in terms of the art of a good lifestyle. In this context, deceleration becomes merely another element of time control, used in relation to the economization of time, but ultimately left up to each individual. Slogans like "slow down, pleasure up" have, in this fashion, long since become a part of our zeitgeist. However, these blend out power differences between the people who can "grant" time (usually employers) and those who must "take" time (usually employees), just as they blend out the uneven distribution of potential for the structuring power of time. It is particularly striking how globalization processes polarize the issue of speed, and aggravate the gap between a global and highly mobile elite, and others who are forced to decelerate and remain tied to local spaces. That is why a socioecological politics of time first needs to recognize that the structuring of collective rhythms and socially tolerable units of time is a form of public property – and to recognize it as a field that must be shaped politically. Next, the challenge of deceleration consists of redirecting the social-metabolic basis of the economy and of society back towards the solar energy system (➞ energy transition).

Dagmar Vinz

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De-commodification

Capital's inner urge is to commodify everything under the sun, to give it a price so that it can be exchanged. Even air has been commodified through the badly functioning CO2 emissions' markets. The current period of deregulated, privatized, globalized and financialized neoliberalism is aimed towards this precise goal. Karl Polanyi describes processes of commodification and de-commodification in his book *The Great Transformation* as a "double movement": "the market expanded continuously but this movement was met by a countermovement checking the expansion in definite directions." According to Polanyi, this countermovement, that followed the first peak of capitalist globalization in 1914, was, "more than the usual defensive behavior of a society faced with change; it was a reaction against a dislocation which attacked the fabric of society, and which would have destroyed the very organization of production that the market had called into being."

Yet when backs were turned upon ➞ Keynesian, social-democratic politics after the 1970s accumulation crisis, responsibility for carrying out de-commodification was left in the hands of ➞ social movements, at times in alliances with workers and ecological movements, and often operating across national boundaries. This process began with an offensive aimed at a real ➞ democratization of what were known as the peripheral states from 1970-1990. This was a period in which "third world" debt crises combined with uprising against the IMF and World Bank's austerity politics to create environments in which no regime, even the most brutal military regime, could be sure of holding onto power. This trend started in southern Europe, and then spread to the south of South America, to East Asia, to Eastern Europe, and to many African states. The process of democratization remained incomplete however, as the change that ensued did not impact on economic and financial politics.

From the middle of the 1990s, a steadily increasing number of social movements, inspired by the Zapatista critique of free trade, placed de-commodification at the centers of their demands, campaigns and ➞ revolutions. Perhaps the most successful of these movements was the battle fought at the start of the 2000s against monopolized intellectual property rights to AIDS medication. The South African *Treatment Action Campaign* achieved victory against the big pharmaceutical corporations, against governments in Washington and Pretoria, and against the WTO. Millions of poor people gained access to medication that had still costed USD 15,000 per capita annually at the end of the 1990s.

A fight to de-commodify water for example, would ensure the creation of a universal, free *lifeline tariff*, which would grant all consumers daily access to water appropriate to their needs. This would then valorize "public goods" (and "meritocratic goods") connected with water, including preventative public health, sexual equality, economic multipliers, ecological factors, and the abolition of geographical segregation – an issue usually ignored in a commodity-based model of water provision. An additional luxury duty for wealthy households and companies that use too much water would be sensible for ecological reasons, and would provide an alternative way to finance the free basic water provision. Finally, political actors must force through legal and even constitutional guarantees for consumers, in order to realize the "right to water" in a way that empowers citizens and workers, and not of bureaucrats. Initiatives aimed at de-commodification have been springing up across international borders and diverse areas of life. The ➞ World Social Forum has acted as a central location in recent years, for various de-commodification struggles to come together, to learn from each other and to develop strategies. Yet although the omnipresence of these campaigns matches the extent to which capitalism has spread, neoliberalism has remained dominant throughout crisis periods, and has in some respects even grown stronger: at the start of the 1980s, the start of the 1990s, the end of the 1990s, and in the period 2007-2012. This means that recent and contemporary movements including ➞ Occupy, Indignados, the Arab Spring, anti-austerity movements, and many other single-issue groups must strengthen the alternatives they're offering in the form of de-commodification. They must join up the points between them, in order to realize the enormous potential of a group comprising 99 percent of the world's population and the world's environment, against the commodity form in itself, and against the unequal and integrated processes of the accumulation of capital.

Patrick Bond

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De-globalization

This concept started to spread debates about globalization after Walden Bello had expounded upon the idea. Bello is a leading figure in the ➞ critique-of-globalization movement. The core thesis is that de-globalization should aim at a reorientation away from national, export-based economies and towards production primarily for local markets. Bello has predecessors who shared this conviction, even if they didn't explicitly use the phrase de-globalization. The economist Keynes, for example, was having thoughts about de-globalization as early as 1933, when he pressed for a reduction in economic interpenetration between nations. According to this position, goods should remain domestic whenever it is sensible and possible for them to do so, and particularly the financial system should remain predominantly national. Bellos' de-globalization strategy also resembles the early work of the Egyptian intellectual Samir Amin in many important aspects. In 1990, Samin supported "disengagement" and the "subordination of external ties to the logic of internal development."

None of these thinkers turned against international relations per se. Amin emphasizes that "disengagement … does not immediately mean self-sufficiency." Keynes also acknowledged that, "ideas, knowledge, hospitality, travel – these are the things which should of their nature be international." Defenders of de-globalization are nevertheless convinced that homogenizing processes of neoliberal globalization that flow from above to below must be reversed. The paradigm of de-globalization contains the argument that the production of goods and services should be orientated around people's needs, and not around the demand produced by consumer culture and steered by corporations. Production should use technologies that improve community, environment and life itself, rather than destroying them. Most of the financial resources needed for these new technologies will have to be found from within a society in a de-globalized economy, in order not to depend on foreign investments. Further, de-globalization politics reduces the status attributed to growth, and maximizes economic justice through redistribution. Such politics honor the core significance of the contribution made by woman to production, and to the reproduction of economic and social systems. De-globalization can overcome the gulf between urban and rural, inherent to capitalist development, by valorizing agriculture, agricultural communes, and agricultural economies. Strategic economic decisions would be subjected to democratic control, and not left to the market. The private sector would be subordinated to state regulation, which, in its turn, would be subjugated to stricter popular-democratic controls. New interrelations in production, trade and wealth distribution in a de-globalized world would cover local cooperatives, private companies and state corporations, but not transnational business concerns. In this fashion, de-globalization safeguards the principle of subsidiarity in economic life. The system protects ➞ human rights, encourages self-determination, and supports cultural and political ➞ plurality, rather than undermining these categories.

Critics stubbornly equate de-globalization with autarky and protectionism. Yet the movement is actually more concerned with turning around neoliberal politics of the liberalization of trade and finance, and of production, privatization and deregulation orientated around exports – the more so when these tendencies are driven by international trade deals and international finance institutions. The power of international corporations and financial markets is "deconstructed," while social relations, local communities, the environment and local economies are "reconstructed." Thinking in the terms used by globalization shows that other worlds are possible.

However, Bellos' vision of de-globalization contains unanswered questions. He does not explain how the state itself can be changed in the process of de-globalization. By attempting to integrate feminist and ecological perspectives, he expands upon traditional third-world nationalism, without comprehensively developing this picture. Moreover, the role performed by new, progressive global networks and organizations is not sufficiently thought through in Bellos' approach. Although he talks about ➞ internationalism and the globalization of people, his view remains essentially local, and centered on the state. In the context of de-globalization strategies, possible alternative economic systems are not elaborated upon exhaustively.

Nicola Bullard

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Democratization

In the classical sense, democracy means the citizens governing themselves and has, as its goal, the self-determination of people. Democratization is understood as meaning both the production of democratic relations, as well as reestablishing such conditions. In a wider sense of the word, democratization aims at the (re-) ➞ appropriation of politics, broadening political participation, and dismantling relations based on hegemony, marginalization and oppression.

Contemporary discussion of democracy is dominated by an understanding of the term limited to formal ➞ equality, parliamentary process, and state institutions. At the time of the Weimar Republic, in which fundamental democratic and ➞ social rights were being won, it was widely contested that a capitalist economy and political democracy could coexist. The point of conflict was the extent to which capitalist relations in production and ownership imposed a limit on democracy. This argument posited that democratization also meant a restructuring of economic relations. The decision to be taken was whether a polity should take representative-parliamentary democracy or as its organizational form or ➞ soviet council/workers' council democracy, which is based on grassroots-democratic structures, and subordinates itself to the economic sphere of democratic structures (➞ economic democracy).

In the 1960s, further criticism was voiced by strengthened ➞ protest movements, citizen groups and new ➞ social movements against bourgeois-liberal democracy. A prominent spokesperson for this movement in the German-speaking world was Johannes Agnoli, who diagnosed democratic regression, criticized the unfulfilled promises of representation, and attacked authoritarian state mechanisms. This included the West German state-of-emergency legislation passed in 1968, and the so-called *Radikalenerlass,* a disbarment primarily aimed at leftists working in the public sector, which came into force in West Germany in 1972. Demands were made to democratize all areas of society – companies, schools and universities, the media and the prison-system – and alternative ➞ forms of life were experimented with. The founding of *Kinderläden* – a self-governing form of kindergarten – and companies run by workers resulted in a cultural revolution, and succeeded in opening up an overly formal and authoritarian post-war society.

The Mexican Zapatistas in the 1990s provided an important push towards a type of local democratization that sent political waves around the globe. For the Zapatistas, democratization means establishing autonomous communities *and* a reshaping of political and organizational forms: these should be increasingly based on grassroots democracy and dialogue. With their radical critique of the failure and destructive consequences of neoliberal politics, they triggered a global democratization movement and a transnational culture of ➞ resistance. The ➞ critique-of-globalization movement that grew up in the 1990s particularly emphasized the re-democratization and (re-)appropriation of privatized spheres and goods, which have been created by everyone and actually constitute ➞ public property.

As in previous historical cycles, political and social protests in many parts of the world – including North Africa, from 2010 – are focused on toppling dictators and building up democratic conditions. Concurrently, people criticize mechanisms of representation, elitism and the political class in general in countries with established democracies, and demand direct political participation. Primarily in Spain, but also in other locations, young people have expressed outrage about the condition of "post-democracy" (Colin Crouch), with their slogan, "Real Democracy Now!" ("Democracia real YA!"). Yet "post-democracy" does not mean the end of democracy as such. Crouch postulates a period in which democratic institution are retained, but are hollowed out and developed into (voting)-extravaganzas, and events. In this context, the aim of democratization is to win back democratic control of political institutions and decision-making procedures, which are increasingly influenced and even hijacked by private actors. These include corporations, think tanks, financial actors and lobbyists.

The ➞ Occupy movement currently has two objectives in the role it plays as part of the critique-of-globalization movement. They wish to spotlight the scandalous enmeshment of political and business elites, while distancing themselves from post-democracy by trying out ➞ radical-democratic political forms. Radical-democratic struggles and protests set themselves the challenge of overcoming hegemonic relations including racism, sexism and class-rule in the conditions of everyday life and work, while developing new forms of autonomous organization and cooperation. However, these can only be realized if criticism continues to be leveled at state hegemony, at conditions of economic oppression and at coercive interrelations.

Bettina Lösch

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Democratization

Dis/ability

Dis/ability is used as a critical concept to deconstruct "naturalizing" and "biologizing" perspectives concerning social hierarchies and institutionalized inequalities. It defines itself in opposition to the medicalizing and patronizing norm, which rushes to diagnose, observe, treat and ultimately to "repair" the majority of physical and psychological variations in existence. Disability has to be seen as the result of practices, discursive and otherwise, that construct being different in physical, psychological and sensory terms, and not as a medical category, representing a particular physical reality. As an analytical category, dis/ablity identifies our modern system as consisting of social, material and symbolic interrelations, which categorize and hierarchize individuals according to binary divisions: normal / abnormal; healthy / pathological; productive / socially needy; independent / dependent. The binaries from which the dis/ability system is comprised, do not just apply to the zones they delineate, but also provide the foundation for a system of coercive norms, which they themselves uphold. The "coercion not to be disabled" is an ideological system that pleads with all of us, albeit in different ways.

Dis/ability and the coercion not to be disabled are inherent parts of modern power relations. They are of central importance for the capitalist system of the colonization of the body, the mind, and the living qualities pertaining to these. As an ideology of normal functioning, dis/ability serves the purpose of commodifying abilities, and converting these into the ability to work. "Disabled" subjects are not only *used* by the modern state in order to produce labor power, but also to solve the dilemma of redistributive justice. Disability is referenced in order to justify the domination of a system of redistributive justice based on work, and in order to differentiate between the "deserving poor" and those who abuse redistribution and the welfare state.

In which ways can a critique of disability inspire us to confront neoliberal realities, in which rigid, modernistic differentiations between *the disabled* and *the healthy* (or *the normal* and *the abnormal*) appear to be disappearing, among conditions of flexible normalization? While disability used to lead to stigmatization and rejection of difference, it is now being transformed into a chance, a possibility, or even as capital for self-transformation and individualization: these are the new ways in which dis/ability is exploited. "Rationalization" in the spheres of social-care and healthcare hit people with dis/ability particularly hard. A critical perspective on dis/ability does not just dispute the norms of rational utility maximization, or capitalization, and of the (moral) economy of *homos oeconomicus* as an entrepreneur, but also supports alliances that draw from various experiences of disability –which also support new social interrelations. This perspective criticizes the ideology of individual independence. It demonstrates that social movements reliant on single experiences or identities will remain ineffective. And it supports forms of work and politics, which make connections across all categories of gender, sexuality, *race* (→ critical whiteness), ethnicity, class or age.

That's why critiques of dis/ability invite us to reflect critically on how modern forms of culture, societal life and knowledge – coupled with space-time organization, and concepts of the modern self – bring into being various forms of disability. Emancipatory aims in this context include both social criticism, and visions of social, political and cultural alternatives. They have a contribution to make to the critique of transnationalism, of globalized capitalism, and of neoliberalism.

Ultimately, the system of dis/ability is also a system that builds on the foundations of neocolonial conditions of exploitation, and globalized forms of inequality and privilege. This critique can also enrich the critique of globalization, especially with reference to the system of → care tourism, the capitalization of body parts (→ critique of bioethics) in the pharmaceutical and transplant industries, and other forms of inequitable resource distribution, which result in the *enabling* of some bodies, the *disabling* of others. The other, significant result is the transformation of the bodies of the global South into a form of “health-capital,” owned by the global North.

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Ecological Justice

The term "ecological justice" developed within ➞ social movements, particularly grassroots movements in the USA at the beginning of the 1980s. *"Environmental justice"* became a battle cry of that era, which named the objective of political activities, and referred back to the tradition of the US civil rights movement. According to this tradition, environmental changes and problems including soil erosion, climate change and locations for toxic and hazardous waste are not neutral, social factors, which can be solved by purely technical means, but are rather indivisibly joined to social, political and economic factors. Added to this is the recognition, that socio-political decisions can rarely be classified as "ecologically neutral." Environmental encumbrances are mostly distributed in a highly inequitable manner among the world's population. This is why ecological justice encompasses ➞ feminist, anti-racist and anti-capitalist practices alongside ecological demands. The inequable effects of changes in the environment magnify existing inequalities within one society, and between the societies of different states. The diverse social and economic repercussions of future changes in the environment on various classes of society would also influence their power positions in relation to one another. This does not merely mean poverty for the one and wealth for the other, it also means that one of the two sides will tend to gain control.

In contrast to the concept of "ecological equality," ecological justice contains more than the mere demand for an equitable distribution of environmental problems. Instead, the use of ecological justice as a term illustrates that even the process of "distribution" itself constructs hegemony and authority; further, the term describes conflicts and question in the context of access to, and the sharing out of resources; it also throws light on the political, structural conditions behind changes in the environment. According to this approach, conflicts about genetic resources are not a result of a "natural" shortage of resources, but rather of societal systems of regulation. Building from this, ecological justice also signifies the demand for self-determination, for ➞ radical-democratic participation, and for a fair distribution of global resources.

With this background, a radical understanding of ecological justice has to aim at transforming the system. Which would immediately lead us into various difficulties. Firstly, the term is also used by some political parties, and state bodies, albeit with a different meaning. This usage of the term claims that all humans are equally responsible for environmental problems and for their social consequences, and argues that solutions to both problems and consequences can only be found in ecological (➞ sustainable) modernization, and ecological politics of industry. Shortsighted interpretations of this sort, represented in Germany for example, by parts of the Federal Office for the Environment and the Federal Environment Ministry, contradict the positions of emancipatory, social movements. Moreover, the term has been criticized by ➞ social movements as being anthropocentric, as it does not concede that any other living creature has any legal position. Ultimately, the relatively unreflective link made to the concept of justice is also problematic. Conceptions of justice do not exist objectively and *a priori*, but are instead the result of societal altercations (➞ social justice). What is seen as just is that which a hegemonic understanding of justice was able to assert within a certain society. In addition to this, very varying concepts of ecological justice exist within different cultural milieus. The understanding of ecological justice dominant inside social movements disputes global relations of power and authority at precisely those points where a one-sided demand for life in an environment that is not a health hazard is welded together with demands for ➞ recognition, self-determination, access to resources, ➞ food sovereignty and ➞ participation. Movements for ecological justice are characterized by efforts on working from the bottom up, and ➞ grassroots democracy, coupled with the creation of transparent, democratic structures. Questions are raised as to: in whose interests it is to tolerate, or to forbid, particular environmental changes; who do these changes advantage and with which social and ecological consequences they will be accompanied? Predominant societal ➞ interrelations with nature and postulations of justice are systematically examined and criticized, as regards their *white*, colonial, patriarchal, racist and capitalist-system-reinforcing components. The challenge today consists of globalizing movements that emerged in local contexts together with a globalization of their cooperation with each other, and their diversity of issues. The purpose of this would be to develop an ecological notion of justice that brought together the existing globality of environmental change, with local interrelations with nature.

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Economic Democracy

Economic democracy means extending the democratic right to co-decision making to include all those currently affected by authoritarian decision-making, and to cover economic processes. This would mean a break with market processes, which assert themselves with the violence of natural laws, and which humans should adjust themselves to according to both liberal and neoliberal economic understanding,. Economic democracy means rejecting the premise that the market should be left to itself for the good of the people. The perspective is that economic laws do not correspond to a natural or immutable necessity, but rather represent ➞ liberty: although it must be said that this is the liberty of a small number of people who substantially structure these "laws," and who also profit from them. If economic processes are the results of decision, then it makes sense to ➞ democratize these decisions. This is even more important in situations where concentrated capital power makes it possible for particular actors to impinge upon the game-rules of parliamentary democracy, or even to put them out of action entirely, as the experience of National Socialism teaches us. Understood in a negative sense, economic democracy can also be understood as a means of control, preventing power interests, which could harm the whole of democratic society, from asserting their position. Viewed positively, a general participation in economic decisions would mean that the interests of those affected by decisions are also considered, and not merely the particular interests of special groups of persons.

While there certainly are expectations that economic democracy could lead to ➞ socialism – understood essentially as the abolition of private ownership of the means of production – the two should not be directly equated. Economic democracy means, primarily, that all individuals are recognized as citizens of an economic, communal system, in which they should all have an equal voice. It would be possible to action such participation rights without immediately disputing the general right to own the means of production. Yet *access* to the means of the production has to be made possible for everybody, because, in capitalist societies, everyone has to secure their own livelihoods through their achievements as individuals. This is why the degree to which some have a right to exclude others through ownership is placed at the disposition of democratic regulation according to the Basic Law for Germany. Land, soil and the means of production can be transferred into ➞ social ownership, if these rights to exclude, granted by the people-as-sovereign in the first place, are actually harming the people-as-sovereign. When seen from a theoretical, democratic perspective, this means that a reversal of the burden of proof applies. Democracy does not have to subordinate itself to the economy, which imposes its sphere as a thing unquestioned, governed by the natural causality of market laws. Rather, this relation is reversed. As ownership falls under the scope of democratic regulation, this also makes the principle of democracy applicable to the economy. As all citizens of the community or *Gemeinwesen* are, in themselves, a constituent part of the economy then they must get the chance of participating in decision-making for it. This ultimately includes the possibility that majorities form, which might decide in favor of a socialistic organization of the economy because they view the current form of democratic participation as generally damaging.

Numerous proposals have emerged from trade union discussions on the issue since the 1920s. One line of these argues for the establishment of committees for co-decision-making at micro, middle and macroeconomic levels. Going beyond the inclusion of the trade unions as the representatives of people dependent on wages, many have also demanded the inclusion of consumers, and, increasingly, direct participation in co-decision making in workplaces. Economic-democratic participation extends, in these demands, to encompass all aspects of the economic process. On the microeconomic level, it refers to working conditions, social security, qualifications, company aims and planning, investment, closures, sales of assets or subsidiary interests, outsourcing and products. On a medium economic-level, this takes in collective-agreement politics, wages, working time and ➞ social standards, development of particular branches of the economy, expanding public enterprises and those that work with a ➞ cooperative ownership model, ➞ remunicipalization and re-➞ nationalization. On a macroeconomic level, this encompasses taxation, economic politics, public control of central banks and ➞ sustainability. Over many years, and under pressure from the dynamics of speculative financial markets, the maximum that was demanded was more regulation. Recently however, there has been a swell in proposals to subjugate financial market actors to the controls of economic democracy, and to establish public funds and public credit rating agencies. These are the first advances for reigniting a discussion about economic democracy under the conditions of global capitalism.

Alex Demirovic´

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Economic Democracy

Ecosocialism

Ecosocialism, as a political current, springs form a fundamental axiom: the protection of the earth's ecological stability cannot be accommodated with the capitalist system's expansive and destructive logic. The global "decision makers," driven forward by the system's limited and short-sighted rationality, and obsessed by the imperatives of growth and expansion, and by the battle for market share and competitiveness, all appear to obey the principle proclaimed by Louis XIV: "after me, comes the flood."

Yet what exactly is ecosocialism? It is a *radical* proposal directed against the systematic causes of ecological crisis, which differentiates itself from both the productivist forms of ➞ socialism for the 21st century, *and* from social democracy and other ecological currents that made their peace with the capitalist system. It is a radical proposal, aimed not only at a transformation of production relations, the apparatus of production and the predominant modes of living and consuming, but also at a constructing a new paradigm of civilization, which breaks with the very foundations of capitalist-industrial, occidental and modern civilization. The central premises of ecosocialism are that a non-ecological socialism can only lead us into a dead end, whereas a non-socialist ecology is incapable of confronting contemporary challenges.

The idea of ecological socialism – also described as socialist ecology – first appeared in very differing forms in the 1970s in the writers of particular pioneers displaying a "red and green" reflective process. These included the deliberations of Manuel Sacristan (Spain), Raymond Williams (the UK), André Gorz and Jean-Paul Déléage (France) and Bary Commoner (USA). The term "ecosocialism" was however clearly not used in everyday political discourse until a left-wing current emerged in the 1980s inside the German Green Party, which described itself as "ecosocialist": its most important representatives were Rainer Trampert and Thomas Ebermann. Concurrent with this, a book entitled *The Alternative* was published, written by a socialist dissident in East Germany, Rudolf Bahro, who articulated, in the name of ecosocialism, a radical critique against the Soviet Union and East German model. While this was going on, James O'Connor developed his work in the 1980s in the USA, with reference to an ecological ➞ Marxism, for the purpose of which he founded the magazine *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism.* Back in Europe, Frider Otto Wolf, at that time Member of the European Parliament and leading figure in the German Green Party, worked together with Pierre Juquin – a former leading Communist figure, who had converted to representing a red-green perspective – to publish the book *For a Green* Alternative: a kind of European, ecosocialist manifesto.

In 2001, Joel Kovel and Michael Löwy published a Manifesto of Ecosocialism, intended to serve as a founding document for the International Ecosocialist Network (www.ecosocialistnetwork.org) in Paris in 2007. On the occasion of the World Social Forum in Belém, Brazil, individuals disseminated a new ecosocialist manifesto about global warming. Also worthy of mention are: the work of the group based around John Bellamy Foster for the US magazine *Monthly Review*, who call for an ecological revolution with a socialist program; the writings of the feminist ecosocialists Ariel Salleh and Terisa Turner; the magazine *Canadian Dimension*, formed by the ecosocialists Ian Angus and Cy Gornik; the deliberations of the Peruvian Hugo Blanco about the interrelation between indigenous movements and ecosocialism; the writings of the philosopher Arno Münster; ecosocialist networks in Brazil and Turkey; conferences in China and – the list could easily be extended.

Ecosocialism is a project of the future, a radical utopia, and a sketch of where the horizon may lie, but it also demands – and is inextricably tied into – action in the here and now, which is focused on concrete and immediate goals and proposals. The sole hope for the future are mobilizations as seen in Seattle, 1999, where points of consensus could be recognized between environmental protectors, trade unionists and the critique of globalization movement. The protests of hundreds of thousands of people in Copenhagen, 2009, clustered around the slogan "change the system, not the climate" can be seen as a subsequent step to Seattle 1999, as can the World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth held in Cochabamba, Bolivia, in 2010. At this latter occasion, more than thirty-thousand delegates from indigenous, small farmers' and ecological movements from the whole world assembled.

Michael Löwy

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Emancipation

Originally, emancipation was a legal term used in the Roman Empire, connoting the release of slaves by their masters. The Enlightenment and the French Revolution granted a political and current significance to the term, which also finds grammatical expression as a reflexive verb in several languages: "to emancipate (oneself)" means to put an end to subjugation through hegemony, and to fight for liberty.

Modern conflicts also used the word emancipation to describe struggle for liberty, for example, the struggle of the American slaves. This continued with political emancipation from the primacy of the church. The demand for emancipation from religion can itself become reactionary however, if it is simply directed against individuals, and if would-be reformers lose sight of the societal foundations of religious forms of thinking. Marx differentiated between "political emancipation" – being the struggle of disadvantaged groups in society and elements in the population – and "human emancipation," aimed at a general release from hegemony and utilization, and thus also from the coercion to work, and from alienation.

In his later writings, Marx emphasized that human emancipation from class itself could and must be fought for – *by* a class that had nothing to lose, apart from its chains. The first step in the abolition of oppression in society was thought to occur through the proletariat battling for its sovereignty; this was seen as prerequisite for the withering away of the state. In the traditions of workers' movement, insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that the battle to abolish classes as a path to human emancipation should not be equated with human emancipation in itself. Marx also examined the sublation of hegemony through the liberation of work itself: without hegemony, work would turn into a productive pleasure and discovering of one's self through evolving ones talents. In Critical Theory, emancipation is discussed in the context of the interrelation between individual and mass society, with Adorno concentrating on a thing or issue liberating itself from societal conventions and controls.

The 1960s ➞ social movements enabled thoughts and approaches from political theory to be used in political practice. Johannes Agnoli conceptualized emancipation in the context of the anti-authoritarian as a controlled violation of rules. Riots as part of youth revolts appeared to him to have more emancipatory potential as the rigid forms of the institutionalized and state-controlled workers' movement. The demands of the social movements in 1968 were directed against an enforced incorporation into Fordist conformity, imperialistic wars, oppression of women, the coercion to be heterosexual, and work without any possibilities of self-realization. The contradictions between general and so-called partial emancipation first came to a head in the social movement because of the "women's question," leading to the independent establishment of a new women's movement (➞ feminism). Over time, further social movements were formed, for lesbians and gays, peace, the Black Panthers or anti-nuclear power – groups that either see themselves as part of a general emancipation movement, or who link emancipation in a political sense to specific areas and groups of people affected. Emancipation often defines itself in opposition to a paternalistic state. Moreover, emancipation understands itself as an individual process, moving against internalized, psychological instances of hegemony. The significance of these for one's own life-choices must be restricted, and ultimately overcome in the process of liberating the self. With the rise of a mode of production based on information technology coupled with neoliberal political concepts, the demands of the movements following on from 1968 have been taken up again, with the prospect of their partial realization – independent, and partly in contradiction of a societal emancipation, in the sense of a complete abolition of hegemony. Groups conjure up emancipation from a paternalistic state in their rhetoric – by proposed the abolition of the welfare state. Promises are made to increase the participation of women in professional life, and particularly at the top of workplace hierarchies – on the back of the establishment of a low-pay sector, and splitting women politically. Plans are made to integrate homosexuals, subcultures and permissive milieus more tightly into social-democratic neoliberalism – so that they can realize their creativity through work.

The challenge remains of achieving human emancipation, which would extract "liberated" work, women and sexuality from the regime of the coercion to utilize. What this kind of emancipation would actually look like will only become clear as struggles continue. Adorno's answer to the question of what an emancipated society would look like retains its relevance today:

"Tenderness would be solely what is most crude: that no one should starve anymore."

Christina Kaindl

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Emancipation

Emancipatory Education

Emancipation describes the release from dependence and intellectual immaturity. Emancipatory education can be understood in two related ways. The emancipatory process of changing oneself is also an educational process; parallel to this, education should act as a motor for emancipation. Oppression and dependence have never been distributed equally, but have affected groups defined along social, gender, ethnic or religious lines very differently. This means we can reconstruct emancipatory educational practice in historical terms not merely as something universal, but also in terms of bourgeois education, workers' education and the education of women. The relationship between ➞ emancipation in general and the empowerment of particular groups remains controversial.

Although the concept of ➞ emancipation can be traced back to the liberation from slavery in antiquity, the current use of the concept – including its use in educational theory and practice – is primarily located in the history of bourgeois emancipation. The current challenge facing emancipatory participation is to step beyond that limited and very particular understanding of emancipation. The vision of "human emancipation" (Karl Marx), is one in which the human is not reduced to a politically-free citizen of the state and of competition, but rather one in which s/he can shape societal relations through free association, and can evolve their own individuality.

Emancipatory education is aimed at a practice of responsibility for discourse, in order to realize humane conditions; in so being, it has to run up against the existing order. That's why emancipatory education cannot limit itself to conditions internal to educational systems. Not only does emancipatory education *debate* emancipatory practice, it *is itself* a societal practice. With this imperative connection to practice emancipatory education forms a necessary correlative to ➞ political education. Interrelations and conditions should not merely be understood and criticized, but – first and foremost – changed.

The crisis of emancipation projects in society is also a crisis of emancipatory education. Political education outside of educational establishments – which is often attributed to emancipatory education, even though such education doesn't have to limit itself to politics, is on the decline. This is only in part a result of spending cuts. The mainstream inside educational science regards emancipatory education as out-of-date. Despite this, a lively educational landscape with provocative aspirations regarding emancipatory education has emerged in recent years in Germany, in part thanks to international impulses.

Emancipatory education encourages the dismantling of various forms of discrimination based on social-class, geographical origin, or gender, without trapping people anew in identitarian categories. Educational work of this sort goes under the names of: *anti-racist, non-racist* and *critique-of-racism education; anti-bias education;* and *social justice education.* It is aimed at empowering the oppressed – see also the Theater *of the Oppressed,* ➞ *critical pedagogy,* and *education conducted by black people in Germany* – and is also directed against those with privileges. In doing this however, it must be said that emancipatory education also reinforces the opportunities that those with privilege have of articulating themselves (in this context, see also ➞ *critical whiteness education* and *emancipatory education of males).*

Emancipatory education fertilizes knowledge and theory, for the purpose of shedding light on the world, and transforming it in a liberating fashion. What matters are the motivations for emancipation, the interests and the sketched out lives of all participants – not just of the organizers, or of achievement-orientated teams.

There are other societal interrelations that are either produced – or fail to be produced – in the educational process. *Workshops of the future, forum theater* and *open spaces* are aimed at integrating everyone with the experiences they bring to the group, and at creating spaces for new models. Emancipatory education actively tackles barriers to access, e.g. hierarchies, language(s) and costs.

Emancipatory education changes interrelations without taking itself too importantly. In periods in which not enough is happening politically, emancipatory education is no substitute but rather an educational practice, capable of reflecting upon unintended ramifications, for example on the deterioration of working condition for the precariat carrying out political educational work; or on the domination of the erudite bourgeoisie.

These are high standards to set for educational practice. But, when reflected upon formally, a spontaneous gathering after a ➞ strike, or heavy-handed policing, or even a flash mob can sometimes kick start more meaningful emancipatory education processes than a finely-orchestrated seminar, directed from above.

Julika Bürgin

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Emancipatory Education

Energy Transition

The term is rooted – in Germany at least – in the scientific milieu of the anti-nuclear power protests. The term first appeared in the title of a study, published by the Eco-Institute in Freiburg, "Energy Transition [or, in German Energiewende] – Growth and Wealth without Oil or Uranium." Up until the present day, "energy transition" remains the central issue for the anti-nuclear and climate protection movement in the German-speaking world. The concept encompasses replacing a fossil fuels and nuclear energy economy with an economic path based entirely on renewable energies, and on a reduction of energy use. Connected to this is the gradual disempowerment of the energy companies, and of their oligopoly. In place of a centralistic system of extracting raw materials, and of producing and distributing energy, a self-determining and largely decentralized energy economy shall emerge. Protecting the climate, resources and biodiversity shall be granted priority over profit interests. Private solutions, such as solar panels on a private roof, or a biogas plant on a farm are just as valid examples of the energy transition as are collective solutions, for example ➞ cooperatives for wind-power plants, villages powered by organic energy, or energy networks owned by citizens. Increasingly, the ➞ remunicipalization of the production and distribution of electricity and district heating, and the ➞ nationalization of transmission networks are becoming major focuses of attention.

On the legal and governmental levels, energy transition as regards electricity is being pushed forward through a combination of guaranteed feed-in tariffs, and the compulsory purchase of ecological electricity. Further policy instruments exist parallel to this, some of which are controversial, like emissions trading. Regarding the district heating and transport sectors, a bundle of subsidizing measures exist, coupled with administrative and tax tools. However, their impact so far has been entirely inadequate.

The use of the term 'energy transition' expanded from 1998 on. On the one hand, the federal government of that time, the Social Democratic Party together with Alliance '90/The Greens, began to enshrine the phrase in its communications. Following on from the "consensus on nuclear power" in 2000, the term was also partially applied in the government's own dealings, even though the anti-nuclear power movement strongly criticized the agreed residual operating lives of 32 years for nuclear power plants. On the other hand, many champions of coal and nuclear power started to use the term for tactical reasons. In doing so however, they repeatedly deprived it of its radical and transformative core. Although there was support for a further growth in renewables, at least formally, a so-called "healthy energy mix" made up of ecological energy, nuclear, coal, oil and gas was postulated as the long-term goal. Energy production from fossil fuels was to be turned into a sustainable option for the future, by the disposal of the CO2 produced through carbon capture and storage.

The Fukushima catastrophe represented a new break with the past. In June 2011, the federal coalition government comprising the Christian Democratic Union and the Free Democratic Party announced phasing out nuclear power by 2022. The resolution was passed immediately after the government had actually approved an extended life cycle for Germany's nuclear power stations. Since then, the term "energy transition" has been used as a matter of course by the conservative component of the party system. However, the majority inside this component will hardly be aiming to disempower the large energy companies, to construct an energy system "from below," or to take serious steps away from a car-based society towards ➞ mobility through solidarity.

Impervious to all the pressures against it, the struggle concerning energy transition is changing increasingly into a matter not of "if," but of "how." This transformation is, without a doubt, technically and economically feasible. Yet the key questions concerning structure and range of the future provision system are all still open – not only due to the resistance of the energy and car companies. The transition to a highly flexible and economical production and distribution system involves means making connections between a high number of variables, some of which continually alter because of technical developments or market movements, others of which are still unknown to us. To what extent transmission networks must be expanded for example, depends on several factors, including which kind of production plants will be installed where, in which regions centers of energy consumption will be located in the future, and from which points in time economically viable energy storage plants can be counted on. Moreover, regarding district heating, convincing models for financing the transition and for codifying tenants' rights – in order to prevent the socially disadvantaged from being pushed out after renovations – are not yet available. In the realm of mobility, the huge presence of the car means calling a whole culture into question. The overarching conflict continues above all these questions: who should pay for the temporary additional costs of energy transition?

Eva Bulling-Schröter and Uwe Witt

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Energy Transition

Entry-level projects

Entry – a word that signalizes something beginning and still open. Entry-level projects is a label given to enterprises that introduce or push forward ➞ socioecological transformation. Emancipatory transformation is a drawn-out process, beginning in the middle of bourgeois-capitalist societies – with entry-level projects – and accommodating alternative reforms inside of what is already given. Before these reforms are then expanded upon, in order to go beyond the limits of capitalism.

The more they satisfy particular standards, the more chance entry-level projects have of precipitating or moving forward a change of political direction. Firstly, they gain efficacy if they're relevant to important, unsolved problems in society and the worries of large social groups, if they address their desire for ➞ good work, economic security, and self-determination concerning their own lives. Secondly, entry-level projects should lead ideally to improvements for many within a foreseeable period. Thirdly, they contribute to forcing back the widespread feeling of there being no alternatives, and powerlessness. Such projects become elements of ➞ self-empowerment, and individuals organizing and mobilizing themselves. Fourthly, they can gain a transformative quality if they're open for further reaching developments, which would culminate in pushing back the domination of capital, if there was a change in power relations.

Entry-level projects are invented at people's private desks, nor in the headquarters of parties, trade unions or movements. When water prices rose by more than one hundred percent in the Bolivian town of Cochabamba because of the privatization of the supply, hefty ➞ protests followed. The aftermath of these mobilizations had an important influence on the election of Evo Morales as the first president to come from the indigenous population. The "Water War" turned out to be one of a number of entry-level projects concerned with social fragmentation, which also had an international dimension. Recently, the number of projects is increasing that contain the potential for far-reaching socioecological changes hidden within them. Individual villages have been successfully striving to achieve one hundred percent energy provision from renewable sources. A growing number of municipalities have carried out ➞ remunicipalizations of local energy companies, in opposition to the oligopoly of the large energy providers. Many individual struggles to defend and strengthen the provision of public services, could lend the ➞ public sphere and the ➞ commons considerable weight in the future, regarding the issue of property and power structures. ➞ Participatory budgeting contributes to the conditions for sustainable ways of life in the future, by defending and reconstructing social and cultural infrastructure. The rise of resistance projects against state-bureaucratic decisions, taken without conducting sufficient citizen dialogue from the start, is remarkable. Struggles such as those fought against the Stuttgart 21 railroad station mega project throw open perspectives for rejuvenating democracy.

Often, the character of entry-level projects is limited to the social level, possibly in combination with the local or regional. However, the ➞ Occupy movement demonstrates that such projects could also be channeled directly against neoliberal power structures form the start, given that they take place amongst conditions of globalization, and a crisis in the acceptance of current politics. In such cases, the entry-level also includes longer-term perspectives of these struggles. The demand for a Tobin tax on all spot conversions of currency, for example, played a major role in the construction of global movements (➞ Social Forum), which included groups critical of capitalism and anti-capitalist groups. This demand even found support among powerful elites. This however also highlights the danger of alternative projects being integrated into the mechanism of hegemony, when it is not possible for them to utilize their initial demands as an entry into ongoing processes of transformation.

The experience of the Occupy movement illustrates that several projects offer the possibility of national, European or international mobilization for the purposes of societal transformation, without excluding a plurality of other initiatives. Entry-level projects can be understood as a call for ➞ solidarity with democratic protests, demands and upheavals, for networking with other actors, and for mobilizing motivated by more than short-term perspectives.

Dieter Klein

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Equality

The term equality rose to prominence in the French Revolution triad "liberty, equality, fraternity." Used in that context to refer to political demands for equal political and social participation, the term equality has retained its social and transformative power until today. Alongside the workers' movement and the women's movement, other ➞ social movements have demanded an equal share in citizens' rights, of both a political and a social nature.

Equality refers to a legal term concerning the interrelation of two comparable persons or objects with reference to a third (person or object), the so-called *tertium comparationis*, and always means a social relation. That's why it's acutely relevant which areas of society are used to base comparisons on, and which yardsticks are used to measure equality. Political theory differentiates between formal-legal, normative and material equality. The *normative* goal of equality in western democracies has been shaped primarily by modern social contract theorists. According to their natural law tradition, all humans are free and equal by nature. However, as this mental image cannot, at first, be found in reality, it must be produced instead. The formal-legal concept of political equality, i.e. related to rights as a citizen of a particular state, ignores the fact of social inequality – for example inequality between women and men – because equality in the state is defined according to the same possibilities for participation, equality of opportunity, and access to collective decision-making. In this manner, the normative goal of democratic equality is realized through the institutionalization of citizenship. This is *not* sufficient to achieve *material* equality in the sense of the abolition of social inequality: formal-legal equality cannot, of itself, change anything regarding social inequalities that have accumulated through history, and that are written into the fabric of political institutions of the state.

Viewed historically, this conceptualization is based on a contradiction between premises in social contract theory. This becomes evident when we examine the socially constructed and institutionalized inequality between women and men. The universalistic principle of equality by nature did not include the basic right to ➞ liberty and equality; and while it generalized regarding bodily differences between men in the public sphere, it did not generalize regarding bodily differences between men and women in the private sphere. Due to their procreative nature, their supposed bodily weakness, and other characteristics that were described as "female," they were not considered to possess common sense. For this reason, they were only granted restricted rights with which to agree contracts and to participate actively in the political public sphere. This is the point at which the difference between natural equality as a pre-legal norm of natural law, and the socially institutionalized legal norm becomes manifest. In the process of legal application, positive law generalizes on the basis of those differences that are considered to be presumed "natural" factors – including the category of gender.

The construction of gender and of class differences on the basis of ownership of property cannot be legally comprehended using this approach. The political exclusion of women from the public sphere and their marginalized social position has acquired political legitimation throughout history because of the social contract theorists' normative conception of equality. To some extent, this has continued up to the present. This is the backdrop against which gender, along with class belongingness became a structural feature of modern western democracies, and proceeds to challenge politically modern notions of equality.

The concept of equality carries, by definition, its significance in transforming systems inside itself. Alongside the demand for equality, recourse should be made to a plurality of political demands, which impact on current debates. These range from the ➞ feminist demand for ➞ equal pay for the same work and for work of a similar value, across the board to the demand for a ➞ basic income for everyone. In posing these demands, the decisive issue remains which content is used to define equality, who or what is considered unequal, and which societal areas are appealed to in the discourse. In this fashion, the demand for equality remains at once both a politically contested territory and a utopia: theoretically, new groups of people continue formulating their alternative demands to the same political and social participation.

Stefanie Wöhl

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Equal Pay

The concept "equal pay" (the same wages for the same work) is a salient example of how concepts can be appropriated successfully and have their meaning changed, in order to pool critique of existing power relations in current political conflicts. In this manner, "equal pay" – which actually stands for "equal pay and equal treatment for the same work" – has been transformed in Germany into a rallying cry for the rejection of the exploitative relations inherent to labor hire. Simultaneously, the concept also represents a categorical demand for the same pay for both the permanent workforce and hired-out labor.

The concept of "equal pay" dates back to the struggle for equal wages for men and women: the Equal Pay Act was passed in the in 1963 in the USA. It stipulates that men and women should receive the same compensation for carrying out what is substantially the same work. Reality and the words of the law continued to diverge significantly, leading to the founding of the National Committee on Pay Equity (NCPE) in 1979, a conglomeration of women's organizations, trade unions and civil rights movements. In 1996, the NCPE called for citizens to protest the continuing wage-gap between the genders at the first Equal Pay Day. As far back as 1966, 3000 female workers from a national arms factory in the Belgian municipality of Herstal went on ➞ strike for twelve weeks, citing the 1957 European Economic Community treaty to demand equal wages for equal work. Since then Equal Pay Day is marked in many European countries, including Germany since 2008.

Moreover, it is in Germany that the concept "equal pay" has been dominated, since 2007 at the latest, by the demand for a change in the interrelations of labor hire. The unions spearheaded these campaigns, led by the united services union ver.di, and the metalworkers' union IG Metall. They moved towards this course of action, featuring specific campaigns and protest days, after major changes in working patterns in Germany. The number of labor hire workers rose considerably from 2005, in the wake of the Hartz reforms to the employment market. Moreover, from 2003 on, the CGZP – the Pay Scale Association of Christian Trade Unions for Temporary Work and Personnel Services – agreed the first of many "wage dumping" deals with its employees.

These developments would not have taken place without the input of the German Trade Union Council (hereafter DGB), who sat at the negotiating table as the "red-green" coalition government penned the Hartz reforms, including the deregulation of labor hire. Impotence, political bartering and unsound evaluations resulted in the trade unions rubber-stamping the Law for Employee Reassignment (named by the acronym "AÜG" in German), which regulated labor hire from 2003 on. Although the clause concerning pay-scale agreements invited employees to form company or "yellow" unions, the law also stated that labor hire workers only had a right to the same wage as the permanent workforce if no other pay agreement were in place. The exposure of scandalous working conditions for labor hire workers, which both trade unions and the workers themselves have brought to the public's attention, has been driven forward in recent years by at least a section of the media. Initial success can be noted: opinion-polling shows that 80% of those surveyed view labor hire as a problem, and as a gateway to further "wage dumping."

The slogan "equal pay" has helped to create a straightforward demand to voice alongside the criticism of a dramatic growth of economically precarious work. People can identify with this demand, and it has forced politicians onto the defensive, temporarily at least. Yet the changes to the AÜG law to date have largely been cosmetic. And while the metalworkers' union IG Metall have been able to force through around 1200 "better financial deals" in individual companies for labor hire workers, most labor hire workers are still worlds away from getting the "same wage for the same work." Developments such as those in Namibia, where hiring out casual workers has been prohibited since March 2009, continue to appear utopian in Germany.

Yet the strength of "equal pay" as a categorical demand has not been fully exhausted. The fact that employers are resorting back to using temporary contracts as opposed to labor hire methods is a questionable success. A movement that addresses harsher conditions of exploitation in paid work cannot avoid also criticizing labor power adopting these new practices; nor should it avoid criticizing the increasing number of €400-a-month "mini-jobs." In the face of continuing economic turbulence and the growth of international competition for export markets, fully-"flexibilized" labor power models and wage reductions threaten to gain significance. Answers to this cannot stop at attacking modern forms of slave-wages, but must go beyond that to discuss general perspectives for ➞ good work.

Eva Völpel

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Equal Pay

Exodus

The concept of exodus as used here arose over thirty years ago among both discursive and activist currents of the Italian *Autonomia* movement, and inside ➞ post-workerism. It describes an active movement of refusal and of falling away, albeit *not* into a place Outside of or Beyond existing conditions of power and hegemony. Exodus is a political and theoretical concept, which, viewed historically, cannot be extricated from the history of political struggles.

A genealogy of the term can be traced back to the 1970s, when it emerged out of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guttari's concept of "line of flight." The motif of flight is used here to describe a movement of desertion, an avoidance of the coercion of division and sublation, which reaches beyond the logic of negation and of resistive reactions. A line of flight is an inventive form of offensive, which opens up and experiments with possibilities for critique and conflict in society's fabric that have not yet been envisaged. This is not about an individualistic and voluntarist departure from societal conditions, which will nonetheless continue to manifest themselves in our heads, in our relationships, and in our ways of thinking. Rather, flight here means a movement of breaking away from conditions, which, in the movement of springing into flight, are no longer accepted as being without alternatives. Flight is more than a negative movement of withdrawal, and also consists of inventing new weapons, new strategies of struggle and a new composition of the social fabric.

The genealogy of ➞ (post)-workerist thought is an important thread in the history of the struggles that developed in Italy in the 1960s and 1970s. Starting with workers' struggles in large factories, and ranging over the *Autonomia Operaia's* struggles outside institutions, these soon culminated in a theoretical and practical showdown with transformations in the capitalist mode of production that continue until today. In the content of these *Autonomia* experiences, "flight" was a commonly used term, used principally to mean flight from the factories. That said, the factory in itself was no longer perceived as the central location of production and struggle, this role having been taken over by working *on* society, which was described as a factory that had become "diffuse," or by using the term "city as factory."

In their book *Empire* published in 2000, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt begin by looking at migrants' exodus through the study of historical migration movements, and interpret these primarily as a termination of the nation logic of nation-state borders – and in the sense of a right to freedom of movement. Parallel to this exodus from the peripheries, regions that suffer under new forms of exploitation in the global, post-Fordist order, three other categories of exodus are described in Negri and Hardt's books. The trope of the march of workers out of the factories, and therefore out of normal interrelations of work and of patriarchy, which had emerged during the original *Autonomia*; the withering away of the state and of representative democracy as an obsolete form of government and of being governed; and, finally, a move away from the tight boundaries of an anthropological model, which sees humanity as the center of the world, while confining it inside the boundaries of its gendered bodies.

The philosopher Paulo Virno's own model of exodus predates Negri and Hardt's. Like Negri, Virno was active in Italian *operaismo* in the 1970s. Starting with the image of workers deserting the factory – which Marx described as a crisis of capitalist processes of accumulation – Virno attempts to interpret the difficulties of implementing capitalism in the USA. Low prices for owning land coupled with an almost inexhaustible land reservoir created a situation of excess, and facilitated the mass flight away from work and the wage-paying masters. According to Virno, the cult of mobility that swelled in the 1970s represents the desire to flee from an absence of ambiguity. These more recent desertions from the factories are a revenant of the USA's earlier US crisis of capitalism.

Virno's concepts unlocks the gates to byways not yet drawn onto political maps. By doing this, he alters exactly that piece of semantics that determines the selection of all, thinkable choices:

"By prioritizing secondary or heterogeneous factors we move, step-by-step, away from a particular problem – the question: submission or resistance? – to a completely different problem: how can we realize a movement of breaking away, while simultaneously trying out ways of self-administration that were previously unimaginable?"

Isabell Lorey and Gerald Raunig

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Fair Trade

The strategy of fair trade is based on the assumption that unfair trade relations (see ➞ Fair Worldwide Trade) are an essential cause of under development. The worsening of the terms of trade, meaning that developing countries get increasingly less manufactured products back from the industrialized countries in return for their raw materials, results in them becoming poorer still. To visualize this, we can take the example of a coffee farmer who, in 1980, had to sell four kilos of coffee to be able to buy a Swiss pocketknife, whereas in 2002 ten kilos had to be sold to buy the same knife. The power gaps inside the distribution chains is a product of the dominance of a small number of trading companies in industrialized countries, with the outcome that peasant producers or plantation workers only receive a very small amount of the sales price.

Fair trade initiatives sprang up in the 1970s as part of the solidarity movement with the so-called Third World. Hundreds of groups, often from church milieus, established direct trading relation with local groups of producers, in order to sell their products in "third-world" or "one-world" shops. By cutting out large trade chains and by using solidarity prices, producers were to be ensured a "fair" wage and therefore be put in a position in which they could "develo" The fair trade movement was consciously political.

Measured based on turnover and numbers of individuals involved, fair trade has been triumphant. Around 800 one-world-shops sell fair trade products in Germany (Austria: 100; Switzerland: 300), and total turnover has quadrupled in the last six years, to over 400 million euros annually. The boom is principally due to the development of quality seals and trademarks. Fair trade coffee is also sold in over 30,000 supermarkets across Germany. Yet even the success story of coffee clearly has its limits: despite gaining entry into the supermarkets, fair trade coffee in Germany only has a market-share of 1.5%. As regards the underlying dependencies, nothing has changed: at the start of this century, hundreds of thousands of coffee growers lost their livelihoods, with additional providers – especially in Brazil and Vietnam – causing worldwide over-production. Parallel to this, the power of the five biggest coffee companies that dominate the market pushed coffee prices for producers down to the lowest levels in 30 years. Since then, world market prices have climbed again thanks to food speculation – but peasant farmers do not profit from this. The fair trade movement looks to solve this specific problem through ➞ Fair Worldwide Trade, expressing itself most visibly in Oxfam's "Make Trade Fair" campaign. Applying the maxim "trade not aid," Oxfam backed a successful Doha Development Round of the WTO, aimed at ensuring fair access to the North's agricultural commodity marked, that would lift "millions out of poverty." The campaign unleashed tumultuous debates. Walden Bello accused Oxfam of fundamentally accepting the WTO's free trade agenda. This involves supporting an export-based model of development that, according to Bello, harms peasants in the south, and would fragment the political movement against the WTO (➞ De-globalization).

The fair trade movement's dilemma is made apparent in the cooperation between TRANSFAIR and Lidl. Although this is one way to sell more fair trade products, the initiative also legitimizes an important protagonist in capitalist globalization, and therefore cements structural exploitation in the world trade system. The trend towards depoliticizing the fair trade movement into lifestyle and consumer decisions for better earners is being accelerated by embracing the big corporations.

With multinationals like Starbucks also offering fair coffee, and Dole Food running fair bananas as a product line alongside the normal exploitative bananas (sometimes with and sometimes without trade union organization), the fair trade movement is degraded to a label without content. They also drink Gepa coffee in the Bundestag, which does not mean that institution operates fair trade politics. Today we need a return to the explosive, emancipatory force that combined in concrete projects yelling against a dehumanizing trade system with the vision of alternatives worthy of humans. Consumption based on solidarity will not change the world by itself. However, by continuing to link concrete product campaigns, educational work and critical material for school lessons with economic alternatives, the manifold initiatives involved in the fair trade movement can continue to highlight and actually take concrete steps in the direction of a better world.

Oliver Pye

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Fair World Trade

Division of labor is the basis of human prosperity, as specialization makes work more efficient. That said, individual labor activities do not have equal worth attached to them. The remuneration for doing deals on financial markets is a thousand times higher than that received for cleaning. Moreover, it is not possible to swap voluntarily between the two activities. This is compounded by the fact that children of female cleaners have barely a chance of ever working as financial speculators. In the global division of labor, gender, skin color and country of origin are the

Among economists, Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage enjoys widespread acceptance. This demonstrates that the international division of labor – which necessarily includes trade – remains advantageous even for those countries that produce *all* goods at higher costs than other countries. Such countries simply have to concentrate on those goods that they can produce comparatively cheaply in relative terms. These same economists are however obstinate in overlooking the fact that any individual country can be economically weakened by the more competitive countries, before it has been able to optimally specialize its production. It must be remarked that not every specialization has positive results. For example, a country that specializes on a few agricultural products misses the opportunity of gaining experience in the area of industrial progress, a fact that Friedrich List noted in 1841 already. Alongside the aspect of alienation through division of labor, Marx also emphasized the danger of failed or failing coordination. Cross-border exchange is almost exclusively based on market principles. Due to decentralized decision-making concerning production and consumption prevalent in market, supply and demand can diverge drastically from one another. From an ecological perspective, division of labor is problematic for two main reasons. Firstly, it dissociates the causes from the effects of environmental damage. Secondly, it increases freight transport, which not only uses us finite resources, but also emits the climate change gas CO2.

The many-sided critique of the contemporary world trade system draws on these arguments – but what are the alternatives? The most radical proposal coming from individual bioregions relies on small spaces biologically disengaged from the world market. While this may be sensible for individual regions or categories of goods, it is not, in general, compatible with the concept of ➞ solidaristic economies. Firstly, it endangers gains that have been made in specialization, and secondly, the cost of adapting to a rejection of the world market are high. Even the much discussed "ecological footprint" would not necessarily be lowered. The CO2 emissions caused by the production of one kilo of New Zealand lamb are still only 25% of those caused by producing one kilo of the same meat in England, even when the 11,000 food miles have been taken into consideration.

It would seem more promising to realign the system regulating world trade with social, ecological and development-politics principles. By opening up lucrative markets for products from poorer markets, by restricting patent rights – which generally those strong competitors that first unlocked a particular market– and by equalizing funds as a buffer against price fluctuations on commodity markets, the development gap could be reduced. Social clauses in commercial contracts could prevent competition from being carried out at the expense of employment rights that are binding under international law. Parallel to this, and financed by progressive taxation, the losers in globalization should be better compensated within specific states: before ➞ financial market regulation has taken place however, this move can only have a very limited impact. Transport costs should reflect ecological costs, for example by taxing CO2 emissions. The production of goods should meet ecological minimum standards, and the ecological costs involved in production should be recorded explicitly.

A prerequisite for such or similar reform is ➞ democratization of world trade government, both in terms of countries' relations to one another, and in terms of domestic democratization. At present, it is primarily the richer countries' purchasing power that gives them a unilateral advantage at the negotiating table, with parliaments normally excluded from such negotiations. The short-term aim is to fight against the current trend of exclusive, two-party negotiations, which decisively disadvantages the countries with lower buying power, as well as preventing further economic "liberalization," which threatens public services.

Christoph Scherrer

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Fair World Trade

Feminism

There isn't just feminism per se, but rather lots of feminisms. One feminism that is focused on discrimination against women intervenes for equality of opportunity. Another feminism that deals with constructions of sex and gender, including the systems of bisexualism, dualism, and heteronormativity, is engaged politically more with queer politics and gender trouble! ➞ Postcolonial feminism criticizes universalizing "white," western perspectives, and the self-image contained within the perspectives, and within ways of living, which originate in the global north. And the feminism that critiques capitalism directs its gaze at patriarchal-economic relations, while presenting the argument that capitalist or neoliberal hegemony would be impossible, if inequable gender relations were not ensured in advance.

Looking beyond these various perspectives, it is obvious that alternatives cannot merely be found in the study of women as an empirical group. Feminism, as a form of social criticism, asks how gender relations are generated – in cultural, discursive, political, institutional and personal terms – and how, through this, power relations, stereotypes and attributes are carried further, and reproduced. One of feminism's important proposals posits occupying the "women's standpoint" as a standpoint, from which to conduct critical discourse. This normally does not mean the standpoint of what are allegedly a homogenous group of women, but rather a standpoint that pulls diverse, societal relations into view, out of marginalized positions. Which practices, kinds of work, questions, themes, and subjects are suppressed by current conditions and interrelations? Which subject-positions and subjects are masked by society, and made to hold their tongues?

As a philosophical alternative, feminism searches for non-identitarian positions *and* strategic subject positions, with which to question self-evident "truths," and the ways in which norms function – and thereby expose the violence connected to these. In this fashion, feminism occupies potential critical standpoints in a society in which the entire palette of welfare, care, and orientation according to needs (➞ see "care"), has been declared to be inessential. The strengths of feminism lie in the standards it sets itself, of cognizing hegemony mechanisms in an integrated way and on various levels; and the way it forwards a "crossover" in the sense of transversal politics. Or in the sense of theoretical ➞ intersectionality, which always takes into consideration at least two realities of oppression and discrimination simultaneously. Feminism offers alternatives, because it regularly voices the aspiration to link everyday realities with structural analysis, in order to understand hegemonic reproduction down to the details of everyday life. Ultimately, critical feminisms question what lie behind given forms of knowledge and of understanding – and the institutions that house these entities.

Feminist practices of resistance are sundry. This can mean transforming feelings – *or* reproductive periods *or* disputed areas of everyday life *or* the social realm – into a component of the movement. The African *Courts of Women* attempt, for example, to bring together feelings and analysis, experiences and wishes: poetry and storytelling create space for the pain about the destruction of the contemporary environment. In this manner, spaces are pushed open in which grief can be juxtaposed with analysis and critique of neoliberal politics. The provisional queer group *Black Laundry* demonstrated in front of the Center for Social Development in Israel, chanting "there is no pride in the occupation," while the movement against the "Bombodrom" military practice ground in Brandenburg, Germany, condensed their feminist resistance into the slogans "every military target is a home" and "pink point." This group painted a reconnaissance tower pink and discussed how military activity is always based on particular norms of masculinity and gender.

Feminist resistance continues to face the challenge of finding new ways to thematize issues. Violence against women, sexual violence, and violence in relations between the sexes remain permanent topics. One of the most recent reactions to the "eternal" inversion of the perpetrator-victor dichotomy involved in sexual assaults were the slut walks, which rejected the societal myth that women themselves are to blame for rape if they dress like "skanks": this was the point of using "slut" in the event title. More generally, feminism can spotlight alternatives in movements and in forms: by "translating" structural questions into everyday questions, by determining hegemony in everyday life, and by finding the courage to use the realities of people's own lives as a component inside movements, and in analysis. The question about sex and gender is in no way an "additional topic." Rather, it is an extended and alternative way of searching for the hidden, underground mechanisms of hegemonic relations, of hegemony itself, and of the violence inherent in all interrelations.

Ariane Brenssell

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Feminism

Feminist Economics

The Archimedean point of feminist economics is the hierarchical division of labor between the genders, and the unpaid care work and social reproductive labor, carried out worldwide by women on a mostly unpaid basis. Since the 1970s, feminists have used a critical approach to Marxist economics to analyze "housework" as a "disguised form of productive labor." Further, they have identified its low societal status as the backbone of gender-hierarchical division of labor. While Selma James demands a "wage for housework," the Bielefeld sociologists, Veronika Bennhold-Thomsen, Maria Mies and Claudia von Werlhof reevaluated the "subsistence production" carried out by small farmers and other marginalized people in the "Third World," and also housework in the "First World," and defined these types of labor as a key category in an economy that is not yet completely subjugated to capitalist production methods.

Since the 1980s, female development economists have composed a critique – based on an analysis of structural adjustment programs – of "strategically keeping quiet" (I. Bakker) and of the "male bias" (D. Elson) in neoclassical economics and neoliberal politics. Such strategies are based on the perfidious principle of, on the one hand, editing unpaid care work out of economic value calculations, and of ignoring the interdependencies between labor mediated by the market and labor not mediated by the market. On the other hand, these strategies conceive of reproductive labor – without which the market sphere cannot function – as endlessly stretchable, and aim, in this way, to appropriate it. In neoclassical theory and in market economy practice, only the labor for which a wage is paid is counted as being productive and value creating. Looking after children and the water cycle are both seen as being outside economics in equal measures – both as externalities. This division is one of the foundations for the functional logic and accumulation of capitalist markets.

In contrast to this, feminist economics examines the whole of the economy and all forms of labor, paid and unpaid, productive, reproductive and care work. It considers them all to be activities that create value, and all as interwoven with each other. It analyzes the whole of the economy as being a gendered process, because gender as a social category of inequality is inscribed into it. Markets and macroeconomic politics are no more gender neutral in their functioning than households are. Feminist economics forces open the myth of gender neutrality, including the economic models, theories, statistics and politics that derive from that myth.

Building on Nancy Fraser's differentiation between affirmative and transformative politics, two strategically differing perspectives can be discerned in feminist economics: one approach based on equality, and one based more on a critique of the existing system. The emancipatory potential of a liberal, equality approach are aimed at ➞ redistribution of wealth, and rebalancing social and gender inequalities inside the current system. One focus of work in recent years was equality in company leadership positions, in the financial markets, and a "de-gendering" of macroeconomics, including trade politics, by moving beyond gender-segmented markets. Important instruments to further this work are time-use surveys and gender budget initiatives, which lay open the gender specific implications of macroeconomic politics, and demand a reappraisal, based on principles of gender fairness, of income and expenditure in public budgets.

From a different, ➞ intersectional, ➞ critique of globalization perspective, other female feminist economists see in the neoliberal market a system of structural absence of care and responsibility, no longer embedded social and ecological contexts, and grounded in inequalities and in the externalization of costs and risks. The market logic of efficiency, competition and profitability jars against the type of rationality that informs actions in care and subsistence economies. From this perspective, the assimilation of women into the profit and money orientated species of homo oeconomicus should be contested. This feminist project is about breaking with the market's coercion towards growth for the sole purpose of making a return, which leads to overusing resources and to one crisis after another. Feminists are also focusing on the social and reproductive labor crises, which range from foodstuff crises, to education and employment crises for young adults, and to emergency care situations in hospitals. In opposition to this, they lay down principles for economic activity founded on principles of morality, ➞ commons, and sufficiency. Moreover, they promote a model of a livelihood economy in the countries of the South, consisting of regional caring systems, gift economy, and ➞ moneyless economy. These are all developmental paths that open up heterodox spaces for thought and for action outside of the neoclassical and capitalist system.

Christa Wichterich

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Feminist Economics

Financial Market Regulation

The large financial crisis that began in 2008 is interpreted by the majority of the western functional elite as the worst global economic crisis, with the furthest reaching impacts, since the global economic crisis of 1929. Against this backdrop, the G20 summit in Pittsburgh formulated a packet of reform proposals in 2009. These included: improving financial supervision; a cross-border regulation of financial market actors, including an international institute with genuine relevance for these systems; tightening equity stipulations and limiting levered financial transactions; encompassing the shadow economy – including hedge funds, tax havens, and dealing outside of stock markets – with the new regulations; regulation of derivatives, including credit default swaps; regulating rating agencies; and improved consumer protection. Establishing the G20 as the leading forum for international economic cooperation was viewed as the main thrust of the measures, in order to increase the efficiency of international structures of governance. This was to be coupled with reforms to the IMF and the World Bank, and the setting up of a multilateral panel of experts, to be known as the Financial Stability Board. These proposals grapple with major deficits in the financial system: applying them in a consequential manner would raise the stability of that system significantly. Financial market stability is a public good; emancipatory perspectives should wish to retain and strengthen this stability.

Yet the attempts at reform were, from the start, either watered down or blocked completely, as a reaction to pressure applied by the financial lobby and its representatives in parties and in governments. The process of EU reform is proceeding at an even laxer pace. Moreover, the exclusive focus on stability means that structural causes of the crisis, which cannot be directly attributed to a lack of stability, are being systematically blanked out.

By contrast, an emancipatory, reformist agenda must be shaped around the following guiding principles. The financial sector has to be dramatically shrunk and disentangled, and its supremacy in relation to the real economy and society must be broken. The dominance of speculative business models must be ended: "shut down the casinos." Financial capitalism as a specific variant of capitalist development has to be replaced by a system in which the financial sector serves the purpose of socioecological, ➞ radical transformation of the economy and of society. The erosion of democracy through the power of the financial markets must be reversed, and the same markets must be subordinated to more democratic controls.

A combination of finely orchestrated concrete steps and tools will be needed, in order to force this through. These include financial transaction taxes, and strongly progressive income and wealth taxes. These will reduce the volume of transactions, and could provide incentives for financial investments directed towards the needs of an ecological transformation of the real economy. Moreover, they could turn the tide of the current, unjust dynamics of wealth and income distribution (➞ tax justice.) In addition, highly speculative practices that are particularly risky and opaque must be prohibited, including the practices of short selling, credit default swaps, commodity index funds, and other complex derivatives and hedge funds. The shadow economy must be shut down completely. Furthermore, the involvement of the international commodity trade (which includes important foodstuffs necessary for ➞ food sovereignty) in the practices of financial capitalism must be stopped, by stopping banks and funds gaining access to the market. Other important measures must encompass: the drying up of tax havens; rendering banking secrecy invalid, in relation to supervisory bodies, including foreign or international bodies; and breaking up large financial institutions that play a key role in the system, and that have been described as "too big to fail." This last measure would prevent a domino effect being triggered, in the event that one of these institutions should become insolvent. A selective ➞ de-globalization of financial markets, alongside their ➞ regionalization, should be aimed for, through the mechanism of controls on capital transactions. Parallel to this, a strong, public banking sector under democratic control must be established, which ought to become the motor of socioecological transformation. Private rating agencies should be replaced by public institutions bound to the exigencies of the law. The international, "out-of-balance" balance of trade, and the compensatory measures to ensure balance of payments that result from that, which in turn generate new debt, should be deconstructed, by raising the domestic demand for socioecological development. The public finances' dependence on the market has to be ended, and the central bank system restructured accordingly, and drawn into the remit of democratic control. The role of US dollars as the global leading currency should be replace by a neutral world currency grounded in the special drawing rights, as enshrined in the institution of the IMF. There certainly are alternatives to financial market capitalism. To move these demands beyond the phase of rallying cries at demonstrations will undoubtedly require further political struggles.

Peter Wahl

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Food Sovereignty

The concept of food sovereignty was first mentioned in a wider context in a declaration of farmers' organizations and NGOs, made at the World Food Summit in Rome in 1996. The international organization La Via Campesina (Spanish for "the peasants' way") was the driving force behind developing an alternative concept to industrialized and export orientated agriculture. La Via Campesina demanded that governments implement food sovereignty principles politically, which would mean protecting domestic agricultural sectors, by using import duties, from product dumping – among other measures. In the period since 1996, Venezuela, Senegal, Ecuador and Nepal have all declared such protective measures to be government policy, while strong groupings in Mali and Bolivia have demanded their implementation. In its 2008 report, IAASTD (which essentially functioned as a world agricultural council from 2005-2007) stressed the significance of food sovereignty for agriculture and for feeding populations.

In a parallel development, the first International Food Sovereignty Forum culminated in the "Declaration of the Forum for Food Sovereignty, Nyéléni," passed by five hundred participants in Mali in February 2007. A key passage of the text reads thus:

"Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems. It puts the aspirations and needs of those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations."

In opposition to the concept of food security, which should be ensured by using, among other methods, genetically modified crops, and which focuses on harvest quantities and on financial utilization, food sovereignty also encompasses the conditions of production, the imbalanced conditions of exchange at the international level, and the quality of production. As such, the concept attacks "Food aid that disguises dumping, introduces GMOs into local environments and food systems and creates new colonialism patterns."

Champions of food sovereignty perceive domestic markets as having been destroyed by cheap imports; they see how the privatization of resources has literally dried up the water underneath their feet; and have experienced bans on using their own seeds, because of international patent law agreements. Instead of moving towards more food sovereignty, biotechnology corporations continue to register new patents for plants, the genetic codes of which then transfer into being the patent holders' property. Food sovereignty rejects all uses of genetic engineering, and do not consider biofuels and bioenergy as an opportunity, but rather as a threat both to their existence as farmers, and to foodstuffs worthy for human consumption. This is because energy plants are farmed across large, monocultural areas, so-called "green deserts," using chemicals genetically modified crops. Food sovereignty also opposes what was called the Green Revolution, which achieved short-term increases in crop yields in the 1960s and 70s by using artificial fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides, but which then – because of pests' resistance to pesticides, and because of polluted soil and groundwater – unleashed its destructive potential. These damages, and the costs that result in order to get a grip on them again, are "externalized" in the agro-industry's accounting calculations, i.e. billed to the rest of humanity. By contrast, food sovereignty considers ecological costs alongside commercial gains, including the use of groundwater and the pollution of the soil, and aims at "sustainable" land use.

Food sovereignty opposes the WTO's global agricultural concept, and against the concepts of the large, industrialized, agricultural export nations. It is a battle cry against the western agro-industry, and its interests in utilization and profit on the world market. Food producers should be able to use water, seeds and land freely, and access and control should be removed from the hands of the large concerns. Whether the soil and land then becomes cooperative or private property owned by peasant farmers is determined on a case-to-case basis. Food sovereignty also encompasses the interests of dependent wage laborers, and demands "fair wages" and "acceptable working conditions" for rural workers. In so doing, it not only conserves and develops preexisting structures that farmers have for food provision. It also goes beyond this, and constitutes an option for millions of slum dwellers. The Brazilian Landless Workers' Movement (often called according to its Portuguese acronym, MST), carries out land occupations with slum dwellers, in order to then practice agriculture on the occupied land. This is one example for how food sovereignty can be seen as a step towards decentralizing the power of the agro-sector, and also as the antithesis to the centralistic strivings of agro-politics in the context of globalization. Finally, it should also be viewed as a reaction to the social dislocations of urbanization and industrialization.

Gerhard Klas

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Food Sovereignty

Forms of life

When the term "forms of life" is used today, it is mostly to discuss how people structure (love) relationships, how their living and housing conditions are, and how they bring up children. Articulating everyday interrelations of cultural reproduction as a political battlefield contradicts the kind of left-wing political consciousness that dominated up to the 1960s, and that can still influence ➞ social movements today. Parallel to this, contemporary struggles for the ➞ recognition of all ways of life reiterate the bourgeois notion that these are struggles about purely private matters. In which it should be possible for individual ➞ liberty to rule the roost, independent from other hegemonic relations in society.

Into the 1960s, a Marxist-Leninist worldview strongly shaped all social criticism that was at all noticeable. Analyses of power referred primarily to the interrelation between capital and labor inside production processes. Alongside this, the essential significance of the party was taken as a given, which you had to subordinate yourself to, for the distant goal of a better society. In this manner, the search for new collective forms of life was a two-fold search for alternatives. It spotlighted hegemony as the disciplining and isolation of individual humans, who experienced this hegemony through the patriarchal nuclear family, sexual norms, and consumption stripped of meaning. Moreover, it included the idea of resistance as a provider of possibilities for making a non-alienated, pleasure-orientated and communal life inside current society something that could be experienced concretely. This led, as regards daily life, to various practices, from smoking marijuana as a political program, to self-sufficient communes, urban communal centers and many further alternatives. In this, the relationship between alternative movements and an encompassing ➞ critique of capitalism and of hegemony remained controversial.

An essential moment in the rejuvenation of interrelations stemming from everyday practices (➞ culture of everyday life) and social criticism was the emergence of the second women's movement (➞ feminism). The starting point here was the criticism that female personality was reduced to the role of the housewife. The exclusion of women from almost all societal processes that accompanied the focus on the housewife was perceived as formative for capitalist relations. Mindful of this backdrop, alternative forms of life didn't just include attempts to develop non-hierarchic forms of love and sexuality, and non-hierarchic relationships between the sexes and the generations. Rather, women's centers, and women's music festivals and demonstrations, were simultaneously a protest against all hegemonic relations in society *and* a massive individual discovery of new forms of life.

From today's standpoint, we can determine that the norms and techniques of disciplining – to which the movements of the 1960s and 1970s sought alternatives – emerged themselves out of a Fordist formation of society. They were part of regulating a society founded on mass production and consumption, imposing a strongly rationalized and standardized form of everyday work onto those laboring in the factory and at home. In contrast, production for profit in the current form of capitalism is based on a constantly mutating production of goods that takes in smaller physical spaces, and, above all, on the service sector. The continual opening up of new sales markets, and a production of needs to match, is the formative moment of this mode of production.

In this context, if conceptions about liberty and self-realization concentrate on the individual structuring of ways of life, and seal these off from encompassing social criticism, we can view this as an own-goal for the hegemony of neoliberal methods of regulation. A prerequisite of a flexible mode of production is that workers can get to grips with new contexts in a quick and motivated fashion. Parallel to this, the safeguarding of reproduction becomes ever more individualized. The partial recognition of ways of life removed from the heterosexual nuclear family does not fundamentally contradict this. To the extent that they support the market-orientated capacity of individuals to act, or support self-organized alternatives to societal responsibility for those who need help (children, the ill, the elderly and stressed people), such alternative ways of life are welcome. Simultaneously, this mode of production is also based on the devaluing of all activities that cannot be structured in an efficient manner. This process is then legitimized through gender-specific and racist epithets, and methods of exclusion. It is in this contradiction, that any future politics concerning forms of life will be played out.

Iris Nowak

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Four-in-one Perspective

The four-in-one perspective comes from the women's movement, and aims at relocating the position of caring labor, necessary for shared human life, from the edge to the middle of society, and championing it as a central force for human cooperation, and for our interrelation with nature (➞ care revolution). The workers' movement is another key source for this perspective, and draws on that movement's omnipresent – though often marginalized – perspective that the production of foodstuffs and the structuring of conditions of life appropriate to that occupation are central factors in the development of society. This leads advocates of this perspective to battle against the inversion of relations into the wage-form. In the societal division of labor, both types of labor, that encompass both production and reproduction, are related to each other hierarchically. Gender relations must therefore be understood as relations of production. This understanding enables actors to criticize accentuated inversion that takes place in capitalism, by which the production of the means of life are organized around profit and seen as the core issue, while life and living themselves are seen as marginal by-products. In the course of history, these divisions of labor have grown together with the personalities who have carried them out. This is what makes hegemony reproducing this ordering of society seem "natural." If you were to lay both forms of production – that of life itself, and that of foodstuffs necessary for live – you would recognize that that they're coiled together in strategic hegemonic knots, the unraveling of which is blocked by numerous fortifications. In this hierarchy, two further kinds of labor are pushed into the wings as being superfluous, the labor or work each individual does on themselves – in developing manifold abilities, including creative ones – and the work of needed political intervention.

The four-in-one perspective has learned from the past not to pursue the "women's question" as a form of politics in itself, but rather to grapple with it as enmeshed in the three other spheres of activity: paid labor, reproductive labor, and work on oneself. Concurrently, this perspective learns how deeply gender relations permeate throughout society, i.e. how large the problematic is, for which solutions are being sought. The project enriches workers' movement politics, to the extent that it can learn to extend its scope to all labor done in society, and not merely that part located in full-time paid work. It can also enrich the languishing women's movement, by demonstrating that its questions are central to the task of deciphering the hegemonic knot.

In concrete terms, the four-in-one perspective argues for a right to paid work, while simultaneously demanding a radical shortening of the time we spend carrying this work out (➞ shorter working time). This, so we can devote the rest of the time in our lives to the other three areas of labor. Everyone should get involved in nurturing people and nurturing nature – both men and women – and everyone should have time to use for their own development. Everyone should also have time to intervene politically for the cause of a good life. The current enmeshment of these four areas in the continuance of repressive interrelations means that all four areas have to be engaged with at once. As a contextualizing question, the four-in-one perspective is intervening in a series of contemporary struggles. Foremost amongst these are perhaps the struggles concerning paid work, because it is here that a radical shortening of working time is apposite, in order to work against growing, structural unemployment. Parallel to this however, we see that the necessary shortening of working time to about four hours per working day would shift the significance and status of the paid work sector in the life of each individual. This would require workers to alter their identity, and a type of politics, that intervenes both structurally and subjectively. Ultimately, this is about the core of societies that are driven by capitalism, about not allowing the logic of profit to dispose over our time in our lives, and about consciously using our time to contribute to a better life. Unions and leftist parties are both supporters and addressees of these politics in relation to paid work, even though they still find it hard to engage with the necessary extension of the concept of labor to encompass the other three sectors.

With reference to Rosa Luxemburg's concept of ➞ revolutionary *Realpolitik*, the individual steps that are called for are both reforms inside of existing interrelations *and*, through these being linked together, something that transcends these. This is the contested space in which apparently oxymoronic solutions like "*part-time work for everyone*" or "*elite schools for everyone*" are to be understood. Accordingly, this political project receives support from many different groups that are fighting for societal change, above all from women's groups, from Attac, from the churches, and from students' movements. It has an interface with the movement for ➞ basic income, because it includes social guarantees for life for everyone, and to ➞ grassroots-democratic groups, as its central pivot is involving everyone in the regulation of society.

Frigga Haug

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Four-in-one Perspective

Free Association

The term "association" (from the Latin *sociare*, "unite with") has referred, in a general sense since the 19th century, to organizational forms in ➞ civil society, like clubs and cooperatives. When the term was taken up into the vocabulary of the workers' movement in the form of a free association," it became a core concept in the question of how to organize leftist politics: in an immediate, in a middle-term, and in a utopian fashion. It was Marx that imbued the term with the iridescent and utopian character that it has retained until today, a character that stirs the imagination. This is because Marx used the term as a cipher for ➞ communist society. Marx describes this society as an "associated mode of production," in which capitalistic class oppositions are sublated, and the state – an expression of these same oppositions – is abolished in favor of an "association of free humans." The free association emerging in this manner facilitates "the free development of each individual" as "the condition for the free development of all." In Marx' work, the concept of free association simultaneously refers to the immediate, "free" union of proletarians, which should enable individuals forced into opposition to each other by the capitalist competitive struggle, to practice long-term forms of ➞ solidarity. In a further step, Marx represents free association as a ➞ "cooperative," a medium-term organizational form in the transformation to communism. The extent to which this medium-term form of free association takes hold depends on the extent to which it is based on communally owned property, and as such foreshadows parts of communist society.

The concept's explosive potential lies in its tense relationship with *realpolitik*: free association is both *how* we fight, and *what* we are fighting *for.* However, in this moment of preemption, it consistently steps beyond itself, as a "small" form of political action, in the direction of "big" politics. Because free association is simultaneously the *form* in which people engage in emancipatory practices, and the *"name"* of a classless society that still has to be fought for, debates *inside* and about the concrete forms and value of the term often become heated. This was already the case for the International Workingmen's Association (also called the First International, founded 1864), whose ➞ Marxist and ➞ anarchist wings split over the concrete articulation of precisely this question: should the "association" function as a centralist umbrella organization for workers' parties, or as a federalist union? Does the path to communism in the medium-term have to lead via a "dictatorship of the proletariat," or can it lead via the abolition of every form of state power in favor of free association? And what would this utopia look like in concrete terms: state centralism and a planned economy, or a federation of self-managed workers' associations?

Even today, these old lines of conflict conceal enough material for current controversies: how should, and, more importantly, how can a ➞ grassroots-democratic, anti-capitalist Left organize itself today? The long history of leftist, non-state self-determined organization – from autonomous housing projects, to ➞ fair trade cooperatives, to commodity communities, and even encompassing academic and scientific networks – can provide impulses here. However, in high-tech capitalism within its neoliberal casing, the conditions for free association have changed substantially. As a decentral form of organization, free association now exists as a divergent form alongside models it should not really be compared to: startups and single-person enterprises, which have, in German-language discourse in the last decade, often been called "Ich-AGs." While the former, startups, shows up the hegemonic form of entrepreneurial self-organization, the latter, single-person enterprises, represents the authoritarian coercion to "self-organize" one's own survival in an age of the privatization of societal risks. Despite this, free association can still today act as a fountain of inspiration for critical reflection about a classless society, and about the road that could lead us there. As such, the fundamental problem remains of having to establish organizational forms as alternatives to the state and to the market under the contradictory pressure of these very same relations. These are not located "outside of" alternative self-organization, but rather permeate the "members" of free association, and thereby free association itself, as the societal foundations for all action. Nevertheless, or perhaps precisely because of this, the unfocused impulse towards free association remains highly relevant. As Wolf-Dieter Narr has put it, this amounts to fighting in a "dis-associative era" for free spaces, in which the utopia envisaged of an "association of free humans" can be brought a little bit nearer. Practicing grassroots democracy, solidarity, and ➞ cooperation, based on a mutual understanding of the individual contradictions between self-organization and the need for security, and based on support and the ➞ solidaristic economy, remain the fundament of leftist politics – under all conditions.

Lars Bretthauer and Daniel von Fromberg

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Free Association

Free Spaces

The concept of free spaces has developed in the new ➞ social movements to a central element of political practice. The political actors were motivated, in many respects, by the goal of changing ➞ culture of everyday life, and, in doing so, of moving beyond the previously dominant tight concepts of politics. The search for new ➞ forms of life was a central call, which manifested itself in alternative economic, interpersonal, political and ecological approaches, among other strategies. This was a corollary, in several respects, to the idea of ➞ radical reformism. However, these new practices required, more strongly than before, the creation of alternative social and physical spaces, which should mostly be organized and maintained by the users through ➞ grassroots-democratic methods. This led to the demand being voiced for women's and lesbian spaces during the ➞ feminism of the second women's movement, and for diverse project workshops in the context of the ecology movement. Moreover, free spaces also formed the goal and the practice of numerous ➞ protests. There are two essential perspectives for signifying free spaces, both closely connected with either a positive or a negative understanding of ➞ liberty. On the one hand, free spaces can be linked with the facet of liberty of doing. understood in this manner, free spaces are principally places for experimenting, for being open to new forms of interaction, and for the radical subversion of established patterns of socialization. In this context, liberty is understood – in a similar way as it is in ➞ anarchism – as an absence of norms and hegemony. According to this perspective, free spaces should also be understood as an attempt to enact immediate ➞ appropriation, with the aim of making resources useable, and of tapping into an active understanding of a political movement proceeding from new spaces. Most free spaces emphasize this aspect of their development at some point, because they're also, because they also develop in agreement with patterns of political ➞ recognition in a narrower sense.

On the other hand, publicly defining the free space regularly results in a conflict situation, which is rooted in the unequal distribution of opportunity. Because contemporary society is imbued by numerous hegemonic elements, ➞ equality in liberty, or in liberties, cannot exist. On the contrary, many people fell themselves to be so restricted by other people's actions, that for them a "negative" definition of liberty is primary: based on this interpretation, free spaces should be free of patterns of behavior, which are experienced as repressive. In the leftist scene, this process has entered the vernacular in an array of terms, utilized as demands in a specific catalogue of "antis" (e.g. anti-sexism, anti-racism, and anti-nationalism). These are intended to liberate the spaces free of the hegemonic moments to which the terms refer. This interpretation of free space shows proximity to the idea of a protective space that wishes to offer space to those affected by violence: liberty from violence, in other words.

The concept of "free spaces" condenses both the strengths and problems of grassroots movements. Not just the demand but also the real application of free spaces place emancipatory political actors in front of apparently insurmountable contradictions. While a fundamental transition of social patterns of interaction with ➞ free association as the goal is aimed for (the "positive" definition of free spaces), in reality, insoluble contradictions and conflicts come to the fore continually. These demonstrate the societal immanence of all emancipatory politics (the "negative" definition of free spaces). Groups and individuals aim for free spaces that, simultaneously, can never "really" exist. This mirrors to some extent a dialect running through the whole history of the Left, located in the conflict zone between "immanence" and "transcendence." The strength of free spaces lies precisely in the updating of this old opposition in real, everyday political practice. Abstract systematic contradictions – including those contained in the ➞ critique of political economy – are broken down into urgent learning and development processes, e.g. in the free spaces of the ➞ moneyless economy. Nevertheless, it's important long-term for the concept of free spaces that the wealth of experience gained doesn't merely remain at the absolutely immediate level of grassroots practices, where it is in danger of ultimately seeping away into (individualized) everyday life. That's why knowledge gained from the free spaces' movement should regularly be linked to more complex levels of societal organization. Such connections are only possible through theoretical and practical communicative work with other emancipatory practices.

Elmar Flatschart

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Gender Democracy

Gender democracy is strictly speaking illogical as a term – we know that democracy means rule of and by the (whole) people. "A gender-based rule of the people" therefore appears at first to be a nonsensical juxtaposition. Yet this awkward concept was introduced into ➞ feminist discussions at the start of the 1990s, in order to criticize gender inequality in western representative democracies, and to propose an alternative democratic model.

Since the 1980s, feminist political science made use of both historical/systemic approaches and empirical studies to conclude that representative democracies are gender exclusive. Despite formal equality of political rights, women are under-represented in the state's decision-making bodies, in quantitative and in qualitative terms. This also means that gender justice in state politics, and acting "on women's behalf" that should be a part of this, are in no way guaranteed in a representative, party-political democracy. That's why "androcracies" – systems ruled by men – is a more fitting classification for representative democracies.

And that's why it should be doubted, from a gender perspective, that liberal democracies ever experienced a past "moment of democracy," which would have deserved the title of democracy in the sense of self-determination and autonomy of all citizens of all genders – the postulate used by Colin Crouch in his popular thesis "Post-Democracy." Instead, the label "post-democratic" is used to describe the political framework that women have always had to live with, characterized by a widespread exclusion from political decisions, and a negation of women's interests.

Beyond that, gender democracy is a strategic slogan of struggle in the conflict about gender justice, and about extending ➞ participation opportunities in the form of adequate representation *and* increasing the attention paid to women's interests in decision-making organs. This concept implies a change of perspectives, and is an attempt to include men as actors in a restructuring of society with more gender justice, by criticizing not only the exclusion of women, but also the male-centeredness of representative democracy.

In German-language gender research, the concept has generated heated controversy. The critique primarily targets the neglect of societal differences including class-belongingness, sexuality and ethnicity, due to a focus on only two genders. More importantly, the concept "gender democracy" conceals an affirmative attitude towards the processes of representative democracy, and therein also a dangerous and subtle erosion of feminist emancipatory strategies.

In recent years, the tempestuous altercations concerning the concept of gender democracy have calmed down somewhat. Nevertheless, it appears to be worth relocating the concept in a ➞ radical reformist manner in the context of contemporary crises of representative democracy. We can also search for more precision in the concept's utopian content – gender democracy is aimed at political institutions, processes and norms, which recognize and apply the interests of both men and women. Beyond this, a democratically constituted entity of this type can open up spaces for thought and action, in which gender can be conceptualized as a category containing more than can be seen by a reductionist "only two genders" approach. In this way, it can be seen as a category imbued by other structures of injustice, like class and ethnicity; this is the cognitive prerequisite for institutionalizing measures against injustice as a whole. Increasing the quantitative representation of women in political decision-making positions, has also to be linked with strategies that locate feminist action "for women" outside of state institutions. Representative democracies need public spaces for discussions about "women's interests," for the simple reason that "*the* interests of women" do not exist. These require political forms to account for the fact that interests emerge in the context of antagonistic power relations, and that gender as an interdependent category is only first constituted through these wrestling matches. In this manifestation, gender democracy functions as a metaphor for an extended concept of democracy. This democracy concept would not only conceptualize gender democracy as a process for reaching decisions and majorities, but also as a way of life, based on gender justice. A democratic gender contract has to be based on justice in the distribution of care work – as essential for society – and of paid work. The only thing that can facilitate political self-determination is the empowerment to do politics – understood here as decisions about time and economic resources. In so doing, gender democracy fundamentally questions patriarchal structures, institutions, and methods of subjectivization.

Birgit Sauer

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Global Social Rights

Another world is self-evidently possible, yet the qualities of possibility it may offer remains undetermined: it was the reaction to this discourse that originally ignited the discourse about global social rights. Lots of activists attempted to more concretely grasp what such a future world might look like. This was, in part, a very concrete process – guaranteeing material needs through a global, unconditional ➞ basic income, freedom of movement, bequeathing a still intact environment etc. – and also mostly included traditional ➞ human rights. But it was also more generally a common starting point, from which to gain an overview of that which all movements of thought and of struggle share. This meant asking the question: where would we arrive at together, if all our individual struggles would be successful? So we see that this subject has a more practical aspect, and also a more theoretical aspect. What should constitute a global social right isn't predefined, but is rather the subject of controversial discussion.

Seen from the theoretical side, the idea of global social rights has to grapple with the concept of human rights, so that it can give an account of how the former differs from the latter. Humans do not want and should not be objects belonging to a third instance; and being human starts with existence. Human rights are therefore nothing that need to be earned, nor anything that can be lost. Comprehended thus, global social rights do not contradict human rights. Despite this, leftist critiques continue to emphasize deficiencies in the arguments for global social rights: because these have developed as defense rights against the state, and more precisely as defense rights of an individual citizen – citizen, we note, in the male and singular form – against the state violating his property, such rights cannot meet the standard they have set for themselves of facilitating equal ➞ liberty for everyone. While this is true, it is exactly this contradiction between aspiration and the reality of present day circumstances – seen in human rights and societal terms – that can become fertile, when it is articulated as aspiring to a right to individual development.

As a negotiating tool between the theoretical and practical levels, a concept of global social rights has to pose the question regarding which conditions it needs, to achieve its aims. Looking at and beyond the universal validity of human rights – what one person is entitled to, all are entitled to – we must also look at the societal whole. Aspiring to a good life for everyone is not compatible with a real world, in which possibilities and power, wealth and participation, and resource-use and rights are all extremely unequally distributed. That's why global social rights extend far beyond what is normally understood when the adjective 'social' is used. Such global social rights also include questions about ecology, democracy, ➞ democratization, and freedom of movement. Global social rights question conditions of hegemony as a whole, whether these have economic, patriarchal, racist or other foundations. They differentiate themselves from traditional human rights in that they're closely connected with practices of ➞ appropriation that have at least been attempted. These practices are not dissimilar to the original defense of property carried out by citizens, who, when they talked about "rights and law" meant their own, immediate interests. The process of formalizing these rights only superficially conceals this attitude, at most. This is about appropriation happening here and now, whilst the traditional leftist critique of human rights postpones this de facto until the sea change of ➞ revolution: prior to this human rights were deficient; afterwards, made real.

In practical terms, global social rights is about actually getting those concrete commodities and services that are a requisite for a good life, and not just about having a right to these things. These appropriation processes take place, for example, when people take, through migration, the "right" to be where they're not allowed to be, or when landless or homeless people take ownership of land or housing. Specific appropriation practices certainly can be legal, economic activity inside ➞ solidaristic economy for example, or can express themselves through more symbolic battles, for example increased possibilities to utilize a particular resource. Completely individual ways of behaving are also thinkable, for example celebrating being ill, or using an employer's infrastructure for private needs.

Demands for human rights were addressed to the nation-state, and it was this entity who had to ultimately guarantee these rights. States are of course neither powerless nor irrelevant in a system of global capitalism, but they're not, in isolation, the central actors. In contrast, global social rights must address itself to not yet existing global addressees. In doing so, they can already become the form in which these interrelations will have to be reconsidered, before these can be challenged.

Werner Rätz

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Global Social Rights

Good Work

Paid work is the central point of reference for all trade unions. Retaining work, supporting it, and shaping it in a "humane" manner are goals that have been at the core of their self-image from the start. That's why employment politics, including the task of regulation, has always been an important field of trade union action, albeit one that was often obscured by other priorities. Using these parameters, the 1990s could be labeled a "lost decade" for employment politics, with concerns of securing employment and income pushing all approaches to a qualitative structuring of work off the agenda. Parallel to this, many of the political successes achieved in the humanization of work in the 1970s and 1980s were revoked by corporations. Thus, compared to the period in which the project of humanizing work was widely accepted, the basic constellations have now changed: companies' short-term orientations, coupled with locations competing for business, and businesses competing to sink costs, mean that, in many places, the quality of work has shrunk to being a remainder, left over after all other sums have been done. In addition: the management of companies and of productivity through orientation on the financial markets has not only put pressure on good work, but has also contributed substantially to the 2008-09 "crisis of the century" in financial market capitalism.

In contrast to mainstream German society, whose slogan, in supporting the deregulation of legal protection could be summarized as "work: that's the main thing," the metalworkers' union IG Metall started the Good Work initiative in 2003, aimed at "developing a reform concept for a modern, humane world of work, by incorporating specific, employment politics issues." Despite the transformation in mainstream moral values, a concrete "Good Work" utopia of this sort can still engage a wide audience in society today. In so doing, actors draw from experiences gained using the old form of what has been called the "politics of humanization." New structural conditions do however demand new emphases and new contents. The Good Work initiative is aimed at both focusing again on the everyday structuring of working conditions in companies, *and* on making quality of work an issue for social politics. This means re-politicizing a field of action. Several dimensions would be needed to describe the "profile" of this field: above all else, Good Work is a *concept of resistance*. It's about putting up barriers against bad work, and constructing lines of resistance, in order to stop standards of good work being consistently adjusted downward in a spiral of decline. The primary implication of this is to lead a struggle against further extensions of working time, and the spread of precarious jobs (see ➞ against precarization). Beyond that, Good Work is also an *opportunity to intervene,* to become capable of action in terms of company politics and in other central fields that determine the structuring of working conditions. But Good Work is also a *concept for the future*, supporting employees in their expectations about, and interest in good work, from inside what is initially a defensive situation. Moreover, this is a concept for unleashing employees' social fantasy, taking a situation of resistance as the starting point. As such, it is compatible with wider reaching aspects of "ecology-izing" and ➞ democratizing work.

Signs of people being over challenged and the limits of an economy based on limitlessness became visible in the most recent phase of economic and financial crisis. The pressure of problems building up in employment politics has been exacerbated yet further during the boom phase that followed. These find particular expression in the ongoing precarization of work, and densification of work tasks. This means that the battle for health and for good work will become an important field of conflict, containing substantial potential for resistance against the impertinences of a shareholder economy.

This requires a new strategic approach to employment politics, in which, parallel to the demands for innovation, the consequences of innovation for health and quality of work will be systematically worked through: people must claim their right to a sustainable way of negotiating humane work. In this approach, orientated around workers and workforces, company competitiveness in markets steered by profit will be recognized as one parameter of action, but will not be raised up as the central strategic aim. Instead, employees' interests, as members of workforces, and, indeed, as individual subjects, take center stage, alongside strengthening standards of humanization. The objective of the Good Work Index, compiled annually from 2007 by the DGB (the largest umbrella organization for individual German unions), is to strengthen employees' core demands, and to focus public attention on the quality of contemporary working conditions. This instrument has been successful in re-establishing employment politics as an important field of action for the whole trade union movement (www.dgb-index-gute-arbeit.de).

Klaus Pickshaus

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Good Work

Grassroots Democracy

Grassroots democracy describes a form of political discussion and decision making orientated around ➞ participation. It represents a counter-model to representative democracy. In a representative democracy, representatives are legitimated, for a fixed period, to speak for and to take political decisions for the whole grou By contrast, in concepts of grassroots democracy, the whole groups always participates in debate and in reaching decisions. Assemblies of all participants are the locations at which decisions are discussed and also taken. If the group becomes too large for an assembly, delegates are chosen from smaller units of the basis of the whole group, who now have responsibility for discussing and taking decisions for the whole group in a plenum with other delegates. In contrast to representatives, who have a free mandate and who can represent the group according to their individual discretion, these delegates are bound to decisions that have been discussed by the basis, in a process that is called an "imperative mandate." Delegates may be voted out at any time and the individuals performing the role of delegates should rotate often, to work against the problem of particular individuals heaping up power. This model of delegation, the recall-and-rotation principle, was developed in the movement of the ➞ soviet councils at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. Neoliberalism's dominance in the political landscape of established parties has led to the population losing significant amounts of trust in the system since the 1990s, and to a frequently discussed "crisis of representation." In the same vein, the emergence of the critique-of-globalization movement is marked by a decidedly strong critique of representation. New, successful experiences with social organizations orientated around grassroots democracy can be observed in the Zapatista communities in Chiapas, Mexico. In comparison, centralistic organizational forms relying heavily on strong representation, which were, until recently, an essential part of workers' movements, have become an exception in the new cycle of movements since the mid-1990s. More recent ➞ protest movements, through the form of occupying public squares, have also clearly criticized representation and have demonstrated a grassroots-democratic consciousness. Perhaps the most prominent example of this has been the occupation of Tahrir Square in Cairo, in 2011. The city's central square should now be thought of as the location at which people express their political needs directly, without these being mediated through representatives. This grassroots-democratic motif also shaped similar forms of action in the summer of 2011 in Spain and Greece, and the ➞ Occupy movement also provided ample evidence of a grassroots democracy impulse. In analyzing the organization of the occupation of these squares, almost no personal representation can be detected. Instead, grassroots-democratic dynamics have been used, ranging from informally agreeing upon standpoints and decisions (as was the case in Tahrir Square), to innovative, formalized mechanisms for discussing and reaching decisions, e.g. the Occupy movement's "people's microphone," used to amplify speeches, by means of a chorus of human voices, so that they can be heard at large assemblies.

The principle of ➞ deceleration is a counterpoint to all these processes. Speed in reaching decisions is no longer seen as the central criterion for assessing a group's ability to act, and a slower tempo is accepted, which should guarantee as large a participation as possible. In ➞ social movements, this tendency aims at realizing the utopia of a democratic society in the here and now. More plebiscites on important social and political issue is a central demand raised by voices who want more grassroots democracy in society. This is the context in which the Brazilian federal state of Rio Grande do Sol initiated the model of ➞ participatory budgeting, under which citizens' assemblies decide upon spending and investments of individual municipalities. Since it was introduced, this model has resonated strongly amongst many rural districts and urban municipal councils around the world.

The primary criticism of grassroots-democratic models concern their practicability. The larger the group, the harder it is for all the members to take part, in a meaningful sense. In some of the structures and organizations pertaining to social groups, this problem has led to a mixed form, combining grassroots-democratic and representative models. The active participation of all individuals is the precondition for grassroots-democratic processes. The critical point is that those individuals who are not able to contribute the same degree of activity have less influence on social processes, a criticism that has coined the pejorative term "activists' democracy." On top of this, much experience has shown that despite the conscious rejection of representatives in social and political groups, spokespersons and leaders often emerge through informal channels anyway (often called "informal hierarchies.") Less democratic control can be exercised over these individuals than if they had to work under an official mandate, which has to be renewed.

Pedram Shahyar

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Grassroots Democracy

Guerrilla Communication

Guerrilla communication is a theory and practice of subversive communication that differs from classic concepts of the ➞ counter-public, but also from an organization's own media for internal communication inside ➞ social movements. The differences are to be found not only in forms of political articulation, but also in the worldview integral to them. While traditional forms of "counter-information" trust in the power of superior arguments, and were orientated around explaining things through a strategy of expertise, guerrilla communication poses the following form in a radical form: "why is no one listening to me?" In contrast to networks like Attac who rely on academic editorial boards to carry out a political project of grounded critique, communication guerrillas insist on the significance of one simple insight: just because I'm telling the truth, there's no reason why anyone should believe me."

One of the cues for this insight was provided by Umberto Eco's critique on a reductionist, educational, broadcaster-receiver model of his communication, and his perception that occupying broadcasting stations would not, in itself, be sufficient: it was just as important to ensure that you were sitting in the front rows of the audience, in order to influence the mode of reception. And his postulate concerning "semiological guerrillas" had a definitive influence on the concept of the communications guerrilla. Alongside touches of the "fun guerrilla" figure of the 1968 generation, and the Italian *Indiani Metropolitani* (urban guerrilla) from the 1970s, numerous practices originating in *culture jamming* (USA), situationism, Dadaism or among the *spontis* – left-wing groups in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s, who saw themselves as political descendants of the "APO" (extra-parliamentary opposition) and the 1968 movement – all flowed into developing the guerrilla communication concept.

Guerrilla communication assumes that although societal interrelations are self-evidently socially constructed, these relations appear in a quasi-natural form in everyday communication, as they do in ➞ common sense thought. This is about attacking the obviousness of power relations, social inequality and societal marginalization, and casting doubts on their apparent normality. To do this, guerrilla communication analyzes the cultural grammar of power relations, the ways and means by which they're inscribed into everyday behavior patterns, manners of speech, and communication forms. This knowledge enables guerrilla communication to be productive in a subversive fashion, through producing representations that appear dysfunctional in the framework of hegemonic, cultural grammar, thereby creating irritation and unease. The basic idea is tearing away the veil of (seemingly) self-evident truths to reveal the absurdities and contradictions in the formation of capitalist societies – to make them visible, and therefore vulnerable.

In working in this way, guerrilla communication uses camouflage and fakes. It does not operate openly as a unit of propaganda or agitation, nor does it in any way attempt to win an ultimate battle. Rather, the communication guerrillas move like "semiotic snipers" through the jungle of signifiers, disseminating messages distorted to the point of absurdity, using the names and voices of their opponents. They are convinced that the "best subversion" lies in "distorting codes rather than destroying them." (Roland Barthes) As opposed to satire and parody, communication guerrillas do not act in the protected spaces of variety stages, comedy clubs or satire magazines, but rather carry the conflict into everyday society.

Viewed thus, guerrilla communication is neither "big politics," nor a "Spring Offensive," nor even a campaign. It often functions at its best in isolation, or as a sequence of small actions. This is micro-politics, bound into the everyday world off its actors, and its actions are informed by reflecting on situations of everyday powerlessness, in which societal relations of power find expression. It is through this critical gaze that a political practice can evolve, which opens up possibilities for action, and wants to empower people to action.

Guerrilla communication is a frontal attack on prevailing circumstances – even when this attack appears to resemble a series of pinpricks. In post-Fordist, cognitive capitalism, the ability to analyze and use signifiers and symbols, and the technology to disseminate these, is not merely a part of everyday life for an ever-increasing part of the population – through their non-material or mental labor – but also increasingly molds how we spend our free time. Producing images, symbolic representations and generating affect are being pulled onto the center stage of value creation. Images – i.e. signifiers and symbols, are no mere variables anymore, but are also advancing to the position of fixed capital. Viewed thus, guerrilla communication has a sound grasp of contemporary developments.

autonomous a.f.r.i.k.a.-group

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Guerrilla Communication

Human Rights

For as long as humans have dwelled on earth, there have been signs that such rights exist. However, it is only since the end of the 18th century that human rights, which ought to be valid for people irrespective of any particular circumstances, have been the subject of declarations. Before the USA was founded in revolutionary fashion, the Virginia Bill of Rights (1776) declared: "all men are created equal..." At the commencing act of the French Revolution (1789), as the tricolor was hoisted: "liberty, equality, fraternity." This was also the period in which slavery's legitimacy was fundamentally disputed. Human rights were justified as being antecedent to the state. All humans ought to possess them, irrespective of whether existing rulers or other people observe their validity. In the spirit of the enlightenment, every individual was primarily perceived as a person who determines themselves. "Man is born free" (Jean-Jacques Rousseau). The word "right" in the term "human rights" should not be directly equated by bodies of rights and laws regulated by specific states. Human rights signify, as a term, all of people's requisite needs, chances to develop, and necessities. Ernst Bloch used the metaphor of "the ecstasy of walking upright" for the realization of human rights. Which, nevertheless, can be absent, refused or suppressed. That's why Rousseau's second sentence underlines that we are discussing a crown of thorns: "but he lives in chains."

In connection with the first constitutions, human rights were gradually valued more as the 19th century wore on. In the 20th century, after the experiences of both world wars and terrorist regimes, including German National Socialism and the Stalinist Soviet Union, these same rights have become core-values. This is particularly true for people whose movements have pushed forward their own and also general ➞ emancipation from others – primarily regime members – who have caused the first group to starve, and denied them political expression. This is the backdrop against which it was possible to found the United Nations in the first pause for breath after the Second World War. Its core task was to deprive all wars of state legitimation, and to create binding forms for maintaining peace. The UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 remains, until this day, the bedrock of all such future declarations. As with all general claims, human rights are disputed. In this context, it's important to know how individual human rights can be justified. What human rights are, and how they can be used, are not self-evident. It is up to everyone who takes human rights seriously, as a matter of the heart and of the mind, to develop their own concept and own form of practice – in dialogue with tradition and with other contemporary practices.

For those who have considered these matters consciously, there is no other form of political involvement that is more liberating, then intervening for the ➞ liberty and ➞ equality of others and of yourself concurrently. Building on Rosa Luxemburg's great statement, "freedom is always the freedom of those who think differently" and live differently. The claim to human rights, generally declared at the end of the 18th century, was however more narrowly comprehended, as "individual rights of defense." It was assumed that people already had their "rights," including the requisite material and social conditions to make use of them, as if the only thing still necessary was to defend these against state encroachment. A series of limitations to human rights was seen as a precondition for the system, a fault initiating a string of consequences that are still taking their revenge today. Human rights were only valid in politically organized communal life, in the constituted state, but not in a comparable way in the private and self-regulating spheres of what is understood as the market economy. The first proclaimers of human rights, and their (neo)liberal successor were not concerned that equality and liberty required material and politically-organized premises. Not everyone is a citizen in possession of property and education. What use is it to proclaim self-determination, if I don't have the skills to make an impact in the institutions that define my life? As a slogan, human rights have a long history of being class based, a trend reinforced today in a global and inequable way. It was almost a matter of course, that women were not considered the equals of men. That is why the struggle needs to be continued today, to help women concretely – and not in abstract, general terms – to their coequal rights. It may take longer for people to realize that human rights cannot be defined primarily in "western terms": this is where the need for change is at its greatest. To comprehend: that human rights are connected with collective rights; that African, Asian and indigenous cultures must be considered; that the rights of minorities are foremost. Human rights understood in this way would square the circle, from their class-based, bourgeois, male beginnings, to the global conditions of today, based on equal freedoms. The universality of human rights can only be perceived, when the rights of every single person are considered in their own, historical context. Otherwise, the danger persists that human rights are transmuted by lies into wars – into "humanitarian interventions" fought for capitalist, hegemonic interests. Taking human rights seriously means an ongoing battle for their definition and for the practice pertaining to them.

Wolf-Dieter Narr

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Informational Self-determination

The term "informational self-determination" was first used in a judgement of the German Constitutional court in 1983. It expresses the fundamental right for individuals to decide about the disclosure and use of person-related data. In relation to data collected during the 1983 German census, the court judged that persons must be allowed to evaluate which information concerning their behavior can be saved and stored for further reference. Along with the "basic right to a private, digital sphere" formulated 25 years later, informational self-determination is a foundation for individual freedom of action. Rather than our behavior rushing ahead of itself to adjust to Big Brother's surveillance, it should be made possible for an individual to participate in a self-determined way to the common weal.

Tougher domestic security politics, the increasing digitalization of all areas of our life, and the internet in general, all possible dangers to informational self-determination. State spying software, telecommunications data retention, and biometric identity documents, are all objects of political struggles. There are conflicts about companies who spy on their staff, or who base their business model on compiling comprehensive data bases about their customers. Alongside age and gender, social "friendship" media, the content of emails, and internet-use behavior can all be calibrated for targeting advertising, or for checking credit status. Informational self-determination is particularly threatened when state authorities are able to access private company data banks.

Discretion and data protection are generally viewed to be the best methods of defending informational self-determination. It is, however, a growing question whether these are still effective in the digital era. The majority of communication is conducted in digital form, smartphones are equipped with sensors, and improved algorithms raise data connectivity, no one is able to control which information can be generated in the future, out of the information of today. This is the point at which debate breaks out – a conversation that extends beyond the "internet public" – concerning the normative evaluation of this loss of control. Representatives of a "post-privacy" utopia criticize data protection authorities for conceptualizing data as a limited commodity and private property – and, by so doing, for favoring a scarcity and control of information. This critique postulates that, alongside technical and legal strategies, data protection authorities utilize a strict form of data protection morality that supports a coercion towards conformity, and bans individuality and non-conformism into the private sphere. Indeed, "post-privacy" raises fundamental questions about the societal function of the private sphere. In opposition to this, post-privacy demands a free flow of information, to destabilize both identitarian narrow-mindedness, and the whole idea of the human being that can be fully planned.

Post-privacy stands for a transformation of the bourgeois-liberal logic of identity, justified through technological and deterministic reasoning. In this process, it gets caught up in futuristic imaginings of a post-humanitarian society, and joins forces with interests that primarily view data protection as a brake on innovation, or as a location disadvantage for business. Under which conditions the release of streams of data in societies – formed out of capitalist conditions of domination – can lead to emancipatory effects remains an open question. Although the issue of discrimination in this context has been considered, the one-dimensional response is a focus on "outing" strategies, which marginalized people have to bear responsibility themselves, and for which they may have to endure sanctions. The fact that the ability to control data – just like the resources needed to evaluate data – are unequally distributed, is not given systematic consideration. It is, however, pointless, to simply practice a paternalistic skepticism about technology, and to relativize state violations of basic rights with the comment that some personal internet profiles are made voluntarily. Instead, we must address the question of the conditions people need to deal with their data in a self-determined way. Alongside rights to anonymity, pseudonyms, encryption and ➞ open source software, this is primarily about possessing the requisite knowledge, and how accessible tools are made. Software should be made so that users can evaluate what happens with their data. Government authorities and companies must be made to make their own practices transparent and accountable. From many different perspectives, what happens with our data has to be turned into something we can actually talk about. Today, informational self-determination means reinventing privacy as a practice.

Kathrin Ganz

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Internationalism

Internationalism is the fundamental condition for ➞ solidarity-based, i.e. leftist politics. It contains an emphatic ''everyone together!',” and results from the insight that the global, imperial order must be opposed by an internationalist form of politics aimed at justice. This global, imperial order is mediated structurally through institutions that include, the WTO (World Trade Organization), the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and World Bank, NATO, the European Union, which are aimed at the marginalization and exploitation of humanity and of nature. Internationalism opens people’s horizons onto global struggles, and can thus be used against attempts to enclose struggles inside nationalistic, Eurocentric or racist parameters.

Internationalism began in the 19th century, parallel to the development of industrial capitalism and a capitalist world market. By establishing the world market, Marx and Engels were convinced that they left nothing else binding two humans together other than the bond of ''naked interest''. That is why the struggle of the workers' movement has to become international in terms of content, even if it's not yet international in terms of form. The workers movement's internationalism has always been in tension with the national politics operated by parties and trade unions. This became evident on the eve of the First World War, when, in almost all countries, nationalistic groupings – supportive of their own state's pro-war stance – were able to sweep the board.

Internationalism has been a key component of the New Left since the 1960s: Vietnam, Cuba, Chile, Nicaragua or El Salvador. The personality and the work of Che Guevara – ''let's make two or three or lots of Vietnams'' – shaped whole political generations. Christian currents also had significant influence however, and were clustered around South American ➞ liberation theology. Despite the importance of this period of internationalism, the downside cannot be denied. Anti-imperialistic patterns of thought and action pushed the historical reality of fascism back onto the USA after World War Two, and downgraded real differences between that state, and fascism itself. The same anti-imperialism was strongly focused on the role model of a heroic warrior (Che Guevara); and fled from political reality inside the countries it was actually writing from, romanticizing instead the object of its solidarity.

International solidarity took on manifold forms: support in terms of publishing and finances, smuggling documents and weapons, supporting deserters, and deploying tens of thousands of individuals in workers' brigades, an element of the solidarity displayed with Nicaragua. The peak in the history of internationalism was the Spanish Civil War, in which c.45,000 individuals fought in the international brigade against Franco and his fascist allies.

With the paradigm shift and the end of the Cold War represented by 1989, many put their hopes in a consensual form of politics known as global governance. It was intended that NGOs play a key role here, in representing civic society. When these hopes were smashed to bits in the wake of the capitalist-imperialistic states' neoliberal politics, the large numbers mobilized from 1999 on for the demonstrations in Seattle and Genoa (2001) led to a rehabilitation of ➞ protest in itself, and to a new international movement, that again more strongly put global hegemonic relations on the agenda. The Zapatista movement has exerted a strong influence. Internationalism did not understand this historical occurrence as a final destination, but rather as a beginning. Protests were concentrated around the ➞ World Social Forum and continent-specific fora (➞ social fora). The central difference in contrast to earlier movements is the form of the organization: whereas early internationalism was based on standardizing and uniting a plurality, the starting point of the current movement is recognizing difference. That's why new internationalism today has to be understood as a contradictory process, meaning that it must be organized in a pluralistic and democratic way itself.

The very existence of this movement has undermined the hegemony of neoliberalism. As the imperial states are interested in upholding the current global order that works in their interests, conflicts that are already manifest will get tougher – conflicts regarding oil and water as natural resources, or regarding the increase in strength of nationalistic, racist and fundamentalist currents. We should assume that in the ''period of transition'' (Wallerstein) that lies before us, the ''Seattle and Genoa camps'' will be increasingly significant.

Josef Moe Hierlmeier (deceased)

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International Law

The signing of the United Nations Charter on June 26, 1945, in San Francisco, meant the community of nations had created principles that they wanted to live in accordance with in the future. These principles represented the sum of all the rulings that had established themselves in centuries of conflicts between states, both in times of war and times of peace, and which, imbued by the legacy of the Second World War that had just finished, were to be newly defined and codified. This codification was to be the equivalent of a Basic Law for a world that wanted ➞ peace. The goal of the charter is unambiguous: "we the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and … [determined] to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained … have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims." Here, the charter defines itself as the basis of a peaceful order – legally-binding rules, international law – for the peaceful structuring of relations between states.

Strictly speaking, international law is not a right of the peoples, but rather one of states. As a grouping antecedent to the state, the people or peoples were never able to develop their own international rights and obligations. It was only in the shape of state organization that the people / peoples became the subject of international law – with one significant exception. In the liberation struggles of the period of decolonization after 1945, the oppressed peoples, and the liberation struggles that represented them, were accorded an international law grading, on the basis of the right to self-determination contained in the UN charter. In the process of liberation, and the establishment of independence, this was then transferred to the new, sovereign states. The right to self-determination formed the legal legitimation for the liberation struggles, which included the use of violence against the oppression of the colonial powers. This right still contains this ➞ emancipatory content, when Palestinians, Kurds and Sahrawis appeal to it in their strivings for independence or autonomy today.

Further core elements of international law as rooted in the Charter include state sovereignty that is linked to a far-reaching ban on interventions, and an absolute ban on the use of armed force (save in the common interest). In article 2.4 of the Charter expression was given to the will to grant no state the right to use military force, except in cases of self-defense. The use of military force remains the sole preserve of the UN Security Council, which can, through application of the widely-known chapter 7 (article 39), empower states and alliances of states to use armed force.

➞ Human rights – which are also part of international law – only receive a general mention in the Charter, as the authors of this work could not reach more precise agreement about the extent and binding force that should be attached to these. It is all the more remarkable that these same human rights have developed so substantially outside of the Charter, in numerous pacts, conventions, the establishment of International Human Rights Commissions, and the creation of a number of continental human rights courts, including the European Court of Human Rights. All these measures have strengthened the protection granted to people, and the peoples' position in the order of international law. The fact that, despite absolute prohibitions on war and the use of armed force, it has been impossible to ban both of these realities from the terrain of relations between states, has, since the middle of the 19th century, prompted the community of nations to develop rules to protect civilian populations, and to fence in the brutality and excrescences caused by warfare. This "humanitarian international law" is codified in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Convention of 1949, and the 1977 amendment protocols to the latter, all of which, however, have been unable to effectively curtail the barbarity of modern warfare. Yet the daily reports of international law violations do draw attention away from most relations between states proceeding in a regulated manner, relatively free of friction – and all that thanks to international law.

International law is under threat at one of the central points of its regulation of peace: the dissolution of the absolute prohibition on armed force, by instrumentalizing human rights in the shape of "humanitarian interventions," or in the construction of an "obligation to protect" people who their own states cannot offer sufficient protection to. Jurisprudential "innovations" of this kind would hardly increase the protection of humans and their rights, but would rather increase the extent of despotic interventions into weaker states, in order to force through chauvinistic economic and strategic interests.

Norman Paech

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International Law

Interrelations with Nature

With an eye on fascism looming ahead, Walter Benjamin drew his readers' attention to a shortcoming in human ➞ emancipation. Benjamin noted how only the "steps forward in subjugating nature" were visible, not however the destructive consequences of these steps, meaning that the fundamental role of interrelations with nature in societal development was undervalued. Dialectic *of Enlightenment*, written by Horkheimer and Adorno, builds on this diagnosis. According to them, it is a fallacious alternative between society being subjugated under nature, or the dominion of society *over* nature, that has prevented real emancipation until now. A perspective of being able to set up society in a sensible way – human emancipation in the emphatic sense of that word – can however only open up when we've got *beyond* this fatal logic, and only then through the conscious *structuring* of interrelations with nature. This diagnosis has lost none of its relevance, and it's in our times of global ecological crisis that its full explosive power is revealed. In saying that, the idea of subjugating society to the "laws of nature" has entirely lost the ground beneath its feet. The "back to nature" motto can no longer offer sufficient orientation, considering the extent to which nature has already been restructured by societal practices. And yet the second side of the "fallacious alternative," the perfection of dominion over nature, has lost much of its power to convince, at least at first sight. That said, this is the alternative that continues to dominate, even though it is contested. Behind the various socioecological battle lines, the question regarding alternatives, in a paradigm beyond the old idea of dominion over nature, remains.

The doubts about perfecting dominion over nature are diverse, and not all of them have a main thrust that adds up to a general critique of political systems. Despite this spaces for thought are opening up, in which alternatives can be developed. This intellectual progress means that the belief in the complete predictability of nature has become less plausible. Today people prefer to assume that with every new step forward for science, that which we do not know increases commeasurably, so that we'll never achieve a complete control our biological and physical environment. Yet even these doubts can be utilized for constantly improving prognostic procedures and a strategy of "reflective dominion of nature," which also attempt to plan for negative side-effects. Regarding alternatives beyond the question of dominion over nature, it is decisive that societal power relations are addressed. Can alternatives to the dominant ➞ social ownership of nature be conceived of and implemented, or does this simply mean lifting up the ecological crisis onto a new level? These problematics are demonstrated today by, for example, the strategies to overcome global climate change. It has long since been evident, that this is already a reality, and that the only thing that could still be limited is its extent. Its consequences are and will be extremely variable for different world regions and social groups (➞ climate justice). Ecological vulnerabilities potentize social inequalities, in the flood regions of Bangladesh as in the drought areas of Africa. Some strategies to work against this even make these tendencies worse. For example, the strategy of replacing fossil fuels with fuels from renewable materials and sources has had fatal consequences. On the one hand, food stuffs including corn, soya and sugar cane have been combusted, leading to dramatic price rises for basic food stuffs in several consequences, economic shifts that are impacting until today. On the other hand, rainforests are being deforested in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brazil to access source materials including palm oil and sugar cane. Not only does this process grind down biodiversity, it is also counterproductive in terms of mitigating climate change. That's why critical NGOs and grassroots movements demand a ban on biofuels and on using ecological labelling for botanical raw materials. Whether this critique will develop further into an alternative structuring of interrelations with nature depends ultimately on global groupings of interests, and on power relations. The hype concerning energy from biomass is grounded in the utilization strategies of several corporations, landowners, and the governments that support these. It is connected with a refusal to call into question the globally dominant form of societal relations with nature, and western lifestyles and styles of consumption, including the energetics and materials that these are based on. A refusal that leaves only technological options open, like the production of biofuels – and these are targeted at increasing the dominion over nature. The search for alternatives in the structuring of interrelations with nature leads, by way of contrast, to the question, in which sort of nature we want to live – and to a confrontation with global power relations.

Christoph Görg

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Interrelations with Nature

Intersectionality

The insight that oppression runs through numerous categories simultaneously led Kimberlé Crenshaw to introduce the term "intersectionality" in 1988. This goes beyond the "triple oppression" approach, as Crenshaw was able to make tangible not only the concurrency, but also the intersections and overlapping, of several axes of power and of authority. The term encompasses three dimensions. Firstly, it makes evident that society is not just based on a single structure of authority and power, but rather on several, interwoven with each other. Modern, western societies, are, simultaneously, bourgeois, androcentric, racist and heteronormative, and these structures of inequality lend mutual support to each other. Because structures of inequality can neither be conceived as merely supplementing nor as deriving from each other, the specifics of each structure of oppression can be revealed through simultaneous links to other structural categories. Sexism cannot be said to be an expression of either class-rule or of racism. Rather, the historically specific concurring of structural categories in society should be viewed as a result of political regulation. Secondly, the term refers back to the construction of subjectivity as a process that runs through several categories. This foregrounds the simultaneity of the subaltern, and of domination, in the constitution of the subject. Thirdly, the approach is relevant for political action. We can learn from the history of ➞ social movements that not taking intersectionality into consideration led to the reproduction of existing relations of power and authority even inside leftist movements. Therefore, radical social criticism must address the connection between different axes of inequality, and authority.

Since its introduction almost three decades ago, intersectionality has become an important component of social theory debates, not only in the English-speaking world, but also in German-language discourse. However, just *how* the interweave of class, gender, race, sexuality, ability, religion etc. can be theoretically comprehended, is the subject of lively discussions today. In contrast to the intersectionality approach, the interdependency approach problematizes the idea of categories independent of each other crossing at particular junctions, or "intersections," and emphasizes, using a deconstructionist perspective that categories are in themselves interdependent on each other. So instead of posing questions about the intersections *between* closed categories, the interdependency approach highlights the inherent entanglement of the categories themselves: the modern, western concept of gender is *intrinsically* intertwined with heteronormativity, with modern, western concepts of *race, and* with the capitalist mode of production.

More markedly than intersectionality research – which has become strongly academicized, and is rarely conducted in a politicized fashion – the interdependency approach increasingly underscores the aim of joining up theoretical analysis with political criticism. One important aspect in this is the need to make the positions of interdependency's own speakers more visible.

Alongside these theoretical challenges, there is still a lot to do politically, if an understanding of the myriad intertwinements of mechanisms of oppression and power is to become an integral part of social movements. Such an understanding is also necessary to fight for the sublation of forms that are, concurrently, class-specific, gendered, sexualized and built on race, forms in which individuals become subjects, and which fix particular, hierarchized identities upon them. To tread this path, it will be necessary to more strongly extend the concept beyond its original contexts of feminist and anti-racist movements and research. In this vein, people are already active, in both theoretical and political ways, concerning shared causality in the fields of gender, race and sexuality; yet class as a category remains less integrated. The challenge of closing up this empty space would be a significant pulling together of anti-capitalist, ➞ feminist, ➞ queer, and anti-racist struggles. The doubts articulated by the Combahee River Collective must still be overcome: ". We are not convinced, however, that a socialist revolution that is not also a feminist and anti-racist revolution will guarantee our liberation."

Gandula Ludwig

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Interventionism

Interventions are encroachments into economic process or its ordering structures, in order to redress undesired consequences or structural deficits in the market economy – but also, however, aimed at realizing particular political goals. It is normally the state which carries out these measures, through its institutions. Especially in economic development processes and in crises, state interventions are indispensable. This is what makes the idea of an economy free of interventions a purely theoretical concept. Even a "free" market economy requires regular state intervention to maintain its ability to function.

Ever since the economic crises of the 1870s, debates in Germany and other industrialized countries have circled around the aims, longer-term strategic goals and extent of economic interventions. As there was no closed concept at first of what could be defined as state intervention, the talk focused instead on selective interventionism. Neoliberal critics including representatives of the Freiburg school in 1930s, with Walter Eucken as their figurehead, lent a negative connotation to interventionism as a concept. According to this, state interventions served specific, politically motivated interests, which would constrain market economy competition and therefore have negative consequences for standards of wealth. It was not until ➞ Keynesianism was developed, also in the 1930s, that a systematic legitimation for interventions based on economic politics was widely available. Opposing neoclassical economics and the neoliberalism that was emerging at that time, Keynes took the principal of instability in capitalism as his starting point, and developed the foundations for economic politics aimed at long-term stabilization.

Parallel to the general question of the point of state interventions, the orientation or direction intervening should assume remains the most controversial point in debates on economic politics. Although regulatory interventions to stabilize market economies meet with approval from orthodox economics, the champions of (neo)-liberal economic theory radically criticize all interventions into market economy processes, especially concerning interventions designed to correct the results of market economy distribution of wealth. For this purpose, interventions that are market-compliant – to safeguard "structural conditions" – are differentiated from non-market-compliant interventions – aimed at putting the mechanism of the market out of action. This differentiation does however demonstrate major deficits, in theoretical, methodical and practical terms. What is, by contrast, much more widely accepted is the interdependence of interventions, meaning that the effects of individual measures on other areas of the economy and of society must be taken into consideration.

No one can seriously and absolutely impugn the necessity of interventions in the economic system, e.g. when the matter at hand is the preservation of the natural foundations of life. Even the construct of a minimal state cannot stand up without state interventions, the requisite *Rechtsstaat* (state of justice), general security or even a minimum degree of public infrastructure are requirements for a functioning market economy. Despite this, the conflict concerning the direction and intensity of interventions by economic politics remains a fundamental question for economic science – and one often overbrimming with ideology.

In the context of political and economic alternatives, the concept of interventionism has limited use only, because of the fuzziness of its contents. It is not enough for an emancipatory perspective to defend the necessity of state interventions against radical market illusionists. This is the lesson learned from interventions responding to the financial and economic crises from 2008 onwards, which stabilized short-term, but left the deregulation of the international financial markets almost untouched (see ➞ financial market regulation). We need a debate about the possibilities and limits of a form of Keynesianism, targeted at the global level, and imbedded in societal politics. The question of a planned economy should also be on the agenda: orientated around criteria of common sense and the interests of the whole of society, and located within the structure of a fair world economic order. To seriously raise this question we need a critical and differentiated analysis of earlier experiences of central state planning, the authoritarian and ineffective tendencies of which cannot provide perspectives for emancipatory politics. This is about developing a vision of planned intervention that is democratically organized on the one hand, and which can meet both societal and economic challenges on the other.

Ralf Ptak

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Keynesianism

Keynesianism is a collective term for concepts of politics and of economic theory that are grounded in the work of John Maynard Keynes, 1883-1946. Keynes' work was formed against the backdrop of the global economic crisis and the failure of the economic theory and politics that dominated that period. Keynes wanted to elucidate that theory and those politics, in order to fight against them. The two essential messages of Keynesianism are: that capitalist market economies are unstable; and that they can be stabilized through state-political interventions.

Fundamentally new findings of Keynesian theory relate primarily to the central role played by *demand in the whole of the economy.* In contrast to neoclassical theory, Keynes did not assume that a capitalist economy tended, by itself, towards full employment, which could be created by adjusting wages in the employment market. Rather, it is the demand for commodities and services that determines levels of employment. Instead of sinking wages during a recession, it is important to close the gap in demand through raising private and public demand. Secondly, Keynes analyzed the central role played by *uncertainty and uncertain expectations,* under which economic decisions are made about investments, purchasing or saving – including the formation of financial assets. This uncertainty fuels speculation, and can destabilize the economy. Thirdly, the *long-term tendencies towards stagnation* of capitalist systems. By 1941 already, Keynes had already predicted three phases of long-term development in industrialized countries after the Second World War. The first would be characterized by a dearth of capital; the second by an approximate balance between the supply of and demand for capital; and the third characterized by an increase in saving because of rising incomes on the one hand, while, on the other, profitable possibilities for investing would fall. Higher private consumption would be needed to combat these tendencies towards stagnation, investments becoming more socially orientated, and a shortening of individual working time. No other long-term economic prognosis for the second half of last century hit the target as squarely as this did. Finally, Keynes also proposed the *necessity of international cooperation on currency politics,* in order to avoid global (financial) crises, and conflicts between states escalating as a consequence. At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, Keynes put forward a system founded on fixed currency exchange rates, and political interventions to create level trade balances – achieved, in part, by taxing long-term surpluses. The increasing polarization of the world economy since the mid-1970s demonstrate the andiminished topicality of the basic idea behind these proposals, aimed, as they were, against unchained, world market competition.

Keynesian economic politics, orientated around demand, were practiced successfully in many countries after the Second World War. In the Federal Republic of German, they contributed to quickly overcoming the 1966-67 recession. From the end of the 1960s on, the neoclassical and theoretical counterrevolution pushed the Keynesian revolution into the sings of economic thought. In 1973, with the Chilean coup d'état and the dismantling of the Bretton Woods consensual, the march to victory of neoliberal economic politics began. Leftist critique of Keynesianism is usually concerned with its ecological blindness, and its fixation on economic growth. The approach could be "cured" in reaction to the first criticism, by a form of politics that paid more attention to material and regional structures. The second is inaccurate as regards the long-term perspective: Keynes expressly viewed more public investment and ➞ shortening working time as necessary and desirable perspectives for the future of capitalism.

The potential Keynesian theory offers for a critique of neoliberalism and for the development of alternatives remains large. Alongside steering economic cycles, and stabilizing and controlling financial markets, precise visions for making investments more social, and for new international cooperation and global governance, are all central aspects of modern Keynesianism. Placing an accent on economic democracy and on social state structures is decisive for further development along these lines, and is also a prerequisite for working against the possibility of a wrong development of Keynesianism inside authoritarian state structures and activities. In this context, the deepest deficit in Keynes' theories must also be addressed: the missing examinations of relations of power, class and other forces in capitalist societies.

Jörg Huffschmid (deceased)

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Keynesianism

Knowledge Commons

Recent developments in the knowledge-based society are akin to a gold rush, with claims staked out using intellectual property rights, including patents, trademarks and copyrights. Within specified periods, owners of these rights are allowed to determine who may use the knowledge they possess, and at what price. This is the mode through which the widest variety of knowledge-commodities are privatized: software and culture, genes and seeds, technological innovations and designs. In opposition to this fenced in world of knowledge, accessible only through the ability to negotiate barriers, a vision of a knowledge commons is upheld. This refers back to the land used for shared grazing in the Middle Ages: the ➞ commons. The vision is of an intellectual world, without impediments to access, in which knowledge belongs to everyone, as a shared, societal good. Everyone contributes to maintaining and nurturing this resource, increasing the common good in the process. Yet rules and parameters for organizing this resource have to be discussed urgently, as privatization and other barriers are progressively curtailing the knowledge commons.

The idea that a knowledge commons exists is as old as human civilization, although terms used to describe this have varied. Knowledge used communally is essential for humanity's development. Existing knowledge is the basis for the "new": "If I have seen further it is only by standing on the shoulders of giants" (Isaac Newton). While a material commodity like an apple loses value when it is used – say bitten into, or eaten up – knowledge actually loses societal value when it is *not* used. This is why each and every access-barrier to the knowledge commons has to be considered carefully, and to remain an exception. Continually tightened intellectual property laws, including patents and copyrights, leads to this kind of under-utilization. The opposite should happen – intellectual property laws should strengthen the knowledge commons. Champions of tough intellectual property laws argue, on the other hand, that as these provide monetary incentives for the production of new knowledge-commodities, they will help long-term to increase reserves of shared knowledge. This is why they maintain that a temporary under-utilization should be accepted.

But particularly in the area of healthcare, the damage that is being done right now by forcing through the privatization of knowledge is substantial. Because patent-owners can determine prices, only a few corporations are in a position, by turn, to dictate high prices for their use of patents, making vital medicines unaffordable for large sections of the world's population, most strikingly for those suffering from HIV and AIDS in Africa. Yet there are alternatives to the current system of intellectual property rights. State financed funds, which pay researchers to place the knowledge they generate at the disposal of the general populace should be highlighted in this context. The World Health Organization has been seriously considering this kind of alternative system. The lives of millions of people who are dying today from treatable illnesses could be saved.

In other areas, the knowledge commons has already become a reality today. Developers of freeware and other kinds of ➞ open-source software write programs that they make available to everyone, to varying degrees of being absolutely free for users. This trend makes it easier to locate mistakes in software, and to avoid reproducing developments. Science and academia itself has traditionally also been a form of knowledge commons, in which the monetary needs of scientists and academics are normally satisfied through public finance – and not through the privatization of knowledge. But this is also an area in which patents are gaining more and more ground, and in which an ever increasing quantity of research findings are privatized – despite public subsidies for this research.

James Boyle has contended that a shared vision of the knowledge commons and its economy could help in changing contemporary politics of knowledge. A parallel to this is the introduction of the term "environment" in the 1960s, a shared idea of a whole worthy of protection, which brought together diverse actors, including bird conservationists and climate researchers. In this manner, both doctors and software developers could unite, and strengthen their joint cause, under the banner of "knowledge commons." This is the approach represented by the German-language Free Knowledge Network.

The question of whether the complete abolition of intellectual property laws and rights would be the best solution has been contested since the debate was begun, and has not yet been answered satisfactorily. It is indisputable, however, that the disadvantages caused by these laws are becoming progressively more grievous, as the scope of these laws expand. The consequences are tangible across the globe, and most damagingly in developing countries. About eighty percent of global intellectual property rights valid today belong to corporations in industrialized states, an advantage that these countries are eager to defend. Intellectual property legislation is central to this development. It is also in the context of achieving a more just global economic order that we need to protect the knowledge commons better, just as we need to trigger a rethink about intellectual property rights.

Petra Buhr

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Knowledge Commons

Liberation Theology

Liberation theology is a collection of texts published predominantly by South American intellectuals since 1971, including Gustavo Gutiérrez (Peru), Hugo Assmann, Frei Betto, Leonardo and Clódovis Boff (all Brazil), Jon Sobrino, Ignacio Ellacuria (El Salvador), Pablo Richard (Chile/Costa Rica), and Enrique Dussel (Argentina/Mexico), to name just a few of the most well-known. Those Christians influenced by liberation theology can be numbered among the most efficacious and important activists in the alter-globalization movement (*altermundialismo*), which squares up to neoliberal capitalist globalization in the name of ➞ social justice. One of the founders of the ➞ World Social Forum, and the representative of the commission "Justice and Peace" (*Justicia y Paz)* for the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (*CNBB*), this political stream contains prominent individuals including Chico Whitaker and the Belgian Father François Houtart (friend and teacher of Camilo Torres), one of the most influential intellectual personalities in the forum. The two most important Brazilian liberation theologists, Leonardo Boff and Frei Betto are also amongst the founders of alter-globalization, and participate actively through their texts and speeches in the World Social Forum's mobilizations and events.

Liberation theology is the expression of a broad social movement that could also be called "liberation Christianity," and which developed at the start of the 1960s. The movement spread through wide expanses of the Catholic Church, winning supporters amongst the priests and bishops, but above all amongst members of monastic orders. Lay religious movements were also incorporated like *Azione Cattolica* (Catholic Action), the *Juventud Universitaria Cristiana-JUC* (Christian University of Youth) and the *Juventud Obrera Cristiana-JOC* (Chrisitan Workers Youth). Pastoral care movements (*pastoral obrera* – workers' pastoral care, and *pastoral de la tierra* – pastoral care of the earth) and grassroots church parishes *(Comunidades Eclesiales de Base*, also called CEBs) were just as vital in explaining its growth. Liberation theology influenced non-confessional social movements like district alliances, women's groups, trade unions, farmers' movements, people's education movements and even political parties. Without knowing about this socio-religious movement, it is impossible to understand extremely important social and historical phenomena in South American history in the last thirty years, including the revolutionary process in Central America (Nicaragua, El Salvador), the new workers and farmers' movement in Brazil, or the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas. "Liberation Christianity" – (which was, in its turn, influenced by Brazilian, Christian University of Youth recipients of progressive Catholic culture, by Emmanuel Mounier, by the "Espirit" newspaper, by Father Lebret and the "*Economía y Humanismo*" / Economy and Humanism movement, and last but not least, by Yves Calvez, the "Karl Marx of the Jesuits" – demanded a radical, societal transformation of South America for the first time in the history of Christianity. This movement was destined to spread across almost every country in the continent in diverse forms – "Christians for Socialism," "Priests of the Third World" etc. – before it found its own cultural, political and spiritual transcription in liberation theology.

If we had to summarize the central idea of liberation theology into a single formula, then that would be "the poor should get the first choice." What's new about the church? Wasn't the church shaped by charitable attention towards the suffering and the poor since time immemorial? The essential difference for liberation theology is that the poor are no longer to be considered merely as objects – for our help, our compassion, and our charity – but rather as actors in their own history, as subjects of their own emancipation. The role of socially-engaged Christians is to take part in the "long march" with the poor – the "pauperiat" (*pobretariado*), to use the language of some Christian trade unionists – until we reach the "*Terra prometida*" (Portuguese for the promised land), which means release through self-organization and the ➞ emancipation of society.

Despite the difficulties – the Vatican's repressive measures, and the competition provided by charismatic Catholic currents and protestant neo-Pentecostal sects – liberation theology remains a presence in South America, particularly in Brazil, where its influence on the church is significant. Without giving up on social care, it has opened itself up for new themes: the oppression of women, indigenous and Afro-American culture, and ecology.

Michael Löwy

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Liberty

Liberty is the intellectual core of the enlightenment, the first named of the triad of values forming the French Revolution's battle cry: "liberty, equality, fraternity." Liberal and individualistic conceptions from the enlightenment still define the contemporary understanding of liberty, defined in an exemplary way by Kant: "There is only one, single hereditary right. Liberty (independence from someone else's repressive tyranny), to the extent that this can co-exist with everybody else's liberty, in accordance to a general body of law." Foremost, liberty is the individual independence of any single person, their independence from the will, orders and authority of another person. This remains the interpretation today in the general law on liberty, in Article 2 of German Basic Law. Liberty is the right to do, or not to do, what I want. But of course, limits are imposed on this broad concept of liberty, primarily because of the liberty of others: and it is this liberty of others in combination with our own liberty that Kant says must be determined by general laws. The spheres of liberty and of law constrain each other mutually, so that one person's liberty cannot be forced using violence against another person. Inside of this now legally defined sphere, the individual decides to do, and not do, what they want.

Fundamentally, liberty is assigned to every individual in equal measure – that was the step forward achieved by the enlightenment. Further, it is this liberty, won by having demanded it, which has an emancipatory aspect: putting restrictions in place on sovereign power. Yet this form of liberty remains individual, and the human a solitary personality, only encountering others through the definition of limits. Liberty is reduced to the right to be left in peace. This does restrict the power of a repressing and surveilling state, by strapping legal shackles to it. However, those obligations from society that don't result from the state's performance of power continue unscathed. This concept of liberty is entangled from the start in its economic and liberal aspect, i.e. it is a figurehead for trade liberty, or the liberty of a corporation. This is a reductionist configuration of liberty, deprived of all the critical impetus of liberal, individual rights, and merely acting as a battle cry *against* every form of politics based on equality and solidarity. In this reduced form, it transforms into its opposite, anti-liberty, in the dictatorship of conformity to economic laws of the market and of competition, which manage to bring not just individuals, but also society and the state, into line. All these entities are now thought about in corporate language, for example as "One-Man-Companies" (in German: "Ich-AGs"), or as part of the Corporation of the Federal Republic of Germany. Parallel to this, a pseudo, consumer-world liberty emerges, about which Leo Kofler has written: "the removal of taboos creates a pseudo-liberty, which, in turn, leads to guilty feelings. And it is these feelings that are the ultimate reason behind the voluntary compliance with reactionary bourgeois morality."

Liberty does not have to be restricted to the atomized individual. A short glance at contemporary society is enough to realize that "doing, or deciding not to do, what you want" isn't working. Individuals are impeded in making use of their liberty by economic necessities, societal conventions and factual limitations. This is how Marx described it: "as soon as labor starts to be divided, everyone gets a specific and exclusive circle of activity forced upon them, from which they cannot remove themselves; s/he is a hunter, fisher or shepherd or critical critic, and has to remain so, if s/he doesn't want to lose her or his means of making a living." The individual encounters social interrelations as coercion that lies outside of herself or himself, which is neither controlled by society, nor produced out of free will. Rather, it reproduces itself as languageless coercion, out of reach of the collective will. The liberal liberty of the individual is merely a liberty halved. Real liberty can only be envisaged as the → emancipation of the whole of society, the conscious self-organization of society, in which society also democratically determines the conditions for its own reproduction, thereby throwing down all interrelations in which the human is a "humiliated, enslaved, deserted and despicable being" (Bloch). In such a society, liberty is no longer merely defined by what it is not, but rather acquires a positive definition: "preferably lots of people have preferably lots of possibilities to do what they want to do." The development of personality does not take place in opposition to, but rather in collaboration with others, and inside society. Liberty does not contradict → equality in this context, as neoliberals claim in their repetitive mantra. Instead, both are a mutually needed precondition for the other. The liberty to be different can only emerge when equal conditions have been put in place, in which this difference can be developed and can be lived to the full.

Andreas Fisahn

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Marxism I

Marxism encompasses all practices that have, in a positive or developmental sense, related back to Marx' work during the last 150 years *and* takes in authors and activists, who have connected in these same senses to Marx' legacy. It constitutes the most potent, most boundary-crossing reference point for intellectual and political activity in the "short 20th century" (Hobsbawm), the period from 1918 to 1989. In contrast with this, his relative loss of significance since the 1990s appears all the bigger. Marxism should always be conceived of as a plurality, and cannot be reduced to *one* single doctrine. It is also pluralist in reference to its own modes of efficacy as an independent form of knowledge, in which intellectual-scientific, ideological-political and everyday-popular practices all intersect.

The starting point of Marx' thought is the social reproduction of human society through labor, conceptualized in the broadest sense of the word, and interaction with the physical environment. Different threads of thought and narrative can be detected in Marx' analysis of this reproduction: a radical, humanist thread, which foregrounds the promise of comprehensive human liberation; a praxeological, actor-centered thread, which emphasizes the possibility of proactive human action; and a structural, logical thread, which illuminates determinations of society through historical and economic laws of movement. Marx' widest reaching analysis is dedicated to the specifics of the political economy of capitalism.

The development of Marxism is divided into several phases. First, the lifetimes and work of Marx and Friedrich Engels. Second, the period of the Second International (1889-1914), in which an initial Marxist orthodoxy was constructed under the ascendancy of large, social-democratic workers' parties. Here, Marxism was turned into a deterministic doctrine, grounded in natural laws, and concerning the unavoidability of ➞ socialism. Third, the phase after the October Revolution, also known as the phase of the Third International (1919-1943). In the aftermath of the October Revolution, and with contributions from Lenin, Trotsky and Gramsci, a different, and explicitly "political Marxism" ripened, which converged on the relations of powers within societies, and on opportunities for political action. In absolute contrast to this, the "Stalinization" of both the Soviet Union and of communistic movements under the label of "Marxism-Leninism" meant almost the complete ruin of Marxism as an intellectual term. Fourth, the bullying of Marxism – in the previous senses of the word – by both Stalinism and Fascism meant that Marxist discussions from the end of the 1920s veered away from political and economic questions, to address philosophical issues instead. Perry Anderson has called this retreat away from political practice "Western Marxism." Fifth, a phase of reconstruction and pluralization of Marxism after the Second World War: the number of state projects referring back to Marxism in terms of their fundamental structures increased markedly, and decolonization borrowed substantially from Marxism in intellectual terms. The upheavals of the events of 1968, tangible in all regions of the world, were also located, to a large degree, in new appropriations from Marxism. In academia, the reception of Marxism grew in arts and in social-science disciplines, a trend that peaked at the start of the 1970s, when Marxism was calling the shots in many universities. Concurrently, Marxism differentiated itself and pluralized itself into an ever growing number of intellectual and political currents.

From the mid-1980s, Marxism descended deeper into crisis in various regions of the world. While the collapse of "real socialism" in 1989 verified this crisis on a political level, Marxism also increasingly lost its intellectual powers of attraction: the focus on the industrial working-class as the central political subject no longer seemed appropriate to changes in the world of work in wealthy countries. Moreover, Marxism was criticized by ➞ feminism for being gender-blind, by the LGBT movement for being heteronormative, and by ➞ postcolonial discourse for being Eurocentric. Yet parallel to this, new chapters in the history of Marxism were being acted out in many regions of the world: politically in parts of South America and in the anti-globalization movement; and academically, particularly in the English-speaking world.

Today, Marx, and thought and action connected with Marx, remain indispensable sources. Marxism remains the single, large paradigm that fundamentally assumes the possibility of a post-capitalist society. In analytical terms, this is an invaluable resource. Further, the many voices and contradictions contained within Marxism make it an elastic point of reference, open for realignments. As a body of thought, all paths transect it.

David Mayer

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Marxism II

"Je ne suis pas marxiste" – "I am not a Marxist," as Karl Marx explained to his son-in-law, Paul Lafargue (see German-language edition of the *Marx-Engels Werke,* hereafter MEW, vol. 35, 1985, p. 388). To no avail. By the end of the 19th century, a social-democratic "Marxism" had established itself, primarily based on Engels' "Anti-Dühring," a critique of the philosophical positions of Eugen Dühring, which had met with wide approval in broad swathes of social democracy in the 1870s. Unintentionally, this book became the foundation of a comprehensive "Marxist worldview." This *Weltanschauung* satisfied the social-democratic workers' need for intellectual and spiritual orientation, and provided the party with a propaganda instrument. The most important representative of this early form of "Marxism" was Karl Kautsky, whose insistence on unavoidable "laws of history." This was the strain of Marxism that was then used to justify the German Social Democratic Party's politics of waiting, prior to the First World War: "as the unfolding of history is on our side anyway, we just have to avoid revolutionary impatience." But this opinion was not without its detractors, with Rosa Luxemburg representing an activist Marxism: the proletariat could only become capable of gaining emancipation through the learning process of its struggles.

After the First World War, which split the workers' movement into social-democratic and communist wings, social-democratic parties integrated themselves increasingly into the capitalist system. They gave up on the revolutionary triumph over capitalism, and took up restructuring it in a reformist, step-by-step way instead. After the Second World War, Social Democracy no longer fundamentally questioned capitalism, preferring to demand that its impact be cushioned by the welfare state: they no longer needed Marxism. The communist parties, clinging on to the aim of overcoming capitalism, looked to the political and economic system of the Soviet Union for orientation. There, the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, had seized state power, and defended it, with an increasingly authoritarian system of hegemony. After a short market economy phase in the 1920s, a centralized, planned economy was introduced. Political and economic power was now concentrated in the hands of a party of authoritarian rule, which acted, under Stalin's regime, in an extremely repressive and murderous way. As a term, Marxism was extended after Lenin's death to become "Marxism-Leninism": an all-encompassing worldview, intended to provide answers for all philosophical, historical and economic questions. This "ML" served as an ideology of justification for the communist parties' politics. Its supposed scientificity was meant to grant legitimacy to the decisions of the state and party leadership. Simultaneously, the party monopolized "ML" as an intellectual quantity, so that no one could contradict it. This form of Marxism quickly deteriorated into a collection of sterile formulas, useless for analysis.

Positioned against both the Social-Democrats' farewell to Marxism, *and* against Marxism-Leninism transforming the latter into dogma, critical Marxist voices continued to raise themselves from the 1920s on, including Georg Lukàcs, particularly in his early work, Karl Korsch, Anton Pannekoek and Antonio Gramsci. In the early phase of the Frankfurt School, individuals including Walter Benjamin and Ernst Bloch also made efforts to rejuvenate Marxism in a particular direction. Since the 1960s, critical Marxisms have increased enormously, in numbers and in geographical spread, criticizing the dogmatic character of official, party Marxism, and its legitimation of authoritarianism. These Marxisms are not only to be found in the North's capitalist metropolises, but also in the countries of the global South. Alongside productive approaches, aimed at a real ➞ emancipation that cannot be achieved by proxy through parties or governments, many Marxist sects and small parties continue to exist, reproducing the old authoritarian and dogmatic Marxism. In some cases, the term "Marxism" in the propagation of a "critical" and "undogmatic" Marxism simply serves to foreground a positive connection to Marxian analyses. But as soon as such a critical Marxism is understood as a "system" – as a real "ism" – then it is also confronted with the problem of how a line can be drawn between a science on the one side, and a dogmatic worldview based on unquestionable principles on the other. Marx at least defended himself vehemently against the insinuation that he had constructed a "socialist system" (see MEW vol. 19, 1969, p. 357). He was not concerned with penning a new *Weltanschauung,* but rather with writing a scientific, emancipatory ➞ "Critique of Political Economy."

Michael Heinrich

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Migrant Strike

The struggles of migrants possess a long and largely invisible history. This is despite the fact that disturbances, actions ➞ protest, struggles and migrant (self)-organization have been and continue to be a regular occurrence in workplaces and in everyday life. They cluster around disputes and demands for social, political and cultural rights, e.g. housing, or equality-of-opportunity access to social infrastructure. In the German-speaking world since 1945, they have taken on a variety of forms ➞ wildcat strikes, rent strikes, and campaigns concentrated on migrants' collective accommodation, or on child-benefit issues. Alongside the widely reported wildcat strike at Ford in 1973, initiated by migrants, there have been many examples of work strikes and "right-to-stay" strikes, even though these have not been supported by the metalworkers' union IG Metall. An exciting chapter in this history was the right-to-stay struggle conducted by Korean nurses in Germany in 1978, or the strike at the A. Pierburg AG works in Neuss in 1969-70, initiated by the protest by migrant women against housing discrimination, and with the same migrant women participating in various strike actions. In such situations, migrants, as employees, not only have to lead an industrial dispute against their employers: they are also simultaneously confronted with the threat of the state making their work illegal. In concrete terms, this meant that during the Neuss strike negotiations, a whole spectrum of bodies were represented alongside the migrants themselves: the company management, chiefs of police, the *Werkschutz* (plant security), district-president civil servants, state prosecutors, and police detectives. Within these parameters, migrant strikes of the early 1970s not only posed concrete demands on companies, but also pointed forward to future struggles, in their articulation of concepts for life and work.

Under the heading "migrant strike," anti-racist politicization and mobilization assume new forms of social protest. A concrete initiative for a migrant strike in the USA in 2006 evolved out of protests and mobilizations against new legislation, the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005. The connected struggles were directed against a massive toughening of asylum and immigration laws, which enormously worsened the situation of many, particularly of people with disputable residency papers – or no residency papers at all. In scores of US towns and cities up to three million people participated in a broad alliance of "legalized" migrants and those US law had deemed illegal, together with other anti-racist activists and trade unions, and carried out rallies, demos, boycotts, blockades and strikes. Following the mass protests in the USA, migrants and activists in Europe took on this form of mobilization from 2009 on, first in Paris, then in Milan, Bologna, Turin, various other Italian cities, individual municipalities in Spain and Greece, and, from 2001, in Vienna: long-term, plans are underfoot to establish March 1 as a day against racism and for migrant protest and resistance.

In France in 2010, the collective *24h sans nous* (24 hours without us) called for a migrant general strike under the slogan of "one day without migrants." Migrants with and without papers were mobilized for a walkout and a consumption boycott, supported by trade unions and human rights associations. One point of reference for "one day without migrants" was the industrial action of the *Sans Papiers* organization: since 2008, *Sans Papiers* have initiated strikes, occupations and street protests, with the legalization of loan-dependent laborers as their goal. "One day without us" was also organized in a number of Italian cities in the same year, with mass protests on the street, and walkouts from workplaces. The "March 1, transnational migrant strike" in Vienna has a slightly different focus, addressing structural exclusion from social and political rights, and discriminating conditions in the employment market. The "March 1" group was initially sparked off by a communal rejection of racist, everyday life after radical right wing elements were successfully elected at the Vienna Regional Parliament elections in 2010. The aim of this group is to make the protest and resistance of migrants in everyday life visible, by starting from the symbolic question of what would happen, if migrants were not to work, consume or take part in the life of society for a whole day. Further, the group aims to write the history of migrant struggles in a visible way, and to occupy public space in an anti-racist manner. The emphasis on transnationality, in the calls for the March 1 action, spotlights migrants' experiences as transnational actors (➞ transnational migration); it is also aimed at networking different political struggles.

March 1 / Transnational Migrant Strike, Vienna

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Miltancy

"Riots by *militant* women's rights activists broke out again in London in 1910" – "*Militant* Music Group & Entertainment supports good quality music, from hip-hop to alternative rock, along with acting and comedy."

"30,000 Hyundai workers … made use of forklift-trucks, bulldozers and sandblasters, to destroy company headquarters and the town hall during the *militant* riots." "The sit-ins in racially segregated institutions led to militant-nonviolent confrontations with racists and put their stamp on a style of nonviolent *militancy*." "Mass slaughters due to foot and mouth disease, 2001 – farmer Vellacott has long since stopped listening – we have to become more *militant* and fight for our rights ourselves." "The port workers refused to load armaments for Indo-China, and a *female militant* stopped an armaments train by lying down on the tracks." "The *militant* group became well-known … through the debate on *militancy*, which it had helped to initiate. In addition to writing *militant* texts, other accusations have also been made about the group."

These random finds in the internet about militant women, militant steelworkers, militant farmers, militant rail-blocks, militant, nonviolent confrontations, militant "sit-ins," militant "good quality music," militant groups and militant texts, all demonstrate attempts to delineate how the terms "militancy" and "militant" are actually used today, in terms of content at least.

Militancy belongs to a group of terms that sound both exciting and stimulating, used, precisely because of their vagueness, in a propagandistic way, to further the purposes of particular interests in political disputes. In German-language mainstream media, *Militanz* functions as a byword both for demonstrators who some would claim are "ready for violence," *and* for those who are genuinely mobilizing against police deployments and the facades of bank buildings. More concretely, militancy stands here for the stone-throwing, balaclava sporting members of the so-called "black blocs." In this sense, people connote militancy with terrorism. This way of interpreting the word "militancy" is motivated by the interest to promote and legitimize state measures and a "tough clampdown," as militancy is a violation of the state's monopoly of violence, and threatens domestic peace. The leftists implicated by this interpretation agree that militancy does indeed have this causality at its disposal. By referring to appropriate images from demonstrations to create a targeted impact on the public, this type of militancy is practiced and defended. This understanding of (street) militancy does not however go beyond these narrow efforts to connote militancy with violence. Militancy derives etymologically from *militare* (Latin: to serve as a soldier), a shade of meaning that has hardly any role to play today. In Romance language and English language communities, "militant / militancy" are much more undetermined words than in German. In these languages, it can simply stand for politically active individuals or for activists from organizations and parties. Additionally, these individuals or groups' relations to violence does not have to be a criterion for "militant" to be used as an epithet. Terms like "left-wing radical," "radical" and "autonomous" do still signify something, but are too shopworn and "loaded," in the context of individual and societal challenges posed by neoliberal attacks, to still have a constructive, binding and mobilizing effect. The decisive issue here is the connections made between militancy and leftism. Firstly, the term "militant leftism" can describe individuals, groups, positions and practices in content terms. "Leftism" here describes, as it always has done, the casting down of all relations in which humans are oppressed and humiliated, while militancy describes the personal attitude with which the individual focuses on a certain type of activity, informed by leftist convictions, and despite the risks of personal consequences. Understood in this way, militant leftists are the conscious antithesis of opportunists, functionaries, sexists, fascists and exploiters. Conceptualized further in this vein, militant leftist organizations could see themselves as voluntary collectives, who conduct their politics in a decisive manner, on the offensive, taking responsibility for themselves, and in a reflective way. This would be grounded in militants contributing as "whole persons" to the realization of their convictions.

In general, the practice of leftist militants and their organizations rests on the insight that a reliable and tough approach is needed to change the world. In the case of such militants, the politics in question determines the methods used, the discussions resulting are a continual corrective to practice, and the practice itself is a learning process. Viewed thus, militancy would reveal itself as a path based neither on violence nor on nonviolence, but rather on political efficiency and purposefulness. In contrast to unreflective and structural violence, but also as a counterweight to academic sterility, leftist militancy can contain the promise of individual and societal ➞ emancipation. This could result from militant wishes and from militant action.

Klaus Viehmann

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Militancy

Militant Research

The concept of militant research or "militant investigations", a more literal translation of the original Italian phrase, can be traced back to a dissident, ➞ Marxist current in the Italian Left at the start of the 1960s, which later became known as ➞ workerism, or *operaismo* in Italian. By the 1950s, socialist and communist parties and trade unions in Italy had lost contact to the working class inside the large, rationalized production plants: instead, they had aimed their politics at participating in governments. Building from a new, intellectual appropriation of Marx' ➞ critique of political economy, the workerist current – clustered around the journals *Quaderni Rossi* (1961-65) and *Classe Operaia* (1964-67) – foregrounded the centrality of the working class as the motor of history, and demanded investigations and studies into the objective and subjective situation in the factories. For this group, "investigation" did not mean a leftist variant of empirical social research, but rather a form of political intervention informed by theoretical criticism, targeted at organizing the revolutionary ➞ class struggle.

The new rapprochement with the working class was inspired at first by methods from industrial sociology that had originated in the USA and France, and by descriptions of the conflictual nature of the everyday production process, as presented by the French group working with the magazine *Socialisme ou Barbarie* (1949-67), using *témoignages*: witness statements from workers. In a clear distancing from sociological investigatory methods, Romano Alquati (1935-2010) proposed a *"conricerca"* (literally: "co-investigation") – at a socialist party congress in January 1961 about the situation in the Fiat works – in which intellectuals together with worker activists would investigate the conditions and possibilities for struggle inside Fiat. The overarching aim of this was that political organization of the struggle in the factory would ultimately lead to the working class carrying out sociological research on themselves. When several German groups drew on the concept of *conricerca* in the 1980s, it was translated as *"militante Untersuchung"* – in English, literally "militant investigation" – with ➞ militancy used in the sense of active interference. This translation was decided upon in order to stake out a decidedly different territory with this approach as that claimed by established sociological methods of the period, and also to include "compassionate observation" in the repertoire of research methods.

Later in his career, Alquati emphasized that "conricerca" was not a ready-made methodological concept, but rather possessed a hypothetical character. *Conricerca* was the active search for informal cores of opposition already existing in the factories, in order to ally with them in political battle against capital. Marx had demonstrated in his critique of fetishism that capital's reified [thingified] power is grounded in the specific, societal character of labor. The productive forces, which have their source in large-scale ➞ cooperation among the workers, appear, in contrast, to those workers who are politically isolated, as the power of dead work. The hypothesis of investigation consists of developing this collectivity of wage labor into an antagonistic collectivity. Investigatory methods were targeted at moments of collectivity, and had to avoid reproducing worker isolation, for capital a functional norm, by using sociological questioning focused on individuals. Alongside interviews and guidelines for discussions, other instruments included pamphlets, newspapers, assemblies and ➞ strikes. The long-term perspective is to sublate – through militant research – the antitheses between researching subject and investigated object, between intellectuals and workers, and between political cadres and the grassroots. This was a strategic and political proposal, to overhaul the Leninist model of the avant-garde party, and intended to put the spotlight on the ability of exploited people to emancipate themselves collectively. Although this transition from *conricerca* to *"autoricerca"* (self-investigation) had never taken place, the original concept nevertheless provided strong impulses for political debate.

Today, interest in the concept is growing again because the composition of the working class has changed dramatically over the last thirty-five years: the restructuring of production, the precarization of working conditions (including labor hire, temporary contracts, part-time work etc.) and a growing proportion of migrant workers laboring under illegal conditions. Interest in militant research also stems from the Left's quest for non-hierarchical and more strongly horizontal forms of organization.

Christian Frings

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Militant Research

Minimum Wages

The controversy behind introducing minimum wages at living wage levels conceals a strategic question of principle. The neoliberal creed demands the expansion of the low wage sector, diverging incomes in the employment market, and more social inequality. This is a destructive strategy, because dumping down wage and social standards results in regular jobs with social benefit and healthcare provision attached to them being lost, and being replaced by precarious employment relations. Current figures document how the low wage sector in Germany has been expanding for years, and now obstinately clings to the proportion of the employment market it has conquered. The introduction of the Hartz Laws from 2003 onwards, reducing social security benefits, combined with continuing high unemployment to put extreme pressure on wage levels. This meant that unemployed people were cajoled into taking any job up to the boundary of a violation of moral principles, including accepting wages 30% below those stipulated through collective bargaining agreements. Around five million workers in Germany, most of them women, labor for wages below €8.50 per hour. This means there are around 1.34 million people in Germany at present, who depend on their low wages being topped up by social transfer payments. Around 320,000 of these working poor, reliant on the lowest level “Hartz IV” top-up benefit payment, even work full time.

A preferred instrument in fighting poverty wages are binding labor contracts where possible, backed up by legal measures. In some branches of the economy, it has been possible to force through collective minimum standards that are substantially higher than bare minimum living wage standard. It is decisive that collectively agreed minimum wages pertain to all employers and all employees. For example, it should not be possible for employers to avoid minimum wages by withdrawing from employers' associations. This is why collective agreements of this type must be declared generally binding. The quickest and easiest way to do this would be to expand the German Employees' Delegates Law (*Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz*), to cover all branches. Up until now, the law has only been legally binding for individual branches, the longest being for the construction industry, since 1996. General concessions regarding this law in relation to the General Binding Declaration of paragraph §5 of the German Collective Agreement Law (*Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung*) are now urgently necessary. This is due to the massive obstacles imposed by the government coalition contract between the CDU, CSU and FDP parties in 2009, but also because of the critical attitude displayed by the Federal Union of German Employers' Associations in the collective agreement committee regarding the introduction of minimum wages.

Collective agreement solutions have their limits however, and cannot replace a legally binding minimum wage. Trade unions do not have the structural power needed in all areas, to conclude collective agreements at levels safe from the threat of poverty; this is also because the empty spaces on the collective agreement map are expanding drastically. The flight to withdraw from employers' associations meant that in 2010, only around 36% of companies in the former West Germany were covered by collective agreements, while in the federal states of the former East Germany the same figure was as low as 20%. This means that more and more employees work for worse wages and under worse conditions than workers do who are employed by companies regulated by collective agreements.

Introducing a legal minimum wage, covering all areas of work, from €8.50 would not only help low earners, but would reduce the burden on federal and on social security budgets: those are the findings of research commissioned by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. According to this, around 5 million employees would benefit from a legal minimum wage, and an additional 2.67 billion euros of income tax would flow into the federal budget. The insurance companies – including state-run insurance companies – for pensions, health, care worker budgets, and unemployment benefits would also receive an additional 2.68 billion euros. Social benefits paid out, including housing benefit, additional child benefits and the lower-level ALG II social benefit, would decrease by 1.7 billion euros in total. Higher net wages among low paid workers would mean a rise in consumer spending to the tune of 0.7 billion euros, which, in turn, would lead to higher government revenues from sales tax, and additional jobs.

As of 2017, 21 out of 28 EU member states had a minimum wage, without any discernible negative consequences for levels of unemployment. Looking beyond the German borders to comparable European neighbor states reveals that not only have minimum wages become standard practice, but that they’re often fixed above the minimum level, demanded by the Confederation of German Trade Unions, of €8.50 per hour. Self-evidently, they do not deprive the economy of "air to breathe." As of 2017, they were fixed at €11.53 per hour in Luxemburg, €9.76 in France, €9.30 in Belgium, and €8.95 in the Netherlands.

The debate about the minimum wage remains a fundamental question of societal politics. It's at the center of the trade unions' agenda, so that people from their work in dignity, and later from their pensions. Ultimately, this debate is about precarious working and living conditions, poverty and a lack of life-chances destabilizing the foundations of democracy, and putting these foundations in long-term danger.

Annelie Buntenbach and Claus Matecki

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Mobility Solidarity

This German-language version of this concept, *solidarische Mobilität,* was created during the preparation for a conference called *"auto.mobil.krise,"* which took place in Stuttgart in October 2010. The backdrop to this was a virulent crisis in the automobile industry and the struggle against the destructive, huge-scale construction of the Stuttgart 21 train station, processes that were connected up to the question of "who does the city belong to?" Then as now, the object is to propagate a social debate to counter unreflective talk about purely technological alternatives, in the form, for example, of electrical mobility, or biofuels. What we need is societal, ➞ socioecological transformation: a planned extension of the railroads, and of electrified public and local transport networks; the reconstruction and greening of cities; the regionalization of plans to reintegrate wasteland into natural and economic circulation, and the regionalization of other economic, repair and recycling targets; and finally, a step-by-step increase in prices for using transport. This is also about perspectives for ➞ good work: the automobile and aeronautical industries have to be "shrunk in a healthy fashion," but not at the cost of those who work in them. To achieve this a new politics of the employment market and of working-time is necessary, which includes new fields of work, and social security guarantees. The planning, steering and structuring of societal infrastructure and production has to result from democratic processes, e.g. by a corporation for the German railways that is orientated towards the common good, capable of cooperating across national borders, and not slimmed down for capitalist competition. All these issues intersect with the question of the distribution of wealth. Both the "right to mobility" and the burdens that ensue from transport are inequably distributed. While drivers of particularly large limousines enjoy tax breaks, the poor are left standing where they're. Whoever can afford to moves to housing districts with low traffic density and traffic speeds, while the rest are left stuck living next to streets and roads with high traffic density. This includes people who do not, themselves, own a car, which still accounts for a quarter of German households – of which, in turn, 70% have no automobile for financial reasons. The decisive issue is the creation of public, collective, cost-efficient and good mobility provision, so that no one will still need a private car. Equally important is the de-motorization of the city, in order to demotivate people from wanting to drive a car. For this to work, structures must be created in which people can experience themselves as "queens and kings of the streets" without driving cars and local green spaces need to be provided for everybody. Whoever walks or cycles a pedal bike should enjoy the privileges of having right of way, physical protection, and free spaces in which to do so.

All of these factors also flow into the agenda of international ➞ solidarity. The climate change crisis is being fueled by increasing transport flows; automobile companies want to double the worldwide stock of personal cars within the next three years, while the aeronautical industry wants to triple the number of airplanes. Such plans thwart climate protection efforts, and aggravate conflicts about oil and other finite natural resources. Biofuel plantations and land-grabbing make basic foodstuffs more expensive, and raise the incidence of death by starvation. Mobility must be restructured, so that it no longer destroys the foundations of livelihoods and possibilities for development in the global South. Motorized traffic in industrial countries has to be drastically reduced, i.e. that in the case of Germany, the current average of 10,000 car kilometers per person per annum must be reduced by half.

There are lots of good examples from the past and present for "inland islands" of alternative transport use. Cycling cities like Groningen; comfortable and free public and local transport systems; car free Sundays, as have recently been implemented in Bogotá in Columbia in recent years; fun holidays without cheap flights; car-free living and working in parts of Freiburg and Kassel (Germany); the Swiss railroad system, and Swiss toll roads for large goods vehicles; campaigns against highway construction, for social transport tickets, and for free use of public local transport networks; campaigns against destructive large-scale projects, including the Upper Moselle Crossing (in Germany) and the Fehmarn Belt Fixed Link (connecting a Danish island with a German island in the Baltic Sea); campaigns for noise protection in the Rhine Valley; and the German "railways for everyone" (*Bahn for alle*) campaign. Moreover, there are "Reclaim the Streets" initiatives in many localities around the world; and parallel to this, actions that fall in the category of ➞ right to the city.

The growing ➞ critique of economic growth puts new wind into the sails of all these campaigns. Oil-fired, fossil-fuel based capitalism has lost just as much of its attraction as the financial market driven variety has done. The former, in its hunt for cost advantages and market shares, transports commodities – including labor as commodity – faster, higher and further than ever before. It has long since lost its dazzle of globalization, because a multiplication of individual wealth and increased life quality have gotten lost along the way. This is the same, basic attitude that played its part in the mass protests against Stuttgart 21, against nuclear power stations, and against the construction of new airports.

The Network for Mobility Solidarity (in German: *Netzwerk Solidarische Mobilität*) was created in 2012. In a similar fashion to the founding of Attac almost 20 years ago, during which a variety of theoretical and practical critiques of globalization were pooled together, activists from associations, citizen initiatives, scientific research work together in the new network. This enables them to conduct a critique of transport politics as a social struggle, with which many people can engage.

Sabine Leidig

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Mobility Solidarity

Moneyless Economy

The moneyless economy is based on the fundamental ideal of separating giving from taking. As such, it matches Marx' famous ideal: "each according to his abilities, each according to his needs." This is backed by a basic attitude that is critical of the very idea of value. While even local exchange trading systems are based on the principle of exchanging human capabilities and human activity in the form of abstract values, which ultimately reduces these quantities to the values they have, the moneyless economy actually manages to overcome this logic of exchange. We can only talk about a moneyless economy when principles of openness and flexible participation are safeguarded: this is the criteria that differentiates the moneyless economy from collectives. It is equally important to differentiate the moneyless economy from organizations that are primarily focused on supporting the needy. Instead, the motto of the moneyless economy is – everybody for everybody else! Moneyless economy initiatives mostly exist as projects covering a particular part of people's needs. Occasionally they exist as open communities, attempting to satisfy basic needs using this basic structure. In a moneyless economy, the difference between property and ownership impacts in the same essential way as it does in the principle of the ➞ commons: the relation of ownership is not what counts, but rather the principle of property, i.e. who is currently using something actively. If an object or a quantity stops being someone's "active property," because it's just standing around uselessly, this resource is then free to be used by another individual.

Free shops – known in the German-language world as *Umsonstläden* – have become the most well-known form in which the moneyless economy expresses itself. "Everything that is useable can [also really] be used; everything that has been used, can be taken [away by someone else]": this is the slogan of the group that run the platform www.umsonstladen.de. As of 2011, c. 60 free shops existed already in Germany, although it should be noted that not all were established according to moneyless economy principles, but had, instead, a charitable or ecological focus. Moneyless economy initiatives also exist in the internet, e.g. www.alles undumsonst.de .

Free shops also exist in other countries outside of Germany, including Holland and the USA, but can only exist in rich countries that are dominated by excess. Contrary to the critics that say this approach takes no account of the sphere of production, activists in the moneyless economy want to consciously utilize this excess wealth: this is about utilizing society's leftovers, and to throw a spanner into the works of our throw-away society into the bargain. In turn, productive activities are included in the recycling process. And the movement is closely connected with the campaign against food destruction. Containers or bins beside supermarkets, large bakeries and vegetable dealers, in which people search for food that has been binned, should also be seen as part of the moneyless economy. In some cases however, agreements are in place with bakeries, wholesalers and even farms, that food which cannot be sold or which does not comply with EU norms can be picked up. This food often provides the basis for “People's Kitchens” – in German, *Volksküchen* – that cook food for free, and also accept donations.

Further, a significant component of moneyless economies are user communities, groups of individuals that use something communally. Such user communities – or *"NutziGems,"* to use the German abbreviation – are based on the principle that not everything has to be owned for people to be able to use it occasionally. This can include objects and infrastructure, but also abilities, know-how and knowledge. "NutziGems" also exist in local forms – often connected with specific free shops – and in internet-supported varieties.

While not belonging to the moneyless economy in a strict sense, it is reasonable in this context to refer to *non-commercial (re)production* in this context, as this also consists of economic activity without the principle of exchange. In practice, this form of production and reproduction has included farms, natural health practitioners, bakery collectives and building groups – all instances of people being active in order to gift their labor to all those who need it. Mutuality is not the condition for each individual act of giving, but it is of course necessary for such projects to continue to exist in the medium to long-term. Yet another variation inside the species of the moneyless economy were initiatives that no longer exist, including "Berlin for free" (*"Berlin umsonst"*), "Hamburg for free" etc., which organized free access to swimming pools, museums, concerts, cinemas and much more, through spectacular direct action. Massive repression led to their demise, an unfortunate development that at least reveals the scale of anxiety about how such projects could contribute to reshaping people's ➞ common sense thinking.

All these approaches are united by the conviction that a better society cannot be seized from elsewhere, but must be created instead. On the website of the Vienna group W.E.G. (www.geldlos.at), the following statement can be found: "We want a free association and cooperation of people who do not swap bus share, who do not compete but join together in mutual aid … Our project is intended as a contribution to a global social movement that shares these aims. WE ARE THE TRANSFORMATION!"

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Moneyless Economy

Mosaic Left

The term "the mosaic left" describes a metaphor for political rhetoric. This is aimed at a theoretical justification of and political encouragement for a collective actor in society, who perceives the regulation and transformation of globalized, financial market capitalism as its core task. A heterogeneous and collective actor, it encompasses diverse organizations, initiatives and movements, which work together on projects to correct and to do away with the malformations of financial market capitalism, while still preserving their own individual identities. In so doing, the metaphor of the mosaic accepts the premise that capitalist societies are also subject to processes of social differentiation, out of which emerge idiosyncratic social contexts. Building on Pierre Bourdieu's work, these contexts can be comprehended as social fields, existing as relatively autonomous social worlds inside the bigger world of the whole of society. Using this mental construct, social fields contain self-evaluation criteria and power structures, and represent fields of struggle to change internal balances of forces. Contiguously, developments inside each field are shaped by the dynamics of accumulation of a financial-market-capitalist nature, which carries the imperative of capitalist utilization processes into the fields, and thereby into almost all spheres of society.

The "mosaic Left" can be conceived of as an association of actors in fields, working towards progressive change in their specific fields, in order to facilitate a cross-field power to act against financial-market-capitalist coercion. In so doing, they're not merely linked into specific constellations of actors and logical forms of the contexts of their action. Concurrently, societies of developed capitalism have reached a degree of complexity, at which no single actor can claim, a priori, competence in acting and dealing across the borders between fields. That's why cooperative orientation strategies between actors are a prerequisite for an efficacious mosaic Left: this is valid for a wide range of actors, including the trade unions. The unions in Germany have been able to achieve respectable, defensive successes in protecting income and job interests [of those they represent] – and this, during the acute, large crisis phase of financial market capitalism, within the framework of crisis-corporatist arrangements that have been made. However, demands that go beyond the defensive – for example, to intervene on economic democracy terms – fail, primarily because of a lack of power resources, and because of crisis-corporatist coercion to maintain consensus. In order for the trade unions to realize a relevant contribution to supporting a mosaic Left in society, they require a self-image as autonomous representatives of the interests of dependent labor (see also ➞ trade union autonomy), *and* a strategy of revitalization, in power politics terms.

Further potential mosaic actors need to reevaluate and possibly rejuvenate their understanding of their own roles and of politics in general, to test their suitability for the mosaic Left. If the state's means of intervention – including the law, money and norms – are to be made useful for a progressive transformation of financial market capitalism, respective majorities must emerge in political arenas. The political parties are called upon to take up their oppositional role in political decision processes against the impertinences of financial market capitalism. Concurrently, they must take up impulses originating in society, to connect them with experience, abilities and resources from their parliamentary work, and integrate them into reform initiatives and transformation projects. Ultimately, traditional images of the role of those intellectuals who are critical of capitalism must be overhauled. In formation processes in the mosaic left, the key function of intellectual activity consists of tracking and strategically working through those transformational projects aimed at the correction and transformation of financial market capitalism *and* which promote the collective ability to act *between* the various field actors of the mosaic Left. This requires understanding the role of the intellectual as an *integrating* intellectual.

The mosaic Left also faces the necessity of overcoming the borders of nation-state arenas. This is particularly true when looking at Europe, and its fragmented publics, organizations and politics. Transnational politics against neoliberal "politics of crisis," and for a new eco-social model of development for Europe could work against fragmentation here. Politics of this sort could contribute to the emergence of a European counter-public and through that to a "European demos," without which democratic steps forward in Europe won't be possible. These are the central tasks for a European mosaic Left. Such a mosaic left would also have to face up to the challenge of altering the power relations in nation-states, in order to gather together nation-state reform politics into Europe-wide transformation projects.

Hans-Jürgen Urban

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Mosaic Left

Multitude

The term "multitude" has been central in political debates since Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri published *Empire* in the year 2000. In this work, the authors analyzed the birth of a new geography of power, of the centrality of nation-states, and the emergence of a global form of sovereignty without either a center or borders. According to their thesis, the global market defines a new logic and structure of a new, sovereign power, which rules the world. The sovereignty is composed out of national and supranational organisms, joined together in a singular logic of power. This is the global sovereignty that Hardt and Negri call Empire, with Multitude being the name they give to the political subject entering the fray against Empire. Multitude is the entirety of the exploited and the enslaved, which represent an immediate antithesis to Empire.

Hardt and Negri work with the opposition between the terms "multitude" and "folk" that can be traced back to Hobbes and Spinoza. Hobbes places a negative connotation on the term multitude: the multitude opposes the folk, and is an obstacle for the unity of the state. Spinoza, by way of contrast, perceives in the multitude a form of social and political existence of the many, and sees it as the bearer of bourgeois liberty. Negri and Hardt's interpretation of Spinoza is original to say the least: they expand the term, by discussing it in relation to the concepts of "Difference" from Deleuze and "Biopolitics" from Foucalt. In their books *Multitude* (2004) and *Commonwealth* (2009), they take forward their work on this conceptional triad.

The Multitude is born inside the Empire and confronts the Empire with an overwhelming power. Its revolutionary nature and its struggles prevent the Empire from constituting a new judicial system adequate to meet the new reality of globalization. The Multitude is not merely the result of an undifferentiated mixture of peoples and nations, but "rather the singular power *of a new state*." Yet how do the actions of the Multitude become political? According to Hardt and Negri, the impact of the Multitude becomes political, when it confronts directly, and with a type of consciousness sufficient to this purpose, the Empire's repressive measures. The Multitude is a "new proletariat," possessing foundational power. Under this definition, the proletariat encompasses everyone who is exploited by the work of capital, whereas the industrial working class is merely a partial moment in the history of the proletariat. The struggles for the right to global citizenship, for the right to an unconditional ➞ basic income, and for the right to a reappropriation of knowledge represent the first steps in the Multitude's struggle. On these terms, the Multitude is: 1. a cooperating group of singularities, and as such neither identical with "the folk" or the people, nor with the masses; 2. a class term, because it is the entirety of all those exploited by Empire's mode of production; 3. a term of potency, because the singularities, from which it is composed, expand until they become a kind of "general intellect."

Under conditions of biopolitical production, which Hardt and Negri see as replacing industrial production, the essential production is the production of subjectivities, and not objects to satisfy needs, as is the case in commodity production. It follows from this that the most important political field is the struggle for the control of – and autonomy in – the production of subjectivities. "The Multitude constitutes itself, by collectively combining the singular subjectivities, which proceed from this process."

From within the paradigm of classical political thought, the Multitude can be neither explained nor represented: it is, instead, an incommensurable plurality. If "the folk" or the people are represented as a singularity, the Multitude cannot be represented, because it impacts as an active social actor that is a plurality. Its struggles break through the traditional patterns of political conflicts, and point out new and indeterminable forms. Multitude, as a concept, has provoked many discussions, and the term is controversial both theoretically and politically. The central moment of the analysis is also contested, a moment after which, according to Hardt and Negri, the organization of production changed fundamentally. Instead of being defined by "factory labor," this production is now defined by "immaterial labor" and by "biopolitical production." Inside of this new kind of production, it would be possible for the Multitude to produce societal wealth through utterly different ways and means. At this point a plethora of questions raise their heads, the foremost among them being whether this so-called immaterial production will immediately be accompanied by a new quality and a new form of ➞ social ownership.

Antonella Muzzupappa

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Multitude

Nationalization

Nationalization means the expropriation and transference of property, including private property, in whole or part into state property, i.e. into property that the state or another public body can dispose over. The goal of nationalization is to take the power of disposition over particular sectors of the economy away from private capital. This normally refers to the means of production in key industries, strategically important raw material sources, or significant infrastructure, especially structures that provide basic provision and transport.
As Marx and Engels declared in the Manifesto of the Communist Party in 1848:
"The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, *i.e.*, of the proletariat organized as the ruling class." They then went on to propose the following: "1. Expropriation of property in land … 5. Centralization of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly. 6. Centralization of the means of the transport and communication system in the hands of the State." Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky all viewed the nationalization of the means of production as a necessary, intermediate step on the road towards ➞ social ownership, and towards workers taking over production. This has led to some currents in communism drawing the conclusion that the nationalization of capital is equivalent to ➞ socialism. Yet this ignores the fact that nationalization, by itself, cannot overcome the capitalist division of labor, exploitation or competition. Neither does it represent a ➞ democratization of production. While the bourgeoisie did lose political and economic power in state-socialist systems, the fundamental laws of capitalism remained in place. This is why ➞ Trotskyist, ➞ soviet council based, or undogmatic leftist currents have often referred to the model of the Soviet Union as "state capitalist." Today, equating nationalization and socialism has become more the preserve of economic-liberal discourses. These seem to forget that even in the UK and France after the Second World War, railroads, heavy industry and electricity supply were nationalized a list that was extended, in France, to include banks, insurance companies and Renault.
Most constitutions in the world reserve rights for the state to expropriate property in the interest of the common good. These remain common today when infrastructural measures are being implemented, even if compensation is provided. Article 15 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany states that: "Land and soil, natural resources and means of production, may for social ownership purposes be transferred to public ownership, or other forms of the social economy by a law that determines the nature and extent of compensation." Despite this, expropriations have been a seldom occurrence in Germany: isolated examples of it actually happening have taken place in the case of coal mining in the Lusatia region, in the former East; and with regard to the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal in the former West. In the former GDR, plants, factories and raw materials were nationalized under the category of "socialist ownership of the means of production" (articles 9 and 12 of the GDR Constitution), agricultural operations became ➞ cooperatives (article 46), and "small, skilled-labor businesses and other small businesses" had to orientate themselves towards the ➞ social economy (article 14).
In countries in Africa, Asia and South America, nationalizations often represent a step forward in the process of decolonization. Yet from the 1980s to the start of the crisis from 2007 onwards, nationalizations were not playing a significant role in the dominant global discourse. On the contrary, the privatization of state and municipal property and services was intensively propagated. This is the context in which the nationalizations achieved in Venezuela and Bolivia prompted heavy criticism from the International Monetary Fund, the US government, and from several EU governments. Under president Hugo Chávez, Venezuela nationalized its oil industry, large land-ownership of agricultural land, and enterprises "of national interest." The nationalization of electricity providers and of the telecommunications enterprise CANTV, which had been privatized in the 1990s, were achieved through buying up the majority of shares, large land-ownership and enterprises were – in as far as they were legally owned in the first place – expropriated in return for compensation, and partially transferred into social and cooperative ownership In Bolivia, president Evo Morales nationalized oil and gas resources. This facilitated a rise in both state revenues and social spending, and made it possible for the economy to focus on domestic development.
In times of crisis, partial nationalizations have a different role to play, that of stabilizing capitalist economies. This is what happened from 2007 on in a diverse group of industrialized states, with state takeovers of banks and large corporations, which stretched to state takeovers of these institutions' financial liabilities, as was the case with General Motors and the American International Group in the USA, with Dexia in Belgium, and with Hypo Real Estate in Germany. In critical terms, these proceedings have been described as private, entrepreneurial losses being transferred into the hands of social ownership.

Dario Azzellini

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Nationalization

Neo-Desarrollismo

Neo-desarrollismo (*desarrolismo* = development) – a term known in English principally through the institution that it is linked with, the New Development Bank – can be understood as an updating of South American thought about development in the post-WW2 era. In the *desarrolismo* of the 1940s to 1970s, the emphasis was on protection against foreign trade, in order to make the economy less depend, and in order to ease the transition from an economy based on agricultural exports to an industrialized economy. *Neo-desarrollismo* diverges from this by putting the emphasis on controlling capital transactions. This method aims at stabilizing the growth path, and is intended to facilitate "autonomous politics for full employment and social justice." A gradual liberalization of goods trade, and in contrast to the earlier, protectionist phase of *desarrolismo*, is possible.

All individuals linked to *neo-desarrollismo* emphasize the need to control capital transactions. Short-term incoming and outgoing capital flows have led to strong fluctuations in currency exchanges, to financial crises, and to macroeconomic instability. Moreover, unconstrained capital transactions open up routes on which capital can escape from what it sees as undesirable economic politics. Capital flight can undermine progressive economic politics. This lends strategic significance, in the framework of alternative economic politics, to controls on capital transactions. An outer vulnerability is also connected to material commodities trade. In this regard, *neo-desarrollismo* perspectives are less unitary. Brazilian economists clustered around Joao Siscú and the South African economists of the Macroeconomic Research Group stress the necessity of strengthening industry's competitiveness, and of supporting industrial exports. Other South American economists and social scientists like Alberto Acosta, Rafael Correa or Eduardo Gudynas oppose this by spotlighting the central role of import duties in successful industrialization, in both central and peripheral countries.

Either way, both camps agree on the domestic economy as the central focus of development, and, inside this frame, on concentrating on increasing mass demand, and on producing fundamental infrastructure. While the majority of Neo-Desarrollists think in categories of growth as an imperative (albeit with social implications) and of competitiveness, a minority insist the process of industrialization be conditioned by social and ecological considerations. This is the gist of Gudynas' argument that industrialization be based primarily on goods to satisfy basic needs, and should progress inside strictly defined parameters of ecological sustainability.

The meta-level here is the articulation of an autonomous and democratic development project, which is why these economists and these economics are closely connected with conceptions of ➞ de-globalization. The state has a central role as initiator and regulator. Such a state's understanding of politics is however substantially less technocratic than that of the post-war "*desarrollismists*." That said, *neo-desarrollismo* conceptions about the ➞ democratization of economic politics, and about the creation of societal alliances to push through alternative conceptions are all much less worked out, than is the main thrust of their economic politics. While the main goal for the Brazilians clustered around Joao Siscú is the articulation of a national development project, Gudynas contends that, seen from the perspective of a small nation-state, autonomous development could only be possible within the structure of a regional economic project.

Neo-Desarrollists are made up of intellectuals from the milieus of social movements, trade unions, and leftist parties. Since the weighty crisis resulting from the ultra-liberal politics of the 1970s to 1990s, they're now able to speak to a bigger public. Elements from *neo-desarrollist* discourse have tentatively made their way into the objectives and economic politics practice of center-left governments. This is most visible in Brazil, where hard-won progress in industrial politics was destroyed again partly due to an appreciation of the Brazilian real currency, influenced by high incoming capital flows. The high volatility of capital flows and the strong appreciation tendencies of the real, which crop up again and again, have moved the Brazilian government to impose tougher controls on capital transactions during the current, global crisis. This tendency towards more regulation can also be discerned in other countries of the South. Regarding economic specialization however, a recent tendency of progressive governments in South American countries towards a de facto – and also objectively desired – increased emphasis on exporting raw materials. This strategy could be challenged if a new accentuation of the crisis unfolds in the central, capitalist countries of the globe.

Joachim Becker

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Neo-Desarrollismo

Occupy

By 2009-10 already, it had already become obvious that the dominant strategies for crisis management at a global level were leveled at utilizing all possible powers, to maintain neoliberal, financial market dominated model for the development of capitalism. The costs of the crisis were shifted into the "social ownership" of individual tax payers, banks and other financial market actors were subsidized with incredible sums of money, and a financial and economic crisis was transformed into a state-debt crisis. These politics of crisis, incapable of allaying the danger of a new, further financial crisis, are directed openly against the majority of the population, and are increasingly pushed through using "post-democratic" or openly authoritarian means.

In this historic constellation, at the cusp of the turn towards global austerity politics, new ➞ protest movements entered onto the stage. Inspired by political dynamics in the risings in North Africa, the next to spread was the Indignados movement in Spain in May 2011. In September, with the occupation of Zuccotti Park in New York, and the slogan "Occupy Wall Street!" the Occupy movement had been born, which soon extended out to cover over one hundred cities and towns in the USA. This led to a worldwide action day on October 15, and by the end of the year had even encouraged people inside the authoritarian Russian state to stage protests against the greedy, power-holding elites.

While the Spanish movement was criticized for not bringing clear demands to the public's attention, the same criticism that was later brought against Occupy, it should be noted that these groupings were primarily concerned with protesting dominant *forms* of politics. People feel shut out of public politics, a sphere foremost concerned with defending existing privileges. Those people gathering on public squares or Boulevards in Madrid, Tel Aviv, New York or Moscow were following a kind of political institution, which informed them that little could be expected from official politics.

These new movements are characterized by the interplay of "(digital) networks and the street." The *Occupy mode of politics* is based on a more or less spontaneous creation of public spaces, in which the message sent via media is the act of occupation itself, coupled with ➞ civil disobedience and solidaristic living and working together, *and* with a radical critique of representative politics. New communication technologies lend a special dynamic to a presence in the public sphere, and the self-assurance that history is being made right here. In going through these processes, the repertoire of possible forms of action was extended to include camping on public squares and spaces. "Yes, we camp!" became an ironic saying, to express a new form of the public sphere. People engaging with Occupy work through experiences and move through learning processes, which gain the upper hand over "the unpolitical." There is, however, no guarantee that this will bring emancipatory contents and solidaristic strategies to the fore. In individual cities and countries, Occupy has taken on bizarre forms, and has proven attractive for reactionary forces. The critical, solidaristic moment that unites many of the participants will either establish itself more permanently in a number of countries, regions and cities, or Occupy will disappear, or remain marginal and wrongheaded.

At the center of the Occupy dynamic is the articulation of social rage about massive social inequality, caused by decades of neoliberal politics, exacerbated by the crisis since 2008, and constructed as something permanent by the crisis politics of recent years. The obscene concentration and entanglement of political, economic and media power in the hands of a few is used as shock tactics in the slogan "we are the 99 percent," which also names the dominant forms of politics and of the operations of the public sphere as part of the problem. In so doing, implicit or explicit criticism is also leveled against forms of left-wing politics, who attempt to shift things using good arguments and in dialogue with elites. The further development of Occupy and similar movements depends on whether the mutual mistrust between these movements and institutionalized actors in the pluralistic left can be changed into a critical-solidaristic cooperation. The insight that political analyses, demands, strategies and political leadership are important was the result, ultimately, of experiences gathered during the previous, large protest cycle of the ➞ critique of globalization movement.

Occupy activists at least managed, in the short-term, to put critique of neoliberalism – at times stretching as far as self-confident anti-capitalism – onto the agenda of media and public discourses. The protests articulated a widely spread but largely isolated rage and indignation, and translated these into collective activity. In so doing, they're part of a genuine movement that contributes to "making ➞ common sense critical" (Gramsci).

Ulrich Brand and Benjamin Opratko

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Occupy

Open Source

Free software is the name given to computer programs, whose source code – a type of code that humans can read – has been made public. The opposite of this is proprietary software, which puts locks on its source code. While keeping source-code secret serves companies' utilization interests, free software, also called freeware, aims at facilitating a communal, public usage and further development of source code.

The free software movement emerged in the middle of the 1980s. One of the protagonists, Richard Stallman, started by developing a free operating system with an open source code, and went on to draft the General Public License (GPL). The GPL prevents the private, exclusionary appropriation of source codes, and protects various rights to use programs without restrictions as to the purposes they're used for, and the right to study, copy, change and disseminate a program or software. The term "free software," and particularly its German translation "*freie Software,"* often leads to the assumption that free software means costless software. Although this genuinely was, and is, one important element here, particularly from a user perspective, Stallman defined the freedom of software primarily in the sense of intellectual, academic and scientific freedom.

With the spread of the internet, open and cooperative models of software development became more popular, and went on to boom, particularly after the success of Linux, a "free" operating system. This system also attracted private companies. It was in this context that the decision was ultimately taken to use the term "open source" instead of "free software," the most common earlier phrase. As a term, "open source" was intended to function as the common denominator for everything that had been characterized by "free software"; simultaneous to this however, people wanted to decide upon "pragmatic" aims, which primarily business saw as desirable. The argument that was foregrounded for open source codes was no longer the freedom of the intellect, but rather increased efficiency in development, and better program quality. In addition, using "open" rather than "free" was intended to signalize that those spearheading the transition were certainly not against commercializing software developed in this way, but were rather "open for everything." Open source software is produced by developers, who work on the project voluntarily, and, for the most part, without pay. Production mostly takes place in a self-organized manner via the internet, products with a high quality value are released for general use, and are available on a semi-ubiquitous basis. At first, it appears that open source's free accessibility defies capitalist utilization logic. In capitalism, it is ultimately the private i.e. exclusive ownership of means of production and of products of labor that form the precondition for selling a commodity. In order to sell software as an independent, single product, a shortage must be artificially created in its availability in a centralized fashion using legal instruments (e.g. intellectual property law) and technological instruments (e.g. blocks on copying software). Yet even though it is not easy to create artificial shortages in open source software, this does not mean that it automatically falls out of the system of capitalist utilization logic. In a similar sense, public libraries or the general dissemination of knowledge also constituted no serious threat to this logical system, at least until now. This is because open source produces high functioning, high value software, a productive force that can, consequently, be utilized by companies in the production of proprietary products – and surplus value.

Furthermore, while the opening up of knowledge can cause damage to individual sectors of capital, it advances the general conditions of production. When defenders of intellectual property rights laud the potential of private property rights to support innovation, while champions of open source argue, in opposition, that openness, and the ➞ cooperation that stems from that, generate progress and development, then both are in the right. Open source software is a newsworthy example for a permanent tension inherent to market economy societies, between a private, locking in of knowledge – and the whole of society gaining access to the same.

The mode of production of open source software demonstrates that efficient and effective production beyond the market's coercions is possible. It crushes the thesis attached to bourgeois economic theory, that only private property can provide the incentive for productivity, efficiency and innovation. Open source is however not, in itself, an alternative to the capitalist mode of production, and does not already contain the "seed" of a future communistic society. Rather, we should see the emancipatory potential of open source or freeware as lying in its function as a door-opener for debates about modes of production that do not conform to market economy principles. In achieving this, open source makes alternative forms of society visible and thinkable.

Sabine Nuss

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Open Source

Parecon or Participatory Economics

Hidden behind the term participatory economics, also widely known as "parecon," or "participatory economy," is an elaborate proposal for an economic system based on anarchistic principles made by two US Americans: Michael Albert, activist and publisher (Zmagazine, South End Press), and Robert Hahnel, the critical economist. Both have been publicizing and publishing about their proposal since the start of the 1990s (see, for example, www.//zcomm.org/znetarticle/an-introduction-to-participatory-economics/)

Using the concept of parecon, Michael Albert wants to lay out a concrete alternative to capitalism, without repeating the mistakes of the centralized-state planned economy that was in place during "real existing" ➞ socialism. He wants to facilitate utopian hope, and new spaces for conceiving and imagining. Parecon is discussed at the ➞ world social forum, and continues to be worked upon under the better-known heading of "Alternatives to Economic Globalization." Albert redresses the dichotomy between the competitive market and centralized administration. Claims that the capitalist market represents “the best alternative” must be refuted, as it destroys both nature and society (see ➞ interrelations with nature). It produces inequalities and contradictions, while oligopolies and monopolies dominate. On the other hand, centralized, planned economic activity also concentrates power in the hands of specific coordinators of the economy. That's why both systems are deficient. In contrast to this, parecon is an economic system, in which decisions are taken in a participatory and non-hierarchical manner in ➞ cooperatives and in consumer councils with similarities to the form of ➞ soviet councils. The five essential elements of this economic system are participatory decision-making, balanced fields of labor, wages for labor based on degree of burden, assemblies of producers and of consumers, and the iterative, decision-making body.

According to this model, markets are subordinated to participatory planning. All those effected ought to participate in decision-making, which should be done democratically, and, if possible, unanimously. The important bodies include the assemblies of producers and consumers, both of which decide upon their production targets and their consumer wishes. Such plans, however, are not determined by a central planning office. Rather, a so-called Iteration Facilitation Board compares the producers' plans with the consumers' plans in a process involving several fixed steps, and communicates issues regarding lack of supply and surplus of demand back to the respective assemblies, until a realistic consensus is agreed upon in an iterative and decentralized manner.

The employment market – inside this scheme of thought – is not a competitive market. Instead, each person gets allocated comparably good and bad labor contents, with reference to decision-making competence, self-development issues, and the level of physical and psychological burden these contents contain – all inside a balanced job complex. When this is not possible, a job with a particular description should rotate. Wages are only partly linked to productivity. Whoever works more hours, or takes on labor in less pleasant job complexes, gets a higher wage. Inequality remains minimal, because basic goods are distributed to everyone equally.

Parecon does have similarities with other socialist economic models. Alongside the tried and tested system of centralized administration, there are further anti-capitalist models. The most elaborate model is a combination of ➞ cooperatives, Keynesian macroeconomic steering (➞ Keynesianism) and limited centralized planning, as outlined in Ota Šik's "Third Way." Ecofeminism contributes the idea of the "subsistence economy." Inside movements focused on communes and cooperatives, people have realized alternatives. The discussions and practices emerging from the discourse on ➞ solidaristic economics also add new impulses to these debates.

All the aforementioned have been subject to much criticism, as parecon itself has. Implementing plans and controls without competitive markets would demand that the actors possessed high levels of social controls. The weak incentives to achieve caused by the absence of profits would reduce economic wealth, at least according to our knowledge to date, and extensive experience of how similar attempts have fared. The demands placed on individuals regarding the amount of initiative they must contribute themselves – but also as regards education and ➞ solidarity – are very high. These systems often reject division of labor and professional specialization. Political and cultural dimensions are often absent from alternative economic models, making these proposals too economistic. The long-term perspectives of realistic alternatives are barely known, a criticism that also applies to their step-by-step political implementation. A wide-ranging, inclusive discussion about the emancipatory economic model of participatory economics inside the critique of globalization is something to be aimed for, particularly in connection with other theoretical models, and with practical experiences.

Thomas Dürmeier

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Parecon or Participatory Economics

Participation

In order for functioning democratic systems to exist, they need to be structured by societal forces in an active and ➞ emancipatory way. The concept of participation describes this challenge, an imperative that converges on both society *and* on the political system. That said, there is great variety in how the term is interpreted, and it can find expression in diverse forms: in exerting influence inside parties and other political organizations; in ➞ protests and ➞ civil disobedience; or in increased participation as a form of self-determination and co-determination in various areas of society. Further, the different forms of participation can be differentiated according to whether they can be collated numerically, either directly or indirectly – for example through regional and local referenda, or the legally binding petitions that precede these referenda, in any of Germany's sixteen federal states – or whether they cannot easily be collated, as is the case with citizens' initiatives, round-table dialogues, or conflict mediation exercises. When getting to grips with this concept, it makes sense to keep track of the activities, aims and functions of participation.

Regarding findings concerning the *activities*, representative opinion polling concentrates on organized participation in associations and clubs. Parallel to this, there are many studies about protest events, and about ➞ social movements. Generally, the results of contemporary studies indicate a growth, but also a change, in behavior connected with political participation. Traditional and long-term forms of political engagement, including parties and trade unions, are being increasingly rejected. Instead, taking part politically is shifting towards an orientation around specific projects, with people participating for limited periods. Moreover, participation is now increasingly linked with issues related to paid labor and the work place.

The *aims* of participation can also differ widely. From the perspective of planning and administration, participation can serve the purpose of improving the content quality of a decision, of building acceptance, or of motivating private, societal or economic actors to take on full responsibility for their actions. On the other hand, protest and civil disobedience continue to be important forms of expression, in order to publicize specific issues, and to influence the political decision-making process.

Closely connected with the aims are the *functions,* attributed to participation by forces in society and by the political system. These can be just as diverse as the aims, and must be seen in the context of superordinated attitudes to ideological values. It is however possible to differentiate the following functions:

Function of recognizing problems: societal groups and protest can recognize and publicize problems early; Legitimization *function:* the active cooperation of societal groups can raise the legitimacy of a decision; *Efficiency function:* this makes it possible to recognize areas of resistance in a population early, and to fence these in; *Fig-leaf function*: participation is foregrounded as the guarantee of an objective that has utterly different motivations; *Conflict mediation function:* specific participation processes can help to break down hardened fronts in a decision-making process; *Control function:* groups can act as a watchdog over the implementation of measures and the behavior of political institutions; *Emancipation function:* engagement and co-structuring of the political process can enhance people's ability to act and their self-confidence. Finally, participation unleashes learning processes into society that are indispensable, if that society wants to call itself democratic.

While all this is possible, it must be said that the increasing transfer of political decision-making to international and supranational institutions consistently decreases the possibility of broad-based societal participation, and of societal groups influencing political decisions. This is because participative work on a transnational level requires far greater resources – of a financial, subject-specific and linguistic nature. A point demonstrated by the fact that participation in decision-making processes at European and international levels is dominated by those societal groups, which are rich in resources. There have been a number of attempts to overcome this imbalance through targeted support of participatory procedures – see for example the Europe wide *Citizens Juries* scheme. Frankly however, these are drops in a very wide ocean, and therefore rarely precipitate ➞ emancipation processes that can put down long-term roots in society.

Heike Walk

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Participatory Budgeting

The term participatory budgeting describes a particular quality of budgetary politics, as well as a defined process for the installation, execution and auditing of – until now mostly municipal – budgets, which are then labeled citizens' budgets or stakeholder budgets. This idea was first implemented in the south-Brazilian city of Porto Alegre as a practical alternative to a municipal politics marred by corruption and clientelism.

The aim is a radical ➞ democratization of political decision processes. Participatory budgeting means citizens influencing the installation and execution of the budget. This includes encompassing information ("readable budgets"), wide-ranging transparency of and access to all decision processes connected with the budget and the independent evaluation of the budget's effects, both in equal measures. This includes, but goes beyond, citizens being able to read the figures with a budget without any problems, or being able to write their own budget in accordance with administrative law. Further, participatory budgeting is based on the connection between a process, organized either according to principles of direct democracy or ➞ grassroots democracy, with forms of representative democracy. During a self-organized discussion conducted by residents about their own visions concerning life in their own city district, municipality or region, participants go on to formulate needs and demands that are then put before professional politicians responsible for budgets. This brings the question about the expectations people have on public services to a wide general public. In this fashion, it is possible to address and politicize issues regarding privatization or ➞ remunicipalization, but also working conditions in the public sector. The administration is compelled to translate the results of these debates into a budget, about which politicians must articulate a clear position.

Participatory budgeting is expressly directed towards the "masses," i.e. towards the population, and not towards parties, associations or initiatives. As a process, it is intended to give the "wisdom of the masses" space to unfold, and in principle should not impose limits on its remit, nor should it predetermine the directions discussions should take, or decisions. In this lies the essential difference between it and other participatory processes, which usually are concerned with a limited topic or subject, and appeal with that to a selection of citizens, who are directly controlled by the administration, and that only for a limited time. Moreover, there is no other participatory process has the budget as its primary concern, and through no other process can budgeting be perceived as the central moment of drawing political roadmaps and of ➞ redistribution. Participatory budgeting also means politics and administrative bodies participating in solving residents' problems. It does not mean residents participating in solving the problems of politics and of the administration.

The residents' assembly is the central form taken by the process. These should be accessible to all residents, which means accessible in all senses of the words. The status as resident is what counts, not the status as being eligible to vote at regular elections. At assemblies in individual districts, proposals for establishing a budget are presented and discussed, an occasion the administration also takes to inform citizens about the budget, and services offered by specific municipalities. Together with politicians, members of the administration also give an account of how earlier proposals from the residents have been realized. A vitally important part of this, however, remains the discussions amongst the residents themselves. Through this route, lists of tasks are created, which are then integrated into the budget. These tasks are evaluated and prioritized by participants voting on them. Finally, participants vote for their representatives, who lead the participation process, conduct the necessary consultations with the administration, and ultimately hand over a list of priorities, which constitute a vote of the residents, to the municipal parliament.

These structures mean that participatory budgeting is an ideal place for learning, a place for ➞ politicization, and a place of ➞ solidarity. To what extent these possibilities actually transfer into political effects depends, however, on the way in which members of various parties and organizations engage within these structures. Participatory budgeting draws its strength from various factors, including the fact that it is: absolutely ➞ public; is carried forward through self-organization and talking actively and personally to people about it; it is understood as an "endless and open-ended" process; and opens up various routes to participation in equal measure. Assemblies, the internet, written statements and questionnaires are just some of these.

Lutz Brangsch

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Participatory Budgeting

Peace

The wish to live in peace has been integral to humanity, for as long as it has lived in organized society. Peace means a coexistence of humans that is contracted and assured, both within and between social groups. In terms of relation between large groups, societies and states, peace is the opposite of *war.* Since records have existed of written history, this appears in the form of a history of wars – for power, territory, resources or religious convictions; periods of peace are, on the contrary, evident as interruptions between the wars. Peace must be created consciously, and connected with a legal system. The assertion that humans have a hereditary disposition to violence and aggression is untenable. Manifestations of group aggression to destroy opponents are always incited, with enemies degraded into non-humans.

The Roman Empire assumed that its wars were "just" (bella iusta), because the *Pax Romana*, the peace imposed by the Empire on the known world constituted the natural order of things. That's why every war against the empire was an "unjust" war (bella iniusta), which empowered the rulers of the empire to take drastic measures: this culminated in the once wealthy city of Carthage being raised to the ground. The idea of the just war extended through the Christian Middle Ages, only this time fought in the name of God. As the criteria of each party in the intellectual construct of a "just war" mutually exclude each other, or are handed over into the despotism of the leaders of each party, Kant proposed, in his famous text *On Eternal Peace,* the creation of an international legal system that would ensure peace. "No state should violently intervene in the constitution and government of another state."

This approach became the foundation of the 1945 UN Charter (➞ international law). Article one of the Charter states that the aim of the United Nations is "to maintain international peace and security." During the Cold War, it was not possible for the maintenance of peace through the UN to function as institutionally intended. The principle of *peaceful coexistence* was nevertheless put into practice, which enabled states with different systems of society to recognize mutually living in peace alongside one another; this contributed to pacification in the conflict of east versus west. Parallel to this, the position that political, social and cultural ➞ human rights form a unity, became dominant. Using the slogan *responsibility to protect* (abbreviated to R2P), attempts are currently being made to gain leverage against the principle of non-intervention – disguised behind the excuse of protecting of human rights. These are attempts to put the tool of the "just war" against real or alleged violent rulers back at the discretion of political power. The war conducted by the West in Libya in 2011 was an expression of this process.

The end of the Cold War did not usher in a new era of peace, as was largely hoped for in 1989/1990, but rather a new era of intervention and imperial wars. The USA and its allies have turned war back into a "normal" means of politics. Worldwide spending on defense was over 1600 billion US dollars in 2010: in the case of the USA, this represent more than a doubling of expenditure inside a decade. Global spending on defense is one-third higher than at the end of the Cold War. NATO accounts for over 60% of this spending. Globalization and war are two sides of the same coin. The "New World Order" postulated by president Bush Senior in the Gulf War at the start of the 1990s, was aimed at access to and disposal over raw materials, particularly oil and gas, and the control of strategic geographical spaces. This line of policy was continued in the wars in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. The war against Iran now threatens. After the failure of the west in Iraq and Afghanistan, Barack Obama prioritized making the USA's ability to wage war more effective. This meant that qualitative rearmament proceeded, while the strategic focus shifted to China.

Peace is both an aim and a strategy. Peace as an issue is concerned with the re-establishment of civil rights, and rights of liberty, in domestic politics, and with an international order built on the foundation of the rule of law, as is laid out in the UN Charter, instead of the "right of the strongest." International politics has to, again, force through demilitarized and peaceful conflict solutions, and foreign occupying troops must be removed. More money is needed for the global fight against poverty, hunger, avoidable illness and environmental protection, and this can only be made available through disarmament. Peace education must contribute to encouraging a humanistic picture of fellow human beings, to replace the templates of the dehumanization of our "enemies." The state and society's outer ability to maintain peace has, as its premise, the inner ability to experience peace.

Erhard Crome

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Pluralism

In contrast to plurality, diversity doesn't mean anything in addition to difference and variety, at least when we take the term at face value. Diversity as a term had a very wide impact and became more positively valued with the emergence and consolidation of the global environmental movement in the last quarter of the 20th century. Biodiversity – the variety of plant and animal species – was threatened by over-exploitation, slash-and-burn agriculture, mass production, and the environmental pollution of every species and of every impervious surface. Parallel to this, there is a substantial economic interest in perceiving existing biodiversity as a reservoir of possible active ingredients for medicines, and as a supplier of genes for breeding alternative plant varieties for agriculture – a perspective, which includes the wish to exploit this reservoir appropriately. In this context, indigenous peoples' traditional knowledge of nature is normally underestimated, as regards geographical areas with a high variety of species.

A contrasting concept of diversity is also making headway in company leaderships, which is now often referred to using the English term, even in companies in which the principle language is German. Not so long ago, these companies looked primarily for young, *white*, male and dynamic employees, but now they're also betting on diversity. This is a recent statement from Hewlett Packard, translated from the original German:

"Here at Hewlett Packard, we're convinced that diversity [sic] – meaning variety in our employee structure – is the main driving power behind creativity, innovation and inventiveness … Diversity is an essential part of our company culture. A must for us as regards an attractive working environment, it also helps us to be successful in the market."

In the light of this kind of development, it's no surprise to hear that *Diversity Management* occupies a central role in the course program for several new masters degrees, and in programs for future "leaders" (again, the English word is used, even when the rest of the discourse is conducted in German) at German and Austrian universities. This is despite the fact that research into the demography of organizations has already concluded that the advantages of *diversity* are not actually clear: "On the one hand, diversity in organizations leads, through the mutual supplementing of abilities and skills, to the creation of new resources, relevant in competitive terms, in the form of creative, innovation and flexibility potentials. On the other hand, it burdens or attenuates existing human resources and organizational resources." (Jans).

Pluralism, like diversity, consists of variety. But while diversity is employed as a term to protect existing natural variety, or to create utilizable variety in technologies or workforces, pluralism as a project is aimed at an affirmative and conscious coexistence of different interests, perspectives and lifestyles. It is only since the enlightenment kick-started the bourgeois' gradual emancipation from the authoritarian hegemony of state and church, that pluralism has gained recognition as the foundation of living together in society. However, the totalitarian dictatorships of the 20th century put a stop to this, and lampooned pluralism for being "anti the people" or as "an enemy of the working class."

In 1960s leftist movements, primarily dominated by students, this way of thinking still resonated at times. This was not helped by the fact that pluralism in the west had deteriorated into becoming a term flung in the anti-totalitarian ideologically fight, devoid of meaning, and disinterested in the actual content of the opinions under question, which were lined up beside each other, and opposing each other, under the umbrella term of pluralism. In contrast to this, it was in the own interest of the new ➞ social movements that began in the immediate aftermath of the students' movement – the women's movement, anti-nuclear movement, environmental movement, lesbian and gay movement, peace movement, and one-world movement – to engage by demanding legitimacy for various models of living, for their political aims, and for their realization, right from the start. In the sense of real pluralism.

As a political project, Attac for example owes a large part of its strength and efficacy to the fact that its members have come together out of very varying intellectual positions and positions, to make something diffuse tangible. They want to show how the neoliberal structuring of globalization is anti-democratic, socially unjust, and ecologically unwarrantable – no one demands of these members that they engage with or agree upon a binding theoretical position to this problematic. Attempts to dogmatically fix this movement to specific theoretical positions or exclusionary, practical forms of action would be entirely counterproductive. Almost as counterproductive as the "whateverism" of opinions to be found among the species of bourgeois pluralism.

Urs Müller-Plantenberg

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Pluralism

Political Education

Historically speaking, the issue of political education and its emancipatory potentials must be seen in the context of the crystallization of new societal and individual self-images in modernity. Justifications for the current ordering of world and society based on the afterlife or on an individual's personal origins had lost their power to convince. This meant groups and individuals had to search for new understandings of the world and of the self that located sociality in this world, not the next one. This task was undertaken using three different routes. Along these three routes, clearly differentiable basic attitudes to politics took shape, which can be grasped as differing concepts of the role of citizens. Of these three self-conceptions, the first can be described as concerning subjects, in a state guaranteeing security, the second as concerning economic citizens, the liberal bourgeois interested in securing private freedom of trade, and the third self-conception as concerning *citoyens* interested in participation, in the republican understanding of self-structured politics.

There are weighty reasons why political education that is interested in emancipatory potentials can profit from working perspectives based on a republican understanding of self-structured politics, including the democratic-theoretical further development of these politics. According to this model, politics is understood as a form of people directing societies themselves. This means that politics can principally be understood "from below" – from the perspective of individuals interested in ➞ participation. Political education built on these foundations takes seriously the subjects who are learning as (future) actors in the context of the people's sovereignty. This intellectual approach demands that happens. This type of political education is not aimed at winning the trust of institutions, but rather on critical interest in participation and structuring of things. As a central field of political learning, it therefore sees the various ➞ publics as the location of self-understanding in society.

A figure of thought that combines the republican political understanding with the basic rules of a universalistic common-sense morality remains essential for political education, which is interested in ➞ emancipation. Even today. According to this figure of thought, only that, which in principle should be conceded to everybody, can the individual concede to themselves. Using this intellectual approach, political education acts as a strong fundament of critique against those economic, societal and political interrelations and ways of thinking that effect exclusion and inequalities. Concurrently, this understanding of politics and education refers to a theory of autonomy and responsibility, in which individual responsibility, and individuals becoming responsible, can only be thought about as a social practice – and not as some kind of individual intellectual sport.

Amidst the challenges of globalization and the transformation crises that accompany them, the significance of this way of understanding politics and political education begins to make its mark. Globalization as an epoch-making transformation can be interpreted as learning process for society, which proceeds, laden with conflicts, and one in which the perspectives of perceiving the self and of perceiving the world must be reorganized. This societal learning process will only be successful if the horizons of self-understanding in society widen to include new, inclusive forms of social morality orientated towards understanding. The most important task of political education orientated around emancipation, today as in the foreseeable future, is to participate consciously and reflectively in this societal learning process. The world economic crisis since 2007, seen as a dramatic concretization of the global, societal transformation crisis, brings the full dimensions of this task to the surface. Unmistakably, this task has thrown open the question of the leading, fundamental rule of social ownership If this is not to be "shareholder value" – the right of equity owners to maximum profits – but should also *not* be a return to the building of communities (or, to use the German-language term, *Vergemeinschaftung*) built on identitarian concepts of "the folk," which is a typical reaction to crisis by the "extremism of the middle" (Lipset) – the question remains: which rule should it be based on? Here, political education will have to defend the central rule of societal self-determination, according to which autonomy for the individual is only thinkable and obtainable when it goes together with autonomy for all humans.

Crises, and the public discourses that accompany them, do not only present challenges to political education, but also offer special opportunities to learn. Crises interrupt the usual run of things, and – through the differentiations between *before and after*, and between *this way or a different one* – provoke people into a consciousness of time, and into a sense that there are alternatives. Circumstances lose their aura of being self-evident and outside of time, and reveal themselves to be the product of human actions and human interests. Whether things are good as they're or not, or what is badly configured in the present set-up, who this benefits and who it harms – all these become ineluctable questions.

Gerd Steffens

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Political Education

Politicization

The concept of politicization connects four operations programmatically, which should make it possible, especially for intellectuals, to carry out a radical critique of relations of authority. *Firstly,* the performative operation, which makes objects that were previously "normal" or "self-evident" into questionable, contested, embattled and therefore mutable things. This also includes the process of bringing something into the public sphere, to which it had hitherto denied entry – cf. Marx' statement, "no admittance, except on business." Implementing this ranges from reaching back to the message Walter Benjamin arrived at with help from Bertold Brecht regarding the "politicization of art," via the 1960s slogans, "the personal is political!" and "the "private is political!," all the way to the practice of forced "coming out." *Secondly,* the connected operation of "activating," instead of the dominant passivity of the concept of "those effected," for example in concepts of autonomous youth education. *Thirdly*, and closely interrelated to the first two, the operation of occupying people's own identities – that had been seen as valueless until this point, or even non-existent – in such a way that the bearers of these identities can become capable of independent action. "Black is beautiful!" or ➞ "Queer nation!" can be recollected as perfect examples of such enterprises. In so doing, a critical concept of ➞ political education is radicalized, just as Theodor Adorno and Ludwig von Friedeburg expressed so pertinently: "Political education can break through the crust of apathy and disinterest, when it manages to relate political processes to the structure of the interests that support them, and when it manages to produce a comprehensible interconnection between the condition of the *Gemeinwesen* (all organizational forms of cooperative human life, beyond the level of the extended family) and the personal issues of individuals."

The concept of politicization, moved forward by the students, and as articulated in the German-language debate of the 1960s by people including Peter Brückner and Alfred Krovoza, worked on a more general problem, present in all societies "in which capitalist modes of production dominate." Actors in society represent their own societal circumstances as the "natural condition" of human social ownership, and perceive these circumstances as lying outside of their own ability to shape them. According to the concept of politicization, addressing these circumstances politically, from the starting point of the effected people's own interests, should suffice in order to break down this "reification." This approach overlooked at first the historical situation, that the facts and circumstances that where actually "politicized" at that time – technological development, and changes in gender relations – were only pertinent to "Fordism" as a particular historical form, and did not question, as such, the more fundamental structure: the authority of the capitalist mode of production.

Bringing the category of politicization up to date for the present age must take much into account. There's a qualitative difference between the technocratic "inherent necessities" of the 1960s, and the "laws of the market" that are wheeled onto the field today to combat criticism. While the former were quite obviously congealed, authoritarian political positions, which it sufficed to "scrutinize" in order to throw open the question about political alternatives, the latter camouflage themselves as pure, objective laws, which it will be insufficient to merely question. It is only when the rationale has been explained for positions connected with a conscious politics of social ownership "from below" – positions, that can withstand the demands of reality, and which are therefore capable of being used to build coalitions and build politics – that the public sphere can be opened up again for political conflicts about how to overcome existing relations of authority.

In light of experiences with the "passive revolutions" (Gramsci) of the 19th and 20th centuries, and, even more clearly, in light of neoliberalism's pacifying counterrevolution since the 1980s, the question must be raised, as to whether the concept of politicization – created in the pioneering phase of the ➞ social movements – should not be supplemented with a concept of "passive politicization," with which processes of politicizing subjugation could be investigated. In order to pursue this, it is sensible to agree with the differentiation made in recent French philosophy (Badiou and Rancière) between the activating "politics" and the pacifying "political." The "return of the state," which could be detected in the crisis from 2007 on, bestows nothing less than strategic significance on being able to make this differentiation concrete.

Frieder Otto Wolf

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Politics of Alliances

The inability of neoliberal politics to solve society's main problems has revealed itself in capitalism's current crisis. From the middle of this crisis, the Left has not yet managed to force through an alternative agenda, despite massive demonstrations, general strikes in Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal, and the ➞ Occupy movement in the centers of financial market capitalism, backed by global activism.

It is precisely because of this, that the development of new alliances to force through an alternative developmental path has become one of the Left's central tasks. To do this however, the Left needs to rediscover itself. It requires a new quality of societal and political alliances, in which the most diverse societal actors combine to form a broad, yet uncreated ➞ Mosaic Left. This would be positioned against a number of tendencies, including the dismantling of the welfare state, processes of social and political exclusion, the de-democratization of society, armed solutions to world conflicts, and ignorance about the climate catastrophe that threatens us.

Left-wing alliances do not come about all by themselves. They are not harmonious, but rather the result of political negotiation processes concerning interests, some of which are the same, some different, and some in opposition to each other. Alliances have to be developed through a shared discourse about alternative models of society, *and* through shared practices of resistance and alternative ways of life. They require strategies that have been worked through, and are based on sharing values and aims in relation to societal development, that build on individual and collective identities, interests and cultures. Alliances always remain alliances made up of various actors. These differ from one another in terms of their social situation, ways of seeing society and its history, and in their ways at looking at global processes and developments. The same class situation can be reflected upon in differing ways, and can be linked up to multiple strategies and forms of struggle. That's why alliances have to generalize different interests to such a degree, that differences that do exist can be respected, and considered in the drafting of alternative projects. Alliances are attractive because of the chances they offer to participate in many-sided practices of resistance, and in the alternative projects that radical realpolitik is made up of.

How alliances function is a political question. Leftist alliances set standards of relationships between equals, which should live from the individual freedom to think differently, and in which nobody can be manipulated.

The array of actors, and the value given to diversity and political equality, are the biggest potential they possess. To this must be added the essential features of open access and spaces, a consensual procedure for balancing out interests, binding agreements, and a solidaristic approach to dealing with different resources including knowledge, organizational strength, money etc. So that alliances retain their ability to act, and can determine themselves the limits of their inner diversity amid political altercations with competitors and components, an agreement concerning a minimum consensus is needed. This deals with aims, methods and forms of shared action, without imposing limits on the sovereignty of the actors regarding other questions.

This demands regulations that are equally binding and comprehensible, for everyone. Working out these regulations is just as much a part of the work of alliances as coordination and organization of activities. The more an alliance is aimed at permanently developing and retaining power – pulling it into the game of hegemonic power in society – the stronger the tendency it has to institutionalization. With this, the danger grows that structural hierarchies are constructed inside alliances. That's why transparency regarding the division of labor and decision-making – coupled with a solidaristic manner of resource management – are indispensable conditions for the work of alliances.

The assorted forms of logic for action and possibilities for action can both constitute – and prevent – cooperation. The same is true for the internal logical of the fields of action of the miscellany of actors in alliances. Parties, trade unions, NGOs and ➞ social movements all have sundry possibilities for changing things, which can either be used to mutually complement the potential of others in alliances – or which can also get in each other’s way. That's why it's helpful to know the concrete worries and problems of the other partners in the alliance, the context of interests and conflicts out of which they operate, and the approaches to solutions they have on offer. Alliances are a key medium of politics. They are controversial, essential and heterogeneous. They exist in local and global forms, with stances on fundamental questions and on current problems, in the construction of new political currents, formations and organizations. They are the location where politics is created and proves itself – but also where it fails.

Cornelia Hildebrandt

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Politics of Alliances

Politics of Scale

The term *scale* was originally rooted in the disciplines of geography and cartography. It was primarily used there to solve the question of how to coordinate measurements of observation and of process. Based on multiple societal restructurings since the 1970s, and the spatial reorganization of politics and economics, the question of the geographical scale of *social processes* was taken up by Anglo-American *radical geography.* This is a perspective that understands globalization as the inequable reorganization of capitalist societies, which conform in terms of space and scale to authority.

The following, central assumption shapes this perspective: geographical layers of measurement like the city, the region, the nation-state or the world market are not preexisting and static units, but are rather the roots put down by social processes in time and space, which are however permanently being reproduced and transformed by society. The significance of these units only emerges in relation to other layers of measurement. The production, reorganization and abolition of layers of measurement is a contested terrain, across which the relations of forces in society push and pull. When for example Margaret Thatcher's conservative British government managed to abolish the Labour Party dominated *Greater London Council* in the 1980s, it was able to abolish with it an important layer of measurement in the organization of oppositional politics. This demonstratively weakened the Left, while the central government increased its influence over the development of London as a metropolitan region. More recent examples of *politics of scale* that conform to authority are the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995, or the tightening of the European Stability and Growth Pact in 2011. Both symbolize efforts to consolidate neoliberal principles at the international and supranational level. These are mechanisms that deprive important questions of their democratic negotiability at different spatial levels, in this case the structuring of trade relations and of budgetary politics.

The societal significance of spatial levels – like that of "the global" or "the local" for example – does not solidify out of the levels themselves, but rather out of political disputes and the concrete activities of actors in the context of historically specific, social relations of forces. Seen in this way, *politics of scale* not only stabilize relations of authority, but also contest and transform them. This has been evident since the uprising of the Zapatistas in Mexico and the advent of the global ➞ social movements. The strategies and constellations that are used to do this are manifold. Institutional focal points of social protests on a global level play an important role here. In this context, the ➞ World Social Forum was and remains important, but also the numerous networks dedicated to specific themes, including alternative global water fora, coalitions for ➞ climate justice (like "Climate Justice Action") or for ➞ food sovereignty (like "Via Campesina"), or international networks for the right to housing, all locations in which concrete alternative agendas are developed. Many local struggles also draw their dynamics from an understanding about global developments and global dispute, including local campaigns against the privatization of public services. It is also important to name the (symbolical) internationalization of local or regional conflicts in this context. These include, for example, international campaigns to support local labor struggles, as seen in the Mexican maquiladora industry, and particular elements in the Mexican Zapatista struggle in the 1990s: the "Declaration of the Lacandona Jungle" to the world's public, and the invitation to social movements form all parts of the world to a congress in Chiapas.

The definitive feature of this altered spatial scale of emancipatory politics is that political articulation is not simply shifted to the global scale. Rather, political articulation is structured in a "multi-scalable" or "global" way, and draws its strength from this simultaneity of global and local action. The "rescaling" of ➞ protest can not only contribute to realigning relations of forces at a local and national level, and for example, to making the repression of social movements more difficult, through the creation of a global public. Moreover, out of the rescaling process surface possibilities to share experiences, which can gift important impulses for the local practice.

*Bettina Köhler and Markus Wiss*en

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Polyamory

The nuclear family is the place where, faced with the exigencies of neoliberal everyday life, "a partnership-based type of solidarity is practiced that is nothing other than love at a normal temperature." This opinion, uttered by a former minister in the German CDU party, Norbert Blüm, is shared by many around the globe. Heterosexual and monogamous relationships continue to be the dominant form of life. It's the model in the heads of the large majority of young people regarding their personal future, according to research by Haug and Gschwandtner. Yet this model increasingly fails. In Germany for example, there are 50 divorces per year for every 100 marriages. In recent years, stepfamilies have arrived to give nuclear families company, just as serial monogamy has arrived to join faithfulness unto death. Yet since the 1990s, parallel to the expansion of the internet, the polyamory movement has spread from the USA. This doesn't seek to replace the various forms of monogamy, but does call into question the status of the nuclear family.
The term, constructed back in the 1960s, joins the Greek poly (several) with the Latin word amor (love), to form a new hybrid. But it's only since Jennifer Wesp founded the alt.polyamory newsgroup online in 1992, that the establishment of this term came to mean ➞ a specific form of life. Here, more than two individuals enter into a relationship characterized by the fact that all participants relate to each other in an open, honest and considerate way. Naturally, there had been many people before this period, who had had trusting love relationships with several people based on principles of honesty and openness. The anarchist Emma Goldman is often named in this context, as is the sociologist, Simone de Beauvoir, and the philosopher, Paul Sartre. Yet it is only as a movement that "poly-contexts" can question monogamy as the only form of life possible in society.

The most important difference to polyandry, through which a woman has several husbands, and polygyny, through which a man is married to several wives, concern the fact that polyamory does not conceive of its form of life as necessarily a hegemonic form of life. Rather, polyamory see itself as part of a society, in which a pluralization of forms of life is taking place. The participants' freedom of choice – for example to be able to leave the relationship at any time or to decide to take on an additional relationship – remains unaffected in a poly relationship, in contrast to polyandry, polygyny and monogamy. It is distinct from what people connect with the term "free love" in an everyday sense, because of the norms that sprang up around that concept in the late 1960s. Today, it's associated with questioning existing sexual morality, and contravening it in an often inflexible manner. ("If you sleep twice with the same woman, you're already part of the establishment," was a catchphrase in Germany at that time.) In contrast, polyamorists today foreground emotional affection between people. Fundamentally, the polyamory movement extends the spirit of romanticism, by establishing romantic love as the foundation for living together. With the difference being that now not just two but several people can live together in wholly different constellations. The diversity of forms the various relationships take on is a barrier to defining exactly what a poly relationship is. Ultimately, each of these relationships is unique. Yet the principles of personal autonomy, transparency and honesty, the search for consensus, and responsible interaction with each other, are used as guidelines. These guidelines, coupled with a readiness to deal with issues and conflicts arising from them, necessitate ➞ deceleration in everyday life, and constitute an alternative to the competition-based nature of our society. Thus, these relationships can offer a protected space, which the nuclear family is often no longer able to guarantee.
There have been alternatives to the dominant forms of life in various epochs. They often gave expression to the fact that these dominant forms were beset with crisis. Often, they were propagated and practiced by people who developed alternatives to the hegemonic structures in each of these epochs. Relationships that would be labeled polyamorous today existed inside contexts, which could offer their members (temporary) stability. Like the Bloomsbury Group for example, to which Virginia Woolf, Bertrand Russell and John Maynard Keynes belonged to at the start of the 20th century. A myriad of constellations in relationships existed inside this group, and the strength, which each individual drew from this, certainly contributed to their creativity. Thus, polyamorous relationships can lead to an enrichment in the participants' inner lives, who can mine strength from them for their engagement with social politics.

Thomas Schroedter

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Post-Autonomy

The concept of post-autonomy refers to continuities but also to breaches in the recent history of the radical Left, and is used primarily to characterize some of that Left's currents and action forms. Post-autonomous politics is different in several points to classic autonomist practice as developed in Italy in the 1970s, and as it reached its peak, in an altered form, in West Germany in the 1980s.

It is not a direct successor to the classical autonomist movement, Italian ➞ workerism and the 1977 movement, but it does orientate itself around some of the same essential characteristics. In the framework of workerism, the concept of autonomy refers to workers being active for their own motivations. This can be understood as "autonomy of the class" in opposition to capital, and as autonomy in opposition to the "deputies," namely, party and trade union. The theory and practice of workerism orientated themselves around the subject of the mass laborer, i.e. the male factory worker on the assembly line. Consequently, the factory was seen as the central location of struggle, but rent strikes, house occupations and squats were also organized in workers' districts.

➞ Wildcat strikes, with workerist group participation, also took place in West Germany at the start of the 1970s. In a similar vein to events in Italy, the location of struggle shifted to city districts. Here, in West Germany, a different vision of autonomy developed: self-determined living in the here and now. The struggle against factory work was set against the withdrawal from wage labor, and the "politics of the first person" emerged. This means that the activists primarily took themselves as starting points, attempted to shape their surroundings according to their own utopias, and wanted to escape societal and capitalist coercions, for example by founding collectives. By this stage, the movement had little in common with the workerist groups in the factories and plants. Some parts of the autonomists also made up the militant wings of various ➞ social movements, but when these collapsed, they withdrew with increasing intensity into the spaces of their respective subcultures. The increasing precarization of the working world, the falling away of lots of niches in society, criminalization, and, equally important, the incorporation of ever greater sections of the population into the neoliberal project, reinforced the autonomist movement's loss of significance. "Post-autonomous" is used as a battle cry by that part of the radical Left, which is actively attempting to move out of societal marginalization and which wants to escalate societal struggles. A prominent feature of this group is its critique of the "politics of the first person," and a renewed and stronger link to the creation of ➞ (post)-workerist theories. The Interventionist Left (IL) and migration politics groups are two of the main locations in which post-autonomists are to be found. Both of these refer to the critique of globalization movement and their protests, during which the "other world" – the desired world of alternatives – already appears. Inspired by the Zapatista movement, and by the book "Empire" by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, the focus is not on taking state power at any particular point in time, but rather on building local and international counter-power or counter-hegemony, which aims at abolishing all relations of authority. In this, the discourse locks back into classic autonomous politics. Post-autonomy differentiates itself from its predecessor however, by attaching more weight to practical cooperation with other actors like parties, trade unions and NGOs. The protests against the G8-summit in July 2007, in Heiligendamm, Germany, or the mass blockades to stop Nazi marches in Dresden, both demonstrate that an orientation towards a ➞ politics of alliances and cooperative mobilization can make the radical Left easier to perceive – even though this tendency remains controversial within the radical Left. As early as the beginning of the 1990s, a debate developed amongst autonomists about a lack of binding engagement and about internal, informal (power) structures. In order to redress and address both issues, the emphasis has been put on groups, networks and organization processes that are now more fixed, and that can be communicated with by those outside them.

What is more, post-autonomous politics is characterized by the development of new, subversive action forms, which have emerged without autonomists rejecting their trademark practice of militancy and confrontation. Individual groupings like Tute Bianche, Pink Silver and "Parades of Precarians" at May Day marches, but also collective ➞ civil disobedience like "Block G8," "Nazi Free Dresden," or collective self-empowerment processes like *Castor? schottern!* (which targeted nuclear waste transports to the nuclear waste repository at Gorleben, Germany), all represent a creative further development of autonomous practice, which differentiates itself substantially from the classical scheme of a partly patriarchal ➞ militancy.

Fabian Rehm and Anne Tittor

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Post-Autonomy

Postcolonialism

While the first significant postcolonial publications date from the 1970s, and the debates about decolonization and neocolonialism (Kwame Nkrumah) already reached a head in the political arena in the 1950s and 1960s, it has only been in recent years that postcolonial theory has been seriously discussed in German-language discourse. And although the first writings were the products of literature theorists, including Edward Said, Homi Bhabha and Gayatri C. Spivak, these quickly became an important perspective inside the movements with a critical approach towards globalization, ➞ human rights and neoliberalism. Beyond that, critical research into migration and political anti-racism have drawn an important stimulus from postcolonial theory.

The fundamental experiences of colonial conquest, subjugation and rule of around eighty-five percent of the earth's territory can neither be simply explained, nor can it have failed to bequeath consequences for the global South and the global North. Deploying key concepts and methodologies from post-structuralism, ➞ Marxism and ➞ feminism, theorists formulated a far-reaching critique of the western production of knowledge, which could be proven by the continuity of Eurocentric violence. An analysis of hegemonic representational politics and an investigation into racist discourses also allowed a challenge to be made to the enlightenment project. These paths enabled participants to make plain the continuity of colonialism, and to bring back the continuing international division of labor into the political debate about social justice. At a later stage, feminist postcolonial interventions illustrated the centrality of questions about gender and sexuality, both during the period of colonial, authoritarian regimes, and in contemporary, postcolonial spaces.

As Shalini Runderia has stressed, investigating the legacy of colonialism always means studying the complex mesh of "entangled histories," as the writing of a history of the west without a writing of the history of the colonized countries is unthinkable, and vice versa. Seen in this frame, the rise of postcolonial studies ties up, on the one hand, with the history of decolonization, and the accompanying challenge this presents to racist and hegemonic discourses about culture, language and class, as announced by activists in anti-colonial struggles, like Frantz Fanon. On the other hand, it ties up with the revolutionizing of western intellectual traditions, which has been accompanied by central concepts like "power," "subjectivity" and "resistance." Both of these moments join to compose a dynamic unity, which permits a shifting of perspectives on global structures of power and authority. According to Robert Young, this is why postcolonial theory has facilitated a radically new conceptualization of the interrelations between nation, culture and ethnicity, which was and is of far-reaching political consequence. In taking aboard the historical, political and social interpenetrations, both North-South and South-North, postcolonial theory counts the situation of postcolonial migrants and the analysis of their struggles in the west as one of its most important fields of intervention.

As observed critically by Aijaz Ahmad and others, postcolonialism often attends exclusively to the politics of representation, and analyzes the symbolism of terms, while blending out direct violence and economic conditions of production. In contrast to this, not only does Gayatri Spivak illuminate the imperialistic continuities and current forms of the international division of labor in her writings, but also articulates a fundamental critique of imperialistic feminism, and of the "morally outraged activists" of the global North. As Nikita Dhawan asserts, decolonization processes need more than philanthropy steered by crises, and over-excited human rights interventions.

Postcolonial as critical intervention has expedited new insights into European development politics, and has differentially analyzed and disputed the structures of a capitalist and patriarchal form of exploitation, which colonialism had established in the name of modernization (see here the work of Ila Kickapoo). That solidarity is not obtainable without a self-critical engagement with the colonial path one of many political insights this work opens u What seems even more important is to reformulate the project of decolonization in the sense of "provincialism Europe" (Dipesh Chakrabarty).

María do Mar Castro Varela

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Post-Development

After the end of the Second World War and during decolonization, colonial racism, which had divided the world's population into "civilized peoples" and "uncivilized savages," was widely discredited. Its place was taken by the division into "developed" and "underdeveloped" societies. This propagated "equality among peoples" while maintaining that some were more equal than others, in the sense of being economically more advanced. "Development" as a guiding principle implied that all human societies stride forward on an evolutionary scale, and that industrial societies stand at this scale's summit. Those societies that had "remained behind" on this scale could also become "developed" through modernization, industrialization, investment, economic growth and development aid. In the 1990s, the so-called post-development approaches contended, amongst other voices of development theory, that this conception was not only thoroughly Eurocentric, but that it was also obsolete. The era of "development" was over, and it was about time to look for alternatives.

This thesis was founded on four arguments. Firstly, the ecological problematic had demonstrated that the industrialized countries should in no sense be seen as role models that should be caught up with, but rather as wrong tracks, which could not be generalized about. Secondly, the idea of "development" had been used as an ideological promise during the Cold War conflict between East and West, and had thus become superfluous after the Cold War ended. Thirdly, the idea of "catching up" had been proven illusory: the material chasm between "developed" and "less developed" countries has not become smaller, but continues to grow. Fourthly, development as a guiding principle does not respect the cultural diversity found in forms of human, cooperative life: instead, its objective is to westernize the world. This is why the failure of ideas and practices of "development" is something to be welcomed.

After the collapse of the project of development, new societal structures, combining traditional and modern elements, crystallize out of the practices of ➞ social movements and communities. These alternatives to development are stamped by the reappropriation of knowledge in the face of modern science (e.g. traditional curative methods), the reappropriation of politics in opposition to the state (e.g. direct-democratic decision processes and ➞ participatory budgeting), and the reappropriation of the economy in opposition to the formal, free market economy (through the informal sector, subsistence economy, or ➞ solidaristic practices). Autonomy and cultural identity play an important role in questioning the superiority of western industrial society, which also casts doubts on attempts to emulate it. However, it is also possible to distinguish between neo-populistic and skeptical post-development approaches. While the first often idealizes traditional communities and has promulgated a return to a subsistence economy until now, the latter is critical towards cultural traditions, which often contain reactionary and patriarchal elements. Moreover, the skeptical does not want to draft universal models of society.

The concept of ➞ Sumac Kawsay, which has been much discussed during the last two decades in South America, particularly in Bolivia and Ecuador, can be seen as a manifestation of post-development ideas. It refuses the western perspective about "development" and with it the linked concepts of growth and material wealth.

Post-development draws attention to the contingency of "development" as a guiding principle, and to its position in history. As a critical tool, it makes it possible to address the relations of power that are interwoven with development as a postulate, and to look for new, alternative guiding principles. Not only does post-development question the practice still common today of using quantities of goods produced and consumed as the indicator for a good society, a practice that sidelines other potential indicators, like self-determination, dignity, or the absence of racism. Moreover, the skeptical strand of post-development problematizes, in utterly general terms, comparing societies using universal measures. Although North-South relationships have been increasingly structured since the beginning of the 21st century under the guiding principles of "crisis prevention," "global market integration," and "global governance," many Eurocentric assumptions about the superiority of western societies are nevertheless still present. In front of this backdrop, post-development can be seen to be a meaningful tool in the search for alternatives to industrial capitalism – in the South as in the North.

Aram Ziai

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Post-extractivism

The term post-extractivism is used in South America to draw together alternatives to an over-dependence on what is known as the extractive sector of the economy. This is the label used for the mining of minerals and fossil fuels, with the aim of exporting these raw materials in large quantities. A practice which has negative social, economic and ecological consequences, including the destruction of indigenous communities, the loss of regionally appropriate forms of production, environmental destruction and pollution, and a spike in violence and criminality.

Classical extractivism is anchored primarily in the activity of transnational corporations, with states merely playing a subordinate role. New, progressive extractivism, in contrast, proposes a more active role for the state – either directly, in the form of state enterprises, or indirectly, through state subsidies for the sector. South America's new and recent progressive governments have therefore been defending this form of extractivism as necessary for "development" (see also ➞ post-development), and particularly in order to finance their programs to fight poverty.

However, all possible current forms of extractivism develop destructive dimensions, and must be urgently decelerated. Such efforts should not be condemned to the inefficacy of isolation, but must be integrated into more extensive programs for a real development alternative: post-extractivism.

The transition should at first move towards "sensible extractivism." This concept envisages first holding up the worst destructive tendencies, and reversing these were possible, in order to improve life quality for local populations. It is important to strengthen both the ➞ participation of ➞ civil society and democratic discussions at this stage, so that the conditions for alternative developmental paths can be created.

Proposals include policies of price adjustment, in order to internalize the ecological and social consequences of mining raw materials inside the raw materials' market values. Parallel to this, norms of social and environmental politics should be implemented as effectively as possible in every country. Often, raw material mining only happens in the first place because corporations do not adhere to national laws. The human rights violations and environmental destruction that accompany this disregard for the law are often completely unacceptable, as is the case with oil extraction in the Amazon region. The absurd subsidies, which the state uses to provide extractivism with cheap energy, infrastructure and transport possibilities, must be abolished. It would be more legitimate to use these resources to subsidize economic sectors that could replace the extractive sector. If and when raw material exports dip dramatically, incomes and investments measured in financial terms also decrease. But there are net savings effects simultaneously, as money can be saved from those budgets that were previously deployed to balance out the negative social and economic consequences of extractivism. This path would force a reappraisal of public finances. On top of this, an appropriate and additional tax burden imposed on continuing extractive activity is needed. To a speed and extent relative to the speed with which extractivism is ended, a diversification of production has to be pushed forward. Particularly important is a re-orientation in the direction of agricultural ecology. This would create employment, lower the use of energy and chemicals in farming, and safeguard life quality, in the area of nutrition.

Post-extractivistic structural changes are only possible when and if several countries work together in a coordinated effort. This is the only way to stop processes of price and wage dumping between neighboring states, to maintain shared prices and social and environmental standards that are at least similar, and to build up production chains, which facilitate an ecological alternative. Post-extractivism is an appeal to bioregions of a similar size to continents, which would enable production on the basis of different ecological conditions. Concentrating on regions allows a selective disengagement from globalization and a recovering of autonomy in the face of world markets.

These changes point in the direction of a radical alternative. The aim of this would be only to exploit or utilize as much natural resources are needed to guarantee the life quality of people, while respecting the rights of nature. Seen from this perspective, nature’s rights would not remain inviolate forever, but would only be exploited when this became unavoidable. Long-term objectives are abstemious societies with dematerialized economies, which should stagnate if possible, and orientate themselves around people's life quality, community-based life, and protecting nature.

Eduardo Gudynas

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Post-Extractivism

Post-neoliberalism

The term post-neoliberalism originated in the South American context in the face of resistance against the neoliberal model that had been implemented there becoming ever more visible. Particularly in the wake of Lula de Silva taking office in Brazil in January 2001, the term embodied the hope for a kind of politics that would clearly break with the neoliberal direction followed in the 1990s, and that would solve central problems like economic instability, inequable land distribution, social polarization and poverty in a *post*-neoliberal fashion. When the politics that followed on from anti-neoliberal rhetoric failed, in essential aspects, to bring about this desired transition, not only in Brazil but also in other countries including Argentina, a widening of the meaning of the term followed in this trail. Today, post-neoliberalism serves, on the one hand, as an analytical perspective to describe the breaks with neoliberalism, which have occurred in varying strengths and on different levels, in the sense of projects, strategies and practices. On the other hand, post-neoliberalism functions as a normative directionality, and as a way of orientating objectives.

The critical potential of the term post-neoliberalism is not immediately evident, as neoliberalism's restructuring processes, involving the World Bank, the UN Development Program and other – neoliberalism with a human face – also make use of the term. Alongside breaks, the term is also used to observe and map continuities.

Used in an emancipatory way however, post-neoliberalism could be used as catch-all phrase to open up new perspectives on manifold processes of searching for alternatives. In this sense, post-neoliberal practices, strategies, and their cohesion into projects in smaller-scale spaces can be called "post-neoliberalism" when taken as a whole. All these approaches – ranging from individual government programs to local initiatives, from an improved mastery of everyday life to more comprehensive approaches including a ➞ "socialism for the 21st century" – have in common a break with aspects of neoliberalism, and the development of concrete alternatives. That said, the multifaceted nature of neoliberalism, both conceptionally and in terms of the consequences people experience, means that the points of connection, objectives and ranges of post-*neoliberalisms* are just as diverse. In this, post-*neoliberalism* as a perspective and a category does not mean people engaged restricting themselves to neoliberalism as the cause of contradictions per se, but also includes other more far-reaching positions, with anti-capitalist standpoints numbered amongst these.

Post-neoliberal practices, strategies and projects can be designed to be transformative of systems in their intentions. Ultimately, because they only seize upon small fragments cut out from neoliberalism or capitalism as problems, they can only be implemented in a spatially limited way, or face a too strong opponent, who can incorporate them into the neoliberal model in a way that stabilizes systems. One frequently important element of post-neoliberalism is the creation of alternative forms of material reproduction, which aim at extracting themselves from the coercions of capitalist utilization. Furthermore, a decisive moment is the relationship with and way of dealing with the state, institutional politics, and traditional forms of representation. Here, positions shift in a contested field. At one extreme stands utter rejection of traditional organizational forms, and the establishment of alternative and autonomous political and organizational forms. At the other end of this site of contestation, stands a positive relationship with parties and the state, which is perceived as essential terrain for conflict and for compromises, aimed at achieving societal restructuring.

The multifarious and multilayered term post-neoliberalism embodies strengths and weaknesses. As a term which should facilitate new perspectives, it is not interested in a large, unitary alternative project to neoliberalism, but rather conceives of social transition as an open and contradictory process of deconstruction, which has to address issues at specific points of time and locations: movements against privatization or the destruction of natural livelihoods; struggles for autonomy or political and ➞ social rights; building up forms of ➞ solidaristic economy worldwide. In the sense of a "post-neoliberalism still under construction," it is beneficial that this draws new processes into people's field of vision: defensive struggles against further progress by neoliberalism *itself,* and against these struggles being absorbed into restructuring measures; and constructive aspects, including concrete, often molecular post-neoliberal practices. It is precisely the rather worn-out examples, i.e. the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico, or the movement of the landless in Brazil, or the unemployed, the Piqueteros, in Argentina, which all show how important synergy is, particularly in the creation of autonomous, political and social spaces.

Nicola Sekler

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Post-neoliberalism

Post-workerism

As the rather awkward prefix "post" suggests, the term post-workerism exists in an ambivalent relationship with its predecessor ➞ workerism. In one sense, it inherits workerism's basic intention, namely, to comprehend social relations from the starting point of the struggles and movements of the many. Yet in other sense, the two terms are separated by historical caesuras, the state crushing the autonomous social movements in Italy at the end of the 1970s being the foremost among them.

Post-workerism is one of ➞ Marxism's heirs, but is no longer Marxism: reflections on the end of the era of the centrality of large factories is very significant for the independence of post-workerist theory construction. The processes attached to the globalization of the economy, which are accompanied by the decentralization of production and the disintegration of nation-state sovereignty demand a change of perspective and a different way of thinking about emancipation. The key figure of a (possible) postmodern communism is no longer the workerist "mass worker" – it's no accident that this actor is generally referred to in the masculine form, particularly in German-language discourse on the subject. The key figure has now become the ➞ multitude, who are also productive outside of wage labor. The multitude's strengths are diversity and communication, not unity and discipline.

The topicality and intellectual wealth of post-workerism stem from the necessity of analyzing changing from the perspective of contemporary ➞ social movements and struggles. The interrelation with capital is also something that is reproduced by people. It's certainly not the least important thing they reproduce, and it's therefore only these same people that can "stop making capitalism" (John Holloway). Post-workerism is political but is not a political movement, but rather a way of looking at the development of societal relationships. Seen from this viewpoint, the key to surmounting capitalist relations is forged in the self-organization of social struggles. Inside this conceptual model, the "constituting republic" (Negri) of the ➞ multitude forms the horizon of a possible future communism, not the transformation of society through taking state power.

Post-workerism is not a concept of class, but does take "the composition of classes" and ➞ class struggles as its starting points. The multitude is created during and out of struggles and resistance in all areas of life in society. It never exists in a pure form, but is rather put together in a myriad of ways. The "technical composition" of class (multitude), meaning the way class regroups itself through the capitalist organization of work and life and the application of new technologies, defers, in turn, to the change in the societal division of labor in post-Fordist capitalism.

Post-workerism is not a movement, but continues to move. "Empire" by Hardt and Negri became a bestseller during the same period in which the global ➞ protest movement became more visible. Within this complex of historical processes and issues, the process of precarization merits special attention. Post-workerist approaches play an important role in the movements of the precariat, particularly in EuroMayDay (started by Catalonian, French and Italian activists in 2001); and in the theory and practice of the ➞ autonomy of migration; and in the struggles of culture workers. The revolts of the last years and months confirm the emergence of new forms of *constituting power*, the multitude organizing themselves. During the Austrian *unibrennt* movement in 2009, which translates literally as "university is burning," journalists had to first get use to the movements structures not permitting the establishment of speakers, who could be represented in the media. In a similar manner, the search for charismatic figures leading the Arab Spring was largely in vein, while the organizational forms of the *Indignados* and the ➞ Occupy movements also reflected non-hierarchic communication and decision-making structures. The fact that most of these politics take place under the label of ➞ "radical democracy" should not disguise the fact that this contradicts the organization of bourgeois society and of capitalism, meaning that they also constitute experiments in ➞ communistic organization. Communistic, not in the sense of political ambitions directed towards state and party power, but rather as a collective reappropriation of the communes, and the construction of a new, post-capitalist *common wealth*, as an answer from below to the existential crisis of capitalism. Post-workerism is optimistic, without being naive. Productive forces in post-Fordist capitalism have reached the level that make social ownership in the here and now possible, beyond capitalist exploitation and economic scarcity. Yet it can only be the crowd's decision "no longer to stomach" these conditions that would cast capitalism into the oblivion of "pre-history." Once and for all.

Martin Birkner and Robert Foltin

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Post-workerism

Protest

Both within and outside of ➞ social movements, we are familiar with a plurality of actions that are at least represented as being protest actions. Sabotage-as-protest, protest letters, protest blockades, protest voters, online protests and self-immolation, burning oneself to death, are all communicated as forms of protest. Faced with this spectrum of protest activities, it will hardly be possible to move beyond a minimum definition: "protest" is the term used to describe those public expressions of opinion, both verbal and non-verbal, which not only criticize a particular situation from the standpoint of what at least feels like a minority position, but also wish to exert influence through their critique. They can be defensive or attacking, individual or collective, legal or illegal, and magnified by the media or ignored by them. In short, they can take on a countless number of forms.

But this bloodless definition does not explain why protest plays such a central role in social movements' repertoire of activities. The important question is not what it *is*, but rather what it *does*, which effects it can unfold. Protest is not merely expressing opinions. It is a political practice, because it wants to change something at the macro-level (e.g. changing laws, or making political ➞ revolutions), or at the micro-level (everyday life and the ➞ culture of everyday life, for example changes in how sexual and gender identities are performed. And although protest in bourgeois-democratic societies are a relatively accepted form of expressing opinions, protest achieves the changes it aims at usually from a position established institutional channels.

And it's precisely in that nature that the fascination of protest lies. Our understanding of the concept is shaped markedly by the developments in the sixties and seventies. On the one hand, the constant expansion of the Fordist welfare state generated fear that "the system" was starting to swallow "the lifeworld." Parallel to this, the social movements – feminism, national liberation movements, the lesbian and gay movement, and workers' struggles – triggered dynamic processes of change and emancipation. From these emerged the thought that in the lifeworld type of spontaneity of the protests, a spring of genuine societal "progress" was buried: the spring of *the new*. From within the apparently eternal reproduction of the same, protest de-normalizes and questions that which is normalized and unquestioned. It creates spaces in which the un-discussable gets discussed, and publicizes what the public sphere attempts, with all its might, to ban. By producing what we can call "the societal New," which it does by forcing established power structures to adjust to this New, and, in turn, attempting to fence in this New and make it productive, protest acquires a position, which is sometimes described as "the supremacy of resistance" or *Primat des Widerstands*, to give it its German epithet.

Defensive protests also bring novelty into the world. The anti-nuclear power protests in the Wendland, Germany, which were at first *conservative* in the literal sense of the world, provided the basis for the ➞ energy transformation politics that the German Federal Government embraced decades later, is, however insufficient these politics may be, a perfect example for novelty born from defensive protest. Further examples of novelty emerging are the anti-globalization protests of the Zapatista Liberation Army in Mexico, which provided the starting gun for an impressive series of global struggles; and the riots, in which mainly gay men participated, following a police raid at the Stonewall Inn in New York, 1969, which lit the beacon for a movement demanding a more open way of dealing with sexuality.

Protest is made up of new developments combined with a decent portion of repetition. Whether May Day, the pacifist Easter marches, or the activities of the Mothers of The Plaza de Mayo in Argentina: protests often ritualize and routinize themselves. However, even this apparent ossification – the protest no longer produces the new, but *re*produces, primarily the political identities of the protesters, causing it to appear open and inclusive no longer, but rather isolating and exclusive – may generate positive effects. In behaving in this way, the protest reproduces the often precarious, antagonistic political subjectivities of the people involved in the struggle. The impression of novelty is often undermined by the fact that new protest forms frequently make use of the language, symbols and practices of the older movements. Marx writes about this in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*: "precisely in … epochs of revolutionary crisis they [the living] anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes, in order to present this new scene in world history in time-honored disguise and borrowed language." An example of this are the protest practices of the ➞ Occupy movement. While Occupy's general assemblies have replicated feminist, anarchistic and critique of globalization movements in their cultural and political codes, they're nevertheless performing – or so we hope – a new scene in world history.

Tadzio Müller and Ben Trott

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Protest

Provision-orientated Economics

The concept of provision-orientated economics stresses the structural significance of economic sectors that provide basic provision. Economic activity, understood as a unity of market economy and provision economy, is embedded in human social life, and interwoven with nature. This is economic activity, seen in its socioecological context, diverse and multi-dimensional, possessing physical-substantial and social dimensions *prior* to its monetary aspect. Looking at the "whole of economic activity" results from assuming the lifeworld perspective. Critically and analytically, this change of perspective underlines the mono-dimensionality of dominant economic relations: these reduce economy to market processes, and define it in purely monetary terms. Unpaid care work, and other unpaid, nurturing labor are, alongside the achievements of the non-human part of nature, are classified as the non-economy, as worthless, as "re-productive." The concept of provision-orientated economics criticizes these separations between the market and the provision economy, between human budgets and "budgets of nature," and between productive and "reproductive" economic processes, including the gender-hierarchical structures that are inscribed into the latter split. Instead, provision-orientated economics emphasizes the productivity of the "reproductive," as it does the unity of production and reproduction, and demands a conscious designing of these two parts inside one system. Three principles guide the theoretical formulation and the practical shaping of a provision-orientated mode of economic activity: providing in advance (instead of acting after the event), cooperation (instead of competition), and alignment towards what is needed for a Good Life (instead of alignment around growth rates).

At the core of its principle of action, is the concept of caring for ourselves and for others, including for future generations, and for non-human nature. This emphasis on caring and provision expresses a way of looking around us, in front of us, and behind us, in socioecological, spatial and temporal terms. Conservation and non-participation (in particular economic activity) should be seen as effective ways of being active. Provision takes the needs of all participants into account, and integrates asymmetrical relations in the economy. Moreover, it is a moral attitude, and forms the basis on which the market's principle of maximization is going to change. Experiences in the care economy demonstrate that humans cooperate with each other and with the non-human part of nature in order to structure "good lives" for themselves, when they're equipped with the abilities and resources to do so. This cooperation is orientated around processes and the future, and progresses through mutual understanding. The welfare concept of provision-orientated economic activity is multi-faceted, and transverses many dimensions. In its principle of action focused on what is needed for a good life, the latter quantity is not defined in exclusively monetary terms, but is rather determined through societal discourses. This is about evaluating needs and the ways that these can be satisfied.

These principles of action are directed towards humans who do not follow exclusively personal interests, but who are capable of taking on a global perspective, and of empathy with others. Just as is the case in the ➞ solidarity economy, provision-orientated economic activity departs from seeing the human as an isolated "homo oeconomicus" focused on competition – and, in doing so, also departs from understanding rationality as meaning the maximization of profit and utility. On the contrary: in provision-orientated economics, it is husbandry that is considered sensible, uniting thinking and feeling. Reason is equated with thoughtfulness. And what is more: rationality is now seen as the "rationality of providing for others and for the future."

The concept was developed in the German-speaking part of Europe in 1992, where it is known as *Vorsorgendes Wirtschaften*, and where it was developed further by a network of the same name. The demand for a more conscious structuring for unifying reproductivity and productivity is something it shares with concepts from development politics including "women's economy," or *Frauenökonomie*, as it is known in German-language discourse. The recognition of the local conditions necessary to live and to stay alive, and the taking into account of everyday experiences demonstrates what it has in common with concepts of sustainable livelihood that have emerged in the global South. And provision-orientated economics is no mere abstract idea, but has already become reality today. The "Vorsorgendes Wirtschaften" network has evaluated a plurality of examples that are principally located at the local or regional level. These have included sustainable agriculture and forestry; people working on their own houses; banks granting loans on the principle of sustaining the conditions for life; and cooperative kitchen gardens. Provision-orientated economics is a path to a sustainable economy, which starts in the here and now, which consolidates itself and grows further while moving forward, and which, in this process, leaves capitalist economy behind it.

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Provision-orientated Economics

Public Ownership

In the shadow of the upheavals on the international capital markets, the call for a "parental state" has fallen on fertile ground. All over the world, governments have been securing large shares in what were formerly the lighthouses of the financial world: in Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan in New York, in the Royal Bank of Scotland and the Lloyds Banking Group in London, and in the Hypo Real Estate Holding and the Commerzbank in Munich and Frankfurt respectively.

This shows, once again, that property relations are something like a society's nitric acid, capable of separating gold from less precious metals. Property relations determine who can and who is allowed to dispose over what, inside the framework of a social-system's legal, economic – and in some context, religious – rules. The objects debated in state theory and in the philosophies of law and of society are property and ownership. This is partly due to the fact that the property rights connected to these create, block, hierarchize or – to express it most simply – influence social relations. In order to structure property relations in such a way that they put a check on profit interests in the private economy, the state needs to do more than enter as a circus animal tamer onto the stage. It needs to create its own provision, in the shape of ➞ public services and commodities, which would transfer, the wealth created by the whole of the society to all layers of the population, and not just to capital investors.

It is significant which answer we find to the question of which relation public and private property should have to each other, because property has both *ex*cluding as well as *in*cluding impacts. While private ownership contains, according to currently valid bodies of civil law the authorization to exclude third parties, and thereby simultaneously protection against state despotism, the legal situation regarding public ownership is exactly the opposite. Public goods and services are subordinate to access that is politically determined, and allow the participation of *all* citizens. They have an "integrative" and egalitarian effect, because people cannot purchase them as they do private commodities, reliant on their individual purchasing power, but use them in the practice of their political rights as citizens of a state.

The growing chasm between poor and rich demonstrates that the accumulation of private ownership only brings the longed for ➞ liberty to relatively few people, while the majority of the population become "less free." When, for example, the financing of the railway and education systems is no longer based on principles of solidarity, but is instead subjugated to the laws of the market, the size of the group "who have fallen by the wayside" grows. Each year, millions of people in Africa could be saved from death, if patent law for lifesaving medicines for thousands would be relaxed, and these patents were transformed into public goods for the production of imitation, generic drugs.

A mixed economy system with a substantial public sector is also invaluable in periods when capital rate of return increase beyond private investors' rate of return expectations, with the result that no investments are implemented. When such "private sector abstinence" effects the health, transport, education or similar key sector, the state must act in the interests of its citizens. Either by formulating and implementing strict conditions for the protection of public service provision – which is regularly shown to have little impact – or by deciding that only enterprises in public ownership can carry out these tasks. The failed social politics regarding the *Sparkassen* banks and state-owned *Landesbanken* in Germany illustrate that (re)establishing state property rights over such institutions is not enough in itself, if these are not tied to clearly defined and democratically legitimated objectives, in a social economy sense. Foremost, this includes making a good value, geographically comprehensive and equitable service provision available to everyone. This is the reasoning behind the moves made by numerous towns and municipalities to ➞ remunicipalize services they had sold to the private sector.

As property relations result from political decisions, we should foreground, more strongly than before, the positive examples of state (economic) activity and of societal negotiation processes. Too often, the debate about public ownership gets dominated by reflex reactions: "a path to slavery," "state socialism" or "planned economy." (Left-wing) alternative concepts need to do better in public relation terms to extricate the claim to public ownership already existing in article 14, paragraph 2, of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: "Property means obligations. The use of property should serve the common good simultaneously." Such exegesis should be aimed at people developing a consciousness that central aims of economic and social politics can be encompassed in the framework of public goods and services: the comparatively good value guarantee of supply security, securing employment, and limiting social inequalities.

Tim Engartner

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Public Ownership

Public Services

Under the heading public services, we understand agencies covering social security and other fundamental areas of provision, including health insurance or other public healthcare systems, pensions, education, public transport, water provision, gas, electricity, telecommunication and post services. In the German-speaking world, the term *Daseinsvorsorge* – provision of the means of existence – is often used instead of public services, although *Daseinsvorsorge* is a term emerging from the paternalistic tradition of the Wilhelmine welfare state, and is often associated with social control and discipline. By way of contrast, public services, as a term, can be located in the French enlightenment tradition of *service public*, and is a basic right of all citizens. Seen from this perspective, the state is obliged to carry out service delivery.

In the vocabulary of neoliberal institutions and discourses, the term public services is absent. According to their logic, the dominant organizational principle of the economy and of society should be the market and the desire for profit. This is why the achievements recorded by the public and nation-state spheres since the end of the Second World War are increasingly under liberalization, privatization and deregulation pressure. In particular, public enterprises are being rolled back, and the state's role redefined primarily as a regulator, and *not* as an instance that carries out public services. Faced with increasing resistance at local and national levels, the rollback of the state and the privatization attached to it began to falter in the mid-2000s. In the contexts of the current world economic and debt crisis, and of austerity politics in Europe and the USA, pressure to privatize and cuts in public services are markedly on the rise again. At a European level, such tendencies have now been enshrined in constitutions through balanced budget amendments, and the European Fiscal Compact.

By expanding the interior market since the late 1980s, and extending competition law to cover an increasing number of economic areas, the EU has been one of the key motors behind the commercialization of public services. While the European Commission and the European Council always stress the importance of "services of general interest," the agenda of competition still holds sway in the interior market, placing the remaining public enterprises in competition to private providers. This compels public enterprises to operate like private, profit-orientated enterprises, and sidelines an orientation focused on the commonweal.

In international terms, the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services plays a central role, which is targeted at liberalizing and making economic all services. Parallel to this, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund attach a string of conditions to the granting of loans in the context of financial crises. These normally include an obligation to impose a package of cuts, which contributed, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, to the dismantling of public services in developing countries. In the context of the current crisis, the IMF together with the European Commission dictate similar programs for Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Italy and other mid-east European states.

Even though the provisioning of services by public providers cannot always be implemented without friction – concerning, for example, service quality, or the absence of co-decision-making – the concept of public services remains a central component of emancipatory politics: these services are a fundament of democratic participation in societal processes. Yet it not enough to intervene against liberalization, privatization and cuts. The concrete performance of public services has to be changed, so that they can unfold the emancipatory potential contained in them. We should particularly consider three aspects here. Firstly, the social politics process of negotiation must determine which services should be carried out in the public realm. These areas should then not be defined as exceptions from the market, but rather as independent areas that foreground civic aims connected with the whole of the society rather than a striving after profit. Secondly, public services have to be ➞ democratized. It is essential that users and employees co-decide about the structuring of public services. Thirdly, public services need resources, and cannot be starve of financial means. Inside national economies that continue to grow richer, respective room to maneuver does exist – even in the context of the current crisis – and includes establishing ➞ tax justice.

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Public Sphere

Only at first glance does the public sphere strike one as being not a very well-known term, and one that is therefore often falsely identified with the general public, and the realm of media activity. But look again and you will see that many and various things are prefixed with "public" as an epithet: public goods, public service provision, public force, the public interest, public spaces, public life, or public participation in decision-making. Extremely often, the term is used as a synonym for the state, or "of the state." In an age, in which the entity of the state is more than ever "active in the mode of private ownership," as Marx once stated about the state in Prussia, associations of an authoritarian or bureaucratic construct are near at hand. Yet the public sphere is also a bridging concept that draws a line in the direction of ➞ civil society: it is only understood thus, that phrases like public spaces, public opinion, public interest or public life make sense. In its four hundred year history, the public sphere has invoked four strong sets of contents, which have been passed down until today.

Firstly: it means the *non-secret, accessible and transparent,* out of which a further meaning emerges. Whatever is public, is also true and therefore fair; if there is nothing to hide, it means that things are proceeding as they should do.

Secondly: since the 17th century, the public sphere has entreated that we orientate ourselves towards the *commonweal* (the general interest), through phrases like "the public good," "public use," "public security" and "public order." This joins the public sphere with a positively connoted orientation towards the commonweal, and with a link to the "salus publica" (the good order).

Thirdly, in the 18th century that followed, the "public" began to connote *of the state*, while "private" established itself as an antonym to it.

Fourthly and finally: public also came to mean public as in audience and public opinion as negotiated through the media.

In our contemporary world, no other term has demonstrated a comparable diversity of usage. This diversity attempts to constitute a discrepancy, on a level footing with but in opposition to the neoliberal cult of the private, and of the politics of privatization, without losing sight of the violent and forceful chasms of the deep state. In contrast to the private, the public sphere signifies a space for discussion and action – for relations – between actors, for whom, outside of and beyond the private and the individual, things are ultimately about the alternative, the general and the communal. The public sphere represents an interrelation, in which not only individual and private interests are pursued, but also the interests of people different from yourself, so that things societal, communal and general can be made accessible, and can emerge through collective participation. How the social and political qualities of the public sphere crystallize at this stage depends on societal struggles and constellations of forces, and the projects, strategies and politics of the public, which have been brought into play through these. A progressive project of the public sphere has to distinguish itself, and aim at the ➞ democratization of authority and rule by standing, from the start, for transparency, accessibility, open and public discourse – and against secrecy. Moreover, it must stand for encouraging political, economic and social ➞ equality by prioritizing an orientation around the commonweal at the expense of dominant, special interests. And it must stand for opening up paths towards *individuality* through insisting on participation equality as regards the elementary conditions of life.

Thus, we see that the project is about causing concrete impact and advantages, on which an alternative concept of the public sphere could be recognized and measured. Social and property relations, companies, commodities, spaces, public service measures, communication, public/state force and political decisions must all be structured in such a way, that they, through their objectives and orientation towards general interests (commonweal orientation) reduce inequality in the distribution of resources in the society and in "political commodities" (participation and access), open up systematic access to them, and democratize and generalize them. This kind of political project of the public sphere avoids statist cuts, and joins up all of the following with each other: conceptional and practical relations – public ownership, public employment, political participation in public decisions – with their use value rendered – public commodities and public services; and various operational modes in the medium of the public sphere (in particular, communication, ➞ cooperation and publicity); and their territories and locations (public spaces).

Rainer Rilling

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Queer

The meanings of queer include weird, gay and exceptional. As a self-definition used provocatively, the term became a strategical moment of subversive politics in gay and lesbian subcultures in the USA in the 1980s. It was also used in conflicts about exclusion and marginalization inside lesbian and gay scenes, leading to an anti-identitarian ➞ politics of alliances in the form of a rainbow coalition. As a concept, queer aims at a politically and socially reflective critique of the consequences of political and legal ➞ recognition for gays and lesbians. In the dominant gender model, and in heterosexuality's respective norms that are organized in a bipolar way, a hegemonic ordering of gender is constantly reinforced, by utilizing identities that diverge from these norms. This finding justifies the search for practical and theoretical alternatives to heteronormativity, which is organized in a strictly binary fashion. By this is meant the hegemonic orientation towards a model of two-genderedness, thought about in heterosexual terms, which dominates all areas of societies. Queer critiques take as their axiom that gender identity, sexuality and sexual orientation do not have to be coupled with biological sex, and that the latter cannot determine the former. On the contrary, there are many different ways of having lived experience of gender identity, sexual orientation, and desire. Queer critique and studies, which latches on in many theoretical and political ways to deconstructionist concepts, and to Foucault's theory of discourse, dispute the authoritarian form of all categories of identity, which homogenize that which they describe.

This basic thought was shaped by early critiques, which approached the subject from feminist and queer-theory perspectives, e.g. those articulated by Teresa de Laureates and Judith Butler, amongst others. In the German-language context, this list includes the work of Sabine Hark, Ante Engels and Corina Schelling. These are complemented by contemporary debates deriving from political struggles and critiques conducted from and by ➞ postcolonial and anti-racist perspectives, queer people of color, and by people engaged in the ➞ dis/ability movement.

A central question in queer discourses is the question of which social and cultural exclusions continue to be produced, through naming and through limited perceptual options, in a performative way. This is coupled with the question of whether these exclusions really are unavoidable. The field of L(esbian)G(ay)B(isexual)T(ransgender)+ practices demands that queer is placed in an interrelation with the newer terms of transgender and intersex, which go beyond gender-based categorizing, and open up a critique of transsexuality as a pathologizing term: the point being that this final concept still produces a reference to two-genderedness, thought about in a heteronormative manner.

The objects of queer-studies analysis of society and culture include, alongside constructions of subjects and of identities, representations in media, film and literature, but also in fields like medicine, politics, modes of consumption, access to resources like housing, and much more. Further, we can also examine how it has been possible law and the language of law to encode legal innovation in this field into society. This means that anti-discrimination perspectives centered on LGBT+ discourse are incorporated into legislation like the Charter of fundamental Rights of the European Union (2009), in the form of extended ➞ human rights, or into Germany's General Equal Treatment Act (*Allgemeine Gleichbehandlungsgesetz*). These developments exist in tension with the fact that new measures are often developed through referring to heteronormative ways of life, for example the civil union of same-sex couples, which perpetuates the imperative of distancing these unions from the institution of marriage, as protected by the state, and this, despite numerous attempts at achieving equal status, using existing legal possibilities. This reinforces heteronormative structures for gender relations, compliant with hegemony, in the form of a "privilege," as the foundation of capitalist-bourgeois organization of state and society – a privilege reinforced in the very fundamental structure of this society. And this is why critical perspectives on the "economies of desire" are important, which discuss (hetero)sexual desire and capitalist social ownership, and which analyze the embedded differences as interwoven dimensions. Queer-theory projects bring together the motivations of conceptional, analytical and political alternatives for forms of living and of loving.; this includes developing modes of labor, and forms of representation, that wish to work towards new forms for society, and new political models. Consequently, this critique has the potential to stretch out to include ultimately all people, who are affected by norms, limitations and contradictions. In doing this, the dangers of a critical perspective that reaches too short are also articulated, the dangers, for example, of homo-nationalism, or homo-normativity. By linking up concrete objectives for societal change with strategies for de-normalizing and de-privileging hegemonic orders of gender and of sex, queer-studies and queer critique aims at radical, systemic alternatives, without losing sight of current possibilities for political interventions.

Katharina Pühl

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Queer

Radical Democracy

Foundational features of democracies as codified in western constitutions include: popular sovereignty; elections based on free, equal and universal suffrage; parliament as the legislative, and as the body controlling the executive; parties as organs for the formation of the will of the people; and majority decision-making. Many struggles were needed, conducted by workers', women's and civil-rights' movements, in order to establish these formal principles. The participation of the population in the *Rechtsstaat*, which best translates as "state of law," depended on these ➞ social movements. These were radically democratic to the extent that they utilized rights of liberty outside of state institutions, in order to assert principles of democratic participation (➞ democratization).

For the last two hundred years, one of the most basic questions of democracy has been, when liberty has been won once, whether the following generations also have the right to give themselves their own constitution, or whether they should exclusively move within the parameters of existing, constitutional institutions. Radical democracy casts doubts on the dominant, liberal understanding of democracy. The people as sovereign may not be understood as a unitary people with an idealized, overarching will, but is composed rather out of a plurality of social groups, interest camps, and forms of life. The constitution can only bestow legitimacy upon itself by providing space for this many-sidedness and mutability of the people as sovereign. That which is considered generally binding is not predetermined from the start. No instance and no group can exclusively claim to speak in everyone's name. The routinized processes for the formation of the people's will are too narrow, too slow and too inefficient to properly consider the constantly changing interests, forms of life, and requirements, in terms of information, decisions and revisions that stem from the former. This is why radical democracy contains a range of proposals to extend and embed existing democratic mechanisms into different contexts. This also effects the definition of who belongs to the people as sovereign. This is why the demand is raised to grant migrants and stateless people without documentation citizens' rights. Moreover, decision-making processes should be extended, to take in social movements, citizens' initiatives, and NGOs. ➞ Civil society, according to this model, must be granted the rights to participate in discussions, and to be invited to round table negotiations, or conflict mediation processes. Through the mechanism of ➞ participatory budgeting, citizens can be directly involved in decision-making.

A liberal understanding of democracy limits its own scope to formal political processes. In effect, however, formal democracy has to assume the existence of particular and substantial ➞ forms of life: those that are attached to the unpolitical private subject, who delegates to "the politicians" and to politics, and who follows their own income-based and consumption interests. In contrast to this, radical democracy emphasizes that democracy is founded on a democratic culture that encounters "democracy" seen as something abstract, and which, in itself, represents a way of life. In this sense, democracy means the readiness and ability: to grant ➞ recognition to the other and others as people equal to oneself; to people able to change sides and take on other people's standpoints; to negotiate in the interests of everyday life; to revise one's own positions in the light of better arguments; or to take on an attitude, which transfers control of the solution to problems over to cooperative, searching processes. As such, radical democracy incorporates the affirmation, that democracy should be valid in all areas of life, from the family, to schools, to the armed forces. It is with such thoughts in mind, that some representatives of radical democracy also consider the overthrowing of capitalist production relations to be one element in democracy.

The limits of radical democracy are to be found in its lack of clarity, and its rather naive belief in democratic-political progress. Radical democracy aims at including all those people, who confront obstacles when participating: gays, women, people who are discriminated against racially, and children. The assumption is that ➞ participation of this kind will eventually reach a tipping point, at which it becomes irreversible. Yet there are still interest groups, who choose to fight *against* further inclusion, a program they pursue by using the same right to participation, and by arguing that their positions would also be marginalized *inside* the radical democracy cam Radical democracy gets stuck at the point of demanding that processes and institutions be open to such conflicts. However, a positive project must also contain the aim that particular mechanisms – including sexism, the private disposal over the mean of production, and state or private monopolies on learning and competences – should be abolished. This positive project must also stress the fact that systemic marginalization and non-participation produce expropriation, forcing people into a position where they still have to fight for their rights merely to have a voice at the table.

Alex Demirović

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Radical Democracy

Radical Reformism

In political discussion, "reform" and ➞ „revolution" are often considered as opposite paths to an emancipatory change in society. This is why people connect very distinct political strategies to these two terms. Theoretical insights and historical experiences prompt us to think about the relation between the two in a new and different way.

By 1989 at the latest, it had become obvious that the two large 20th century projects aimed at societal change, the communistic revolution, and the social-democratic attempt to gradually "tame" or even overcome capitalism by way of state reform politics, both had failed. A decisive reason for this is that the modern state is not a neutral instrument, which can be used for any purposes at will, and by all societal forces to the same extent, but rather an organizational form and mode of functioning. This incorporates the institutional consolidation of fundamental, societal relations of power. Specific relations of exploitation and authority are encompassed inside this embodiment, and these relations are, amongst there many aspects, not least class and gender formations.

Historical experience demonstrated that abolishing the private ownership of the means of production is not enough to throw down structural relations of power and oppression. Instead, complex societal structures must first be revolutionized, from which hegemonic relations of authority and oppression proceed. These are: the forms of the division of labor; relations of production; relations concerning the family, nature and gender; the contents of consciousness; moral concepts; and even styles of consumption, i.e. ways of life as a whole. Changing these is an affair for the humans who are involved themselves, a matter of concrete practice, which needs to take immediate life contexts as its starting points. Politics aimed at ➞ emancipation can only develop out of existing society and its contradictions, and therefore remains welded to society's structures, alignments in relation to which it can act, and the influences subjects act under. Political and social movements are needed, which establish new societal alignments and practices, and trigger off collective processes of experience, education and learning. In place of seizing power, what matters foremost is revolutionizing society practically, as Marx put it. Emancipatory societal change described thus can also be categorized as "radical reformism." "Reformism," because it is not about a revolutionary seizure of power or about authoritarian coercion, but rather about difficult, step-by-step change. And "radical" because the target is those societal interrelations from which the dominant relations of power and hegemony proceed.

People engaging in changing themselves, i.e. humanity, and their forms of behavior and of consciousness, is a complicated and difficult process, with an open end. It is only possible when success is achieved in creating forms of political and social self-organization, from the state to parties, independent of the existing apparatus of authority. A secondary requisite is practicing a concept of politics that takes as its object the "political" in the "private." In doing this, politics that takes the state as a major point of reference remains important. This is the level at which not only are conditions fixed, but also where the social rights and compromises that have been fought for can be codified in a binding way. These politics that refer to the state are however not the core, neither are they the main launching point for taking emancipatory action.

Just like the student ➞ protest movement, the ecology and women's movement of the 1970s and 1980s developed, at first, independent of and in opposition to the apparatus of state hegemony. Their successes led to strong transformations in modes of consciousness and of behavior. The consequence of this was that state politics itself also ultimately changed, up to a certain point. However, the difficulties and setbacks that go hand in hand with this way of approaching things led to the movements becoming weaker again generally, the alignment towards the state stronger, and to the movements' themes being hegemonically mainstreamed, and cut up into digestible bits. This stripped them somewhat of their emancipatory impact. Whether and to what extent the trap of the fixation on the state can be avoided in the context of the critique of globalization movement – which could instead develop contexts of practice and experience for an immediate change in societal relations – is a question that remains open. The ➞ Occupy movement, which emerged in the wake of recent waves of "financial" crises, seemed at first to exhaust itself by posing demands on states. Models for concrete societal alternatives appear, at present, to be barely visible.

Joachim Hirsch

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Radical Reformism

Radical Transformation

Using this concept, Nicos Poulantzas attempted to make his findings in the field of theories of states available for emancipatory action. At the core of this are the criticisms he voiced concerning the state-centered conceptions of liberty shared by both social democracy and by Stalinism. For all their differences, "both demonstrate a fundamental connectedness, namely, statism, and a deep mistrust concerning the initiative of the popular masses, i.e. a caginess in the face of democratic demands" (Poulantzas). The reasons behind this lie in a similar understanding of the state. The state is either understood as an instrument, and/or *misunderstood* as a subject, and not as a complex, social interrelation, complete with internal contradictions. For both movements, the state was at the heart of their conceptions of ➞ liberty. The Stalinist variety led to despotism, while the social-democratic sort led to a statism, or étatisme, controlled by experts.

"The essential problem of the democratic road to socialism, of democratic socialism, must be posed in a different way: *how is it possibly radically to transform the State in such a manner that the extension and deepening of political freedoms and the institutions of representative democracy* (which were also a conquest of the popular masses) *are combine with the unfurling of forms of direct democracy, and the mushrooming of self-management bodies?*" (Poulantzas) The term "radical transformation" was developed by Poulantzas in order to make clear, that the transition to democratic ➞ socialism is not about reformist interventions by the state into society, but rather about the exact reverse: the radical transformation of the apparatus of the state through societal struggles, which always remain connected with the state themselves, both inwardly and outwardly. That said, a democratic path to socialism is primarily concerned, "with opening out, strengthening, coordinating and leading the centers of resistance that are strewn within state networks, alongside creating and developing new centers. In this fashion, these can [become] effective centers of real power in the strategic territory of the state." Power is not a quantifiable substance, which can be torn out of the hands of the state. Rather, power consists of "a series of interrelations between societal classes, which are concentrated in the state par excellence, which constitutes the consolidation of an interrelation of power between the classes. In order to avoid being reductionist in class terms, Poulantzas' concept of radical transformation has to be extended at this juncture to encompass other societal struggles, including those directed against patriarchal and racist oppression mechanisms, and to include societal ➞ interrelations with nature.

These strategies always have to adjust themselves to the specific situations to be found in various countries. It is nevertheless possible to draw lessons from the past that are relevant for all transitions to democratic socialism. The central conclusion to be drawn from the failed attempt to create a socialist society is without doubt the recognition that socialism will only exist as democratic socialism (Poulantzas). The only way in which authoritarian statism can be avoided is by joining up struggles for grassroots democracy with a radical transformation of representative democracy. On a democratic path to socialism, political and ideological ➞ pluralism must be guaranteed, and existing political liberties – including those belonging to opponents – must be extended. The continuity of the institutions of representative democracy is not a regrettable relic, but rather "a necessary condition for democratic socialism." Transforming state apparatus radically *cannot* mean doing this in a statist way, but rather must by force lead to deep breaks with the past, which go beyond mere ➞ democratization and decentralization. The objective is a fundamental change in the societal division of labor, so that the separation between the economy and the state cannot reproduce itself in an infinite number of new varieties. The question regarding how the internationalization and trans-nationalization of states and relations of authority will be changed by the transition to democratic socialism is one that future movements will answer. In producing this answer, global interdependencies, and institutions with an almost global reach, which should also be seen as part of the apparatus of state, will certainly have to be given more consideration.

Jens Wissel

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Rebellion

Today, rebellion has become normality. A repressive society gives rise to a rebellious society as a matter of necessity. We're constantly rebelling. Sometimes we do this openly, as when someone tells us that we should do something, and we say no. Often also often takes place in less open ways: we're meant to do something, say yes to it – and then do something else instead. When stress levels rise at work, we might go on personal strikes, or stay away from the workplace, in order to play with the kids, or we go to the park and read a book. Even when we do everything we possibly can to obey, our body or intellect sometimes rebels anyway – we become ill, or increasingly neurotic, or just plain insane.

Rebellion is everywhere around us. Sometimes it's easy to recognize, when it takes on large proportions, as in the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas at the beginning of 1994, the uprising in Argentina on December 19 and 20, 2001 (also referred to as the *Argentinazo*), or the risings in Bolivia between 2000 and 2005. In other cases, we either don't see rebellion, or we don't take it seriously: a girl going to the cinema, instead of going to school; a mother refusing to prepare the evening meal. It might feel strange to place this girl side by side with the huge Zapatista uprising. The latter represents a significant, revolutionary act, while the former may be nothing more than an individual, apolitical, petit bourgeois tantrum, at best. But if we do not attempt to draw lines of continuity to join up the dots, then we pigeon hold rebellion as an exceptional event, and cut if off from everyday life. Which would mean us failing to meet the challenge concealed inside the Zapatista' most profound and most complex pronouncement: "we are utterly normal women, men, children and elderly people, i.e. rebels, non-conformists, nuisances and dreamers" (La Jornada, August 4, 1999). If normal people are rebels, then rebellion belongs to the everyday (➞ culture of everyday life).

And if rebellion is indeed part of the everyday, then it is because it is inseparable from repression. Without fail, repression leads to rebellion. Amongst the Left, there is a long tradition of separating the pair of them. The largest part of people's attention is directed at capitalist hegemony. When rebellion is mentioned at all – which does not happen often – then it is considered as a thing apart from hegemony. (In Marxian analyses, it is for example usual, to consider capital and ➞ class struggle as two separate entities – a peculiar position). But this is exactly where the problem lies: if we do not view rebellion as a plain part of our everyday experience of repression, then being a rebel becomes unusual. And if being a rebel is something special, then it stands to reason that us rebels take on leadership roles, and see ourselves as a kind of avant-garde. Even amongst those circles who reject a Leninist model of organization, Leninism's elitist premises are often reproduced.

The perspective that rebellion is inseparable from repression is tantamount to the statement that repression can never encompass everybody and everything. The oppressed are never broken down entirely: something, even if merely isolated reactions against the oppression always survives. Our actions are never wholly subsumed into abstract labor, and utility value is never wholly subsumed into value. We never fully blossom in the roles that capitalist society deals out to us. There is always something left over, a non-identity, which identity cannot keep at bay. An ecstatic space or moment always exists, a projection that is beyond one's own oppression. This is what the Zapatistas term dignity. Rebellion that cannot be separated from oppression, and which is woven into every moment of life.

Perceiving rebellion as enmeshed in every aspect of life leads to a different form of politics. According to this form, anti-capitalist politics are not about delivering new forms of conscious to people, or encouraging them to rebel. Because they're rebelling already. Our problem consists of recognizing these rebellions and this dignity, of taking them seriously and joining them up with our own rebellions. The consequence of this is a politics of listening, of attempting to hear what cannot be heard – the precise opposite of a politics of talking. This perhaps implies a politics that resonates, which finds channels to be on the same wavelength as the dignity and rebellion that surrounds us.

The bourgeois theory that comprehends rebellion as an unusual experience leads to considerable confusion. It fits with that theory's general tendency to turn the world upside down, in order to represent the normal as abnormal, and the abnormal as normal. We are reminded of the analogy with bourgeois economic theories, which treat crises less as something endemic to capitalist society, and more as an extraordinary break with the normal level of balance.

John Holloway

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Rebellion

Recognition

Recognition is an essential precondition for the constitution of an autonomous bourgeois subject. S/he sees themselves reflected in the consciousness of another or of others, whereby a mutual acquisition of perspectives of the self and perspectives of strangers occurs, so that ''self-consciousness … only [exists] as something recognized'' (Hegel). The processes of social ownership and individualization are needed so that the whole scope of the self-consciousness can attain this kind of recognition.

Civil society releases the individual from narrow-minded structures like extended families, clans, castes and social-estates by revolutionizing the processes of social ownership and individualization. Concurrently, it promises to guarantee the ''universal validity'' of recognizing ➞ liberty, autonomy and self-consciousness. This process is institutionalized and, ultimately, approved of by the state, through legal and political forms that give rise to legal rights of freedom, political participation and social welfare. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the characteristic basic form of recognition is built into the socioeconomic foundational structures of bourgeois-capitalist society, and ideologically shaped by them.

At first, the capitalist market economy appears to look like ''a true Eden of the hereditary human rights'' (Marx) of liberty, equality, achievement and property, and the best of all possible worlds for recognition between subjects. However, dependencies and structural inequalities exist contemporaneously; during periods of better social stability and individual developmental perspectives, these repeatedly retreat behind being recognized as a free participant in the market, and as a citizen possessing equality of opportunity.

A socially critical discourse concerning the ''struggle for recognition'' (Alex Honneth) has been pursued with increased vigor since the 1990s. This reflects that patterns of bourgeois recognition, which previously centered on the livable connection between (paid) work and achievement, have become brittle. A pluralization of lifestyles and globalization processes have combined with the crisis of Fordism to demolish previous mechanisms of recognition – calibrated around the idealized type of a male, white, heterosexual (wage-earning) citizen) – and make more differentiated patterns of recognition necessary. This illustrates that civil society is on location where outdated, hegemonic forms – patriarchal, sexual and racist – and attributes are reproduced. The struggles of the women's movement, ethnic minorities or homosexual are also about overcoming this asymmetrical order or recognition.

The growing precariousness of paid work, deregulation of the market, and capitalization of social security undermine, inside the framework of financial market capitalism, the system of bourgeois values, and the patterns of recognizing these. ''All touchstones … are disappearing here'' (Marx). Success and exclusion have replaced achievement and social permeability. In the 1990s and 2000s, neoliberalism sought to negotiate these contradictions politically using market imperatives, or ''governing by individualization'' as it can be termed. But since the big crisis in 2007, the meritocratic foundations of the bourgeois cosmos are crumbling more than ever, while the ''struggle for recognition'' grows more precarious. This leads to ''fury without a target'' on behalf of those who are wage-dependent, the growth of new forms of ''negative individualism'' (Robert Castel), civil society reforming itself in an authoritarian way, with the help of ''atavistic'' ideologies, and a ''brutalization'' (Wilhelm Heitmeyer) of parts of the bourgeoisie.

Faced with such erosion in patterns of bourgeois recognition, emancipatory movements are facing a double challenge. One the one hand, they have to go beyond ''bourgeois-limited content'' (Marx) as part of the ''struggle for recognition," and come up with ''new forms of subjectivity'' (Foucalt). On the other hand, outdated egalitarian conceptions of transformation must be cast aside, in order to battle for forms of recognition and political regulation that differentiate according to the diversity and specialness of individuals, forms that also take account of variety in lifestyle choices. Social movements and the left must reach consensus in their own ranks regarding a political language, symbolism and culture, which represents the plurality of struggles for recognition, links these struggles together, and thereby strengthens the ability of subjects to act. However, all approaches based on a *"Rifondazione"*, a refoundation of social protest and emancipation movements – from the ➞ World Social Forum, to ➞ Occupy protests in metropolises or the communal ➞ "right to the city'' movements – also prove that ''the association of individuals will also remain a process of conflictual communication of the self as part of a process *of recognition,* and will not be a melting-together into community; a process of exposing each other, and not the beginning of harmonious unity''. (Jäger/Seibert).

Christoph Lieber

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Recognition

Redistribution

In capitalist societies, structures and mechanisms for wealth distribution are primarily shaped by the market's functional principles, an ordering of property centered around an ordering of ownership based on individualistic property, and the market's asymmetrical structures. The capitalist ordering of ownership leads to a specific ordering of appropriation. This ordering grants the owners of the means of production the right to the private appropriation of value added, which results from the application of human labor power. The ordering of distribution generated in this way causes a systematic inequitable distribution of income, wealth and social life-chances, both between the classes *and* inside the class of those dependent on wages. Additionally, it brings about an over-utilization of natural resources. Despite this, there are opposing socioeconomic models of development within the basic capitalist structure, which differ from each other in relation to economic efficiency and social justice criteria, and which are decided about in the course of social struggles and political negotiation conflicts.

In the capitalist metropolises, particularly in Western Europe, the social democratic and Keynesian welfare state established itself after the Second World War. This was aimed at correcting the structurally inequable distribution of wealth as mediated through the markets and through power, by consciously pursuing redistribution politics, or "secondary distribution" (*Sekandärverteilung*), as it has been known in the German-language discourse. The same aim was shared by the trade union's wage-settlement politics, which were allocated an important role, often safeguarded by institutions, within the framework of the deal or compromise between the classes that the welfare state represented. Even though the welfare state did not abolish the basic structure of the capitalist ordering of ownership and appropriation, even though it denied women and migrant in the working world and in their lifeworld, and even though it was grounded in a model of growth that destroyed nature, this state was still able to achieve a historically unique standard of living for large sections of the population. Since the start of the 1980s however, this welfare state has slid deeper and deeper into crisis. This, in turn, has its roots in the development crisis of the Fordist regime of accumulation, in the conceptual deficits of the champions of the welfare state, and in the offensive launched by neoliberal and neo-social-democratic politics. The welfare state has already been largely replaced by the competing state, which supports capital and the markets, and welfare state based governments of redistribution are being pushed, step-by-step, into the wings, using a new model of "accumulation through expropriation" (D. Harvey). During the current, large crisis of financial market capitalism, the contradictions of these new types of government were exacerbated, while hegemonic crisis politics drove forward the redistribution of societal wealth in favor of finance capital.

Emancipatory politics cannot exhaust itself merely by defending the last remains of the traditional welfare state. It has a far better perspective if it aims at a neo-solidaristic regime of (re)distribution, which would correct the capitalist mechanisms of distribution using democratic means. Firstly, by forcing back the spread of precarious employment (➞ against precarization) and by (re)distributing contracted, paid work, which is socially protected in terms of pension and benefit entitlements, ecological, and more meaningful for society than the precarious employment it would replace. ➞ Gender democracy criteria would be equally important in structuring this "new distribution of labor." Secondly, redistributing income streams and wealth via a solidaristic form of trade union income politics, including progressive politics regarding taxation and business rates (➞ tax justice). Thirdly, the extra resources achieved thus should be invested into stabilizing a social system orientated around needs, and into public goods: in the areas of education, health, mobility, communication and family reproduction. Everyone should have access to all these areas, and should not be impeded by social access barriers: "the redistribution of life chances." Fourthly, and finally, limits on – and a redistribution of – the utilization of nature would be an imperative. This utilization is enacted both within and between capitalist metropolises and other global regions, which is why the newly regulated utilization would have to be connected with a fundamental renewal of the energetic foundations of economic activity: "redistribution of the utilization of nature."

There is no alternative to nationally organized trade unions and nation-states continuing to be key actors in this "regime of (re)distribution." Nevertheless, these new structures and mechanisms of distribution will also have to be fixed institutionally using transnational governance structures. A prerequisite for this would be overcoming the current, large crisis of financial market capitalism. A further, even more important prerequisite is replacing the current regime of accumulation based on expropriation with a socially and ecologically viable model of development. In aiming this high, the project of progressive (re)distribution demonstrates that it can extend beyond the financial capitalist order of property and expropriation.

Hans-Jürgen Urban

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Redistribution

Regionalization

Regionalization is not simply an alternative. First and foremost, regionalization politics can justifiably be understood as one element in a new form of statehood, one orientated towards flexible modes of accumulation. Politics on behalf of and in a geographical space above the level of towns and municipalities, but below the level of federal states (at least inside the German system) is pursued as part of a vertical differentiation of layers of regulation (e.g. municipality, region, federal state or *Land* in the German system, nation-state, Europe and world) *and* as part of a horizontal de-concentration. By the latter is meant that private actors, e.g. chambers of commerce, associations and companies, are incorporated into the articulation and realization of politics. Regionalization through development agencies, regional conferences, regional management and various forms of public-private partnerships then assumes the meaning of pursuing company orientated politics, directed towards strengthening the position of the region against other regions, by intervening in the region in land management, planning measures, expanding infrastructure, education politics and much more. Above all, regionalization means creating a "competitive region."

This is not the only reason why the theme of regionalization is an awkward one. As a concept, "region" imagines a local area that is easy to grasp, in contrast to a complex, globalized world. A vision of "small is beautiful" is inherent to this concept. It follows from this that the region not only makes it possible for interconnections to be comprehended, but also facilitates a community building process, or *Vergemeinschaftung*. Concurrently, the latter also becomes the antithesis to globalization. The potential problematics of an exclusive and marginalizing community building process can be spotlighted by looking at an array of tendencies, not least the right-wing populist, secessionist movements, like the one in northern Italy, for example. By using a perspective sensitive to gender discourse, valid arguments can be made that "local spaces" are imbued with structures of authority and relations of violence, so that emancipatory contents in these spaces will not come to the fore "automatically."

So, in opposition to this, how can we think about regionalization as a process for the creation of a new space for connections and regulation, i.e. as an emancipatory alternative? Here, two different perspectives come into view. Taking on what should, in the broadest sense, be called a neo-Keynesian way of looking at things, "regional economic activity" counts as a "leftist reform perspective" (➞ crossover). Based on the assumption that export-orientated accumulation has largely disengaged with domestic demand, investors are motivated to put their money into a ➞ sustainable regional development fund, through transfer mechanisms encompassing the whole economy – and more concretely, through higher taxation. This should be aimed at strengthening regional economic circulation, in order to support the ecological and sustainable domestic economy. This would be reinforced by a politics of state procurement, which in turn orientates itself around regional investment, and minimum environmental and social standards. Small local companies, the non-profit sector and municipal economic activity would all be both standard-bearers and beneficiaries of this form of regionalization. This kind of politics would be backed by: measures to support local companies; further-education programs for those marginalized in the employment market, and to create a regional, public employment sector; and the establishment of ➞ participative regional planning, directed towards social needs and ecological sustainability.

Yet regionalization can also be seen as an alternative from the perspective of ➞ cooperatives. The region and its circulations, including economic circulation, are the area of reference for various forms of ➞ solidaristic economics, which are primarily aimed at needs-orientated production. Communes, local exchange trading systems (sometimes known as LETS) and schemes through which individuals gift time, as part of the gift economy, are just a few examples of cooperative forms. This debate also refers to the idea of regional money, increasingly widespread in Germany and known there as *Regionalgeld*, i.e. currency notes with regional motifs on them, which are a valid payment method inside the regional market. As these various regional moneys are still mostly tied to "official" currencies, they have, at best, a symbolic character; critics brush them aside as a marketing tool. Leaving this issue aside, regional ➞ social ownership is needed to support organizations structured as cooperatives. Economic activity in regional circulation systems appears to be both ecologically sustainable and effective in creating employment.

The ambiguity of regionalization as a new area of reference demands that in every situation in which regionalization is discussed as an alternative, a strategic calculation is made. Like all other political-societal areas of reference, the regions are contested terrain. They can therefore only become spaces for alternatives in social politics, where emancipatory forces and groups are strong-willed and substantial.

Detlef Sack

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Regionalization

Remunicipalization

Remunicipalization is a developing trend, opposed to privatization. It reverses the privatization of public services and tasks, and the sales of public property. Public services return to being carried out by municipalities and by other public enterprises and bodies, with a legally enshrined public status.

In the mid-1990s in Germany, a new wave of privatizing public property started, at all level. This time, core sectors of public provision including housing, education, transport, health and other social sectors were all affected. There were several reasons behind this development. Firstly, the differentiated understanding of state and municipality shifted, as a result of fundamental realignment of political forces of power. Using the neoliberal premise of a "slimmed-down state" and the modernization of administration, business based norms were introduced into administrative bodies and into politics. In this context, municipalities were increasingly put under pressure, in the Germany by both the higher-level *Länder* and by the federal state, to privatize local services. The claim was that private could carry out services in a better and cheaper way. This thesis was part of an ideological campaign contributing to a permanent and unfavorable change in the conception of the ➞ public sphere, in terms of the images of humans and societies that were now located there, and in terms of values. Secondly, from the mid-1990s on, the financial situation of the municipalities developed in a catastrophic way. Privatizations seemed the best way to consolidate budgets. For more than half of the German municipalities, this was and remains the decisive motive for privatizations. Thirdly, both these tendencies, established by the *Länder* and the federal state, were reinforced by limits imposed by the EU.

The bad image of the civil service and of public corporations advanced the cause of privatizations. A lack of transparency coupled with public controls, public corruption and the wasting of public money were also utilized as arguments to privatize. Behind this, a strong economic interest could be concerned, willing the opening up of municipal service provision (➞ public services) as a field for the utilization of capital. Ultimately, this is what all efforts of the German federal government, the EU, and various other lobbying organization are aimed at.

After many long years of privatization madness, sobriety is beginning to reemerge. It has now been demonstrated that privatizing public services is a road to nowhere. Higher prices and fees, worse service, the ruthless exploitation of monopolies over provision, less democratic control, precarious working conditions and lower incomes for municipal coffers have become everyday reality in many places. Many municipalities now recognize that privatization is the wrong path to take. Over a hundred German urban municipalities have returned waste disposal, cleaning and local energy companies back into municipal ownership. When tender contracts expire for example, the chance presents itself to remunicipalize energy provision.

Moreover, remunicipalization provides the opportunity of mobilizing various municipal actors, who can enter into new and lasting alliances, capable of changing the balance of forces towards left-wing municipal politics, and willing to try out alternatives. These same chances are not possible at present at federal government nor at *Länder* level.

The precondition for this is that remunicipalizations are initiated and realized through a wide participation of the population, and that public influence and public controls are safeguarded after the remunicipalization has gone through. Citizens have to exert influence so that the remunicipalized organization fulfills publicly agreed objectives, and have to influence how profits are used and controlled. This is the only way of strengthening the public's interest in retaining public corporations. The challenge, one not fully met until now, consists of reconciling remunicipalization with ➞ participative forms of leadership in new public enterprises. Yet a solid financial basis for the municipalities is the decisive proviso for enabling privatized services to return into public hands, and for stopping further privatizations. All three German municipal divisions of urban municipalities *(Städte)*, *Gemeinden* and rural districts *(Landkreisen)*, all need stability, planning certainty and substantially higher incomes. Achieving this requires tax reforms (➞ tax justice), to increase the state's overall ability to act in financial terms (e.g. through the reform and introduction of a wealth tax and a financial transaction tax), fused together of a new ordering of the finances in Germany between federal state, *Länder* and the municipalities.

Petra Brangsch

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Remunicipalization

Revolution I

One of the most remarkable aspects of 2011 as a year was that revolution made a comeback. Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt swept away regimes in a matter of weeks, although these states' western allies, and the majority of their subjugated populations, had considered them to be unshakeable. Mutually and digitally connected, and informed via social media, the example of the revolutions in north Africa gained political ground in the European protest movements. In Syntagma Square in Athens, in the tent village on Plaza Puertal del Sol in Madrid, and in the ➞ Occupy movement, references to Egypt and Tunisia started to appear, which increasingly turned into expressions of ➞ solidarity. Through this practice of ➞ rebellion, the concept of revolution inched back into the territory of what is sayable. Via this route, a term that provided orientation to numerous political predecessors was able to reaccess the vocabulary of new ➞ social movements. Perhaps more than for any other group in history, revolution was used as a key reference point for the early European workers' movement. At the end of the 18th century and during the course of the 19th century, several waves of citizens' or "bourgeois" revolution shook Europe and the colonies, during which social movements, acting in the name of ➞ liberty and democracy, challenged the old autocracies. It soon however became clear, that the toppling of an old regime and the installation of elements of "bourgeois" democracy was not necessarily accompanied by a real improvement in the lived reality of those dependent on wages. This experience led to the recognition that liberty and democracy in an encompassing sense, which also incorporated the majority of subalterns, could not be achieved, if the struggle was only to be fought on the field of forms of government. As Karl Marx concluded, the question must rather be raised, "to what extent these revolutions really dispute the conditions of life of the bourgeoisie, and to what extent [do] they merely impact on their political formations."

In this historical context, the term becomes a meaningful and loaded element in socialist discourse. This is not least because it enables users of the discourse to connect the conviction that capitalism will turn out to be a surmountable episode in human prehistory, with hopes for a completely different, emancipated life. As it is used in this manner, revolution itself occasionally becomes a fetish in itself, and functions as a "secularized afterlife," into which things are projected that seem unachievable in the contemporary misery of class society. Talking about the revolution like this has been used to placate demands, interests and needs, including, for example questions, about gender relations, sexuality and the ➞ culture of everyday life, by comfortingly referring to this "period after," thus de-legitimizing these concerns and the struggles that accompanied them.

The term appears to have been so disavowed until recently, primarily because of the long history of failure and disappointments that is attached to it. This still impacts today, from the revolutions lost in Europe in the cycle of political movements after 1917, to the downfall of global revolutionary enthusiasm after 1968; and above all this Stalinism as an historical experience hovers, a system that organized dictatorship and exploitation of humans by humans, all in the name of revolution. Yet even more enduring than this disavowal is the phenomena that, no sooner than it is branded utterly passé, revolution then returns to the stage of world history, causing more surprise than on the previous occasion.

What does the most recent "return of revolution" signify for the contemporary boom in social movements? *Firstly,* it signifies a way of understanding of political action that refuses to be drawn into patiently taking the line of maximum resistance along institutionally prescribed routes. Instead, it recognizes the possibility and necessity of intervening collectively and militantly into the course of history, challenging the self-evident truths of ➞ common sense as it goes, and engaging with the logic of the event. *Secondly*, an old finding of the workers' movement is being virulently revived: when people are aiming at a fundamental change in the conditions of life inside society, then separating state and economy is more than difficult. It follows, that if the political revolution is not also part of the social revolution, and vice-versa, then no movement will be successful in "throwing all the old muck off its back" (Marx/Engels). To conclude with *thirdly*, lots of contemporary activists are currently experiencing the fact that a revolution is not only a dramatic break with the existing order, but is also a process, in which "changing the outer world, i.e. the general conditions" (Gramsci) means "potentizing and developing oneself" [and/or a group]. This dimension of ➞ self-empowerment "from below" is perhaps the most significant effect of revolution, and an important reason for the Left to hold fast to it, conceptually as well as practically.

Benjamin Opratko

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Revolution I

Revolution II

There is hardly any other terms that seems to be in such utter disrepute as revolution. In the 1930s, the ➞ Keynesian economists marketed their reform concepts as an "income revolution." Parallel to this, ideologists of fascism consecrated the stockade-building strategies of their *Volksgemeinschaften* (literally: people's communities) with the phrase "social revolution." Other groups talked about a "conservative revolution" at the end of the 1920s. This was the period in which the offshoots of the first workers' revolution from 1916-1921 were being incorporated into constructing "socialism in one country," offshoots which were consigned to the fate, a few years later, of being handed over to the forces behind Stalinist terror. Faced with this balance sheet, the "revolution inside the revolution," proclaimed thirty years later, was also not capable of rehabilitating the term. The power struggle inside the Chinese party oligarchy, billed as the "Cultural Revolution," did even more harm in this regard. The final note was delivered by the event of the bankruptcy of the post-Stalinist provisional societies in Eastern Europe – an event to which the epithet of "revolution" was also attached.

Viewed etymologically, revolution is a term created during the enlightenment and the French Revolution from 1789-1793. It draws various facets of societal development together into a complex unity. It perceives a political uprising, advancing up to the level of a civil war, as a phenomenon, and as the objective of a short-term change in the constitution or in a political dynasty. It also includes the concept of revolution as it appears in astronomy and in astrology, which is orientated around longer time periods. This semantic synthesis was the answer to those massive sea changes that the capitalist world system brought forth during its period of globalization – the relatively bloodless, English *Glorious Revolution* of 1688, the bloody War of American Independence from 1755-1783, and the French Revolution, with its combination of republican rights of self-determination, and the plebian underclasses' demand for equality. In the wake of the European Revolution of 1848-49, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels' further reaching configuration of the term gained special significance. They reclaimed the *industrial revolution* as the "locomotive" of long-term revolutionary restructuring. This locomotive's innovations – the *scientific-technical revolution* – continue, when combined with the remaining *productive forces*, to call into question the *relations of production*. Moreover, in the middle term, this combination engenders *social and political revolutions*, and would facilitate the transition to a classless society and to ➞ socialism. This transformation-based model differentiated itself from previous concepts of revolution in its pronounced directionality towards the future. The Bolsheviks and Lenin's concept of revolution was tailored to suit Russian conditions, and it focused the avant-garde – a substitute for the working-class, and a group that took on a life of its own – on taking political power: the dictatorship of the proletariat. It did this without properly taking into account the complex conditions for action and the self-determined structures (e.g. the movement of soviet councils) of the international workers' revolution. Moving on from the Bolsheviks, there have also been other approaches for giving the concept of revolution a new social foundation, including those promulgated by the theorists of the ➞ movement of soviet councils and of revolutionary syndicalism, the critics of processes of "involution" in the Soviet Union (including Trotsky), and the Italian communist Antonio Gramsci, who problematized the consequences of Fordist upheaval for the working class. Parallel to this, Chinese communists made efforts to find new answers, while Mao Zedong set out doctrines for partisan war to be borne on the shoulders of the peasants and the villages. After that, the concept of revolution went off to hibernate amongst niches on the edge of the workers' Left, in the revolutionary intelligentsia, and in the polyphonic New Left, who crystallized a semantics of social revolts during the 1960s and 1970s.

What can we still expect from the term revolution? It does not represent a supra-historical substance, but can only be grasped, anew, in its various historical contexts – as a striving towards social, economic, political, ethnic, gender-related and cultural ➞ equality and justice for all people. This will usually be a model that is directed towards solving the global problems of humanity, without losing sight of particular local circumstances, or of the need to overcome the many-layered process of the fragmentation of classes. Whether or not it is possible for the concept of revolution to develop believable alternatives, which can justify the risks of a revolutionary upheaval of systems, will remain the decisive question. In searching for this, it could turn out to be necessary to scrap the "locomotive of history" and replace it with new instruments, which are capable of joining up the perspectives of a social ➞ emancipation of humanity, with its limited resources, to the ecological conditions needed for life to survive, which have become precarious.

Karl Heinz Roth

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Revolution II

Revolutionary Realpolitik

The question of whether capitalism is reformable, or whether it should be overthrown unconditionally, is one that splits leftist movements, groups and parties. But this way of wording the question distorts the alternatives: a leap into something "utterly different" is actually impossible. Strategies of transformation always begin with reform. If these reforms are capable, however, of paving the way into a different society, and what the relation between short-term and long-term perspectives in this is, are questions that must be regularly re-determined. According to Rosa Luxemburg, reform and ➞ revolution are "not different methods" but rather "different moments in development." Capitalism is not simply capitalism. When circumstances are unfavorable, reforms serve the exclusive purpose of improving the immediate situation of the exploited, the humiliated and the oppressed. More favorable circumstances permit reforms to extend and safeguard the spaces, both material and immaterial, in which the Left can act. As with every reform, hard-won achievements – including ➞ shorter working time, increasing wages, social security systems, ecological improvements and steps towards democratization – are all fragile compromises with contradictory forms. They took on their present shape amid social struggles, and it was possible to integrate them into capitalist dynamics. Yet these achievements are threatened when accumulation starts to falter, or when interrelations between different forces realign themselves. There is no alternative to fighting in order to fence in the socially and ecologically destructive dynamics that go hand in hand with capitalism – and yet engaging in these fights means hitting ones head against the limitations of the bourgeois state and the capitalist market. The state, on the other hand, must fulfill two functions: safeguarding social cohesion of a society that is divided into classes, and guaranteeing the general conditions of reproduction for the accumulation of capital – which simultaneously represent the fundaments of its tax-based existence. These parallel functions impose limits on reforms inside capitalism.

It is also not possible to arbitrarily regulate the capitalist market, i.e. by substantially curtailing its negative effects, without it simultaneously losing some of its ability to function. The function of capital is not exclusively based on the innovative and efficient (re)-combination of laborers and workers, of the means of production, and of resources, but also on the production of an increasing surplus value, i.e. exploitation, and on uninterrupted accumulation, i.e. growth. If one of these two is restrained significantly, capital loses the foundations of its existence, including its "innovative" moments. There is a contradiction between capitalist production and ecology, and there are limits to the social state within capitalism.

Leftist politics has to sound out how politics can be done within these boundaries, how the boundaries themselves can be surmounted, and how, in the process of doing this, the "innovative" moments can be extricated from the capital form, and organized in a new way. Against this backdrop, realistic daily politics "which only plants achievable goals and knows how to follow them along the shortest routes and with the most efficacious means" (R. Luxemburg) are falling short of their potential. Transformative steps that can be implemented immediately are needed. Concomitantly, these immediate measures have to increase individuals' ability to act in relation to their own life conditions, and to dispose over shared possibilities. Moreover, these same immediate measures have to lead the way to a new perspective, and to indicate the next steps that need to be taken, on the road to an ongoing transformation of the whole of society.

"Revolutionary *Realpolitik*" in Luxemburg's sense of the word sublates the false dichotomy between reform and revolution. In this concept, "revolutionary" refers more to the tumultuous, transformative character of a kind of politics that digs right down into the roots, and refers less to the violent, turn-around point of a revolutionary seizure of power. Luxemburg's warning about realism makes this clear: act using what is known about the relations of forces in society, but while remembering the perspective of realigning these forces; link in to the real conditions and contradictions, through which every individual must navigate, including individuals' everyday worries and interests; start from one's own interests and passions, but reformulate these in such a way – "ethically-politically," to use Gramsci's words – so that the immediate interests of various groups, still isolated from each other, can be transcended, and can be generalized in a synthesis with the interests of other groups and class-fractions.

A positive, transformational and integrated project is needed, which takes reforming capitalism as its starting point, yet nevertheless confers a particular direction on these reforms. A project that is capable of thinking about breaks with the existing order, and which knows how to lead the way to them. Protagonists in such a process must be part of a ➞ mosaic left by default, orientated around participation, and capable of empowering each individual to take hold of the steering wheel of their own history.

Mario Candeias

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Revolutionary Realpolitik

Rhizome

In 1970, Michel Foucalt appealed for a turning away from dualistic, dichotomous and dialectic models of thought, i.e. a renunciation of those concepts, characteristic of ➞ Marxism, which are based on thinking in opposites. The intellectual ordering of categories into dual singularities was repellent for Foucalt, and not just because it led to big simplifications. Foucalt argued that the issue was also of practical relevance: anything recognized as being identical (to another category) and composed of various parts can in turn be represented, and it is in these representations that relations of power are represented. Building on this, Foucault pleaded for a type of "thinking [made up of] scattered and nomadic plurality, which is neither limited nor summarized by any coercions of the same."

Deleuze and Guattari followed a similar strategy, when they began to write about the rhizome. This concept originated in botany, where it describes a subterranean plant stem, like ginger. Guattari and Deleuze drew on this botanical element to distinguish their work from another botanical image, the tree as metaphor. And the tree-of life-does indeed play a central part in the history of ideas, as an image that represents relationships and contexts of development. It does this by immediately suggesting clear derivations, lines of evolution, and dualistic divisions: using this framework, theories can be traced back to an original theory, history is understood as evolution, and sparks jumping the gaps or roads linking separated areas are not part of the plan. Whereas the subterranean plant stem, which captured Deleuze and Guattari's imagination, offers a completely different story. A rhizome grows in an unforeseeable and non-hierarchical way, building webs and knots, and "can be snapped and destroyed at any given point, [yet it will still] pullulate on, along its own and other lines." Or to put it in a different way: the rhizome as a metaphor is permanently associative.

Strategic interest in the concept can be explained by the situation that Deleuze and Guattari found themselves in, as co-thinkers inside radical movements in the 1960s and 1970s, who were confronted with an evolutionist form of Marxism, in which stages of development were (almost) set in stone. In contrast to the majority of the New Left, Deleuze and Guattari were not simply content with criticizing the schematic understanding of emancipation that had taken hold inside communist parties. Instead, they disputed the very foundations of this type of thinking. Starting with the rhizome, they endeavored to establish a philosophy of things that are moveable and of mobilities. In their work, the fencing-ins and segmentations that are characteristic of interrelations of order are interrupted, repeatedly and persistently, by nomadizing disengagements and (intellectual) flights (➞ exodus). Further, it is characteristic for associative, rhizomatic thinking to have neither a central subject nor a leading instance, from which historical change or even emancipation could be derived.

Using apparently disconnected terms from the theory or machines, art, botany and the history of war, Deleuze and Guattari started to describe society as production. The processes of refusing and of protesting, and the outbreak of sexual desire that could be observed in the 1970s, were not, according to this way of thinking, the result of a single political line of development, or of the class struggle, but were rather a complex interlinkage. Various social and artistic practices, organizational knowledge, authoritative *and* subversive discourse, economic conditions and much more, all conglomerated. While thinking in this very broad fashion, Deleuze and Guattari always returned to two concepts: the machine, in which various elements engage with each other in order to bring forth something new – and the ma And it is indeed a cartographic perspective that makes it possible to consider utterly different elements – actors and types of knowledge, tactics and tools, cultural memories and state structures, economies and acts or speech – as not cut off from one another, but rather as elements that can be arranged, in a shared process, onto different levels. Deleuzian thinking is often criticized for having smoothed the path for postmodern whateverism. Deleuze and Guattari's idealization of a nomadic type of movement has also provoked many ripostes. Ultimately, disengagement is not, in itself, positive, but can fly off into any conceivable direction – including fatal ones. Despite this, there is something fascinating about Guattari and Deleuze's thought: their texts constantly send out impulses. The concepts they propose are not intended for describing circumstances exactly, but rather for triggering off movements of thought about the circumstances, and thereby setting associative nexus into motion. Continuing to think about the same things in a different way, to consider new possibilities, to produce surprising connections between what appear to be delimiting phenomena – these are perhaps the most important contributions that Deleuzian rhizomatics continue to make to a political form of practice.

Raul Zelik

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Rhizome

Right to be lazy

This slogan can be traced back to Paul Lafargue, an individual with close ties to Karl Marx, and alongside that his son-in-law; and one of the early fighters for ➞ Marxism in the French workers' movement. His 1883 work "Le droit à la paresse," subsequently published by Eduard Bernstein in German in 1891, carries a title that translates as "the right to be lazy." In this work, Lafargue uses polemical and satirical means to attack the demand for a "right to work," and the extreme form of work ethic that accompanied it. Lafargue discusses pre-capitalist forms of society, in which work – apart from agricultural work and the work involved in "war craft" – was frowned upon, and considered not worthy of a free citizen. Lafargue then proceeds to transfer this scorn onto wage labor, and focuses on emancipation through the machine "as the savior of humanity... the God that will buy us free from wage labor, and will grant us freedom and the inspiration that comes from doing nothing." This argument was criticized: by harking back to historical forms of society and zooming in on happy people who, instead of working, "lie smoking in the sun," Lafargue reproduced upper-class prejudices. Despite this, the slogan is today more relevant than ever, with political stakeholders everywhere demanding the "right to work," more jobs, or more discipline within the system of wage labor.

Which is where the question of alternatives comes in. Marx had already had a vision of abolishing work [prior to Lafargue], by which he meant that human activity should be turned from a burden into a voluntary pleasure, in which people could joyfully develop their capabilities. This is the starting point taken by Iring Fetscher, in a new interpretation for a new edition of Lafargue's work. Fetscher asks which new opportunities would be open up if we had more free time: and points out that this is what we already have had, through shorter working days. Although these opportunities could create more self-confident, critical and vigilant citizens, Fetscher reminds us that this would not automatically be the case. Free time can be spent either in an extremely achievement-orientated fashion like working time can, or in a totally passive manner. The growing number of ways to watch TV in recent years is a case in point.

According to Fetscher, what is apposite today is less a "right to be lazy," and rather a "right to develop the ability to be satisfactorily active." Restructuring the world of work by "freeing up" (➞ reducing working time) only makes sense if people retain their ability to use the ➞ liberty they have gained in a satisfying way. And that has to rest on suitable skills and knowledge. Regarding periods of high unemployment, some go on to claim that these shouldn't just be seen as a curse but also as a possible opening; such claims should be considered in relation to other concepts that disclose new perspectives, like ➞ basic income etc. It would also be fitting to mention the concept of "new work" at this stage, meaning supporting other forms of activeness beside paid work, even though this approach is not met with universal approval in alternative circles.

Alternative projects and alternative ways of life of life (➞ lifestyle-forms) can only be appraised from the perspective of the right to be lazy. The diversity of such projects means, however, that only general observations may be made: although alternative projects normally have to earn money too, the claim persists that economic pressures be dodged as far as possible, and that cultural, artistic and social issues at least be given equal treatment. Often in organizing such projects, individuals decide to do without conventional payment, and normally without working-time accounts, and other similar record-keeping methods. Further principles of such projects, including, foremost, that all participants are involved in making consensus-decisions – as opposed to majority-decision-making – are an essential foundation for overcoming wage labor employment relations. Such principles certainly don't result in doing nothing: on the contrary, these projects can often only be sustained with a high level of engagement and time contributed for a common cause. Returning to the core message of the demand with which we began, meaningfulness in activity and the development of skills are unquestionably intrinsic qualities of such projects.

Karl-Heinz Simon

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Right to the City

Originally coined by Henri Lefebvre, the concept of the "*Right to the city*" is highly abstract, its meaning multilayered and undetermined simultaneously. Both *city* and *right* are used here as metaphors, and not in accordance with their quotidian definitions.

Lefebvre's right to the city contains both the city's "creative excess," stretching beyond the rationality of economy and of state planning, the city as a space in which things and possibilities unfold, *and* the right to participate in urban centrality, to not be deported to discriminating zones on the edge. As such, it incorporates the right to *difference*, the right not to subordinate yourself to the stipulations of homogenizing powers. For Lefebvre, the city represents both reality and possibility. From one perspective, urbanity is the currently dominant spatial form through which life in society is transmitted; from the opposite perspective, the city is the location of utopian visions of a different, better society, and of collective resistance against the technocratic colonization of everyday life. The concept of the right to the city emerged in the context of Paris in May 1968, which Lefebvre interpreted as an attempt by students, workers and migrants to (re)-conquer the historical center of Paris by starting from the respective peripheries of each group. From the factories, the *grandes ensembles* of the suburbs, and from the universities in the outer districts, these groups steamed back into the center of the city and appropriated *(the right to) the city.* While these demands for, and battles about the city in the wake of the 1968 movements often contributed to steering urban development into more sustainable, post-Fordist channels, they also effected a radicalization of relevant academic disciplines, particularly urban sociology and geography. The question of "who does the city belong to?" had made it onto the radar of widely diverging social and political groups.

For several years now, the concept has appeared with new connotations, in academic discourse, and in the communications of international NGOs, and in the language of ➞ social movements. Post-structuralist debates, in which Lefebvre is traded as a pioneer of cultural transition, mostly use *the right to the city* to describe particular conflicts in complex cities. It is also popular to reach for it in analysis of public space contestation, as Don Mitchell does for example, who addresses the (withheld) right of the homeless to use public spaces (in his work *The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space*), or by individuals like Setha Low and Neil Smith, who discuss the right to the city as a claim for the political use of public urban spaces (The Politics of Public Space, 2006).

"Urban agendas" of international and transnational political networks and the multifaceted initiatives of ➞ social fora and international NGOs provide wider specifications for the RTC. In 2003, international human rights groups presented, together with UNESCO, a *World Charter for the Human Right to the City*. In 2004, the Habitat International Coalition unveiled several documents, including the draft version of a *World Charter on the Right to the City* at the Social Forum of the Americas in Quito, and at the second World Urban Forum in Barcelona. In order to unify these diverse efforts and declarations, the UN-HABITAT and UNESCO have been working since 2005 together with the International Social Science Council and international NGOs to build consensus between the central actors – particularly municipal authorities – regarding a form of politics capable of safeguarding sustainable, fair and democratic development for urban inhabitants. In these campaigns and declarations, the RTC encompasses ➞ human rights to housing and work, nutrition and clean water, health, safety, access to public infrastructure, participation in decision-making processes, and much more. In this context, social movement groups and social fora are primarily interested in the relevant *tool kits* to develop participatory municipal budgeting. In the USA for example, local migrants' groups, local district groups and workers' groups joined forces in 2007 to form a *Right to the City Alliance* (RTTCA), to link up their local battles against gentrification, exclusion and marginalization on a national level. For these groups, RTC means resistance against neoliberal urban restructuring and the "vision of a city appropriate to working-class needs." Faced with keener social polarization and the many-sided impertinences that the neoliberal adjustment of urbanity implies forever more inhabitants, the RTTCA groups are practicing Lefebvre's original concept of RTC – without even referring to him.

Margit Mayer

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Self-empowerment

In the ➞ emancipatory sense of the term, i.e. a principally leftist political sense, self-empowerment means reappropriating powers to decide and to act, and collectively violating rules, by using an autonomous method of carrying out actions that extends beyond mere ➞ protest. Defined thus, self-empowerment can take place on all layers of regulated societal life, when people refuse to accept these same political or economic regulations, e.g. laws or employers' plans. This is why it is no accident that we find self-empowerment in practice in the most regulated areas of the wage labor relations, and of social struggles. Both in the form of workers organizing themselves and in the form of social struggles, self-empowerment can be understood as a revolt against everyday petty regulation, and as a departure from political representation using representatives. It should however be remembered, that self-empowerment emerges out of diverse contexts. The concept of workers' self-empowerment is understood as meaning workers self-organizing, a process that usually finds expression in ➞ wildcat strikes that have not been permitted, and which are therefore not only directed against the employer, but also against the official representatives of these workers interests. Up into the 1970s, there was a lively tradition in Germany of labor struggles without trade unions, but since then there has been an enormous professionalization of the representation of both companies and of trade unions' interests, which has made the representation model stronger. This has been described in a variety of ways, including from critical perspectives, which talk about this new development as the ordering function of the trade unions. Despite passionate debate on this inside the trade-unionist left, it has not yet been possible for any workforce to criticize practically the right of representation that the trade union apparatus appears to have, by, for example, founding an independent strike steering group. Against this backdrop, it has always been possible, until now, for trade union functionaries to transform initiatives for wildcat strikes and factory occupations via the channels of negotiation, and to reshape these into "socially compatible" solutions. Despite this, individual self-empowerment in the workplace still takes place on a daily basis, and expresses itself either through sabotage and whistle-blowing, or, alternatively, in the form of unpaid co-thinking about challenges, and by closing the gaps in the planning and the organization of work. In countries with lower levels of organizational intensity, like France for example, self-empowerment extends right up to the point of occupying companies or "detaining the manager" – albeit without any major success at the end of the process.

In the case of social resistance, actions are directed against the state and its institutions. Here, self-empowerment means contesting regulation about the distribution and allocation of resources. The forms of action that result from this are appropriation, refusing to carry out a task, or the use of humiliation and occupation to obstruct particular individuals, while empowering others. The most well-known German examples in recent years include the: "*Aktion Agenturschluss*," a campaign aimed at closing down state job centers to protest the punitive unemployment benefit and social security laws known as the *Hartz-Gesetze*; *"Castor schottern,"* aimed at stopping nuclear waste transports; the furious protests of a diverse group of citizens against the mega train-station building "Stuttgart 21" project; and, more recently, the ➞ Occupy movement.

Self-empowerment as an act of recalcitrance and of disobedience (➞ civil disobedience), is based on the premise that at least some signs of a rebellious (➞ rebellion), emancipatory subject exist in advance, which it then goes on to define more clearly. As such, it should be understood as a collective process of learning and autodidacticism, and one that depends on its own dynamic, and on the quality of self-organization. Comprehensible, as being the self-organization of those immediately affected by a process, the mere act of self-empowerment represents a symbolic success, and carries within it the potential of being able to move out of a purely defensive fight into a different stage of the battle. Whether or not self-empowerment attains the character of an emancipatory practice that can change society – or not, as the case may be – depends on the forms of organization and protest chosen during the process, and on the opponents' reactions.

Many actions of self-empowerment and appropriation actions up to the present day have had no more than a symbolic character, because it was not possible to integrate the bulk of those affected by a particular development into these actions; nor was it possible to convey the protest into an everyday resistance of those affected. However, the global Occupy movement has developed positive approaches in this regard, by, on the one hand, reappropriating what used to be public squares, and, on the other hand, practicing ➞ grassroots structures of action and decision-making in the process. Yet if long-term structural changes are to be achieved, these new forms of behavior need to be carried back into everyday life outside of the camps.

When acts of self-empowerment are considered shameless by the general population, because they overstep boundaries, then this speaks in favor of their success, at least in the short term. However, it largely depends on their longer-term objectives, whether or not they become integrated into the existing system as a modernizing

factor, whether they lead to changes in consciousness that can think beyond the borders of the current, capitalist system, or whether they can even impact to overcome this system.

Mag Wompel

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Self-empowerment

Shorter Working Time

It's actually a development we should be cheerful about: the digital revolution, or "third industrial revolution," is increasing workforce productivity massively. Continually more efficient technology, better qualifications, and growing work intensity allow ever fewer people to produce a wider range of goods and services – in less time than they used to. Despite this, millions remain unemployed. There's a gaping chasm between the number of workplaces on offer, and the number of people seeking work. There's nothing more plausible than the idea that working time could now be reduced for everybody, merely by sharing it out onto everybody's shoulders. Bertrand Russell tackled this issue many years ago already, by reconsidering the example of pin production that Adam Smith had already addressed:

"Suppose that … Someone makes an invention by which the same number of men can make twice as many pins. But humanity doesn't need twice as many pins: they're already so cheap that hardly any more will be bought at a lower price. ... The men still work eight hours, there are too many pins, some employers go bankrupt, and half the men … are thrown out of work. There is, in the end, just as much leisure as on the other plan, but half the men are totally idle while half are still overworked." (From *In Praise of Idleness,* 1932)

This absurdity is being trumped by current economics. Companies and states are extending working time, which destroys workplaces. Grave realignments in the capitalist world system form the backdrop to this process. The global provision of workers has swollen markedly, creating a *global industrial reserve army* – a result of the end of the alternative world market in the "real socialist" countries and the integration of Asian countries into the world market. This in turn has led to massive pressure on wages and working conditions worldwide, and has allowed the power of capital to grow still further. The pronounced rise in global competitive pressure has caused real wages to sink everywhere, and to an enormous increase in profits, which then perpetually search for new investment possibilities. The global working class finds itself in the *jaws* of a technological destruction of workplaces, and facing the merciless whip of financial markets run wild. The world economy grows, producing worsened working and living conditions in the Global North as it does in the Global South. In so doing however, it also produces potentially rebellious victims.

The fight for shorter working time has become harder under these conditions. Yet there have always been successes and defeats during this battle: in 1891, the German Book Printers' Association struck for the eight-hour day; while in 1923, the eight-hour day that had been won several years before, was abolished again. After the Second World War, it was possible to introduce the 40-hour week in France, while in Germany some success was recorded in the battle for the 35-hour week. Which is now being threatened again.

The economic system is developing in the wrong direction at present, as is evident from the downward spirals of wages, social standards and taxes. An ➞ emancipatory opposition movement must aim for reconquering the *primacy of politics over economics* for society, and at regulating the markets – the employment market above all. It is imperative to use contradiction possible in daily conflicts. The demands for a ➞ minimum wage, ➞ for basic income at an existential-security-providing level, and for shorter working time, constitute a trio of aims that could be fought for using ➞ solidarity that crosses all borders. However, long-term goals in this field including abolishing meaningless work (e.g. in the arms industry); and are concerned with a redistribution of work between men and women, between leaders and people who carry out work, and between physical and mental labor. This will not be possible without changing property relations. It is only when the "slavish subordination under the division of labor" (Marx) has been overcome, that we will be able to talk about a real *humanization of work* – or from a FAIR distribution of work.

To come back to Bertrand Russell: "In a sensible world, everybody concerned in the manufacturing of pins would take to working four hours instead of eight." When the people have torn the markets out of the hands of those who profit from them, and when they have created an exit out of their powerlessness in the face of the markets – that they themselves are responsible for; when they take their fate back into their own hands using new democratic forms; then this "common-sense world" will be able to shorten working time in a radical and planned fashion, in order to go easy on nature, and give us more time in which to live, love and laugh.

Peter Strotmann

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Social Europe

This term was first coined in the 1980s, when the European Community was in the process of opting for a market-centered means of integration, embodied in the project of a single market. In order to legitimate this and to lend a social dimension to this new market, Delors, the president of the European Commission at that time, developed the idea of defining shared social values – a "European social model" – which should be defended and maintained in the face of increasing economic enmeshment. According to this model, the European level of government should take on increasing responsibility for social equilibrium and social-political regulation, with the objective of combining ➞ social justice and ➞ solidarity with productivity and efficiency. But this has not worked: the single market, now wearing the crown of economic and currency union, has considerably exacerbated competition concerning the location of business and industry between member states. The downward spiral in terms of social-benefit levels, tax incomes and regulation triggered off by this trend could not be halted by a few minimum standards in the areas of social and employment politics, which the actors involved were able to agree to

In 2000, people began to draw on the concept again, when the aim of a "social Europe" was accorded a prominent place in the Lisbon Strategy. Whoever studied the small print of this plan soon discovered, however, that one conceptualization of the term dominated in this context: social politics was there to serve the purpose of providing the economy with well-trained and educated, flexible and cheap members for its workforce. Financial burdens were to be removed from state and company budgets by an increasing privatization of pension and healthcare systems. Social Europe had become a stalking horse for a neoliberal strategy focused on "modernizing" (i.e. diminishing) social achievements in the name of growth and competitiveness. The euro currency crisis has aggravated this tendency. Recommendations to member states to structure their social systems in way that conform to the market, which were not yet binding within the framework of the Lisbon Strategy, have been made increasingly binding through new instruments for coordinating economic politics that include the Euro-Plus Pact, and a ratcheted up Stability and Growth Pact. For those states under the control of the Euro Rescue Package, these "recommendations" are immediately obligatory.

In front of this backdrop, the most urgent task facing ➞ social movements is to fight back in a shared, cross-border effort against these unparalleled social cuts that are being implemented throughout Europe. When doing this, it would be sensible for social movements to re appropriate the term "social Europe." Using the term assures, on the one hand, that the EU is being referred to in a generally positive way – even though its current form should be strongly criticized – and that going back to nationalism is not an alternative. On the other hand, the argument must be fought through concerning *how* the term should be reappropriated, and about the new directionality for European integration that would arise from this. In presenting this argument, we can draw on a number of preexisting and sometimes contradictory proposals. A *defensive version* sees a social Europe as a protection for national "social states" (i.e. in the sense of the German word *Sozialstaat*, akin, but not identical to the welfare state). Incorporating a social progress clause into the major European agreements, coupled with fixing impressive minimum standards in the areas of social-benefits, regulation and taxes would at least have the effect of removing these three latter mentioned quantities from a competitive framework, and would thereby open up new spaces in which member states would be able to shape things again. An alternative to this defensive agenda must be, however, a version of social Europe that is *genuinely European and designed to attack*: alongside a sea change in economic politics, which clearly subordinates these politics to social goals, developing a catalogue of ➞ social rights – including rights to education, housing and social security – makes sense in this context. Using the mechanism of an "Alternative Stability Pact," targets could be set for combating poverty, unemployment and environmental destruction. The coordinated reconstruction of ➞ public services, which are currently under pressure from economic liberalization in all member countries, constitutes another important element in a program for a social Europe. This would create latitude for transforming societies according to ecological principles, and for forging jobs that are worthy of humans. Increasingly, all these measures should be accompanied by a redistribution of wealth between richer and poorer member states. These paths can lead to a transnational European solidarity that can be realized without transferring costs onto the backs of the global South, or onto nature.

Anne Karrass

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Social Europe

Social Fora

Diverse social movements, organizations and actors have been meeting on an intensive basis in social fora since 2001. Organized initially as a counter-forum to the World Economic Forum, the ➞ World Social Forum, the idea rapidly developed beyond being mere opposition and critique of economic globalization. Like the accompanying continental, regional and local social fora that emerged in the aftermath of the first World Social Forum, all these for became drafts of alternative "different worlds," and locations at which global ➞ social movements meet and construct new infrastructure for productive conflict, swapping experiences, shared reflection, and decentralized yet still globally organized processes of resistance. While international meetings are in themselves nothing new, world social fora do represent a new form of global organization. It should be noted that social fora are *not* a representative council of delegates, equipped with voting rights, for an emancipated, global civil society, at which concluding declarations can be penned, or decisions taken. Rather, social fora define themselves as open-access spaces, as a forum for debates, as a movement of ideas, and as a horizontal process of renewal for constructing a solidaristic world.

The idea of space – including intellectual, mental, geographical space, and space conceived of in other way – is central to the organization of social fora, and is enshrined in the ➞ World Social Forum *Charter of Principles*. This document is sustained by the conviction, that societal relations of power and authority can only be transformed long-term if resistance grows from below – in a grassroots-democratic and decentralized way. Concurrently, the charter is conscious of global-local processes of contextualization. This is why the multiplication of local, regional and polycentric social fora perceived as decisive. This is a process that has to take the various, and nevertheless interrelated realities of this world into account, alongside diverse political perspectives, and legacies from the past – including leftist ones. Mirroring this intention, the significance of transnational networks, often focused around specific issues, has risen rapidly during the course of previous social fora. New networks have been established, including the African Water Network and Afrique-Europe-Interact, out of which new, transnational resistance activities have issued. Here as in the many, issue-based and region-based social fora which continue to take place in the global South, the gains already achieved are there for all to see. Convergent to this, social fora are facing huge challenges. The "social forum movement" in Europe has more or less tailed out. Whether the roots for this lack of dynamism could be found already in the constituting processes for the Social Forum in Germany and the European Social Forum, with their tendency for doing concealed, "smoke-filled rooms" type of politics, or whether in Europe and Germany other political locations have proven to be more productive historically, leading to a dearth of dynamism in European social forum politics, is an open question. Nonetheless, it is undisputed, at the latest from the start of the "crisis," that the European social forum process could no longer offer appropriate spaces for dealing with this crisis productively. This is despite the fact that a European answer "from below" was extremely necessary, in order to build ➞ solidarity, a process that was hindered by the crisis manifesting itself so differently in different parts of Europe. Leaving the specific European dimension aside, we see generally that global social movements will have to stride forward on the social forum route, when fury about the status quo, the difficulties of radical change, and the challenges that are inherent in transnational organization have all been considered. How "small" and "big" levels can be joined up together organically amid a myriad of organizational forms, fields of contestation, people, and different starting points remains the intractably difficult core, yet also the tremendously exciting thing, in the global movement process.

The labor invested into new networks, which have been nudged into life by the social forum process, demonstrates that emancipatory politics must be situated at a level that overcomes thematic divisions, and situated in a place between openly accessible spaces, reflection, and active individuals. This is the way to unlock maximum potential. In a loose parallel to this model, a network of refugee groups from Europe and migrant groups from Africa and specifically from the Maghreb pushed forward their agenda in advance of the World Social Forum in Dakar in 2011. Out of this, new contexts, politics – including actions against land-grabbing – and organizational forms have emerged. So while there are many locations and many actors for whom the social forum process has not been a lasting influence, it has nevertheless had a substantial influence on many other locations and groups. Viewed as a unified promise, and as a necessary illusory one at that, the social forum as a political space is perhaps past its best. This does not however mean that the search for transnational, open political spaces has reached its end. A search now equipped with a wealth of experience from thematic, regional, local, continental and world social fora.

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Social fora

Social Infrastructure

The state's task and role in guaranteeing property, contracts and loans, in providing transport routes, energy provision and real estate development, and, finally, in even supporting "risky" investments – all in the name of maintaining infrastructure for "the economy" – seems to go unquestioned. At the most, there is some nitpicking about "subsidies," but this is principally about issues like fixed tax breaks for commuters in Germany, and not about the state providing massive guarantees for business risk. Moreover, the company forms prescribed by law, ranging from a "company with limited liability" (known, in the German-speaking world under the acronym GmbH), to a concern, configure the regulations for write-offs and bankruptcy law as mechanisms, with which losses can be redistributed onto the shoulders of taxpayers – and onto all taxpayers in society if possible. What does exist, analogous to this, as guarantees for the reproduction of labor power, is constantly being denigrated to the status of a gift, or a mollycoddling luxury at best, even though it's largely paid for in Germany by personal contributions into insurance schemes. When seen in this way, it is also seen as a legitimate object when governments consider what to cut next.

Despite the greatest efforts however, humans cannot realize themselves entirely through their function as labor power. Furthermore, labor power is neither the sole nor even the most important form of labor, which needs doing and which is necessary, to conduct an individual life. However much the economy attempts to turn their argument, that only wage labor is "real work" and everything else is "free time," into a self-evident truth, it remains an unavoidable fact that the most important forms of labor, from which we actually live, are the shared activities and mutual services, which can be described as "house work," work we do by or for ourselves (in German: *Eigenarbeit*), and "community work." Wage labor, with which we earn money, is merely one part, conceived of in such a way as to make it necessary, of this whole repertoire of forms of labor that make up the work of keeping the households going, in which and from which we live. Many people, including many in the workers' movement, held and still hold onto the idiotic illusion that all these forms of labor could be replaced by commodities and services. Equating the realm of ➞ liberty with the realm of spare time was and remains an idiotic misunderstanding, as if liberty consisted of watching TV, drinking beer with your friends, and making cheap comments.

Seen in the context of the labor of life as a whole, the value of wage labor is limited. In addition, goods manufactured using wage labor as an input are only of limited use for life, and are often superfluous or even harmful. This is directly the case with weapons, and indirectly the case with negative ecological consequences from much wage labor production, and from the massive utilization of products. Viewed from this perspective, social security based on providing a temporary replacement for wage payments is not enough. Social security should rather be seen as something that can enable everybody to do the labor that we need for our lives. Or to put it another way: the state would maintain social infrastructure, in an analogy, to what it does for economic activity. Just as is the case with the economy, it would maintain social infrastructure using tax income. This perspective goes on to consider economic infrastructure as being one special area inside the framework of social infrastructure. This special area must demonstrate that it is serving the needs of economic activities that are necessary for a life that can be called "social" in the true sense of the word; further, it must demonstrate whether it helps or harms such a life.

Infrastructure is necessary for the "defensive" activities of guaranteeing nutrition, clothing, accommodation, and equipping households. Infrastructure is also necessary for the activities of education and developing cooperational life and mutual advancement. Infrastructure is necessary to provide care in foreseeable situations and periods of particular neediness, for example during childhood, youth and old age, when sick, or after accidents. Infrastructure is necessary in order to facilitate a future spreading of activities connected to the organization of specific processes and services. To facilitate everyone to be able to take part and contribute their ideas to decisions about the future of society, infrastructure is also necessary. This is why this form of infrastructure consists of organizations concerned with: basic provision; the health service; education; the facilitation of nursing care; economic and political development; science and art; and experiments with different modes of living. A subordinated part of this infrastructure would also be something like a ➞ basic income: the better all this infrastructure is, the lower this basic income can be.

Looking at the politics of social security in this fashion is an obvious result of an informed insight into the various forms of labor and their meaning. It also results from studying how social security is being levered out of upholding a significant role by precarization and labor-force-entrepreneurship in neoliberalism's mode of production. A fundamental reconstruction of social security should not restrict itself to the idea of a basic income, but should rather aim at building up social infrastructure more comprehensively.

Heinz Steinert (deceased)

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Social Infrastructure

Socialism

Socialism established itself as a deep-seated intellectual current during the great upheavals of the French Revolution and of the onset of capitalism in the United Kingdom and other west European countries. Its objective was to bring about the ➞ emancipatory demands of ➞ liberty, ➞ equality and fraternity (see ➞ solidarity), and to grant universal validity to the declaration of ➞ human rights. As early as 1793, Jacques Roux, leader of the radical-democratic movement known as *Les Enragés* (the enraged ones) addressed the national convention: "Liberty is but an empty illusion, when one class of men can starve another with impunity. Equality is but an empty illusion, when, through monopolies, the rich have the right to dispose over the life or death of their fellow humans. The Republic is but an empty illusion when the counterrevolution is enacted daily through the price of foodstuffs that three-quarters of the citizenry cannot afford; and no one sheds a tear."

Socialism articulated the goal of restructuring interrelations of ownership and power, of the means of life, culture and society, and interrelations with nature, between different peoples, and between the sexes, in such a manner, that the most strongly disadvantaged classes and groups in society could gain access to the material and immaterial commodities necessary to live an emancipated life with dignity. The basic position was that without fundamentally changing the basic conditions of a society, it would be impossible to liberate the exploited, the marginalized and the despised. This is the sense in which the term socialism was first consciously used in 1837, in the teachings of Robert Owen, a Welsh social reformer and founder of the ➞ cooperative movement. After this early use, it quickly acquired general recognition.

During the 18th and 19th centuries, four basic variants of socialism emerged, that differed from each other principally on the issues of the role of the state and of ownership. Both ➞ communism and social reformism wanted to make use of the state as a central means of transition. While communism insisted that collective ownership and the planned economy had to be central features of a new society, social reformism envisaged the main task as being the creation of fundamentally new state parameters for markets, for the ➞ social-state or welfare state, and for building up the public sector. In opposition to this, ➞ anarchism views the state itself as a central instrument of oppression and strives instead for the free cooperation of individuals, without hierarchies, in self-administered collectives. Democratic socialism, in turn, wants to achieve this same aim through a fusion of ➞ solidarity economy with ➞ social ownership of disposal over property, and through a form of ➞ radical, participatory democracy. In its various incarnations, socialism became an important reference point for important emancipation movements, including the workers' movement, the women's movement, movements against slavery, racism, colonialism and anti-Semitism, and the peace and ecological movement. All have had or still have a socialist wing, and enrich the ideas of socialism with concrete experiences, utopias and alternative approaches.

These movements drew an explanation from socialism for why their aims were impossible to realize without a structural ➞ revolution or transformation of society. Seen from a different perspective however, socialism saw in these movements a force with which to realize just this sort of upheaval for socialist aims. As Karl Marx wrote in 1843-44: "Just as philosophy [author's note: i.e. the philosophy or radical liberation] finds *its material* weapon in the form of the proletariat, so does the proletariat find its *intellectual* weapon in philosophy ..." The Bolsheviks' establishment of a party-dictatorship led to the split between a form of communism with this specific directionality, and democratic currents in socialism. Attempts made by Rosa Luxemburg and others to join democracy and socialism together remained a minority pursuit in the 20th century, or where put down by force of arms. This western New Left, which formed in the 1960s, aimed for an anti-authoritarian and emancipatory renewal of socialism. In cooperation with the Zapatista in Mexico, the ➞ World Social Forum process, the new ➞ social movements, the restructuring and new emergence of left-wing parties, and governments in Venezuela and Bolivia, contemporary ideas about a ➞ socialism for the 21st century continue to be voiced and written. Concepts of a ➞ solidarity economy, radical democracy and ➞ global social rights are taking more of a back seat, while the project of *green* socialism is being articulated.

Michael Brie

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Socialism for the 21st Century

This concept is principally about pursuing two aims. Firstly, people can use it to defend ➞ socialism as an alternative to capitalist society that remains valid. This became important at a moment in history in which ➞ Marxism found itself in a crisis caused by the break down of "actually existing socialism" in the eastern bloc countries, and in which socialism had disappeared beyond the horizons of current political struggles. Secondly, the concept of socialism for the 21st century is used to distance contemporary struggles about post-capitalist society from the experiences of socialism in the 20th century, particularly from the Soviet model.

One of the most influential authors in the first phase of the debate was Heinz Dieterich. In his theses, he proposes a radically scientistic and technocratic theory. He begins by reactivating the idea of so-called scientific socialism. Knowledge about human nature makes it possible to scientifically prove the necessity of socialism today. Moreover, the material basis for socialism has only become available now, alongside the contemporary development of productive forces. The absence of a matured development of these forces explains the failure of socialism last century. It is only since the beginning of this century, thanks to recent scientific revolutions, particularly in microelectronics, that productive forces have developed far enough to facilitate human ➞ emancipation, and thereby the transition from the realm of necessity to the realm of liberty. Finally, it is only on the basis of contemporary science and technology that it has become possible to organize and administer a socialist society. It is only through progress in cybernetics that the law of value has become applicable to the whole of production. Because of this, a work-value can now be attributed in a rigorously scientific manner to every phase of the production of commodities and services. This is turn makes it possible to completely liberate ourselves from market laws, and to achieve a truly socialist society.

These however are not the contents that have left a real mark on the political debate about a socialism for the 21st century. In the sense of this being a political program, it is closely connected with recent upheavals in South America, especially in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. This was even more the case after the Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez had made a public call to build the socialism of the 21st century, at the World Social Forum in Puerto Alegre in 2005. This call and this concept was also met with interest amongst some currents of the European Left.

In political debates, the concept remains open, imprecise and layered with many meanings. Depending on how critically historical experiences of socialism are evaluated, and how the reasons for its previous failure have been interpreted, differing questions are stressed. And depending on the context, various aspects are considered to constitute a new socialist project. These include its necessarily democratic and participatory character, its connection to ecosocialism, and its multicultural directionality, with which it distances itself from the Eurocentric and monocultural model of the old form of socialism. It is precisely in these points of reference that the critical potential of the concept lies.

However, the debates are often colored by a lack of willingness to reflect on the experiences of socialism in the 20th century, and to learn from them, that radical alternatives are needed. This results in a tendency that the concept "socialism for the 21st century" loses and lacks critical sharpness, and is simply understood as a new name for the old socialist project. Under these conditions, the danger remains that the kind of socialism that people are attempting to construct through contemporary political processes in South America – with a state, a party, and an extractivism-based production model (➞ post-extractivism) – can ultimately hardly be told apart from the socialist experiences of the previous century.

The question remains as to whether the socialist idea is able to utilize these new auspices to liberate itself, not only from the historical burden of a state-centered, authoritarian, Soviet model, but also from its Eurocentric roots. Can they survive without a quasi-religious belief in progress, and without identifying with a universalistic and monocultural project of western modernity? And without a permanent war fought for the control over, manipulation and destruction of "nature"?

Edgardo Lander

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Social Justice

Justice is a central point of orientation for cooperative, human life, and has been characterized, from many different sides, as a key term in contemporary debates about the future. Considering something to be just means, at first at least, that it is suitable, or put more simply, right. This kind of evaluation is based on criteria accepted by society. It does not equate exactly with the legal system as codified in laws. Moreover, there is no criteria for justice has never been contested. Justice always refers to behavior and / or interrelations between different people, or, to put it another way, between their specific interests. In addition, the processes by which particular results come about are subject to a formal evaluation of justice – with reference to the impartiality of rules, for example – and are also subject to preexisting conditions, which are themselves the result of particular practices: as is the case for material justice, for example. It is against this backdrop that the situation in which a fifth of the world's population, living in the industrialized countries, utilize around four-fifths of global resources, is often labeled unjust.

The question of social justice is about principles for the distribution of commodities, goods, and opportunities to participate. As such, it is closely connected with the economic potential for increasing wealth, and with the social frameworks that are the parameters for this. As principles of social justice are always concerned with social interrelations that are constructed upon rules laid down by humans, which are themselves open to mutable and rational verification, social justice principles must, in turn, always be seen in connection with societal struggles about ➞ counter-hegemony.

Doing politics is invested in the question of how specific proposals can be *justified*. Since the 1970s, three discourses have developed more efficacy than any other in this field. It was John Rawls, who, towards the start of the crisis of the welfare state, provided impulses for the debate with his "Theory of Justice." The quintessence of his "difference principle" is that social and economic inequalities are only then admissible, if they also benefit the worst situated members [of a community or society]. The legitimation of ➞ redistribution of wealth by welfare states contained within this provoked rebuttals from neoliberal theoreticians. They argued that because the market did not use moral considerations to distribute wealth, it was not permissible to measure the results of market mechanisms using moral standards. In short, the term "social justice" was in itself a nonsensical category. These neoliberal polemics went on to compare taxes with forced labor, and to pronounce the question of (re)-distribution as more or less obsolete, or at least to define it in new terms, as a problem primarily existing between the generations. The result of a concept of justice so narrowed down that it contained no more than the efficiency of exchange, demolishing the welfare state appeared to be a prerequisite for improving the conditions of those least favored in society. Communitarian concepts, which have exerted the strongest influence on "new" social democracy at the start of the 21st century, consider that to be just, which strengthens individual responsibility *and* which contributes to the rules for the distribution of social goods being appropriate to the respective societal value of each of these goods. If, for example, the market rewards success with lots of money, then it is necessary to prevent – according to this principle – that lots of money also makes it possible to acquire other desired goods, when these goods should be distributed on the basis of other criteria (e.g. political influence, or friendship), on the basis of a general moral vision. However, because the global market is allocated the responsibility for creating work and wealth, and the ➞ welfare state is merely allocated the subordinate task of absorbing hardships that can occur, it is an individual's ability to take part in the market that becomes the ultimate condition for participation. This trend is "supported and exacted" by tougher controls on the needy, and by increasing the pressure of existence in material terms. Inside this model of thought, social justice is downgraded to being a dependent variable of national competitiveness.

An alternative to this interpretation of justice, trapped in the jaws of the market, consists of more clearly underlining the connections between poverty and wealth, and between interrelations of distribution, and opportunities for participation. Because it is paradoxical that humanity disposes over a historically unique potential for increasing wealth, yet this apparatus of production increasingly takes on a separate existence in opposition to human society, and creates more social marginalization in the process. This means that the striving towards ➞ equality should be seen as a pluralistic approach, in which the question concerning the socioeconomic preconditions for ➞ liberty, in its turn a prerequisite for the development of individual skills and human diversity, has to be set up to oppose the thesis about the "productive function of inequality."

Jörg Reitzig

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Social Justice

Social Movements

Creativity and innovation, the ability to engage with the future and sustainability: all qualities which we cannot expect to experience from the institutions that rule currently. Instead, social movements have continued over the years to erect experimental workshops, and have tried out surprising drafts for a better future. Precisely because global capitalism has continually propelled itself forward to penetrate into the last pores of world society, the Marxian hope of an all-encompassing Proletarian International – of *one* great social movement that can push open the door to a liberated society – has not been fulfilled. More than ever, social movements remain a polyphonic choir, or rather many choirs, singing very different melodies. In these, laments about injustices and human rights violations mix with complaints about authoritarian rule, and multi-faceted oppression. In addition, social movements often coalesce around catastrophes, and around unacceptable and scandalous circumstances, and protest the obscenity of ongoing and thoroughly renewed hegemonic interrelations. That said, emphasizing the defensive character of many mobilizations is only half the truth. Social movements conceive of society as something that can be consciously changed and restructured. As such, they are the personified rebuttal of the conservative and demotivating myth of complexity, and of the neoliberal creed: "there is no alternative!" Indeed, their demand for change is much less modest than that.

German social movements in the 1950s wanted a different type of federal state: with no military, with no old Nazis in positions at the top of society, and without what is known in German-language discourse as "the restoration" (*"die Restauration"* of national-socialist values, using demo-authoritarian means). The political-cultural turmoil of the 1960s was packed to the walls with alternatives that have not yet been redeemed. "Rebellious subjectivity," was how Herbert Marcuse characterized this fissure with the past. Material wealth that was piling up now seemed to be able to facilitate everything: from a guaranteed ➞ basic income, to a gently relationship with both inner and outer nature. What had begun in the 1960s with "fantasy taking power" was continued in the new social movements in the 1970s and 1980s in smaller, more practicable units of exchange: from the numerous women's projects, to the "Alternatives inside the Alternative Movement." What all these movements continued to have in common was the shared assertion that societal interrelations can be restructured. Considered individually, none of these movements appeared to be strong enough to move fundamental changes in society forward, and yet the total sum of the impulses for change that have issued from the new social movements is substantially larger than those that have come from the 20th century's large alternative systems.

With the mobilizations that are clustered around a critique of globalization, coupled with other transnational campaigns, a "movement of the movements" has emerged, that has again taken up a large part of what historically have been the themes of newer and no longer new social movements. The "movement of the movements" then imposes its own emphases on these themes (e.g. ➞ social forum). The large questions about ➞ social justice, about a strong democracy, about those interrelations of production and exchange that could facilitate a dignified, human existence for everybody – none of these have become easier to answer since their relocation to the transnational level, but they're now at least being articulated in more appropriate ways. We are now bombarded with such a range of old, new and far-off alternatives that an encyclopedia of these really is necessary. Perhaps it will be possible for the "alter-mondialisten," the champions of alter-globalization, to conserve and update these changes, and to "translate" them into a concrete and global practice of change. This appears to be more urgent than ever, in a situation where we are not only combating the catastrophic potentialities and impacts of neoliberal globalization, but also have to square up to the strengthening of right-wing extremist opposition movements, which want to profit from the same globalization with their racist ideologies of ethnically-defined people's communities, or *Volksgemeinschaften*.

A new wave of transnational protests has been unleashed by the financial market and debt crises, ongoing since 2008, by the departures towards democracy in the Arabic world (also known as "Arabellion"), and by the Fukushima nuclear power disaster. These protests take up well-known themes, but are, in many locations, more disposed towards radicalism and utopianism than their predecessors were. Moreover, the internet and social media have been able to make substantial contributions to the mobilization and dissemination of protest initiatives. The worldwide occupations triggered by ➞ „Occupy Wall Street!"; the *Acampadas* (sometimes self-defined as *Indignados*) of southern Europe, who have campaigned for "real democracy" and against shoving the debt burden and financial crisis burden onto the shoulders of the "ordinary people"; and numerous regional citizens' initiatives – all of these have demonstrated anew that social movements have become the core of demands to democratically co-structure society.

Roland Roth

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Social Movement Unionism

In the discussion about rethinking approaches to trade unionism, which primarily refers to Anglo-American approaches, Social Movement Unionism (SMU) is used as an interfacing term, which refers to a variety of concepts, including community unionism, trade union organizing, strategic unionism, comprehensive campaigns and workplace unionism. The traditional trade union approach often focused exclusively on improving working conditions for the core workforce in a plant, factory or company. With the new orientation decided upon by the US trade union federation AFL-CIO under John Sweeny in 1995, SMU campaigns were initiated with increased vigor, and the bell was sounded for the gradual departure from traditional business unionism (BU). As a term, SMU was introduced by Kim Moody in 1997. Moody is the founder of the independent and Detroit-based union newspaper "Labor Notes," and characterizes SMU using five criteria: trade union democracy and extensive participation of active volunteers; members having a responsibility to themselves to organize and unionize people who are not yet unionized; to engage with issues in a city district or municipality that effect wage-workers, and to build local, civil-society alliances; and, finally, trade union ➞ internationalism, and members having a responsibility to themselves to engage in independent political action.

Successful prototypes for this special kind of practice are campaigns like "Jobs with Justice," called into being in 1987 to mobilize people against exploitative workplaces and for social justice. In 2005, there were active alliances for *Jobs with Justice* in forty cities and in twenty-nine states in the USA. A further example is the popular "Justice for Janitors" campaign, organized the US service sector union, SEIU. Proof that this type of action leads to an increase in tangible assertiveness and in member numbers, can be seen in the 200,000 new members that SEIU has won in the cleaning sector since the start of the 1990s. A more recent and successful example of "Justice for Janitors" was the unionizing of cleaners in Houston in 2006.

In a broad coalition involving community organizers, people in public life, and activists, it was possible, using measures including militant ➞ civil disobedience, to conclude the first US collective bargaining agreement for cleaners. This contained a wage rise of more than three dollars [per hour] inside a two-year period, health insurance and pension plan, with all these improvements also pertaining to undocumented working citizens. The core of this successful SMU approach is not working conditions as such, but rather the question of social justice.

SMU is practiced in many countries. In Australia and New Zealand, the campaign that corresponds with "Justice for Janitors" is called "Clean Start." In the UK, SMU has been successfully put into practice in the "Justice for Cleaners" campaign. In Germany, SMU ideas have flowed into the campaign for workers in the cleaning sector, led by the IGBAU trade union, and titled "I clean Germany" (*"ich putze Deutschland"*). In the 1980s in Germany, the former Trade, Banks and Insurance (HBV) trade union had already provided the breakthrough for SMU concepts in the retail industry, through its campaign against inhumane working conditions in Schlecker drugstores. Following this lead, the campaign to found work councils in the Lidl supermarket chain was explicitly based on the five components of SMU as laid out by Kim Moody. Within the framework of its "respect and better jobs" campaign, aimed at the security guard industry in Hamburg, ver.di also tested SMU methods for the first time. EuroMayDay, launched in Milan in 2000 with the purpose of organizing and drawing attention to the scandalous and precarious working conditions of many self-employed people and jobbers, is also closely connected with SMU.

With the emergence of globally active corporations, the necessity of networked union action, and the increasing significance of movements critical of globalization, a discussion about Global Social Movement Unionism (GMSU) has also developed. This links up achieving sociopolitical, human rights, ecological and trade-unionist demands in local environments with the combination of being able to push through change using trade union and social movement leverage at the global level. Based on the examples above, we see that the SMU approach widens enormously the possibilities for action within the context of the existing societal order. However, the demands raised often point beyond this same existing order. This shows us that a system of transformational potential is structured into this approach. In the setting and achieving of objectives by the two instances who enact the concept – the trade unions and the ➞ social movements – it is the determination of both these actors that will decide how durable the transformation is that arises from the dynamics of each respective conflict.

Peter Bremme

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Social Ownership

For the socialist workers' movement, social ownership means transferring individual private ownership of the means of production into societal ownership (see also ➞ public ownership). The latter is seen as a form of ownership in which humans associate with each other in a manner based on cooperative ownership struggles. The democratic state then acts in the name of these people. Capitalism is grounded in the private ownership of the means of production. The individual capitalist or shareholder appropriates the surplus-product on the strength of their control of ownership, which includes their control of labor power. The transference of the means of production into social ownership is aimed at defeating the contradiction between the societal character of production and the private appropriation of the wealth created by production – and at overcoming, in the process, the proletariat's subaltern class position. This is why social ownership means more than a change in forms of ownership, but also encompasses societal ➞ appropriation, and demands a system of rationally planning the economy, the development of productive forces, and the society as a whole – "with the participation of all members of society" (Engels). In this context, the founding of ➞ cooperatives for production, consumption and for providing credit, was a component of programs of the workers' movement from an early stage.

With the creation of modern, joint-stock companies since the end of the 19th century, a process of transformation towards social ownership of what was formerly private ownership has asserted itself: within the "boundaries of the capitalist mode of production" (see MEW vol. 25, 2012, p. 452). The more complex the conditions that capitalist economies need to function become, the more the state must ensure that general production conditions, including education and infrastructure, are in place. Many states run their post, telecommunications and railroads as state corporations, which is also in military interests. Alongside this, the growth of the metropolises was accompanied by the growth of municipal ownership, including energy provision, transport, and education and healthcare systems.

After the October Revolution, a state-socialist system asserted itself in what had become the Soviet Union, including state ownership and central state planning. This was protected by a dictatorship, which, in turn, prevented "that society openly and unceremoniously seizes property from any other source other than from their own, mature labor power" (Engels). At the end of the First World War, the social-democratic parties supported comprehensive measures for transferring industry into social ownership, which above all targeted the key industries that processed raw materials. Concurrently, they supported ➞ economic democracy in their party programs, by which was meant the extension of a shared economic sector through the structure of cooperatives. After the end of the Second World War, a system of a "mixed-economy" established itself in Western Europe, in differing varieties, and as one of the foundations of the Fordist class compromise. In a mixed-economy, the private sector exists alongside a developed state sector, which encompasses large parts of public service provision, infrastructure, social-state regulation and – in some individual countries – key sectors of the economy, including mining, the steel industry, and car manufacturing. Looking back on the experiences of an era of catastrophes – wars, global economic crises, and fascism – a developed state sector, based on non-profit criteria, was intended to safeguard social guarantees (➞ social state), but also to protect economic growth that was free from the pressures of crises.

Neoliberal politics of privatization and deregulation have led in recent decades to a major rollback in this move towards social ownership. Following the privatization of large state corporations in the areas of telecommunication, transport and energy, further areas of public sector provision have been privatized, and opened up to the exploitation of capital. This normally leads to worse working conditions for wage-laborers employed in these sectors, and to a drop in service quality. On top of this, the democratic control over these corporations has been lost. For the Left in the metropolises of capital, the immediate task is to organize and to support resistance against privatization politics. In addition, the question of the democratic control over public forms of ownership is becoming more and more pressing, as is the question as to how such organizations should administer themselves. A solidaristic society is not one based on state centralism, but one in which a broad non-profit sector in the provision of public services can flourish, and one in which various forms of ownership are permissible.

Frank Deppe

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Social Ownership

Social Rights

Social rights are one component in the larger framework of ➞ human rights. In contrast to political and civil rights, it was not until the 20th century that social rights won themselves a place in declarations of human rights. The epitome of this trend is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948. According to this, every human has a right to work for a wage that guarantees their basic livelihood. It also makes explicit every human's right to housing, nutrition, clothing, medical care and education.

Despite this delayed formal recognition, social rights were not just invented last century. Since the genesis of bourgeois society, they have been demanded by the propertyless, i.e. by those who have to sell their labor power in order to earn a living. The claim that property always entails social obligations was already laid during the French Revolution: "Liberty is an empty madness, as long as one class of people are allowed to starve the others, without being punished" (Jacques Roux). Social rights are the substructure of political rights and of democracy. Without social safeguards, political rights cannot become lived experience. Physical existence is an absolute precondition for political existence. This is why the historical struggle for formal ➞ equality, i.e. equality before the law, is incomplete if it is not complemented by material and social equality. And this is what makes curtailing the founding norm of the capitalist market economy, the right to property, by insisting on the non-property owners' right to life, the prerequisite for a dignified human existence for everyone. The victory over the hell of work in industrialized countries during early capitalism during the last one hundred and fifty years is inseparably linked with forcing through claims to social rights including the eight-hour day, the right to form free unions, and the claim that provision should be made for the old and the sick. These rights were never granted voluntarily by the rulers of states, but had to be battled for, especially by the workers' movement, through social and political conflicts.

In Germany, before the constitutions of the various federals states came into force after the Second World War, no legal claim to social security existed. According to the old system of Prussian law, provision should be administered to the needy, but merely on the grounds that this was necessary to maintain public order: the needy had no independent right to this provision. On the question of social rights, the constitutions of the individual federal states, conceived of as a collective legal force, have more to say than the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. These federal state constitutions are more strongly influenced by a mood critical of capitalism that was prevalent at the end of the Second World War. This critique stemmed from the collaborations that had recently been experienced between large-scale industry and the fascist dictatorship. Some of the federal state constitutions recognize a right to work (see article 28 of Hesse's constitution, abbreviated in German as "*Art. 28 Hessische LV*"), or, to express it in a different way, the state's obligation to ensure that everyone "can earn their livelihood through work" (Bremen's constitution, article 48, paragraph 2.) This is a principle that is being ignored in the current era of a slashing of wages that is sanctioned by the German Federal Government. The Hessian constitution even postulates a "citizens' social-security" or citizens' social security / insurance system, in stipulating that a form of "social-security that joins the whole people together" should be created (article 35). In North-Rhine Westphalia's constitution, article 24 states: "the focal point of economic activity is the people's well-being. Protecting this people's labor power has precedence over protecting material property." The self-evident influence that the zeitgeist of the time had on the state constitutions demonstrates that the level of social rights continues to be dependent on the relationship of societal forces between capital and labor.

In contrast, the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, which came into effect in 1949, is clearly defined by the restoration of reactionary principles that had already set in – known in German-language historiography simply as *die Restauration*. Accordingly, it contains no explicitly social basic rights. This said, a right to a minimum level of existence has been extrapolated from legal judgements from the level of German law analogous with the Supreme Court of the United States. These include the entirety of judgements from the highest instances of German law regarding issues that include: Germany's status as a "social state" (or *Sozialstaat*, a term used to differentiate Germany from state's that function explicitly on a welfare state model); property as a socially dependent entity; and particularly the imperative of human dignity. The minimum level of existence extrapolated from these judgements does not only ensure a life of surviving on bread and water, but also includes the so-called socio-cultural minimum existence, i.e. participation in cultural life at a level appropriate to any given time period. In concrete terms, this means that every member of the resident population has a right to appropriate working conditions, education and social guarantees in case of illness, unemployment and age. Regulations of this kind can be found in German employment law and social-security law. These rights have been under massive attack during the last ten years. Supported by media propaganda communicated by institutions including the New Social Market Economy initiative (in German: *initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft*), and reinforced by donations to political parties and lobbying work, the actors involved have managed to force

through a drastic worsening of claims to social rights – known to the population by the loaded terms of the "Hartz laws" (on restructuring social-security benefits), cutting pensions and health care reform. In the wake of the most recent financial crisis since 2008, social rights have been cut worldwide, to finance saving the banks. Understanding the human rights character of social rights makes resistance against this expropriation of the majority of the world's population essential.

Regina Viotto and Lars Niggemeyer

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Social Rights

Social Standards

Fixing minimum social standards in an effective way inside the global economy is a central demand of the international trade union movement. The term social standards encompasses minimum standards to be used when structuring employment contracts (covering working-time, pay etc.), and workers' rights, such as the right to freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. Among the supporters of an explicit protection of workers' rights, there is wide-reaching consensus about the central social standards and fundamental rights that are defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions, and which are collated in the Declaration on fundamental Principles and Rights at Work from 1998. This covers freedom of association; the right to collective bargaining; a ban on child labor, or, more precisely, on exploitative forms of child labor; a ban on forced labor; an ban on discrimination in employment and in professions; and abolishing gender-specific wage discrimination. Champions of social standards emphasize the ➞ human rights character of "rights to facilitation," which enable the actors effected to agree improvements to their working conditions through negotiations. Opponents flag up the rigid character of minimum standards, arguing that they ignore diverging levels of development.

That notwithstanding, the discussion until now has focused on standards, not on human rights. One reason for this is that the globalization debate is dominated by the economic sciences, which aim at taking corrective action through using quantifiable effects. Another reason is that the demand for social minimum standards in countries of the global South is often rejected as a curb on their own ability to compete and to develop. Increasingly tough trade competition with China and with India, based on lower production costs in these states, has only led some countries to reevaluate binding standards. In the debate about global and social minimum standards inside the economic sciences, neoclassical and institutionalist interpretations oppose each other, and leave little room for other positions. From an institutionalist perspective, every market needs a specified social, political-institutional and ecological context, in order to avoid market failures and ruinous competition. This dangerous, ruinous competitiveness exists primarily between countries of the South, whose competitive advantages are based in roughly equal measure on the large potentials that workforces with little formal qualifications offer. Viewed long-term, regulative protection through social standards would actually make larger development chances possible, because it would provide incentives for workers to train for qualifications, which in turn represents a way out of a "low wages economy" – a specific category inside the larger, global economy.

Taking the proposition that workers' rights contribute to economic development to be correct, should not compliance with these follow on a voluntary basis? In fact, these rights are still rejected in many countries because of power politics and because unions often provide a location that protects political opposition against authoritarian regimes. Another important reason for the disregard for workers' rights is the lack of clarity, seen from the point of view of business and industry, as to whether long-term economic advantages would also manifest themselves in the short-term.

The political debate about global social minimum standards, and the best way to fix them structurally, has largely taken place within predetermined parameters until now, which delineate the dichotomy between free trade and protectionism. Trade unions based in OECD countries are united in their demands for social standards that not aimed at overthrowing the established institutions of the dominant form of globalization, but rather at their explicitly declared intention to make these serve an alternative kind of globalization, which is orientated around the regulated, national capitalisms of the post-war years – their catchword is a "Global New Deal." The lines and dimensions of conflict between labor and capital, and between North and South, overlap here. For the demand to create a regulated capitalism, inherent in the global social standards perspective, to become efficacious, it is vital to build trust between trade unions, so that the tense relationship between narrowly defined locational interests, and a solidaristic balancing of interests, can be overcome, both between and within countries and world regions. To achieve this, it is suitable, in principle, to use social capital, in the form of bilateral and interregional trade deals. In practice however, these have regularly been in danger of becoming mere fig leaves for liberalization politics, as has been the case in the EU's negotiations about so-called Economic Partnership Agreements with the countries and regions of Africa, South America and Asia.

Thomas Greven

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Social Standards

Social State

In the perception of the general public, the social state normally appears as a big charity event. (German-language discourse differentiates between the *Sozialstaat*, i.e. social state and the *Wohlfahrtsstaat*, i.e. welfare state. This entry is about the former). While its liberal critics denigrate the image of the social state in full view of the state's citizens, presenting it as an overbearing "nanny state," and demanding it withdraw from society, its well-meaning champions fly into a rage about the same cuts in social services that are the key point of contention. In German-language discourse on the subject, these supporters go on to demand that the "imperative of a social state," or *Sozialstaatsgebot*, is upheld, as enshrined in the German Federal Republic's Basic Law. What are exactly the social state's numerous and costly benefit programs, that the debate is obsessed with? They include child benefit; financial support for families and for employment training; heath care; unemployment insurance cover; and care provision for the elderly and other people with care needs. These are the issues that both those who wish to present social state benefits as a scandal, and those who wish to defend them, focus on, meaning that the "dark side" of social state power is rarely discussed. To claim that the social state is exclusively concerned with doing "good" would be to distort the truth. The social state is much more than being merely a public and secularized version of Christian charity, or simply a location and protector of aid, ➞ solidarity and care. It is of course all of these things, to a greater or lesser degree. But it is also an instrument utilized for social regimentation, control, and punitive action aimed at "disciplining" citizens. State led social politics creates spaces for individuals to act in – but it also creates new dependencies. The social state is an instrument of mutual support – and of shutting-out certain groups and individuals. It mitigates inequality of life opportunity – and produces new inequalities in the process. In the course of its history, it has continued to draw new and larger groups of people and issues into its institutions and programs' spheres of influence. Parallel to this, it manifests numerous forms and mechanisms for excluding not just individuals, but also whole categories of people.

Whoever wishes to champion the social state, or, to be more exact, to champion the idea of the social state and its democratic and emancipatory contents, will not be able to turn a blind eye to this ambivalence. Any realistic vision for an alternative social state, capable of resisting the (neo)liberal slogans about rolling back the state, while also resisting the temptation to defend what exists now in merely conservative terms, will have to account for the basic and unavoidable contradictions that result from this major social-political intervention in capitalist relations. Every future social state will be faced with two central questions which, when looked at realistically, without leftist social state illusions, exhibit fundamental and substantial potential for problems, conflicts and inequality. Firstly, a social state constructed on the foundations of wage labor, will always have to define its position in relation to the question of what it intends for all social categories that are seen as "unproductive," in earning-for-society terms. These include all groups of wageless individuals and those incapable of earning – and the question encompasses their claims to an equitable participation in life in society. Let's not deceive ourselves – in a society fixated on the nexus of salaries-wages-and-productivity, both the proposal of decoupling labor and income, and the proposal of keeping these two entities coupled together, will remain the contested territory on which, even inside the Left, the idea and politics of the social state will be put to a decisive and long-lasting test (see also ➞ basic income). The other central conflict field for the social state will be its border controls, an issue just as unavoidable as the wage-income interrelation. We live in a global society configuration, in which the solidarity-communities of the privileged continue to be defined in terms of the nation, while the readiness of the disadvantaged to move transnationally, gambling that this will give them better inclusion chances, is increasing. This makes the question of defining the limits of who belongs to a particular society, and who qualifies for social claims, one of the highest political order. In this conflict, mere good intentions, dressed up as well-meaning, rhetorical ➞ internationalism, will not get us any further. As in the case of the claims for social provision made by and for those who the capitalist logic of utilization deems to be "unproductive," the broad mass of the middle-classes also have to be convinced that a social state, which promises and administers equivalent life conditions to all humans living on its territory, is primarily an imperative of lived democracy. And not solely a humanistic imperative, or one, perhaps, of self-interest.

Building on this, we see that the social state of the future will have to be realistic in how it defines problems, and will also have to go on the offensive, in strategies to justify itself. It will no longer suffice for it to be merely universalist in its reach, and egalitarian in its benefit guarantees. If it does not take this step, it will cease to exist.

Stephan Lessenich

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Social State

Social Work

Social work is the term used for the discourse that constitutes both social work as a social science, and social pedagogy. It refers, in the first place, to social work as "organized help" in the context of poverty, socially problematic situations and locations, marginalized persons, processes of exclusion and inclusion, discrimination, and curtailment of possibilities for societal participation. Secondly, it refers to social pedagogy, the focus of which extends to encompass: help in managing everyday life; supporting informal educational opportunities; managing crises in relationships between the generations; and supporting people targeted by social pedagogy programs to tackle everyday problems. Viewed internationally, there are various mixes of these two lines of tradition, which have developed a common denominator in the term social work, in professional practice and training, and in an academic sense. In the international context, a strong connection with "social development" exists.

Social work possesses an analytical, an evaluative and an interventional dimension. Professional action presents itself in the forms of support, advice, accompanying processes, communicating information, encouraging people to engage in ➞ participation, accessing material and tangible sources of help, reflection, education, planning and publicity work. Parallel to this, professional action also involves drawing public attention to bad social circumstances or bad practice by any professional actors, and more general political engagement inside the structure of a politics of the social. Social work refers to a diverse number of fields of practice and action, e.g. pedagogical work in child day care centers, social work with young people and youth work, street social work, community work, advising unemployed people, and working with individuals with mental health issues. The potential target groups are disadvantaged and marginalized persons, which means, in an extended sense, all those who are currently not managing to bridge the gap between societal expectations and individual resources, and who require professional and institutional support in order to live lives that "work out better in the everyday." "When an individual's skills and competences do not fit with society's demands, it can be necessary to intervene, to go between the lines." (Hamburger)

Social work's collective "memory" knows about the "double-headedness" of the ideology it has to negotiate, akin to the double-headedness of Janus, the Roman god: this can be expressed as the "institutionalized conflict between help and control" (Kunstreich). Discussions about problem groups in society always come to the fore within discourses about power (Anhorn / Bettinger). Ascribing attributes to individuals and groups is both the point where processes of stigmatizing people and turning them into clients starts, *and* a precondition for an intervention and/or building up ➞ social infrastructure, which is legally and professionally safeguarded. The framework for professional social work is built up out of many different elements: national and European social politics; the structure of charities and other non-profit organizations in each respective state; the dominant discourse about normality in a society; the individual, organizational logic of each institution and training center involved; justified concerns of those who work in social work regarding appropriate remuneration for paid positions on the one hand; and ethical foundations for the profession and for social work as an academic discipline on the other.

Social work can be extended to include short-term and long-term volunteers, and self-help initiatives. This trend is however implicitly dangerous, if the political-administrative propagates making ➞ civil society more active, and simultaneously reduces budgets for professional social services. In societies in which professional social work is still only rudimentary, structures for volunteers and the work of NGOs should also be perceived as social work. When social work is structured like this, some of the structural elements it takes in and produces stabilize the system, while other elements voice criticisms, and provide alternatives. The critical-political potential of social work can only present itself to its own advantage when the dilemma and potential conflict between "system-stabilizing" and "system-critical" elements has been reflected upon. It must be noted however, that in the German-language theoretical discourse on these issues, and in social work practice since the 1980s, a number of factors have forced the kind of social work that understands itself as an explicitly critical and political social science to retreat. These factors include: a socio-political instrumentalism of social work; economization; specific fashions in theory and rituals of practice; and the politically motivated reorientation of German higher education, away from "diploma" degrees, and towards a concentration on bachelor's and master's degrees. This notwithstanding, contemporary discussions of the theory of social work do provide hints of a re-politicization, and of a new interpretation of critical positions.

The breadth of concepts for methodical, professional activity extends beyond the three classic fields of social casework, social group work and community organization. The range of methods available from a micro to a macro-level can only then become a component of an alternative strategy, when they take their bearings from

the needs and interests of those who the methods are addressed to, from concepts of ➞ social justice and ➞ human rights.

Andreas Thimmel

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Social Work

Socioecological Transformation

This term is being proposed currently in multiple circles, to pool together emancipatory perspectives, without imposing uniformity on them. The concept is made up of an analytical, a political-strategic and a normative component.

In *analytical terms*, the starting point the recognition that the "ecological question" plays an essential role in today's politics of crises. This is not about variants of environmental politics, but rather about changes in societal ➞ interrelations with nature, some of which are more and others less far-reaching. This encompasses the ongoing commodification of nature, as in the prominent case of emissions trading in climate change politics. This also encompasses eco-authoritarian variants of changes in the interrelations with nature, under which political decisions in society are decided upon in the interests of a minority, where, on the international stage, the western model of wealth is defended with weapons if necessary, and where billions of people are kept in poverty using authoritarian means. This can however also encompass the context in which proposals for a Green Economy are being voiced, for example in the form of a Green New Deal; these proposals emphasize a combination of the market, state steering of the economy, and a social redistribution of wealth. All these variants put a considerable amount of hope in the capitalist (world) market, existing political institutions, and in technologies developed according to capitalist principles for the management of multiple crises. In contrast to these possibilities for development, the term socioecological transformation can be used to draw together those approaches that see capitalist and imperialist dynamics as the root of contemporary problems, and not as there solution. A perspective that not only takes account of the mode of production, but also the interrelations of people's lives. Appropriate to this broader view, more comprehensive political strategies can be articulated.

The second, namely *political-strategic* dimension of the term lies in the fact that while even from the hegemonic side interpretations of the current, multiple crisis go very far indeed, the political proposals that are joined up with these do not dare to break with existing capitalist and imperialist patterns of social ownership. A prominent example from the German-language debate on this issue is the independent expert report entitled "A Social Contract for Large Transformation" authored by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (German acronym: WBGU). A very far-reaching description of the problems is followed by incremental political proposals that conform to existing institutions. Relations of hegemony and of societal forces are largely not named as causes of crises.

This is the context in which the third, the *normative* component should be located. This normative function should ensue by making the term socioecological transformation explicit, in order to open up more advanced perspectives. The normative component takes progressive approaches seriously, including the WBGU's, as these reveal cracks in the block of power and dissent among the elite. This is not just about dramatic interpretations of problems, though these may also be warranted, but is also about demonstrating that existing hegemonic political, economic and cultural relations all cause crises. To change this, a ➞ democratization of societal interrelations with nature is needed. This is also the strategy with which to support emancipatory forms of working through the crisis. For example, a more sustainable use of the environment can only be attempted in connection with socioecological justice: the central point is a democratically determined production of, and access to, foodstuffs. This is about more than investing in "green" branches of the economy. This is about wielding democratic decision-making powers over investments and over the fundamental question: who actually determines which the direction in which society should develo

Socioecological transformation is a perspective, which should not be misunderstood as a socio-technological approach. Whether a pluralistic project can develop from this basis remains an open question. In order for this to happen, it must be carried forward and determined, in terms of contents, by both a wide-range of reform-orientated forces but also by more radical forces. It has to be open to the task of re-articulating interests and values, for dealing with conflicts, and for a critical consideration of experience. The multiple crises that surround us, and the cracks that may open up, caused by the crisis, make this function particularly important. To prevent these cracks being papered over again in a neoliberal and / or authoritarian way is the driving force behind the debates, strategies and real changes, which make up socioecological transformation.

Ulrich Brand

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Socioecological Transformation

Solidarity

Solidarity is the expression of a worldview that conceives of people as being part of a community, or *Gemeinschaft*, to give it its German name. Semantically, the German term can be traced back to the Latin "*in solidum*," which, literally translated, means "about the whole, for the total sum." This thought can be found in law in the principle of joint and several liability, many religions stress the concept of a general form of "love thy neighbor," and social philosophy differentiates between *solidarism* and individualism. This is because its base is an understanding of humans as fundamentally connected to the purpose of the common good. In terms of politics, a "solidarity principle" exists. The consequence of this is that better situated members of a community, defined either in financial or in health terms, contribute more, in order to support others. This is what makes the ideal of solidarity a frequently central element of political mobilization.

The legal institutionalization of the principle of solidarity began in the 19th century, during the period of capitalist industrialization. The labor force recognized that there was such a thing as a shared fate of the class, behind diverging individual fates. Even in countries with authoritarian, Communist regimes, solidarity movements took shape to protest injustice, the absence of the rule of law, misuse of the apparatus of power, and restrictions on freedom of expression. The outstanding historical example is the Solidarity trade union in Poland, which emerged from a strike in 1980, unionized to such an extent that it grew to having 9.5 million members – one-third of the Polish population of the day – under Lech Wałęsa's leadership. The ➞ critique of globalization movement is a solidarity movement for global ➞ social justice and universal ➞ human rights, which shares a broadly similar agenda with its Polish predecessor. The more recent movement positions itself against exploitation, injustice and political marginalization, and organizes mutual support between individuals, groups and alliances, which transcends state borders.

We see that the motif of solidarity also has a profound, existential dimension. This is the feeling of connectedness between people who put up a fight against individual dangers, which may appear to be a matter of fortune, and against selective curtailments of more general life possibilities. Appeals to solidarity are also deployed manipulatively, however, when the issue at hand is the spreading of costs or disadvantages resulting from political or business decisions. In the contemporary, international-competition-based state, the emphasis on community mostly appears during wage negotiations and debates about company taxation. This is remarkable, as outside these junctures, the standard message is that employees should take on personal responsibility [for their employment futures], and that companies may still need to close down works or offices, even while they're notching up double digit profit margins.

For ➞ emancipatory projects, solidarity can provide a good foundation, in the form of a constituting ideal of togetherness and ➞ equality. It's important here to strike the right balance between openness and obligation: are the participants' expectations about the quality of the solidarity clear enough? Which intensity of [mutually determined] agreements can the shared mindset satisfy? Which rules and which freedoms are needed in order to develop, or redevelop, trust in giving each other mutual support – and how are these to be applied? It is worth taking a look at the different forms of solidarity at this stage: with regard to the quality of mutual support, we can differentiate between *interest-based solidarity* (equality of interest in a particular situation, which ends again after the common goal had been achieved), a *solidarity of action* (a mutual readiness to help) and a *solidarity of mindsets* (which could also be called a unitary kind of consciousness). Individual appeals to solidarity can be roughly classified according to this scheme, so that each appeal's instrumental character can be identified, and clarity achieved regarding mutual expectations and necessary safeguards.

There are manifold projects worldwide that are living these alternatives, and just as many theoretical debates for drafting shared rules for solidaristic communities. In Germany in 2010 for example, the *Institute Solidarische Moderne* was set up as a cross-party think-tank for drafting and disseminating concrete and practicable alternatives to neoliberalism. A related movement is the *Gemeinwohlökonomie,* as it's known in German, which aims at the creation of a socially sustainable economy, with companies making offset payments for the common good. These solidaristic approaches go beyond the individualism of contemporary society, and pull fellow human beings and the environment at the center of their worldview and their concepts. As an orientational principle, solidarity can immediately change everyday life for each individual who is hacked off by competitive society.

Maja Göpel

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Solidarity

Solidarity Economy

The solidarity economy is a term used to describe forms of economic activity that satisfy human needs on the basis of voluntary ➞ cooperation, self-organization and mutual help. The principle of ➞ solidarity, central to this, exists in contrast to the alignments of capitalist market economies, which are orientated around competition, responsibility for one's own self, which is wrongly understood, and therefore not solidaristic, and profit maximization. In the economy, solidarity means using cooperation partners' needs to take your bearings. This is the method individuals active in this field use, to emancipate themselves from a logic for their (economic) actions that is predetermined by the market. Solidarity can be grounded both in the principle of mutuality, e.g. community self-help, and in the principle of ➞ redistribution of wealth. Moreover, solidarity as a term refers to the voluntary nature of cooperation and of mutual help. In so doing, it incorporates aspirations towards self-organization and democracy. From the perspective of neoliberalism, an economy of this kind does not allocate resources correctly and contradicts the goal of maximizing innovation and competition. So the solidarity economy is about "alternatives, which should actually no longer be permitted" (Elmar Altvater), when the issue is viewed from a neoliberal perspective. Despite this, solidarity economy exists in a number of projects and enterprises. Some of these approaches have a long history, while others have only emerged recently. These include: communal forms of ownership, including ➞ cooperatives for housing and for production; agricultural cooperatives, community companies and workers' buyouts, or other methods for workforces winning ownership of companies; user communities, communal ➞ forms of life and community settlements, communes and ecological villages; direct selling, producer-user communities, foodstuff cooperatives and new village shops; the shared and (sometimes virtual) community-based production of knowledge, e.g. in the case of freeware or Wikipedia; ➞ fair trade; alternative money systems including local exchange trading systems (LETS) and regional currencies; local banks and ethical investment.

The solidarity economy can have diverging levels of reach and impact. It can be perceived as a human extension of capitalist market economies, or, alternatively, people acting within it can pursue the aim of overcoming capitalism. The geographical distances between people participating in such an economy can vary. It mostly exists at a local level, but can be practiced between people living in quite different parts of the glob, as is the case with ➞ fair trade. Further, this kind of economy encompasses different sized economic units. There are individual businesses that work with solidarity economics, but there are also projects incorporating whole economic systems, e.g. ALBA, formally the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America. Solidaristic economic activity be based on voluntary agreements between cooperation partners, but it could also consolidate into binding regulations that apply to all economic actors, e.g. the concept of a "Solidaristic World Economic Order." At that level, the solidarity economy would not have to function without the participation of the state.

Societal and political support can play a decisive part in pushing forward its development. The Brazilian government has forwarded the cause of the solidarity economy for example, while the advancement of cooperatives is anchored in the constitutional law of some southern European countries. Parallel to this however, the limitations of the concept of solidarity economy have also made themselves plain. Lots of projects remain small, and because of this are at risk of going under in the turbulent waters of the dominant, capitalist economy. Such companies either fail economically, or adapt by renouncing their principles of solidarity. Democratic self-organization as a mainstay of solidarity economics regularly leads to projects encountering problems, which often include interpersonal conflicts, or people placing too much work and responsibility on their own shoulders. In addition, actors in the solidarity economy are frequently criticized for their concept of communal self-help potentially legitimizing a rollback of the state. ➞ Social rights can however only be safeguarded for all humans, when they have been consolidated in binding universal regulations and laws. Solidaristic support in groups that only small sections of the population are part of cannot replace social rights for everybody. In a similar vein, ➞ fair trade projects do not, in themselves, represent a valid alternative to a solidaristic world economic order. The corollary of this is that the solidarity economy is no substitute for an obligatory and comprehensive regulation of the whole economy, for example in the field of financial markets (➞ financial market regulation).

The solidarity economy should see itself as one element in the struggle for ➞ emancipation for everybody. As soon as it assumes this perspective, the projects and approaches already taking place under this label will be able to spread political support for alternatives, by already beginning to build a different world today.

Sven Giegold

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Soviet Councils

"All power to the soviets!" Ever since Lenin proclaimed this slogan in 1917, in order to prepare but also to justify the 20th century's most influential political upheaval, the Russian word soviets – often referred to as soviet councils, while German-language discourse prefers the German word *Räte* – has primarily described battle organizations of the oppressed, which spring up spontaneously in times of ➞ revolutionary seismic activity, and which oppose the existing state. First, they govern parallel to this state in a transitional period of "doubled government," before pushing this state into the wings, in order to become, in themselves, the core of a new political and economic order – a soviet democracy. The Paris Commune of 1871 provided the role model: Marx saw this as the discovery, at last, of *the* political form to overcome the bourgeois state. Its principles included the abolition of the standing army and the civil servant apparatus, the rule that representatives could be dismissed from their posts at any moment, and wage levels for representatives set at the average workers' wage.

It was only later that these approaches to prevailing over the outdated state were called "soviets," a word that first appears during the Russian Revolution of 1905, as strike committees coordinating activities at many different works laid out political demands, and consolidated into "Soviet Councils of Workers' Deputies." The Russian soviet councils linked into this tradition again after the February Revolution, 1917, to which Lenin wanted to transfer all powers. While a Russian Soviet Republic was created on paper after Lenin and Trotsky had led the October Revolution, in reality, power soon slid from the fingers of the real, existing soviet councils. Civil war and the phase of War Communism worked into the hands of the centralizing party's authoritarian practices, which increasingly put all forms of "soviet democracy" out of action. The sailors' rebellion in the naval fortress of Kronstadt, which opposed this development under the banner of "soviet councils without Bolsheviks" in 1921, was bloodily crushed.

Soviet councils were also formed in Germany at a time of revolutionary upheaval. In 1918, soldiers' soviet councils rebelled against the continuation of the world war, and workers' soviet councils – also known as revolutionary councils, workers' councils, or in German, *ArbeiterInnenräte* – were created in many factories, plants and enterprises. While leftist forces wanted to drive this development forward, a majority – even inside the committees of the soviet councils – decided to support general elections to a national assembly: and decided thereby in favor of representative democracy. Only economic councils remained (➞ economic democracy) based on soviet organization in factories, but these could not become a vehicle for widespread ➞ social ownership. It was only after the soviet councils were defeated at the start of 1919 that a theoretical discussion was set in motion about their character and potential. Supporters of structuring the whole of society anew through the unit of the soviet councils – a "pure soviet system" or "*reines Rätesystem*" as it was called – were pitted against those who attempted to join up the soviet councils in the area of the economy with parliamentary democracy.

Even after the defeat of the soviet movement at the start of the 1920s, soviet councils didn't just exist in the realm of ideas. Just as before, soviet councils were able to make take on concrete forms during exceptional situations, like civil wars, or other profound disruptions of the ruling order. Examples of this are the Spanish Civil War, in which soviet councils appeared in manifold forms in the tendency towards self-organization, and workers' risings against the party dictatorship in Hungary, 1956, and Poland, 1980-81. A soviet constitution drafted in great detail and communicated under the heading of "worker self-administration" was partly realized in the former Yugoslavia, with and despite of all the contradictions that the Communist Party's continuing monopoly on power entailed. In the west, the idea of the soviet councils leapt back to life whenever the undemocratic character of the real, existing parliamentary system became particularly dazzling, as it did for example during the first so-called "large coalition" government (of the center-left SDP with the center-right CDU) in West Germany between 1966-69. Then however, the invocation of the formula "all power to the soviet councils!" more an expression of implacable criticism against the demolition of democracy, which that critique had also diagnosed, and less a sign of a new, strengthened soviet councils movement.

Yet individual elements of soviet democracy can certainly be said to have determined the practice of the extra-parliamentary opposition. These included: rejecting the abominable role of the professional politician, in favor of the rotational principle; the constant obligation to demonstrate accountability; the possibility of recalling and dismissing delegates, and the mandate of deputies that this option is coupled with; and deputies refusing material privileges.

Serious discussions about anti-capitalist strategies make the question of a new economic order carried by the soviet councils one that can hardly be avoided. At present however, people criticizing capitalism mostly avoid engaging with the theory about soviet councils and debates about soviet councils from the 1920s, in dread, perhaps, of slipping back into a utopian ➞ socialism. One exception is the US American Michael Albert: in his model of a "participative economy" (also known as ➞ parecon) without the market, producers' soviet councils

and users' soviet councils, which he prefers to call workers' councils and consumers' councils, have a central role to play.

Klaus Meschkat

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Soviet Councils

Strike

The word strike functions as a dictum in some circles of explicitly political leftists, and one that often serves as not much more than a mental space, onto which things can be projected. Viewed soberly, strikes are something exceptional in people's everyday lives, as they're normally accompanied by hardship and uncertainty. Marx maintains that for proletarians, using strike as a method to improve their living conditions was unavoidable. In taking collective action, they temporarily sublate their rivalry with each other.

Strikes are important for Marx, but he could not discern moments of ➞ revolutionary overthrow in them. Others value more highly the gateways that strikes can create, and saw and see these in anarcho-syndicalist, autonomist or workerist terms. It is particularly the syndicalist perspective that sees the strike as the most important form of struggle. This conceptualization of the strike tends to limit itself to economics, which brings advantages and disadvantages. It is an advantage to concentrate analysis on the structural power (Beverly J. Silver) that workers possess because of their position in the production process. The lack of attention paid to non-economic factors, for example the political sphere, is however a disadvantage. The core thesis runs as follows: only a general strike is capable of hitting capitalism where it hurts, because this would be a direct attack on the production of surplus value. This would then fundamentally call into question the capitalist *dispositif* of work (to use the Foucaultian term), and the capitalists' control over the means of production. This anarcho-syndicalist perspective rejects political parties, and even more so, the state as a mediator of change – entities that play an important role in Leninist and social-democratic models. Instead, it places more trust in spontaneity and the self-organization of class.

Most workers' movement debates were colored by the industrial nature of strikes. This included a specific image of the subjects that choose strikes as a means: namely, mostly male, white, industrial workers. Yet the phenomena of the strike is older than "big industry" and even older than capitalism. The first strike of written record took place in 1155 BCE in Thebes. The necropolis workers struck because wages had not been paid. Highly specialized manual workers, they formed an important pillar in maintaining the Egyptian cult of the dead, which had, in turn, an important function in legitimating the authority of the pharaohs.

The normal definition of strike today, strongly influenced by trade unionism, which sees strike as a situation in which dependent employees apply economic pressure, must be rethought in the light of the diversity of strike situations that have played out during history. Disputing ideological structures of authority, as was the case in the cult of the dead in authority, illustrates that the workers have power in strikes beyond a narrow economic understanding of the situation. Furthermore, the concept of "dependence" must also be rethought in relational terms. The concepts of authority and hegemony always contain a duality between those who rule and those who are subjugated. But the latter category is also constitutive for the category of hegemony. The subjugated have to reproduce the manifold forms, which the structures of hegemony takes on, by exhausting their human labor power, manually and intellectually. The forms which using up this wealth takes are the economy, the bureaucracy, and the symbolic order of hegemony. Because of this duality, the concept of structural power should be extended beyond the sphere of the direct production of surplus value. Beverly Silver emphasizes that exercising structural power should not merely be seen as a working-class reactive element, but also as a part of the capitalist dynamic of development. The labor struggle, consisting of the strike, but also of many other forms, forces capital to continually reorganize. This perspective is a core component for a theory of working-class autonomy.

Due to the variability of capitalism resulting from these processes, a transformation of the dynamics of the strike in Europe since the 1970s can be observed. The large strikes, shaped by industry, are on the retreat, whether they're supported by the unions or not. Instead, a shift of focus to service-sector industries, and a feminization of labor struggles, can be noted. Particularly the service sector is providing new locations of conflict. In the current phase of "just-in-time" capitalism, employees in transport companies can build up large potentials of power. In recent years, an increase in strikes in the local public sector has been noted, a tendency that is not solely down to the state's efforts to cut budgets in the wake of the crisis. In the course of these struggles, attempts to define which labor is "useful" for society or which labor benefits the common good remain contested, as to struggles to achieve recognition and dignity. These labor struggles harbor huge potentials for the ➞ "social ownership" of strike movements, as they offer very direct connections to the question of the ➞ commons and of re- and ➞ de-commodification.

Mario Becksteiner

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Strike

Sufficiency Economy

The term sufficiency economy (SE) can be traced back to a series of speeches given by the Thai King Bhumipol Adulyadej in reaction to the Asian financial crisis between 1997 and 1999. After the economic boom of the 1980s and 1990s, the financial branch collapsed in 1997 and, starting with Thailand, pulled the whole region down into a deep financial and economic crisis. The king used his speeches to call for a different development model, and demanded a return to local forms of economic activity that are less prone to being hit by crises. SE ought to be based on three principles: moderation, proportionality, and the necessity of creating economic and societal structures against blows coming from without, structures that are resilient and imperishable. Although the official commissions dealing with SW since 1999 stress that the concept is not limited to rural areas but is also applicable to all areas of the urban economy, the exact meaning of this remains, nonetheless, abstract – a concrete model has only been developed for rural areas. In accordance with this, the king defines 15 rai (or 2.4 hectares) of land as the foundations of life for one family, and recommends using 30% of the land for rice, a well, and aquaculture, 30% for growing mixed vegetables, and 30% for products for the market. The remaining ten percent should be used for housing, buildings for animals, and streets. Starting on the basis of these units, cooperatives should be created, which organize financial investments in further economic activities.

While the concept was presented as the king's original invention, the proximity to the debate about ➞ sustainability, to the Buddhist concept of the middle path, and to moderation, cannot be overlooked. Moreover, the commissions in Thailand charged with fleshing out these concepts are in close contact with institutions of the Bhutanese royal family, and the concept of gross national happiness that is followed in that country. SE enjoyed its widest dissemination and popularization between 2006 and 2008, a period in which its status was increased to that of an official guiding principle of economic politics. Concurrently, the manipulation of the policy manifested itself in political circumstances during this period, leading to the concept becoming widely discredited.

In 2001, the soon-to-be prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra also stood for election by promising to lead Thailand out of the crisis. He then proceeded to follow through on a two-pronged economic program comprising neoliberal globalization, flanked by social programs, investing in rural infrastructure, and consumer credits. After his spectacular re-election in 2005, resistance against Thaksin stirred increasingly in the royalist-conservative camp, where the plenitude of his power was experienced as a threat. These forces in society facilitated a military coup in 2006 that forced Thaksin out of government. It was this new government, implemented by the armed forces, that raised SE up to the status of leading paradigm, and opposed Thaksin's popular development programs, which had won him such widespread support in the rural northeast of the country. The demands for modesty, moving away from consumption, and moderation, were aimed directly against Thaksin's development concept, and against Thaksin's rural projects, which were popular because of the prospect of material improvement they provided. Seen from this perspective, SE is essentially the discourse of an elite, which fits into the prejudices of the urban middle and upper classes. These groups interpret Thaksin's popularity amongst the rural population as a sign for their lack of political maturity, and their susceptibility for populist programs.

Critics point out that SE does not address Thailand's central development problems. Demands for land reform or, at the least, limitations on land ownership, are not engaged with. Moreover, the concept fails to recognize the economic reality of the rural regions, which are interwoven with Bangkok as a center via the routes of labor migration and cultural globalization. In addition, SE does not represent a departure away from ideas of progress and of wealth. Particularly since generalization became a leading economic principle in 2006, SE has been carted around by various business concerns in the form of a company philosophy articulated in non-binding mission statements. It would however not be fair to completely cast SE aside: the foundational thought covers the same strategies that include ➞ de-globalization, ideas that are currently being discussed in the debate about ➞ a critique of growth, and strategies in South America, in connection with the term ➞ post-extractivism. In Thailand too, resilient and emancipatory projects and initiatives are subsumed under the heading of SE, in part without the agreement of the activists involved. Finally, local projects and initiatives that demonstrate resistance are also among the groups using, for their own strategic purposes, the financial packages that SE provides.

Wolfram Schaffar

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Sumac Kawsay

South America is currently being criticized concerning the very concept of development. On the one hand, a critical debate from the history of the region is being rescued from oblivion. On the other, conceptions belonging to indigenous communities and traditions concerning Abya Yala – an indigenous term meaning ''land in its full maturity'' – are blossoming.

While a critique of the concept of development has established itself within western, modern academia – alongside a critique of many other trends – the most recent South American debates on this issue reach beyond such boundaries. This finds expression in constitutions: the ''good life'' is enshrined in the constitution as ''Buen Vivir'' (Spanish) and ''Sumac Kawsay'' (Quechua); the Bolivian constitution mentions ''Vivir Bien'' (again, Spanish), Sumac Kawsay and Suma Qamaña (Aymara). This is still a long way from saying that Sumac Kawsay has actually been realized here. To approach the concept it is necessary to concern ourselves again with the indigenous communities' experiences, which should be taken seriously, without idealizing them.

Alongside the visions of Abya Yala, related holistic philosophies from all parts of the earth may be utilized in this context. As a culture of life, Sumac Kawsay can be linked with diverse names and manifestations, and has been practiced at various periods and in various regions in Mother Earth's history. Sumac Kawsay, as debated today in the countries of the Andes, is neither unique not new. It is part of humanity's long search for alternatives, and is characterized by struggles for ➞ emancipation, and for a good life. It is also salient that these alternatives have been most intensively developed by those people who traditionally were most marginalized. Sumac Kawsay is comprehensively distinct from a western worldview, because it can be traced back to communitarian, non-capitalist roots. It is a break with the anthropocentric logic of both hegemonic capitalist civilization *and* of real socialism, which continues to exist to this day.

Sumac Kawsay is not the same as development. This is not about employing programs, measures and indicators, in order to successfully move from "under development" to the "development" sought, which is, in any case, a hopeless task. Few countries have achieved that which is normally described by the concept of development. The problem is not just about the paths to development: development as a concept is problematic in itself (➞ post-development). We could say, from the present standpoint, that the world has "developed badly." This also pertains to the so-called industrialized countries, whose lifestyles constitute a point of orientation for the so-called "backward countries." But perceived more fundamentally, the world-system as a whole "develops badly''. In short, we have to get over the concept of progress, and the myriad of synonyms it has – in its fixation on production, in the one-dimensional way development is orientated, and in its mechanistic imaging of economic growth. Beyond this, however, we also need a new vision, richer in substance, and in complexity.

Some indigenous knowledge systems have no concepts whatsoever that equate with development, meaning that the idea is often thrown out unconditionally. Life is not imagined as a linear process or as a dichotomy between before and after. There are also no concepts of wealth as a stockpiling of material goods, or of poverty as a lack of the same. Time and time again, Sumac Kawsay has to be built up and reproduced in a close relationship with nature. Holistic thought of this type wants to understand the diversity of the elements, on which the human activities depend that make Sumac Kawsay possible. These include knowledge, rules for ethical and spiritual behavior in relation to the environment, human values, a vision for the future, and much more. Sumac Kawsay is not reduceable to a monocultural program, but is a pluralistic concept – it would be better to talk about many "good lives" or "forms of living well together." Although it emerged primarily in indigenous communities, it doesn't deny or reject technological advantages of the modern world, or possible contributions from other cultures and knowledge systems, that call into question hegemonic modernity.

Postulating harmony with nature in opposition to permanent accumulation, and advocating a return to use value, Sumac Kawsay throws open the doors to formulating alternative visions. Sumac Kawsay proposes a transformation of civilization.

Alberto Acosta

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Sustainability

Sustainability is a cumbersome term, and one that is wrestled over and argued about. Its standard translation in German is *Nachhaltigkeit*, but it is only really the adjective deriving from this, *nachhaltig,* that finds wider acceptance, describing something with a longer lasting effect, a lasting – or *nachhaltiger* – impression, for example. It was as a practical answer to a historical crisis that sustainability became a potent word. Its origins can be traced back to the forestry economy and wood crisis of the 17th century. Boundless deforestation had endangered both the availability of wood as a raw material, and the functionality of the woods as a location of production. This means that sustainability contains a quantitative *and* a qualitative dimension. Quantitatively, this means that we shouldn't cut down more trees than can grow back again. Qualitatively, we need to pay attention to soil, water and air quality when cultivating forests.

The newer defining of the term took place in the paper *Our Common Future*, published in 1987 by the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development, in the contexts of the poverty crisis in the countries of the global South and the global ecological crisis. Development can qualify for the epithet "sustainable," if the needs of the current generation can be satisfied without endangering future generations, either in the satisfaction of their needs or in their choice of lifestyles. This maxim is incompatible with roughshod use of resources and irreversible environmental outputs. This document formulates boundaries that are strange per se to capitalist societies. A compromise is however also offered to the status quo, through the attempt to combine sustainability and development with a concept conforming to predominant wisdom about economic growth.

In contrast to this, a network of women of the South, DAWN, are pleading instead for "Sustained Livelihood." This means, on the one hand, the sustainable securing of the fundamentals needed to live, and, on the other, sustainable economic activity to create livelihoods, or at least to secure the minimum necessary to survive. While, as a macro-strategy, development appears to be compatible with resource intensive growth, the concept of Sustained Livelihood builds instead from local living conditions, everyday experiences and the ➞ culture of everyday life, particularly as these three categories pertain to women. From this perspective, sustainability is not decreed from above, but rather negotiated from below. Sustained Livelihood takes secure fundamentals of life as its point of reference, and not a more efficient dominion over nature (➞ interrelations with nature).

Sustainability also stands for what could be called the "ecolog-ization" of what is already there: growth-based, ecological modernization through technological innovations, raising efficiency, and recycling. On the other hand, it is also about constitutive changes as the premise for achieving sustainability: an ecological transformation of structures, and profound changes in the economy and in society, especially in industrialized countries. The economic scientist Christiane Busch-Lüty demanded that the idea of sustainability should not exhaust itself by subordinating itself to statistical targets, but should stay fluid, inviting people to contradict it. In 2011, Dennis Meadows, who has worked on limits theory, told the German Federal Parliament's Select Commission on *Growth, Wealth and Life Quality* (2010-2013) that, in his opinion, it was now too late for sustainable development. Climate change demand that we reduce the utilization of the environment in a peaceful and just way, and without causing further damage. This means increasing the resilience of societies through the means of providing sufficient buffers for possible future shortages, efficient resource use, and reconsideration of redundant systems. Yet it should be argued that a society going through climate change needs visions and alternatives – precisely because of that change.

Sustainability presents a challenge to thinking about economics. It forces attention towards productive achievements – including the productivity of nature, and women's reproductive labor – that do not conform with market economy terminology. The economy implicitly assumes these achievements, but does not value or evaluate them (➞ feminist economics). Sustainability contradicts the dominating dichotomy between productive and reproductive, and challenges us to place these in a non-hierarchic relation. Sustainability also provokes political thought. It throws open the question regarding a new type of politics – which we could call a local democracy of negotiation – and spotlights the challenge that a decentralized steering of environment and economy presents in terms of democratic politics. It reminds us that the emancipation out of natural contexts carries a hegemonic shadow with it: the colonization and exploitation of those who are declared to be "other" than society (this includes nature and other peoples) and "other" than politics (this includes "private" care work, particularly that done by women. As such, sustainability is not, by itself, an alternative. But it does signpost us beyond what already exists, and towards what could be reached.

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Sustainability

Tax Justice

Taxes serve the purpose of generating income for the state. Already by the era of the French Revolution, the postulate of ➞ equality was accompanied by demands that the financial burdens implied by equality should be distributed justly. As time passed, the conviction grew that a just distribution of burdens should be calculated in accordance with individual financial capacity. From this follows that everyone paying tax at the same rate, i.e. a flat tax, would not be a fair system. Instead, this new conviction led to the conclusion that the section of the population that disposed over high levels of wealth and income, and who could therefore afford substantially higher payments, should also carry a proportionally higher part of the overall financial burden, i.e. progressive taxation. This conclusion was backed by the argument that this section of the population has obtained higher wealth and incomes chiefly thanks to infrastructure provided by the state, including education. As the rich would then contribute more to financing the state, while the poor would more often profit from state benefits, a system of this kind automatically contributes to a redistribution of wealth from above to below, and to social balancing. During and after the construction of the ➞ social state, the idea of redistribution moved steadily towards the top of tax politics agendas. As the publicist Constantin Frantz put it as early as 1881 in the title of one of his works: "Social tax reform is a *sine qua non*, if social revolution is to be prevented."

The postulate of tax politics that are social and just is concerned, at first, with a strategy that is inherent in the existing system, and one that perhaps even stabilizes that system. Yet it should not be forgotten that it is not just in capitalist systems that members of government and civil servants have to face the question of how to justly finance life inside the state. ➞ socialist societies also aim at means to finance spending on society, education and infrastructure in such a way that low-earners are not burdened in an above average manner, as was for example the case in the GDR, through the means of price rises caused by the transfer of profits.

And now, today, the question of the redistribution of wealth has again become a central matter of interest for many. As the current crisis progresses, a feeling grows justifiably inside more and more people, that the burdens of the crisis are not distributed equitably, and that those who caused the crisis are not paying the costs they have incurred. Moreover, the increasingly inequitable distribution of income and wealth is one essential cause of the current financial crisis, although it is certainly not the only cause. When not many people dispose over so much money, there is no chance they can ever spend it all, so it gets invested in financial markets, where actors enter into ever-riskier transactions with the aim of securing ever-higher rates of return. This behavior has been preceded, however, by a dramatic rise in the concentration of income and wealth over the last quarter of a century, a trend in which tax politics played a considerable part. In Germany and in most other countries a gigantic, tax-politics-assisted redistribution of wealth from below to above is in process. Business concerns are granted ongoing generous possibilities for tax "structuring," while rounds of tax cuts for top earners, limited companies and investors continue. Governments then compensate for missing tax income by cutting state provision and benefits, which primarily hit the poor, and by raising taxes on everyday consumption. The latter means higher sales taxes, which function regressively, because low-earners spend an above-average portion of their income on daily needs, and have to pay tax on each of these purchases.

When the financial crisis broke out in 2007, states leaped in, as has often been recounted, to save the banks and the whole financial system. These were the means by which the financial crisis became a state debt crisis, and the means by which the costs of the crisis had, and still have to be borne by taxpayers. In this context, there is nothing more self-explanatory than demanding that those actors who had profited previously from redistribution enacted through tax politics, now be forced to cough up. These are the same actors who contributed to triggering the crisis through the gigantic wealth at their disposal. The demand that they now foot the bill can be established not solely in terms of justice, but also in terms of avoiding a new financial crisis.

Tax justice seen in concrete terms today means reintroducing wealth tax, a clear rise in top income tax rates, the revocation of cuts in corporate taxation, a consequential fight against rich private individuals and companies' tax avoidance and tax migration, and introducing a financial transaction tax. These measures can only be built on the premise of a systematic battle against states competing to cut taxes, and the premise of shutting down tax havens. As sensible models of how to do this have long since been prepared, we can no longer accept politicians excusing their inaction by pointing to the pressures of globalization, and of global financial markets.

Nicola Liebert

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Tax Justice

Third Wave Feminism

Especially in the Anglo-American world, a whole spectrum of individuals, projects and political actions have assembled under the banner of "third wave feminism." The initiators of the movement include the musician and riot grrrl icon Kathleen Hanna, alongside her bands, *Bikini Kill* and *Le Tigre*, the writers Naomi Wolf (*The Beauty Myth*) and Rebecca Walker (*Ms. Magazine, To be Real, Telling the Truth* and *Changing the Face of Feminism*). Third wave feminism describes a new generation of the women's movement, differentiating itself and also sometimes distancing itself, in terms of contents and organizational forms from earlier waves. It uses self-definitions including "grrrl," "chick" and "bitch" to positively re-signify terms that are derogatory, or which impose a "sweet" identity on women. Thinking about gender that works with concepts of diversity, ➞ queerness and sex-positivity, are strongly backed. One part of the third-wavers criticizes the second wave of the women's movement for their homogenous construct of women, their hatred of desire, and the assumption that universal patriarchal oppression exists. Other third-wavers point instead to a distorted perception of second-wave feminism, and draw attention to the achievements of this earlier wave.

While the first and second-waves of the women's movement had relatively clearly defined objectives in demanding voting rights for women, and political and legal equality, the political agenda of the third wave remains intentionally diffuse. This is simultaneously a strength and a weakness of the movement. Nonetheless, it does manage to constitute a shared, feminist roof under which diverse forms of resistance and emancipation practiced by younger women gather, it successfully extends the circle of activists, and it is capable of addressing the complex mesh of different inequality mechanisms. This means that the third wave is providing manifold possibilities as to who and how an individual can be a ➞ feminist. Issues of culture and of identity politics are foregrounded, while questions of global ➞ social justice, violence and political participation are also addressed. This is an activism that does not follow a predefined program, which is often targeted at specific, local and "private" matters, yet one is also enacted within other ➞ social movements in various localities. Lots of the third-wavers have been through Gender Studies degrees, and actions are often focused on university campuses.

Parallel to countless smaller projects, actions and publications, substantial projects have also been established over the years. *Bitch*, a quarterly magazine that carries the tag line "a feminist response to pop culture," has been published since 1996, while the Third Wave foundation has supported younger women's feminist projects *and* the reproductive rights of younger, poorer women, in the form of an emergency abortion fund, and other measures.

In Germany, similar debates were conducted symptomatically at the start of the 1990s, triggered by Judith Butler's *Gender Trouble*, but also by contested fields in queer politics. Even when these ebbed away, generation questions seem always to become acute again when the orientation framework for feminist politics in society is subject to renegotiation. These contestations have not led to any larger, new feminist movements or alliances, even though practices are on the increase – including collective action *against* anti-abortion activists (particularly to oppose the "One thousand crosses for life" marches), and including queer, artistic and pop-culture initiatives – that are moving in a similar direction to third way feminism. *Missy Magazine*, also focused on pop-culture, has been published since 2008, in which themes of social politics are written about from a decidedly feminist perspective. Communication also takes place using blogs, including *Mädchenmannschaft* and *Mädchenblog*. Publications like *Wir Alphamädchen* (Haaf et al., 2008) or *Neue F-Klasse* (Dorn, 2006), are viewed as some as belonging to third wave feminism, while others criticize them for being a new, elitist and "individualistic" form of feminism, lacking a focus on social justice.

In April 2011, the first SlutWalk took place in Toronto, a demonstration against transferring responsibility for the victims of sexualized violence onto the victims, and to protest the recommendation that women should avoid wearing "revealing" clothes. This form of ➞ protest spread quickly around the world, and in August 2011, a cross-city SlutWalk took place throughout Germany. Some people of color and some parts of feminist movements criticize the SlutWalks for the revealing self-representation during the demonstrations, and for the use of derogatory terms, which non-white women are associated with on a daily basis. Nevertheless, these walks have created new audiences for feminist positions about sexual self-determination and about physical integrity.

Helen Schwenken and Charlotte Ullrich

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Third Wave Feminism

Trade Union Autonomy

In order to effectively intervene for political alternatives, parts of the trade unions are demanding a thoroughly new determination of their political self-image, by foregrounding the "winning back" of trade union autonomy. This concept stands for demanding of the trade unions to recollect what their own core causes are, and to develop autonomous self-assertion through mobilizing workforces. This critique is concerned with the trade unions' enmeshment in competitive alliances, both inside companies, and in society as a whole. These alliances established themselves in the 1990s as a new political arena. From today's perspective it appears self-evident that these new partnerships caused trade unions to lose rather than to gain legitimacy.

Against this backdrop, trade unions face the task of developing new forms of political influence. It's useful here to refer back to the traditional, leftist critique of corporatism, which put corporatist integration as a "loss" of trade union autonomy onto the agenda. But this subject also concerns the interrelation between the trade unions and social democracy. Despite the fact that in Germany party-political neutrality is part of the trade unions' self-concept – experienced through the principle of an *Einheitsgewerkschaft* (a neutral trade union, in party-political terms) – a de facto "privileged partnership" (Hans-Jürgen Urban) has long since existed with the SPD. However, this relationship has been fundamentally transformed in recent years, in the face of the domination of "new social-democratic" political concepts, including the orientation towards a "new middle" in society, or towards the "Third Way."

This loss of "natural" partners on the political stage means that the trade unions are now forced to increasingly take responsibility for their political mandate. The loss of significance attached to corporatist agreements coupled with the change in the relationship with social democracy demand that new strategies for action be developed. An example of such a new, autonomous political type is ➞ social movement unionism, which originated in the USA, and is steadily becoming more popular in Germany. This concept is about trade unions learning from other ➞ social movements, so that the trade unions' powers of assertion be magnified through targeted ➞ alliances with other social organizations and movements. However necessary this widening of the canvas into the spaces of societal politics is, trade unions cannot become universal citizens' organizations, nor can they become a kind of replacement political party. A political dovetailing of the level of the company with the level of societal politics remains decisive. In doing this, those who see a contradiction in trade union autonomy and institutional integration are failing to recognize the complex forms through which trade unions evolve power. According to Klaus Dörre, we can differentiate three main sources of trade union power. The first source lies in the development of "organizational power." Starting in factories and companies, trade unions have to have a critical mass of members at their disposal, to empower them to conduct industrial action measures, thereby proving their ability to tackle conflicts. Faced with decreases in member numbers, trade unions have been sorely weakened in many areas. The debate about trade union autonomy has to always take real, existing organizational power as its starting point, to avoid fizzling out in voluntarist slogan making. The second source of trade union power results from the concrete positioning of work-forces in capitalist production processes. The structural power that emerges from this encompasses two dimensions: on the one hand, the power to triumph politically is directly related to the level of unemployment. On the other hand, the specific profile of job tasks and qualifications of individual workforce groups provides a – sometimes higher, sometimes lower – potential to apply pressure. The extent of structural power simultaneously marks the limits of trade union autonomy. Finally, the trade unions have a substantial amount of "institutional power" at their disposal. In this context, institutions can be seen as the expression of historical class compromises, in which power relations in society get nailed down, in political and legal terms. Thus, institutional integration does not necessarily contradict trade union autonomy, but rather provides an important medium for realizing trade union interests. Seen in this light, the question of trade union autonomy is not primarily an institutional question, but one of content.

Thorsten Schulten

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Transnational Migration

Transnationality describes economic, cultural, political and social involvements and organizational forms, which cut across nation-state boundaries. In the narrower sense used here, what is meant are connections between private persons, across and beyond state borders. During transnational migration, migrants cross nation-state borders. Through the way they conduct their lives, these people can create new spaces, which could be termed transnational spaces. This characteristic is not primarily about geographical locality, but rather about social enmeshment, social practices of exchange, and practices of symbolic representation. Transnational spaces are constructed through feelings of belonging, cultural similarities, labor relations, everyday life practice, and the societal regulations that regulate that practice.

At the start of the 1990s, Glick-Schiller et al. used the term intensively in social-science research, and until today it is primarily used inside the academy. These researchers draw attention to people conducting lives in which the same people act in and across the borders of several countries; these ways of conducting lives create their own social forms. This research lays stress on the subject a subject who takes action; this subject is seen as the active, structural potential that migrants have in building up a life of society beyond well-established geographical, political and cultural boundaries. This is what makes the individual transcending borders – and interconnections beyond national cultures and beyond nation-state regulation – into one part of a supranational practice of networking, which in turn facilitate new ways of thinking, new interrelations of communication, and new structures. These respond to new conditions of life that are established through migration, and contain potential for change, for people in countries of origin *and* in the target countries of migration (→ autonomy of migration). In this manner, the concept is an inherent part of the critique voiced against several assumptions: the assumption of a migrant communities conducting culturally narrow lives that remain tightly connected with countries of origin, the assumption that wishes to concentrate on migrant life conduct as a deviation from a norm (which is mirrored in terms like "ethnic ghetto" and "parallel society / societies"), and the assumption that a life in society is led within the borders of nation-states, which in turn harbors the assumption that takes the nation-state as the starting point for all things social.

In the discussion about transnational migration, contradictions have been highlighted, and warnings issued about being too euphoric about the critical potential of the term. Historically speaking, neither migration itself nor the establishment of transnational spaces is new, yet the intensity of the form and variety of material and immaterial exchange – principally facilitated through modern media and transport possibilities – has increased enormously. This, in turn, is closely connected to the capitalist logic of globalization. Migration should also be seen as a response to globalization. Many migrants leave their countries of origin to search for work, and thereby service the demand for labor power. Just like capital, which does not follow nation-state logic, these migrants also for communities that are bound neither to one geographical locality nor to the boundaries of the nation-state. This does not mean however, that state and supra-state migration politics are no longer important to them. For good or for ill, the nation-state remains an essential point of reference for migration, because of its restrictive practices. Convergent to this, the concept of transnational migration opens up a new perspective. This illustrates that it is the aforementioned nationalism that creates the "problem of migration" in the first place, which it then attempts to deal with through the forms of regulating and criminalizing migration, and through utilizing borders.

The relative openness of the concept of transnational migration is problematic, but also conceals potentials: transnational spaces redress an exclusive, geographical concept of space. Some see the biographies of migrants as a main reference point of transnational space. In a biography, the individual unites several places in itself, and so becomes, in itself, an embodiment of transnational space. Moreover, potentials may be assumed in the network character of the transnational in migration: potentials which → counter-hegemonic projects can unleash.

Susanne Spindler

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Trotskyism

It all began at the start of the 20th century, when the young Russian revolutionary Leo Trotsky enriched the ➞ Marxist theory of ➞ socialism with a theoretical innovation. This innovation postulated that the new epoch that was dawning – and which Trotsky was living through – made it possible and – under particular conditions – even probable, that the dictatorship of the proletariat, for which Marx and Engels had set their sights on the industrial and advanced countries, could instead be achieved first in those backward countries of the global-economic periphery, which orthodox theory contended were not yet ripe for this development. Bourgeois and socialist ➞ revolution take place concurrently, where the bourgeoisie of countries that are intentionally kept backward are unable to emancipate themselves from the native nobility and from the global market, i.e. from foreign capital, and where this class is unable to tackle the bourgeois-democratic tasks of agricultural revolution and national independence. Trotsky called this permanent revolution:
"under certain conditions, backward countries can arrive at the dictatorship of the proletariat earlier than more advanced ones, but they will arrive at socialism later." This bold thought had consequences. Not only did Trotsky become the organizer of the 1917 October Revolution, he also became the bitterest enemy of the post-revolutionary Soviet bureaucracy, denying with authority that this possessed a genuinely socialist character.
This is the context in which the term "Trotskyism" was first used, as a denunciatory battle cry by a communist movement that was becoming steadily more Stalinist. But used as a positive term, Trotskyism was, in its first manifestation, the attempt to create a Left Opposition against the rising power of Stalinism, an opposition that demanded an active struggle against the bureaucratization of the post-revolutionary state, a return to inner-party democracy, and ultimately, to a radical-democratic socialism facilitated through the ➞ soviet councils. Economically, the Left Opposition championed an increasing industrialization, to be achieved by using a planned economy though without using force. They rejected the Stalinist theory, that "socialism in one country" could be constructed, as an illusion and a hegemonic ideology of the post-revolutionary bureaucracy. During the 1930s, faced with the failure of the communistic world movement, and with the will to stop the rise of fascist barbarism, and to continue the socialist world revolution, Trotskyism became the attempt to build up a new socialist global movement, far removed from social-democratic reformism, or Stalinist, paternalistic dictatorship.
"Taken as a whole, the world-political situation is marked primarily by the historical crisis in the leadership of the proletariat," wrote Trotsky in 1938, *On the Founding of the Fourth International*. Since then, the Trotskyist movement has been characterized by the balancing act of the period from the 1950s to the 1970s, in which the political legacy of classic Marxism was defended while building up a new political-social movement under altered historical conditions, a process that has done little to make it homogenous. Above all, it's been he questions of the evaluation of character and of the dynamics of the "socialist" transition societies, on which Trotskyist authors have contributed pioneering and enduring writings, which have caused fights and splits in the movement on numerous occasions.
Slowly and surely from the 1980s on, and especially after the epochal break in the period 1989-1991, it became evident for most of the "Trotskyisms," that politics could no longer merely be about offering new leadership to workers' movements assumed, in themselves, to be revolutionary. Since then the Fourth International has orientated itself towards a trade-unionist and political rejuvenation of the global workers' movement in the tradition of a ➞ radical-democratic socialism based on ➞ soviet councils. Not least amongst its achievements has been its involvement in the various global ➞ social movement in support of a new ➞ internationalism in the tradition of the revolutionary workers' movement:

"If we take England and India as the opposite poles of capitalist types, we must state that the internationalism of the British and Indian proletariat does not at all rest on the *similarity* of conditions, tasks and methods, but on their inseparable *interdependence.* The successes of the liberation movement in India presuppose a revolutionary movement in England, and the other way around. Neither in India, nor in England is it possible to construct an *independent* socialist society. Both of them will have to enter as parts into a higher entity. In this and only in this rests the unshakable foundation of Marxian internationalism."

Christoph Jünke

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Trotskyism

Uni for everyone!

The slogan "university for everyone!" can be described as an important battle cry for the transnational education movement. Not only does it encompass the various critiques of the education system's social selectivity, and the reproduction of social inequalities that this gives rise to. It also includes: the economization and privatization of education; the de-democratization of universities; the precarization of academics and scientists, particularly young ones; the tendency of turning university teaching into uniform school-type instruction programs, and of disciplining programs to conform to uniform standards; and the general insufficient financing of educational institutions.

The transnational education and student movement reached a provisional peak during 2009 and 2010. In Chile, the USA, the UK and Germany, but also in many other countries, university students and lecturers formed stronger networks. Alongside street protests that often lasted for several months, they occupied lecture theaters, discussed the causes and also the concrete problems of the misery in education, and drafted alternative concepts for the education system. "Uni's burning" (or *"Uni brennt,"* to give it its original German-language title), the Austrian form of the education movement – to give but one example – worked intensively on forms for ➞ democratizing universities, and on possibilities for self-determined learning.

The major role currently played by higher education in social struggles can be explained by its altered role in the contemporary formation of society. While in the 19th and early 20th century – but also through the Fordist era that followed – there was no demand for masses of well-educated wage laborers, capitalism in the global North since the 1970s has depended on well-educated individuals. These individuals' construction as subjects compels them towards permanent further training, and entrepreneurial thinking.

Although the reasons why the education system should be criticized are shared by a large section of the activists, understandings of the causes of the current misery in education differ widely, as do the approaches to political strategies for pushing forward an alternative educational system. The discussions really catch fire around questions concerning the very character of education, and about alternative forms of education under capitalism. One conceptualization emphasizes the special role played by higher education as a location for the production and dissemination of knowledge. As this is seen as a central motor driving societal progress, it has to be made possible for all humans to participate in university processes. Tuition fees, deficient systems of subsidizing students, exams designed to force significant numbers to drop out, and overly-standardized syllabi, all have a socially selective effect, and act to prevent a shared experience of going through university. Moreover, the realignment of higher education around the needs of the employment market has forced a standardization of learning forms. Particularly in Germany and other central European countries, this transition is known as the Bologna Process, and involves transforming the forms and contents of previous degree programs into bachelors and masters courses, which have a high degree of uniformity across Europe. This shift opposes the ideal of a higher education landscape that supports ➞ emancipatory education, and which produces knowledge accordingly. under the new conditions, many commentators view critical knowledge as "useless," and something which should, at best, be pushed into the margins of optional, minor subjects. The large companies that invest in higher education are increasingly granted opportunities to also advertise in universities, and to adjust course contents in accordance with their own respective interests. As a consequence, universities thus restructured drive a type of societal "progress" that merely serves to perpetuate hegemonic relations in society. Another perspective on the same subject stresses the close connection between educational systems and the capitalist mode of production. This sees the production and transmission of knowledge as closely connected with the logic of profit and competition, and thought about in terms of the assertion and reproduction of social relations of power and authority. The finely calibrated dovetailing of education and capitalism is also what lies behind the facts that still very few children from workers' families make it to university, that universities retain strict hierarchies, and that there is very little support for a self-determined and critical mode of studying.

The common goal that unites all approaches under the banner of "uni for everyone!" is to be able to think about education at a level beyond that of practical constraints, and to be able to assert progressive forms of producing, appropriating and disseminating knowledge. Strategies for the assertion of an alternative education system do however vary between those that are aimed at concrete attempts to challenge bad practice in universities, and those interventions that are more focused on linking up education politics demands with perspectives aimed at sublating whole systems, including working with wider ➞ social movements. Contemporary, transnational social movements encompass education and many other fields of tension, and are attempting to navigate their way through these fields. What they share is a break with neoliberal ➞ common sense, and a questioning – sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit – of the contemporary ordering of society.

Julia Hofmann

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Uni for everyone!

Wild Cat Strike

Amongst the US-based Industrial Workers of the World at the start of the 19th century, the "black cat" and the "wildcat" served as symbols for an independent and multinational type of labor-struggle politics. Several myths were connected with these totems, and they came to act as both bugbears and lucky-charms in the history of ➞ strikes. Intellectually, they were primarily located inside international ➞ anarchism, but also in parts of the mythology of the labor struggle, as disseminated by the ➞ Marxist Left. This is reflected in the slogan "the general strike sets us free."

According to one formal definition, job action or any other form of labor struggle, which has not been called by a union, can be categorized as a wildcat strike. This is however a very vague definition. It falls far short of accuracy, for example, to categorize the French mass strike of May 1968, which followed immediately on from the youth revolt, as "wild," as French strikes occur within the framework of the individualized strike law that in that regulates such disputes in that country. Moreover, while the first phase of the May strikes were conducted largely independent of the French unions, during the second half of the month a massive quantitative extension of the strike was made possible precisely because the General Confederation of Labor (often known by its French acronym, CGT) called for work stoppages, and moved on from their to lead the whole strike movement.

By contrast, labor struggles in the Federal Republic of Germany are subject to a very restrictive strike law, which leads to all job action that takes place external to the "legal obligation to maintain peace" – imposed for set periods as contracted through collective agreements – being categorized as wildcat strikes. Such strikes are seen in Germany as violating the "union monopoly on strike action," the principle of strike as the ultima ratio – the last resort – and other similar principles of national strike law. Furthermore, the political strike in Germany has not yet been fully legalized. This is because, in contrast to most constitutional democracies in western Europe, German law does not prohibit lockouts.

As a wide spectrum of labor struggles can be counted as "wildcat" according to these criteria, the analysis of these leads to a comparison between "collective agreement" and "non-collective agreement" strikes. On this basis, it can be demonstrated that the majority of labor struggles in post-war Germany – measured in terms of individual job actions – were wildcat. That was true in the 1960s, and it remains true today. That said, striking workforces have often vehemently rejected the epithet "wildcat" as they have seen it as an attempt to smear their "justified demands." In addition, wildcat labor struggles can often turn into collective agreement battles, while it is also possible for collective-agreement job actions to slide out of control, if the strikers are not satisfied with the results that the unions have negotiated.

Both in history and in the present day world, it is possible to differentiate between three forms of wildcat strikes. Firstly, *local labor conflicts*. These are about everyday questions, conflicts with authoritarian employers higher up the company hierarchy, concrete working conditions, health hazards etc. This form of labor conflict occurs often, but is practically invisible. Yet one part of the dynamic of labor struggles emerges precisely because of its invisibility, in which "subversive" forms always have a part to play: work-to-rule, slow motion, rotating strikes, sabotage, and much more. Secondly, *wildcat strikes as mass movements*: in the history of the German Federal Republic, the strikes of September 1969, and the strike movement of spring-summer 1973, substantially shaped by migrants, are both notable (see ➞ migrant strike). It was in the period subsequent to this latter movement that strikes were connected with, thirdly, *factory and plant occupations*, in which the question of the appropriation of production was posed. Examples of this in the German Federal Republic have been the occupation of the Krupp steel works in Rheinhausen in 1987, and the occupation of the Howaldtswerke-Deutsche shipyards in Hamburg in 1983.

During the 2000s, the wildcat strike became an issue again in the context of an increase in workplace conflicts. Examples of these include the wildcat strike against the closure of Opel Cars in Bochum in 2004, and the occupation of a bike factory in Nordhausen, Thuringia, in 2007. Parallel to this, a significant rise in labor conflicts in the service sector industry has been observed. The implication of this is that the composition of those groups going on strike has been changing: this has been called a feminization of strikes, meaning much higher percentages of women involved than previously. Despite all this, it remains questionable whether wildcat strikes can be bundled together as a "method," through which it is possible to constitute societal alternatives. Rather, wildcat strikes should be seen as phenomena that demonstrate the fundamental contestability of the world of labor. Wildcat strikes point in the direction of changes in society, or at least this is what they do, when they're viewed as a historical whole. It is important to engage with their history and to the impact they can have now, because they throw light on surprising and invisible things, and not because a political program can be found inscribed inside of them.

Peter Birke

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Wildcat Strike

Workerism

Two factors contributed to the emergence of workerism. Firstly, the widespread transformation of industrial production into mass production, in the 1950s and 1960s, and particularly in the context of the "Italian economic miracle." This meant that traditional forms of worker representation lost a substantial amount of influence in the plants and factories. Increasingly, young, unskilled workers from the south of Italy were employed, almost none of whom were unionized. Secondly, in the immediate, post-war period, traditional workers' movements and parties of the left had enjoyed – based on their resistance against fascism – a position of political trust and influence that reached fare beyond their normal clientele. Yet the positions in power they had gained through that were called into question when the Stalin myth ended and the Hungarian Rising of 1956 was crushed. These events led to a deep political crisis inside the traditional workers' movement and in the communist parties, in Italy as in other countries. Workerism can be understood as an answer to the workers' movement crisis of that time.

Traditional ➞ Marxists saw the development of productive forces – i.e. technological innovation – as something fundamentally positive, held the opinion that these paved the way for ➞ socialism at a material level, which meant that it was only the capitalist form of rule and authority that had to be overcome politically. Workerists, however, had utterly different convictions on these matters. Mario Tronti postulated that an analysis of capitalism must foreground workers and their behavior, and could not start from the position of capital as causation. Raniero Panzieri addressed the issues of technology, material techniques and the organization of labor as an expression of the social (power)-relations between workers and companies, at both company and societal levels. The method of co-investigation (*conricerca*), advanced by Panzieri and others, prioritized empiricism over ideology: theoretical reflections about the roles played by technological innovations, the organization of labor and labor conditions combined to construct hypotheses for numerous empirical investigations, e.g. at Fiat in Turin, or at Olivetti in Ivrea. The hope was to use these methods to find out more about the changes in labor conditions and in workers' behavior. For this purpose, the "co-researchers" collected first hand testimony spoken or written by workers, and were interested in their social life outside of the factory. People saw such investigatory methods as a means for getting closer to the "real working class."

But how should we understand the question of class composition? Workerist debates differentiated between the "technical" and the "political composition" of the working-class. The first was understood to mean the entirety of socio-professional knowledge and know-how, and the culture of labor belonging to it. The second was understood to mean the entirety of autonomous and class-conscious ways of behaving, and the culture of ➞ rebellion belonging to that. In the results of empirical studies held in some branches of industry, the highly qualified skilled-worker was sketched as a product of the second industrial revolution, who identified strongly with his work, and who, because of his qualifications, controlled the production process. The changes in the process of production, which can best be characterized by using the terms Taylorism and Fordism, had undermined the position of the skilled-worker, proud of his profession. The (male) mass worker as a new type of worker had emerged.

Workerism also gave a new impulse to historiography. The strikes in September 1969, and the ongoing strike movement until 1973, acted as an explicit demand in West Germany to engage thoroughly with the history of workers' struggles that happened *outside of* traditional organizations. The challenge that a history of workers' struggles be written from the workers' standpoint had been born. The workerist methods of ➞ militant research were also based on how intellectuals and workers wanted to work together – at least in theory. The Italian workerists did not want to be the *Führer* of the class, nor did they want to represent a particular political standpoint, nor did they want to be a tiny, sectarian party. They attempted to live with the contradiction of supporting a political theory while simultaneously rejecting traditional organizational models for the workers' movement. Getting involved with the actors negotiating a process demands from political, social and intellectual elites that they reflect upon their role, and that they give up power and influence.

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World Social Forum

Since the first World Social Forum in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre in 2001, planned as a counterpoint to the World Economic Forum that was meeting at Davos in Switzerland at the very same time, the WSF has become one of the most important meeting places for leftist activists and intellectuals from global ➞ civil society. It rallies these people together under a succinct motto, that some have criticized for its triteness: "a different world is possible." A radical critique of neoliberalism combined with the opening up of a public space in which "learning itself is learned anew" sparked off the rapid emergence of numerous local, regional and polycentral social for a. In both years subsequent to 2001 thousands took part in the WSF in Porto Alegre, yet the "Other World" retained a distinctly Brazilian feeling. Against this backdrop, the International Council (of global social fora), which c. 130 organizations belong to, decided to hold the 2004 World Social Forum in Mumbai, India – and from 2005 on, only every second year.

The first forum outside of Brazil witnessed the achievement of a further important aim. In addition to the defining themes of: the privatization of ➞ public commodities; ➞ human rights; and the struggle against unjust global trade and global capitalism; issues like ➞ racism, ➞ and social rights and working conditions were pushed into the foreground, largely due to the participation of marginalized groups in the Indian population, including the Dalits (the untouchables) and the Adivasi ("the impure"). Following this, decentralized forums took place between January and March 2006 in Bamako, Mali; in Caracas, Venezuela; and in Karachi, in Pakistan. In January 2007, the WSF caravan rolled onto Nairobi in Kenya. It was not only the 50,000 participants who made the first World Social Forum in Africa a big success. It was the fact that it was thoroughly shaped by local struggles, partly even in the face of resistance by the organizing committee. "A different world is also possible for slum inhabitants": this was the unambiguous central demand voiced by participants at the concluding rally in Nairobi.

In 2009, the WSF selected the Brazilian city of Belém. This time round, environmental and climate issues, and *testimonies* – first-person accounts from those affected by, and activists fighting, large-scale projects, including dam projects in Brazil – dominated this forum in the Amazon region. Parallel to this, discussions about ➞ Sumac Kawsay, the Good Life, and the strong presence of indigenous activists, were trademarks of the event.

The tenth WSF took place in 2011, in Dakar, Senegal, with a surprisingly high number of participants – 80,000. Some of the participants who came from the local region walked to the forum in marches under the stars. These powerful demonstrations of human power were a distinguishing feature of this forum. Dakar 2011 added the questions of the politics of resources, migration, and the relationship between Africa and the EU to the WSF agenda. It was heavily influenced by the political upheavals taking place in north Africa at the same time. To support these, it was decided that the next WSF was to take place in north Africa itself – in Tunisia, in 2013.

The World Social Forum lends expression to "a different" kind of globalization, and has developed into an important interface for international networks. It is however becoming more and more obvious, that the seminar forms taken by large, international events no longer function. The times are over, in which old, white men used to explain the whole world from their place on the podium. Yet the question remains as to what kind and extent of political influence can actually be exerted by the World Social Forum. On the one hand, the urge exists to offer concrete alternative models and alternative action plans for globalization, and to strengthen links to progressive governments. On the other hand, the validating core of the organization remains the 2001 "Charter of Principles," which stresses the pluralistic and strictly anti-hierarchic structure of the forum, along with its emphases on processes and on "open spaces" for debate. Nobody in the forum is authorized to issue declarations. Even after the conclusion of ten World social fora, this continues to be a virulent contradiction that blocks progress. The WSF is, today, in less of a position than it was at the start of the 21st century, to be able to develop discussions and to organize, with the purpose of establishing global points of reference. It is possibly the contradictions between the (mental and physical) spaces themselves, and the actors involved, which define these conflicts, and which must be resolved in favor of a coordinated strategy, through which WSF as a space becomes WSF as a political actor. Even though the breadth of the movement and the variety of the debates have lost their novelty, there is no better alternative in the development of leftist movements to the idea of the social fora as a "shared good for humanity" (Chico Whitaker) – both globally, and in front of our own front door.

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Further Reading

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Published with the support of Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung Southeast Asia with financial means of the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development.

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